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RURAL FACTOR MARKETS IN PAKISTAN 
A summary 
Four important and inter-related issues in the economics of agriculture 
in developing countries are production efficiency, tenancy, technological 
innovation and rural--urban migration. These issues are examined in this 
study by analysing the working of rural factor markets using empirical 
evidence on selected farmers in four villages and an important sub-division 
in Pakistans Punjab province. 
The pattern of land holding in Pakistan suggests that land is very 
unequally distributed. This observation is the basis for may proposals 
of land reform. It has been argued that inequality in land distribution 
is undesirable per se as well as because it leads to inefficiency in 
agricultural production. Empirical evidence from the villages suggests 
that an inverse relationship exists between farm size and productivity thus 
lending support to the second part of the argument. Explanations in terms 
of the working of rural land and labour markets are offered for the existence 
of the relationship. 
Tenancy is important in Pakistan. Its existence is explained in 
terms of adjustments in factor endowments by landowners and landless 
cultivators given that markets for labour and draught power operate 
imperfectly. Different tenurial contracts imply different sets of incentives 
that influence decisions regarding resource allocation on the farm. The 
empirical evidence suggests that adjustments are made - such as devising 
cost-sharing, input stipulation and supervision arrangements - to ensure 
that different tenurial contracts are equally efficient. 
It is argued that despite the apparent difficulties of access to 'green 
revolution' technology inputs due to imperfections in their distribution and 
scarcity of rural credit, small farms use inputs such as high yield variety 
seeds and chemical fertilizers no less intensively compared to the large 
farmers. The evidence suggests that new markets for factor services and 
intricate but more accessible networks of fertilizer and seed distribution 
may have developed to facilitate the use by small farmers. 
The relationship between migration and rural credit markets is examined. 
It is argued that migration may improve the credit ratings of households and 
thus may facilitate borrowing in the rural credit market. Detailed comments 
are also made on the role of other rural-end variables such as non-farm income, 
mechanization, output per capita , education and available 
land per capita 
in influencing the decision n to migrate. 
The underlying theme of the study ispthe'analysis of operations in 
rural factor markets. We analyse, carefully, interactions in these markets 
and then examine some important aspects of policies in the light of our 
analysis of the four issues. 
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GLOSSARY 
arhtia :a middleman engaged in commodity exchange in market 
towns. 
baithak : the front room in a farmer's house used for receiving 
visitors. 
barani : areas dependent on rainfall for cultivation. In 
particular, it implies the absence of canal irrigation. 
beopari :a middleman engaged in commodity exchange in the village. 
birathori : literally, brotherhood. A broad caste category. 
dhani a popular breed of sturdy bullocks used for ploughing; 
indigenous to the submontain division of Rawalpindi. 
kammi :a broad caste category which includes non-cultivating 
households engaged in seasonal farm labour and other 
menial village tasks. 
kharif : the crop season lasting from June to October. 
lambardar : the village head-man, usually someone who owns land 
and is well-respected in the village. 
malik :a big landowner. 
munshi :a bailiff. 
patwari :a government servant who keeps village recoiýsfor 
land revenue assessment. 
rabi : the crop season lasting from November to May. 
rajwah :a distributary carrying water from a canal to the village. 
tehsil : an administrative unit within a district. Now commonly, 
known as a sub-division. Three to four sub-divisions 
comprise a district. 
thana :a police station. Also an administrative unit. There 
are three to four thanas in a tehsil. 
vaar : literally means a turn. Usually used in connection 
with the distribution of canal water in the villages. 
In well irrigated villages each plot of land gets one 
'vaar', of irrigation (measured in terms of acre feet 
of water) every seven days. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTIODUCTION 
X1.1 Issues 
§1.2 Data 
§1.3 Structure of the Study 
Section 1.1 'The issues 
This study is concerned with four'inter-related issues in the economics 
of agriculture in developing countries. These are production efficiency, 
tenancy, technological innovation and rural-urban migration. We shall not 
attempt a comprehensive analysis of each of these issues separately. Instead, 
we shall' concentrate on certain aspects that are important in highlighting 
their inter-relationships. The analysis will be carried out by using 
empirical evidence from Pakistan. 
The pattern of land-holding-in Pakistan suggests that land is very 
unevenly distributed. Most of the land is owned by a few large farmers 
while the majority of the farmers have small holdings that comprise a very 
small proportion of the total available land. This observation is the basis 
of many proposals for land reform. It is argued that inequality in land 
distribution is undesirable per se as well as because it leads to 
inefficiency in agricultural production. In this study we shall attend to 
the second part of the argument and examine the relationship between the 
size of farm and production efficiency. We shall investigate the hypothesis 
that small farms have better access to inputs such as family labour and 
soil fertility compared to large farms and this makes them relatively more 
productive. 
Tenancy is important in Pakistan. The most frequently observed 
categories of tenancies are share-cropping and fixed-rent tenancies. 
2. 
Different land tenure arrangement may imply different sets of incentives 
that influence decisions regarding resource allocation on the farm. For 
example, share-croppers are required to share crop output with landowners. 
This may result in less intensive use of inputs. But tenancy contracts 
may be adjusted to take into account such disincentives. Costs of inputs 
may be shared and strict supervision may be exercised to ensure efficient 
resource allocation. After arguing that tenancy is not necessarily a 
'remnant of an inefficient"historical past' (as, implied by the literature 
on tenancy reform , see, for example, Bhaduri (1973) and Bell (1977) we shall 
discuss the important determinants of'tenancy. It will be argued that 
in a world where factor markets operate perfectly there would be no need 
for tenancies. In the real world, however', market imperfections are a 
common feature so that tenancies may result from an'adjustment in factor 
endowments by landowners (who have excess land given labour) and tenants 
(who have an excess of labour given land). ' - 
The importance of 'green revolution' technology is apparent from the 
voluminous debate that has been generated regarding the pattern of its 
spread and the impact on productivity, income distribution and rural 
employment. It has been argued that due to imperfections in the rural 
credit markets and inefficiences of government distribution systems small 
farmers have restricted access to the, new inputs so that the relationship 
between farm size and productivity may change. An important issue that 
needs to be examined in this regard concerns the nature of changes in the 
rural factor markets brought about by the 'green revolution' technology,, 
There exists some evidence to suggest that new markets for factor services 
(such as purchasing tube-well water for irrigation and ploughing with 
hired tractors) and an intricate but more accessible network of fertilizer 
3. 
and seed distribution may have developed to facilitate the use of new 
inputs by small farmers. This evidence requires a careful examination. 
In the standard approach to studying rural-urban migration, it is 
argued that individuals migrate because of a difference in the expected 
incomes between urban and rural areas. In this approach concern with 
migration arises in part on account of its impact on urban labour markets 
and public services as seen in the growth of, respectively, urban 
unemployment and shanty towns. This partial view of migration ignores 
the importance of the flow of remittances to the rural areas. A 
comprehensive approach to rural-urban migration requires the analysis of 
decisions concerning welfare maximization by joint households in the rural 
areas. Liquidity requirements of rural households may be high and may 
not always be met in the imperfectly functioning rural credit markets. 
Therefore, remittances from household members employed in the urban areas 
may be an important source of finance. When technological change occurs 
liquidity requirements of farming households may acquire greater significance. 
We shall explore-the relationship between migration and rural'credit 
markets and comment in detail on other rural-end variables influencing 
migration. 
Our summary of the four issues indicates that the underlying theme 
of this study is an analysis of operations in rural-factor markets. The 
issues are examples of production arrangements that result from decisions 
taken by households regarding resource allocation in imperfectly operating 
rural factor markets. A careful analysis of the interactions in these 
markets will enable us to examine the wider implications of policies 
aimed specifically at the four issues. 
4. 
Section 1.2 Data 
A data set that has been used extensively for discussion of empirical 
issues surrounding the agricultural sector in Pakistan is the Pakistan 
Census of Agriculture compiled by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
Government of Pakistan. Two censuses have been conducted so far. The 
first covers the period up to 1960 and the second brings the data base 
up to 1972. While the data collected in the two censuses are very 
comprehensive there are problems of consistency arising from changes in 
methodology (see S. M. Naseem 1979). The main problem with this data base 
is that it does not report data on crop output. One way to overcome this 
is to supplement the census data with data on output from other publications 
of the Ministry of Agriculture (such as the annual provincial agricultural 
statistics). But this is likely to worsen the problem of consistency since 
selection of the sample for these publications is done independently 
of the method used in the census. For'our'purposes, however, a serious 
problem arises with the census data on account of the level of aggregation. 
The two censuses report results for specific size-classes at the district 
level 
'. 
The district is, far too aggregate a unit of observation for a 
discussion of issues that we have outlined in Section 1. However, we 
shall present general economy-wide evidence during our discussions throughout 
the thesis as a background to the more detailed analysis of the empirical 
issues that concern us. We shall refer to the census data-in these discussions. 
The empirical issues that interest us are best investigated with the 
type of data base available in the Farm Management Surveys in India. These 
1/. The 1972 census reports data on a subset of variables at the sub- 
divisional level (a smaller administrative unit) also but the number 
of variables declines sharply and the level of aggregation still 
remains. 
S. 
surveys collect data at ! farm level from villages chosen in five 
representative states in India. The sample was chosen bya multistage 
stratified random sampling procedure. Such data were not available in 
Pakistan. 
Alternatively, farm level data may be obtained from village studies. 
These data were available in the village studies conducted by a research team 
at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. The team consisted of research 
investigators who were members of the Department of Economics at Quaid-e-Azam 
The village studies were sponsored by the Economics and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, E. S. C. A. P. (U. N. ), Bangkok, as part 
of a project-on social participation-in rural development. The field work 
on the studies was started in November 1976 and lasted for 15 months. The 
objective of the study was 
"a close understanding of the condition of the rural poor in 
different environmental settings ..... to be able to identify 
the direction in which change was occurring and affecting the 
rural poor in different environmental settings. " (E. S. C. A. P. 
Mimeo, p. 2. ) 
Thus the research team was given a wide brief. 
The sample of villages chosen by the research team was by no means 
randomly selected but an attempt was made to get a representative picture 
of the poverty profile in the country. In its preamble the-research team 
writes 
"In view of the vastness of the country, we considered it necessary 
to capture the ecological, regional and institutional variations 
in the country which generate the principle types of poverty 
situations in the country..... We did want, however, to get 
a set of villages in the Indus basin which would broadly reflect 
the regional, ecological and institutional differences..... We 
decided to choose-villages from the three provinces of Punjab, 
NWFP and Sind in a manner that would bring out the effect of*the 
major factors on the poverty situation in each province. We 
decided to put greater emphasis on Punjab, not only in view of 
its importance and weight in the economy, but also because of 
the great variations within Punjab as well as because it was 
easier for our core team members to supervise the research work 
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within Punjab. Initially it was decided to choose three villages 
each in the irrigated and unirrigated areas. After taking care 
of the regional and ecological factors, we decided that the 
villages chosen should reflect the variations in tenurial 
arrangements as well. It was with. a view to this that of the 
three villages in the unirrigated areas in the Punjab, one, viz 
Khunda, was chosen because most of the land in it belonged to a 
few big landlords and the majority of farmers were tenants. 
The other two villages in unirrigated Punjab, viz Mandhar and 
Jatli, were small farmer villages where owner-farmers dominated. 
These two were close together but had important differences in 
regard to urbanization, education and use of new agricultural 
inputs. We thought that their inclusion would bring out the 
causes of the differences in the extent of poverty in a relatively 
similar ecological and tenurial situation. 
The two villages in irrigated Punjab were chosen on similar 
considerations. One of the villages, l4ehdiahad, is again a big 
farmer village while the other, Chak 305, is inhabited by small 
owner-farmers. 
Similar ecological and institutional considerations dictated the 
choice of the two villages Rukrani and Manojamali in Sindh and 
Nari and Hasan Dara in N. W. F. P. Baluchistan and Northern Hill 
areas were excluded altogether to avoid extreme cases, as well 
as to'keep the logistical problems at a manageable level. " 
(E. S. C. A. P. Mimeo, pp. 3,4) 
Thus, 
"the basic strategy of the selection of villages was to isolate 
the difference in poverty situation due to different factors. 
Frequently consideration was given to specific features of the 
villages such as accessibility, incidence of migration, landlessness, 
peasant solidarity etc. - issues on which it was hoped to focus. 
Thus our methodology of choosing the villages was aimed at making 
the sample as representative as possible. Within the given 
limitations, by choosing the villages which are diverse geographically, 
ecologically, in cropping pattern, in sources of irrigation, land 
use and distribution, tenurial arrangements, as well as in the 
access to education, employment opportunities, in availability of 
farm inputs and in government programmes to help farmers and 
landlords. " (E. S. C. A. P. Mimeo, p. 5) 
Information on households was collected on a basic set of variables 
in each village concerning households' demographic, economic, social, 
cultural and perceptional characteristics. 
A careful examination of the questionnaire used by the research team 
at Quaid-e-Azam University indicated that sufficient quantitative as well 
as qualitative information had been collected to enable the analysis of 
most of the issues outlined in Section 1. After consultation with the 
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research team in Islamabad in 1978 it was agreed that a Pareto-improving 
arrangement could be arrived at which would give us access to data in 
exchange for coding, cleaning and arranging the data for a preliminary 
analysis. The Islamabad team further requested that we. write reports 
based on the evidence they had collected within the framework of, 
our research objectives for circulation in the Planning Commission in 
Islamabad and the regional offices of the I. L. O at Bangkok. 
During the long and arduous task of coding and arranging data for 
the research team in Islamabad (spread over a period of four months from 
September 1978 to January 1979) we had the opportunity of getting a feel 
for the quality of data regarding reliability and consistency. It was 
learnt that amongst the nine villages surveyed by the team, the best data 
were available for the five villages of Punjab, where fieldwork had been 
supervised closely. Farmer response in these villages was enumerated 
very carefully. There were very few gaps in information. The reported 
values on inputs used on the farm and crop outputs produced were those 
generally expected in the region. There were few outliers. When 
exceptional values were reported (too high or too low) the unusual 
circumstances resulting in such values were noted. (For example, low 
output due to sickness etc.. ) In the unirrigated (barani) areas, of 
the three villages, ) Jatli, Khunda and Mandhar, the last is the least 
representative of the region because of severe soil erosion caused by 
deep and fast rivulets. For these reasons crop production is not very 
important and the village is heavily dependent on remittances from 
non-resident members of the village (overseas migration is a very 
common feature). For the purposes of our analysis, therefore, we decided 
to use data'from the four remaining villages of Punjab. These-are Khunda, 
Jatli, Mehdiabad and Chak. (See map on p. ix. ) 
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A description of the villages 
Khunda is the larger of the two barani (rainfed unirrigated) villages. 
It is situated in Tehsil Pindi Cheb of district Attock which is one of 
the less developed districts of Punjab., The village was chosen because 
it represents a very unequal pattern of land-holding along with high 
incidence of tenancy. The social and political life of the village is 
dominated by a few Nal. iks (big landowners)who own most of the land. in the 
village and have strong connections in the Government. There is, very little 
irrigation in the village. Persian Wheels may be, seen frequently but their 
drawing capacity is small (the water table being 40-60 feet deep). Some 
of the big Maliks have started to invest in the construction of small 
irrigation dams on the seasonal rivers that pass through the village. 
There is very little use of modern inputs (such as high yield variety 
seeds, chemical fertilizers and tube-wells) due to the type of soil which 
is hard and rocky. The village has a fairly big bazaar with commercial 
activity which provides non-farm employment opportunities. The incidence 
of migration is high. Both seasonal and permanent migration takes place. 
The traditional source of employment has been the military but with the 
shifting of the capital of Pakistan to Islamabad (the capital was shifted 
in 1964 and is 40 miles North-east of the village, and there is a fast, 
reliable bus service) numerous other employment opportunities have sprung 
up. Temperatures in the summer rise up to 116°F - 118°F and in winter 
fall to 28°F - 32°F. Most of the rain falls in the monsoon months. of 
July and August. In the winter frost often damages the wheat crop. 
Our other barani village, Jatli, is very similar, to, Khunda regarding 
employment opportunities outside the village and climatic conditions., The 
village is approximately 30 miles So iIth-east of Islamabad in Tehsil Gujjar 
Khan in district Rawalpindi. The pattern of land distribution, however, is 
very different from Khunda. Land is more equally distributed and the 
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incidence of tenancy is low. A special feature of Jatli is that it is 
located in an area that was earmarked for special attention by the 
Government in its Integrated Rural Development Programme (1973-1980). 
The objective of the programme was to provide, intensively, extension 
services, credit facilities, H. Y. V. seeds, chemical fertilizers and 
agricultural implements in the area covered by the programme. It was 
hoped that such areas would become agricultural growth points which would 
set an example for the surrounding areas to emulate. (By 1980 the 
Government had changed. The new Government thought that the programme 
was too ambitious and drastically reduced budgetary allocation. ) Jatli 
has very good road connections with Islamabad which resulted in frequent 
visits by senior Government officials. Consequently Jatli was turned into 
a model I. R. D. P. village. Thus, - use of modern inputs. in. Jatli is very 
widespread. The fertile soil of the village has responded well to the, 
inputs so that yields are exceptionally good.. We chose this village as an 
interesting example of the productive potential in barani, areas given 
concerted effort by the Government to remove. the supply constraints onýthe 
use of modern inputs. 
Both our irrigated villages, Mehdiabad and Chak, are located in 
district Lyallpur of Punjab. The district has been carved out of the 
Chenab Colony which was part of the Triple Project (1905-1917) undertaken 
by the British to irrigate vast tracts of land in the Indus basin (Spate 
and Learmoth, 1972). Despite the recent problems of water logging and 
salinity, this was a remarkable feat.. The provision of canal water 
transformed the barren, semi-desert region into one of the most fertile 
in South Asia. Both Mehdiabad and Chak lie in Tehsil Toba Tek Singh in 
the district. The tenurial structures in the two villages are quite 
different and have been influenced by the settlement schemes pursued by 
the Government to give property rights to cultivators. Nehdiabad was 
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settled under an old scheme (1890--95) by. inviting large landowners from 
the older sub-montain. districts of the province with the promise of large 
holdings. They came along with their tenants and settled down in the village. 
Thus in Mehdiabad the incidence of tenancy is. high and the distribution of 
land unequal. The village has excellent soil which responds well. to 
irrigation and modern inputs. The use of H. Y. V. seeds, chemical fertilizers 
and tube-well irrigation is widespread. An important tributary of the main 
canal in the region (lower Chenab canal) passes 3 
, 
miles from the village 
so that canal water is regularly available and is plentiful. Although the 
district headquarter., Lyallpur, is an important industrial city and is 
35 miles away, the incidence of migration from the village is low. The 
village does not have good rail/road connections to the main highways. 
Our other irrigated village, Chak 305, was settled more recently under 
a different scheme. (The unusual name of the village is the work of an 
unimaginative settlement policy. )" There are no large landowners in the 
village. Land was auctioned in small lots of 5 to 25 acres. This is 
reflected in the.. current distribution of land. The incidence of tenancy 
is low. An important feature distinguishing Chak from Mehdiabad is that 
being situated at the tail end of the canal, the quantity of canal water 
is rather low. Also, the subsoil water is saline and unfit for irrigation. 
This has affected the cropping pattern in the village. Chak is well 
connected to the-transport system and the incidence of migration is quite 
high. 
Our brief description of the four villages indicates that although 
the villages are different from each other, each may be seen to represent 
important types of villages to be found in Punjab. 
Data collected in the village studies go, in some respects, considerably 
further than the requirements of the empirical issues outlined in Section 1.1 
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that we propose to analyse. The objective of 'the E. S. C. A. P. ýstudy 
was to present a profile of relative poverty so that detailed income 
generating activities of all cultivating as well as non-cultivating 
households were carefully enumerated and quantitative'data were'collected 
in each village. Our concern in this thesis, however, is primarily with 
the cultivating households in the villages. Therefore, in order, to save 
time and money we restricted ourselves to that data matrix in the villages 
that provides quantitative and qualitative information on the income 
generating activities of members of cultivating households only. 
Table 1.1 gives the breakdown of cultivating households by tenurial 
categories in each of the four villages of Punjab that we-shall study. 
The five main tenurial categories are owner-cultivators, share-cropping 
tenants, owner-cum-share--cropping tenants, fixed-rent tenants, and owner-cum- 
fixed-rent tenants. 
Table 1.1 
Number of households in different tenurial categories in the village 
Tenurial Owners Share- Owner- Fixed- Owner- TOTAL 
Status cropping cum-share- rent cum- 
tenants croppers tenants fixed- 
Village rent 
tenants 
Khunda 135 42 - 16 - 194 
Jatli 150 3 - 18 - 171 
Mehdiabad 22 14 18 8 8 70 
Chak 305 80 9 2 6 13 110 
Total 387 69 20 48 21 545 
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As will be seen in the Table, not all, tenurial categories exist in 
all villages and there is considerable variation in the incidence of each 
category in the villages. In the chapters that follow we shall. attempt 
to explain this variation.,. It is quite likely that other combinations of 
tenurial categories exist, e. g. a tenant who rents in parts of his land 
on fixed-rent arrangements and the other on share-cropping arrangements. 
However, we did not come across such cases in our sample of farmers in 
the four villages. 
The data collected from cultivating households in each village 
provide details of_inputs used and outputs produced for each of the principal 
crops grown, in the four villages. Additionally, we have quantitative 
information on incomes, assets, prices, indebtedness, the sources of inputs 
purchased and outlets of outputs sold. There is data-also on the'incidence 
of migration and remittances-in each village. Altogether, the data matrix 
consists of 545 households and over 200 variables. 
Khanewa1 
The data available in the village studies conducted by the research 
team at Quaid-e-Azam University provide valuable empirical evidence for 
the 
. 
investigation of most of the issues outlined in Section 1.,. There are 
a few remaining issues, however, to which the village studies do not attend 
even indirectly. One such issue concerns details of the rental 
contracts. For example, no data were available on the inputs stipulated,, 
in the rental contract and the methods of contract enforcement, As we 
discussed earlier, these issues are vital in a discussion of tenancy since 
they determine the conditions which influence the relative efficiency of 
different tenurial contracts.. There are other refinements regarding, 
input use that have also been missed out in the E. S. C. A. P. survey. -For 
example, the distinction between whether or not an input is used and the 
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intensity of use is not brought out clearly. Time profiles regarding 
input use are also not available. This suggested the need to supplement 
available data by another' survey. With this in view we conducted 'a 
survey of a carefully selected ' sample' of cultivators'in Khanewal Tehsil 
in Punjab (see map on P. X. ). ' 
An important consideration in choosing Khanewal for our survey was 
that the farmers in our sample, ' selected from the Tehsil as a whole, are 
in many ways similar to the farmers in the two irrigated villages, Mehdiabad 
and Chak, discussed earlier. We have pointed out that Mehdi-abad and Chak 
were chosen in Tehsil Toba Tek Singh because they are representative of 
the villages in that Tehsil. Similarity to the general characteristics 
of this Tehsil, therefore, is important in our decision to choose'Khanewal. 
Thus we hope that some of the conclusions that we arrive at. after discussion 
of the evidence in Khanewal carry over to the two villages as well. 
There are many similarities between Toba Tek Singh and Khanewal 
Tehsil. Both are relatively recently settled canal colonies (Toba Tek 
Singh was settled between 1890-95 while Khanewal was settled in 1915-20).,, 
There are considerable within Tehsil variations regarding settlement so 
that both old as well as new canal colony villages are found in both Tehsils. 
The tenurial patterns (in themselves determined by settlement schemes) are 
quite similar in the two Tehsils. ' There are considerable ecological 
similarities as well Being located adjacent to each other there is little 
variation in'climactic conditions of the two Tehsils. Both are dependent 
on canal irrigation. Again, there are within Tehsil variations of irrigation 
intensities (we have seen that Chak is less intensively irrigated then 
Mehdiabad. This variation was kept in view while choosing our village in 
Khanewal). Cropping pattern is also similar in the two Tehsils with wheat 
being the main rabi crop and cotton the main kharif crop. Sugarcane, 
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a year-round crop, is also widely grown in both Tehsils. The incidence, 
of the use of'modern inputs"is quite high in both Tehsils.. Because of 
similarities in soils, varieties of fertilizers and modern seeds used'in 
the two Tehsils are quite similar. In both Tehsils the. use of tube-well 
irrigation and tractor cultivation is widespread, (Pakistan Census of 
Agriculture 1972. Special Report Selected Data by sub-divisions ). 
It may be argued that the supplementary data ought to have been 
collected in the four villages discussed earlier. This was not done because 
it was considered desirable to broaden the base of the data for our 
discussion of tenancy contracts. Also, it may be methodologically unsound 
to return to the same villages with a different research team. The 
villagers may have had their fill of 'questionnaiiebearing outsiders'-after 
the long stay of the Quaid-e-Azam University research team. Also, Khanewal 
is more easily accessible to the principal researcher. His family's 
association with the Tehsil smoothed out many administrative difficulties 
of access to 'Patwaris' whose help and advice were necessary in obtaining 
the appropriate . ample of cultivators. It is unlikely, however, that this 
may have resulted in a reporting bias in the sample, since the farmers were 
chosen on the basis of reliability of response and co-operation. Influence 
due to family associations was absent at the village level. 
Khanewal Tehsil has 44,821 farms spread over 396 villages cultivating 
628,767 acres. Administratively, Khanewal. is-divided into four thanas 
which are Khanewal, Jehania, Mianchannu and Talamba. Most of the villages 
in the first three thanas are new canal colony villages while the majority 
of the old villages - situated along the Ravi river bed - are in Talamba. For 
the purposes of land revenue (levied by the Government) the soil in 
Khanewal has been divided into four major categories. These are called 
Beas, Ganjibar, Ottar and Hattar. Keeping in view our requirements of 
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selecting representive villages (with regard to the distribution of farms, 
soil types, tenurial pattern, irrigation facilities and the use of new 
inputs), we consulted the record keepers, 'Patwaris', attached to the 
office of the Assistant Commissioner, Khanewal, for identifying villages 
from which we selected our sample of farmers. After careful discussions 
regarding representativeness on the basis of soil fertility, cropping 
patterns, tenurial arrangements, access to public transport and the use 
of modern inputs we decided to choose 11 villages from the Tehsil. These 
are given in the Table below. 
Table 1.2 Villages chosen in Khanewal 
Thanas 
Villages 
Khanewal Jehania Miachannu Talamba 
168/10-R 157/10-R 133/15-L. 17/8-R 
88/10-R 114/10-R 66/15-L Pukka Haji Majid 
Kot Barkat Ali 
23/10-R Basti Santpal 
0% 
The numerical names given to canal colony villages"have been frowned 
upon by. sensitive settlement and revenue officers even'during the British 
Colonial rule (see, for example, M. L. Darling (1934)). R and L refer to, 
respectively, the left and right bank tributaries of lower Bari"Doab canal 
which is the main irrigation. channel in the Tehsil. In Talamba three of 
the villages are situated along river Ravi and'have existed for a long time 
prior to the introduction of canals. Here the names are derived from 
tribal chiefs and religious heads. 
There are four tenurial categories that are of interest to us in 
studying tenurial contracts and changes brought about in them by the 
introduction of new technology. These are: 
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1. Share-croppers who have neither increased nor decreased the 
total area they rent in in the five years prior to the survey. 
2. Share-croppers whose average rented in land has decreased in the 
five years prior to the survey. 
3. Self-cultivating landowners who have not resumed land for 
self-cultivation from share-croppers. in the five years prior 
to the survey. 
4. Self-cultivating landowners who have increased their size of 
holding through resumption of land from share-croppers in the 
five years prior'to the survey. 
In order to get a sufficiently large sub-set of cultivators in 
each tenurial category to perform statistical tests of significance, we 
decided to interview 3 cultivators in each village belonging to the first 
two tenurial categories and 2 cultivators in each village belonging to 
the last two tenurial categories. Thus in each village we interviewed 
10 farmers 1ý . 
The village Patawari's advice was of great help in guiding us to 
the'villages. Once in the village we arranged a meeting with the cultivators 
in the '. baithak' (front room in the house where visitors are received) of 
the 'lambardar'`who is usually a respected cultivator in the village. We 
explained the objectives and the nature of the survey to the assembled 
cultivators. They then discussed among themselves and determined the 
respondents suitable for the categories of cultivators that were of 
interest to us. Usually, the respondents they recommended were very 
if. In Talamba this procedure was used in village 17/8-R but not in the 
other three villages. Instead we chose two share-croppers (one in 
each category defined earlier) and one self-cultivating landowner 
each from Pukka Haji Majid and Kot Barkat Ali. The remaining four 
respondents (two share-croppers and two landowners) were chosen 
from Basti Santpal. (This procedure was used because in each of 
the former villages one family owns all the land. In Basti Santpal, 
on the other hand, land holdings are small and ownership is dispersed). 
In this manner we hoped to capture the tenurial arrangements in the 
old pre-canal colony villages. 
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co-operative. We hoped that this method of selecting our sample of 
farmers would minimize any reporting biases. - 
The respondents thus selected enthusiastically answered our questions 
in long and laborious questionnaires which enabled us to collect data on 
nearly 400 variables giving us qualitative as well as quantitative 
information on tenancy contracts and input use. The, field survey was 
spread over four months - from January to April 1979 and was conducted 
with the help of two local graduates. - 
It is clear that our sample of cultivators in Khanewal has been 
selected purposively rather than randomly. Further, we have used both 
personal as well as official contacts to seek out cultivators who were 
willing to sit through long interviews (taking up to 5 hours per respondent). 
Many arguments may be made for and against this procedure. The decisive 
argument for us in choosing this procedure was the shortage of time and 
a tight budget that did not allow for a sample sufficiently large for 
non-response not to matter. 
Oft 
We are satisfied with the quality of data collected in the field survey. 
The qualitative information on the nature of tenurial contracts is fairly 
exhaustive. There are very few cases of non-response. Most cultivators 
have given details of crop output and inputs used on the farm. Random 
checks of the reported values indicate that they are generally in 
conformity with those suggested by field workers of the Government 
extension services in the area. 
The data base resulting from our field survey in Khanewal is quite 
large. Only some of the information has been processed for the purpose 
of this thesis. We hope to use other valuable data at a future date in 
extension of our research on issues discussed in this thesis. Some of 
these issues will be indicated in the concluding chapter. 
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Section 1.3 An outline of the structure of the Study 
The chapter-wise layout of the thesis is as follows. 
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In Chapter 2 we shall examine the theories underlying the four main 
issues that we shall be concerned with in this thesis. As indicated in 
Section 1.1 these are production efficiency, tenancy, technology and 
migration. We shall first examine the debate on the size-productivity 
relationship. This will be followed by a discussion of the so-called 
Marshallian and Cheungian arguments regarding tenurial efficiency and 
the role of environmental'uncertainty in determining the choice of the 
tenurial contract. Next we shall briefly discuss the history of technical 
change in Pakistan's agriculture and its likely impact on the size- 
productivity relationship. Finally we shall discuss the theory explaining 
rural-urban migration. The role of rural-end variables in determining 
migration will be examined. We shall argue that there may be a relationship 
between technical change and migration. 
In Chapter 3 we shall describe the rural factor markets in our four 
villages and in-ft j Khanewal. The important factor markets that we shall 
consider-are land, tenancy, credit and labour markets. A detailed 
examination will be made of the characteristics of agents. participating in 
the four'markets. An important objective of our discussion in this chapter 
will be to determine whether linkages exist between markets which may 
influence resource allocation on the'farm. Our discussion will provide 
a rich background for each village in the context of which our ensuing 
detailed analysis will be conducted. - 
The first main issue that we shall address ourselves to in 'the 
formal analysis of our data is production efficiency in the four villages. 
This will be the topic of our discussion in Chapter 4. We shall present 
estimates of the size-productivity relationship and examine direct 
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evidence from the villages to suggest explanations for our results. 
For each village we shall also estimate production functions with three 
inputs. This will allow us to comment on the relative intensity of 
the use of the three important inputs in different size-categories of 
farms. 
Tenancy will be discussed in Chapter 5. Relative efficiency of 
different tenurial contracts will be examined and different criteria` 
for evaluating efficiency will be discussed. We shall present a discussion 
of the variables that are important in explaining the incidence of tenancy. 
This discussion'will enable us to examine the interaction between land, 
labour and bullock markets that may be important in explaining the 
existence of tenancy. 
In Chapter 6 we shall discuss the impact of modern technology on 
production in our four villages. Inputs characterising the new technology 
in the villages and in Khanewal will be discussed and the importance of 
size and tenure in determining access to inputs will be examined. We 
shall present d time profile of modern input use for our sample of farmers. 
Finally, we shall present the results of a covariance analysis, in which 
the use of modern inputs will be regressed on the important characteristics 
of farmers in our sample. 
Chapter 7 will be introduced with a discussion of the extent of 
migration amongst the cultivating households in our villages. We shall 
discuss the hypotheses underlying our empirical migration function in 
which village-end variables explaining rural-urban migration are given 
importance. On the basis of the available evidence in the villages we 
shall present a very general discussion to determine whether the 
characteristics of migrants suggested by the hypotheses can be verified. 
This will be followed by a more rigorous analysis using the probit method 
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to evaluate the probability elasticity of migration of the 'representative' 
household in each village with respect to the characteristics indicated 
by our hypotheses. Our discussion in the chapter will allow us to suggest 
linkages between urban labour and rural credit markets in an environment 
of technological change. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 we shall attempt to integrate our analysis by 
linking up the conclusions of each of the four issues that we shall have 
examined. Some of the important policy implications emerging from our, 
analysis will be discussed. We shall conclude by making suggestions for 
further research. 
mm 
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` CHAPTER. 2 
The theory and review of literature 
Section 2.0 Introduction 
In the present chapter we shall outline the theoretical background 
of the empirical issues to be investigated in Chapters 4 to 7. The 
major theoretical issues will be'stated critically with the objective, of 
suggesting testable hypotheses. Some existing evidence on the hypotheses 
will also be discussed. In the chapters that follow-we shall concentrate 
on the empirical issues and frequently refer to the theory presented in 
detail in this chapter. 
An analysis of production on the family farm allows us to identify 
both the technological frontier of the farm as well as the institutional 
arrangements that determine factor proportions on the farm. The farmer's 
choice of a particular point on the production possibility frontier is 
indicative of the transactions in the factor markets and the combination 
of inputs given the level of technology. Clearly$ imperfections (as well 
as interactions)"`in the factor markets and the perception of environmental 
uncertainty are important in determining this choice. A detailed analysis 
of the production arrangements on the farm, therefore, is likely to 
provide valuable information on the working of rural factor markets. 
In Section 2.1.1 of this chapter we shall review the literature in. which 
the important issues concerning production efficiency have been discussed. 
We shall begin by reviewing the Indian debate on the relationship between 
size-and productivity. Empirical evidence concerning the relationship 
and'the theoretical arguments concerning land and labour markets that explain 
the relationship will be discussed in this section. Allocation of resources 
in an uncertain environment will also be considered as a possible explanation. 
The theoretical problems of'the definition and measurement of economic 
efficiency'and the estimation of`production functions will be examined 
in Section 2.1.2. 
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There are three broad categories of contracts under which agricultural 
production is organised. These are owner self-cultivation, fixed-rent 
contracts and share-cropping tenancies. In Chapter 5 we shall use data 
from Pakistan to examine empirically the relative efficiency of the 
different contracts. We shall also estimate the degree of influence 
exercised by factors that determine the choice of a contract. In the 
present Section, however, our main concern lies with the theoretical 
arguments underlying these two issues.. In Section 2.2. lwe shall assume that 
agricultural environment is certain while our discussion in Section;. 2.2.2 
takes it into uncertainty. 
Technological change influences labour markets in'an important. way. 
Markets for new inputs develop along with markets for'input` services. For 
example, tractors may be hired and tube-well water purchased. Adjustments 
are made in factor markets because of the expected gains in production as 
a result of the introduction of new technology. We shall discuss techno- 
logical change in Section 2.3.1. The meaning of new technology-and-the 
existing pattern,,, of its diffusion will be examined. In Section 
2.3.2 we shall examine the likely impact of the-introduction of new 
technology on size-productivity relationship. We shall postpone they 
discussion of the likely impact on tenancy to, Chapter 6 where empirical 
issues will be taken up in greater detail. 
Finally, the theory of rural-urban migration will be presented in 
Section 2.4. ' We shall first outline the standard rural-urban migration 
models in which migration is seen to result from a'differential between 
urban rand rural' incomes., Empirical investigations based on such models 
emphasise the urban-end variables. We shall argue that there is a need 
to investigate rural-end variables closely. With this'in mind we shall 
review two models that suggest the theoretical plausibility of an empirical' 
rural-urban migration function in which rural-end variables matter. 
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In our concluding chapter (Chapter 8) - after we have described the 
markets as they operate in our four villages and in Khanewal and the, 
empirical investigation of the four issues has. been completed -. we 
shall construct an argument that will bring out-the, linkages between 
the four issues outlined in this chapter. 
Bartinn 
. 
i_1 Prnrm- t- im. 
Section 2.1.1 Size-Productivity Relationship 
An important and much discussed issue concerning production 
arrangements in developing agriculture is the relationship between size 
and productivity. The discussion in the literature is, a good illustration 
of interaction between theory and empirical data. Several theoretical 
insights about the working of rural factor markets were developedin the 
process of analysing data in India. These insights are invaluable in 
the determination of policies such as land reforms, -co-operative farming 
and the structure of input subsidies in agriculture. 
The first major contribution to the debate on the relationship 
between farm size and productivity was made by Sen (1962, -1964,1966). 
On the basis of his analysis of the Farm Management Survey data 
1V he 
observed that by and large in Indian agriculture output per acre declines 
as the size of holding increases. He discussed this result in terms of 
a behavioural model of the peasant family farm where labour. is, allocated 
beyond the point where the marginal product equals the market wage rate. 
This result may be explained in terms of lower disutility of work on 
family farmsrso that the opportunity cost of labour is lower than the 
market wage rate. Another explanation for the inverse relationship 
1/. Farm Management Surveys were launched by the Directorate of Economics 
and Statistics, Government of India, in 1955-56. Villages were 
chosen in five typical States of India (Punjab, West Bengal, U. P., 
Bombay, Madras) by a multi-stage stratified random sampling 
procedure using both cost accounting and survey methods. The 
surveys were conducted for a number of years. 
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suggested by Sen is the difference in the quality of land on the'small 
and large farms. A historical-demographic argument, is used to suggest 
that, compared to large farms, a greater percentage of land on small 
farms is of good quality. because fertile soils can support a large 
population which. results in greater subdivision of land (hence the 
concentration of small farms) on; such soil. ;: _ý> 
The. basic nature of the relationship between size and productivity 
as well as the two main explanations suggested by Sen resulted in 
considerable controversy. Sen himself cautioned against generalising 
these results since they are based on average yields in each size-category 
of farms, so that variations in yields across farms in each size-category 
are ignored. Earlier, C. H. H. Rao (1963)-had suggested thatTa reliable 
test of the nature of the relationship would require an analysis of 
individual holdings. Such-an analysis was'undertaken by. Khusro (1964) 
and C. H. H. Rao-(1966) using regression analysis for farm level data. 
Their results confirmed Sen's observation. 
The measure of land use in defining farm `siz'e 
is quite important in the relationship. The'earlier studies used total 
cultivated area as a 'measure of farm size. If, instead, gross cropped 
area (which allows for double cropping on the total cultivated area) is 
used to measure farm size, the inverse relationship is weakened considerably 
so that the results cannot be generalised for India as awhole (A. Rao, 
(1968), A. Rudra(1968a, 1968b)). The appropriate measure of farm size for 
determining the relationship is the total cultivated area since an 
important reason for higher productivity on small farms is the greater 
intensity of cultivation which results in double cropping. By taking 
gross cropped area as a measure of size that aspect is not captured with 
the result that farm size and productivity appear to be unrelated (C. H. H. 
Rao, (1968)). 
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A version of this argument suggests the absence of the inverse 
relationship for specific crops since the distinction between gross and 
net cultivation is no longer relevant when acreage for each crop is 
considered (K. Bharadwaj, (1974)). This hypothesis was tested by Bliss 
and Stern (1980). They found that, for most crops output is proportional, 
with acreage. They also report that gross value, of output is proportional 
to size. This may be, due to the absence of large, farms and close, super- 
vision of tenanted plots so that the various hypotheses (to be discussed 
below) advanced as explanations of the inverse, relationship are not 
relevant for their sample of farmers. 
The second round in the debate on the nature'of the relationship 
resulted in an excellent paper by Bhattacharia and Saini (1971), in 
which they used disaggregated farm level data in several villages chosen 
from different Sates-in-India and established that when cultivated area 
is used as a measure of farm size output and productivity are generally 
inversely related.. Their results-are based on the estimation of partial 
and rank correlations at the village level. Sign tests are then used to 
determine the overall effect. After experimenting with, various functional 
forms it-is argued that the log linear functional, form is appropriate for 
examining the relationship. A surprising result is that the'inverse 
relationship between farm size and productivity is weakened for farms 
chosen from different villages. This appears to contradict the implication 
of Sens land based hypothesis that suggests that the inverse relation- 
ship is more likely to be observed for farms chosen from different villages 
since the quality of land is likely to vary more within the sample of 
farmers thus selected. 
While there appears to be some sort of a consensus in the early 
literature on the, nature of the relationship between farm size and 
productivity there is much disagreement on the hypotheses advanced as 
explanations for the inverse relationship. 
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Sen's labour based hypothesis discussed earlier has' been interpreted 
in various ways and challenged by several writers. Sen suggests a 
duality in the labour market on the basis of a distinction between family 
and hired labour whereas Mazumdar, (1963), distinguishes between slack 
period and peak period supply functions. In the slack period opportunity 
cost of family labour is low since the probability of getting employment 
is low. This lowers the labour supply curve for the-annual crop year on 
small family farms resulting in a greater allocation of labour and thus 
raising output per acre on such farms. Another reason for a dualistic 
labour market may be the psychic costs of working for other people which 
reduces the attraction of labour outside the family farm. 
A test of then labour, based hypothesis may be devised by splitting up 
the. sample of farms into pure--labour hiring and pure family farms and 
then examining the size-productivity relationship for the former. Such 
a test was carried out by C. H. H. Rao, (1966). 
- 
The inverse. relationship 
was seen to hold for the labour hiring farms as well which led Rao to 
reject the labour based hypothesis. However, this test is not conclusive 
particularly when there may be other explanations for-the inverse - 
relationship based on hypotheses to be-discussed presently. 
A correct procedure for testing the dualistic structure of the labour 
market is to evaluate the marginal product of labour on farms distinguished 
on the basis of size and then compare the estimated marginal' products 
with the market wage rate. For the hypothesis to hold marginal product 
on small farms (large farms) should be lower than (equal to) the market 
wage rate. Using this procedure Bardhan (197.3) concluded that the'. 
1/. A size-proxy was used to distinguish between labour hiring and 
family farms on the assumption that, on average, large farms hire 
in more labour than small farms. 
27. 
estimated marginal product is greater than. the average wage rate on many 
small as well as, large farms. However, these results should be interpreted 
with caution since the production function may be misspecified due to 
the exclusion of bullock labour. It is quite likely that some of the 
influence of the excluded variable has resulted in a biased elasticity 
coefficient of labour (Sen, 1975). 
Like land, labour is also sensitive. to measurement. Thus whether 
labour is measured, in manhours, mandays, the number of labourers or in 
terms of farm activities, has important consequences for both the 
magnitude of the coefficient as well as its statistical significance 
(Bliss and Stern (1980)). 
Sen's land based hypothesis. 
. 
justifying, the existence of an inverse 
relationship between, farm size and productivity employs, a historical- 
demographic argument for explaining the higher concentration of good 
quality soil on small farms. An'alternative is the distress sales 
argument which suggests that at times of distress farmers sell the 
poorest quality soil. (It is not obvious to us they would do so. If 
a farmer wishes to raise Rs 1000 he may be indifferent between selling 
two plots of Rs 500 each or one plot of relatively better quality land. ) 
Usually large farms buy such land so that these farms have, on average, 
not only poorer quality soil as compared to the small farms but are 
also more fragmented. Fragmentation lowers productivity because it 
stretches fixed factors such as supervision and increases the cost 
of digging irrigation ditches etc. (Bhagwati and Chakravarti (1971)). 
A test for the land based hypothesis requires correction for soil 
fertility either by standardising the measure of farm size in acres 
on the basis of land revenue yields or by introducing a variable such 
as the percentage of farm area irrigated and then observing whether the 
elasticity coefficient of land approaches the value of unity. Khusro 
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(1964) and C. H. Rao (1966) use these procedures and confirm indirectly the 
validity of Sen's land based hypothesis.. 
Irrigation is a very labour intensive activity. It requires 
careful supervision at the time of actually irrigating the fields. 
More importantly, it is closely connected with other farm labour 
activities, such as sowing, fertilizing and weeding. For these reasons 
irrigation is likely to be correlated with labour. Correcting for 
irrigation 
, therefore, involves elements of both land as. well as labour 
based hypotheses. 
It is not clear whether the greater concentration of good quality 
soil on small farms is 'inherent' or the result of more labour effort 
on such farms. After all, the quality of soil can be improved with good 
husbandry. Thus there, may be an element of overlap in the land and 
labour based hypotheses. 
The allocation of higher labour input on small farms may be 
explained as rational response by the farmer in the presence of uncertainty. 
Srinivasan (1972) has modelled such behaviour. He ^xgues that a farmer 
has a choice between cultivating land which is a risky asset and seeking 
employment in the labour market where the wage rate is known with 
certainty. -A farmer's total income is given by 
YQ+w LL - aHl1 - (1-a)H12] (1) 
and QH 
Fa 
f(11)rl + (1-a) f(12)r2 
where Q is total output from land 
w is the certain wage rate in the labour market 
L is the total own supply of labour 
H is the total available land 
11 is labour per acre on irrigated land 
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all is total land under irrigation 
(1-a)H is total land not under irrigation 
12 is labour input per acre on unirrigated land 
r1 > r2 are the random returns on irrigated and unirrigated. 
land respectively, 
f(, ) is. a concave production function Laving, constant returns 
to scale in labour and land, and is the same on irrigated 
and unirrigated plots of land 
The farmer's objective function is to maximise the expected 
utility from (1) by allocating labour'on the two types of land, i.. e. 
Max E(U(Y)) 
11'12 
(2) 
First order conditions of (2) imply that, the farmer will allocate 
more labour on irrigated land. as compared to unirrigated land., Since 
in equilibrium: 
wa EU ri 
fi. EU, 
EU'r2 
s r2 (4) 
EU, 
where f is the marginal product of 1 
fl is the marginal product of 12 
Next using Arrow's postulates when returns are risky, it is assumed 
that absolute risk aversion ( Ra (Y) _ -U"(Y) ) decreases when 
U IM 
wealth increases and relative risk aversion Rr(Y) U"(Y)Y ) 
Uly 
increases when wealth increases. Using these assumptions-a comparative 
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static exercise gives i<0i. e. labour input on all types of 
aH 
land decreases when the farmer's total endowment of land increases. It 
is also shown that labour input is an increasing function of a, the 
proportion of land under irrigation and L, the farmer's own labourti 
It is then argued (quoting evidence from India) that small farms have relatively 
larger L and greater aý so that, they. allocate more labour input per 
acre as compared to the large farmers, 
In the analysis, Y, the farmer's wealth, consists of a safe asset, 
labour, which is sold at given wage rate- w in a certain labour market, 
and a risky asset, land. It is implicit in the results that an increase 
in wealth is considered to be the same as an, increase in the endowment 
of land. As land increases, risk increases in a linear relationship 
to land. In this sense uncertainty in the model is multiplicative. 
This, in turn, implies that relative risk aversion is important. in 
determining the allocation of resources and it is this that, gives 
the result , 
ali 
< 0.., 
_ . aH 
Bliss and Stern (1980) have shown that if a farmer's wealth increases 
as a result of an increase in the endowment of a safe asset (e. g. non- 
farm income or rent from fixed-lease tenancies) absolute risk aversion 
is important in determining choice. This gives us a result opposite to 
that of Srinivasan so that, as a farmer's wealth increases due to an 
increase in the safe asset, he uses more variable inputs per acre. This 
argument is implicit in Srinivasan's analysis where it is shown that 
ali 
> 0, L being the safe asset in (1). 
aL 
Section 2.1.2 Efficiency 
Implicit in the size-productivity discussion presented in the 
previous section is a concept of efficiency. The empirical conclusion 
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that inverse relationship exists between output per acre and the size 
of holding has been used as evidence to suggest that small farms are 
more efficient than large farms. A number of studies have interpreted 
this result as indicative of diminishing returns to scale in Indian 
agriculture. This may be 
'a 
valid approach in an agricultural system 
where most of the variation in output is explained by land alone. However, 
South Asian agriculture is going through a period of technological change 
that is characterised by capital and labour constraints. Therefore, 
the use of a single input such as land in the measurement of efficiency 
and returns to scale is unsatisfactory (Farrell (1957)). 
The use of the total value of capital on the farmhusro (1974), 
U. Patnaik-(1972)) as a measure of size or scale of operations is 
equally objectionable since a , 
single input is still being used to 
compare efficiency of different farms. The biases pointed out by 
Farrell operate here, as well. It-is interesting to note Patnaik's (1972) 
results that suggest an inverse relationship between size and productivity 
when land is used as a measure of size and a positive relationship when 
the measure of size is the total value of capital used on the farm. An 
implication of these results is that within any homogenous size 
category of farms there may be considerable variation in efficiency when it is 
measured in terms of output per acre. This may be due to differences 
in managerial efficiency and attitude to new technology amongstfarmers 
in the same size category in terms of land ownership. 
The production function 
An analyticaltechnique that allows us to comment , on both returns- 
to scale as well as; relative efficiency of small and - large f arms requires the 
estimation of production functions (Farrell (1957)). The=theoretical 
problems associated with specification and estimation of production° 
functions need a detailed discussion.. This will be taken up in 
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Chapter 4. For the moment we shall concentrate on some empirical. results.,. 
Using Indian data Saini (1971), Sidhu (1974) and Bardhan (1973) 
estimated returns to scale by adding up the elasticity coefficients'of 
the inputs specified in a Cobb-Douglas production function. They report 
that, in general, constant returns operate in Indian-agriculture. 
Similar results have been reported for Pakistan (Aslam (1978)). The 
four studies also report diminishing returns to land. This casts some 
doubt on the assertion that a fixed coefficient production function is 
appropriate (C. H. Rao (1966)). 
Production function analysis allows a straightforward test for` 
the relative efficiency of small and large farms5holding inputs such as 
land, human labour, bullock' labour, irrigation, fertilizer and other 
capital inputs1 constant. This method isolates managerial'abilities and 
other unmeasured'factors, as explanations of differences-in efficiency. 
The usual procedure is to determine an appropriate' distinction between 
farms on the basis of-size and then to Use a dummy variable in the 
production function. Junankar (1976) used this procedure in his study 
of farms in India. On the basis of his tests he concluded that there is no 
difference in efficiency between small and large farms-given that they 
have-the same production function. For Pakistan, Aslam (1978), reports 
that small farms have a higher intercept term than large farms which 
suggests that small farms are relatively more efficient. His results 
are based on the use of farm size as an independent variable in 
crop specific production functions... 
` The use of production function analysis to comment on the relative 
efficiency of different farms size categories assumes that the estimated 
coefficients are reliable. This assumption has been questioned 
(NowshLrani (1967), Wallis (1973)) since the equilibrium levels of the 
inputs specified in the production function are derived as a result of 
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profit maximization. This may imply that,. the quantities'of inputs used are not 
independent of the error term and, therefore, the estimated 
coefficients are likely to be biased. (A detailed discussion of these 
issues is presented in Chapter 4. ) An alternative procedure is to 
estimate input elasticities by using profit functions. 
Profit functions-' 
The profit function expresses the dependent variable (profit) 
as a function of input prices and fixed inputs (McFadden (1970)). 
Specific production functions such as Cobb-Douglas production function 
may be used in the actual estimation (Lau and Yotopoulos (1971)). Using 
a size dummy in a profit function Lau and Yotopoulos (1971) find that 
small farms are relatively more efficient compared to large farms in 
Indian agriculture. Junankar (1976), on the other hand, reports no 
significant differerence between the two farm sizes. Using Pakistani 
data (Aslam (1978) reports that the small farm dummy is positive and 
statistically significant suggesting that this farm category is more 
efficient than the large farms. 
The data requirements for estimating profit functions are quite. 
stringent. The evaluation of input prices paid by different farms is not 
easy. Further, the distinction between fixed and variable inputs is 
rather subtle and, in practice, quite arbitrary. These problems 
are reflected in estimation. Lau and Yotopoulos (1971) report a 
negative sign'of the coefficient for capital while Junankar (1980) 
reports a positive sign for the coefficient of wages paid out to 
hired labour. It is quite likely that these 'incorrect' signs are 
due to misspecification. 
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Section 2.2.1 Tenancy without uncertainty 
The fixed-rent contract 
f, 
We shall begin by describing the equilibrium for owner-cultivators 
and fixed-rent tenants. Suppose the production function is given by 
F(H, L) where H is land and L is labour. Assuming that a competitive 
market for-land and labour exists, the opportunity cost of land is R 
and that of labour is w. The cultivator maximizes output in agric- 
ultural production subject to the market determined opportunity costs, i. e. 
Maximize F(H, L) - wL - RH (1) 
LH 
The equilibrium conditions are 
(2) s F1 R 8H 
äF FZ ý, w (3) 
(2) and (3) describe competitive equilibrium where land and labour 
markets are cleared. Using these results economists have tried to 
determine whether share-cropping tenancies are equally efficient in 
allocating resources. 
Share-cropping inefficiency: 
Marshall suggested that share-cropping tenancies could be 
inefficient in resource use. He`argued 
". '.... when the cultivator has to give to his landlord half of 
the returns to each dose of capital and labour that he applies 
to the land, it will be not be to his interest to apply any doses 
the total return to which is less than twice enough to reward 
him. If, then, he is free to cultivate as he chooses, he will 
cultivate far less intensively than on the English plan (i. e. 
fixed rent tenancies) ..... " (Book VI, Chapter X, Section 
4) 
The result derived by Marshall using partial equilibrium analysis 
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may be represented mathematically in terms of the maximizing problem 
presented in (1). Now if r is the share in output received by the 
landowner, the share-cropping tenant's maximand is : 
Maximize (1-r) F (H, L) -wL (4) 
H, L 
The freedom to choose H and L results, in the following 
'equilibrium' conditions : 
(1-r)F1 0 (5) 
(1-r)F2 =w (6) 
(5) implies that in 'equilibrium' F1 =0 since (1-r) > 0. 
Thus there is excess demand for land whenever the marginal product of 
land is positive and since there is little evidence to suggest that 
F1 0 (6) implies that the share--cropping tenant will allocate less 
labour than in (3) again because (1-r)>O. Thus when the maximand is 
given by (4) labour is allocated inefficiently, intensity of cultivation 
is less and so is output per acre compared to the solution for owner- 
cultivators and fixed-rent tenants. 
Share-cropping efficiency : 
(5) and the lack of evidence to support the result that the marginal 
product of land equals zeroptaken together, suggest that landowners have 
some bargaining power while negotiating tenurial contracts. One 
manifestation of this power may be that they do not have to accept 
returns from share--cropped land less than those from alternative use of 
land. Thus one can argue that in equilibrium 
rF - SH (7) 
where SH 
= RH is the opportunity cost of land and S is some attractive 
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rent to the landowner. 
A landowner who self-cultivates a part of his land could ensure 
that a share-cropper performs at least as well as he does on his self- 
cultivated land through periodic checks on performance. One way to 
achieve this is to contract short term leases. 
(The intention here 
need not necessarily, be to have a high turnover rate of tenants but 
to maintain the threat of eviction if share-croppers apply insufficient 
inputs With this consideration the share-cropping tenant's maximand 
is 
Maximize F (H, L) - SH - wL 
H, L 
Now the equilibrium conditions are 
F1 S 
F2 =w 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
The landowner's total income is 
SR +F (H', L) - wL + R(H'- H' - H) (11) 
where H' and L are land and labour used in self. cultivation and H 
is the total. available land. In equilibrium 
a FRS- F1 (12) aHl 
aL W= Fz 
(13? 
R may be less than S by a factor representing costs of management 
incurred by the landowner in supervising the share-cropping tenants. The 
landlord is not-free to make S as large as he likes since the share- 
cropping tenant has the option to bid for fixed rent tenancies or sell 
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all his labour in the labour market. As we shall see below he may also 
mix contracts. 
It is clear by the analysis presented above that the land'owner's 
bargaining power implied by (5) enables him to devise contracts that 
result in allocative efficiency. The duration of the lease discussed 
above is one method. Alternatively land may be rationed. If F, 
the production function, varies across tenants, landowners may discriminate 
against less productive tenants while contracting land. If F is the 
same for all tenants, land may be parcelled. Both rationing procedures 
imply that landowners have considerable bargaining power'while allocating 
land so that we must revise the assumption that tenants are free to choose 
land and labour as implied by (4). 
A problem with the model that gives the allocatively inefficient 
solutions (5) and (6) arises on account of the empirical evidence 
suggesting that share-cropping tenancies are at least as efficient as 
fixed-rent tenancies (Cheung (1969), Herring (1979), Bliss and Stern (1980); 
also see the results presented in Chapter 5). Considering these results 
and the superior bargaining power implied by (5), it may be argued that land- 
owners can dictate the use of'inputs on share-cropped tenancies to 
bring about efficiency. Marshall certainly seems to be aware of this 
since he goes on to argue in the section quoted above : 
"..... by constant interference the landlord can keep up the amount 
of labor he (the tenant) puts on his farm, and keep down the use he 
makes of the farm cattle for outside work, the fruits of which-he 
does not share with the landlord ..... 
" 
It is argued'furtherlthat the landowner can ensure appropriate intensity 
of cultivation 
"..... if the tenant has no fixity of tenure the landlord can 
deliberately and freely arrange the amount of capital and labour 
supplied by the tenant..... " 
The model presented in (8) captures the above argument. 
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The bargaining power of the landowner enables him to maximize the 
rent that he receives from share-cropping. This may be achieved by an 
apprppriate combination of the chosen values of the rental share and 
the number of tenancies contracted since the total income of the tenant 
from share-cropping must not fall below the income he could earn by 
selling his labour. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.1 where only two 
tenants are considered. 
Product 
Land 
H1 H2 
Land 
Fig. 2.1 ,, 
In Fig. 2.1 the total rent received by the landowner is given by the 
shaded area. To maximize this the landlord minimizes Ts (1-r) 
[F1 
+ F1] 
which is the income of the two tenants subject to the constraint that it 
12 is at*least equal to w(L +L, the opportunity cost of the tenants' 
labour. A landowner could increase the total shaded area by dividing up 
land into more than two plots. However, without an adjustment in r this 
will lower tenants' income relative to alternative income opportunities, 
and they will opt out for other employment. 
To see the allocative properties of the model presented in Fig. 2.1 
we shall state the prohlem mathematically. 
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Landowner's objective function is : 
Maximize R- urF(n , L) (14) 
by choosing n, r and L 
where n is the number of plots into which landowner's holding 
is sub-divided. 
The constraint may be represented by 
For each tenant (1-r) F (11 , L) > wL (15) 
Assuming that the constraint binds and substituting, the landowner's 
maximand, given by (14) and (15), may be re-stated as : 
Maximize n EI: n L) wL 
First order conditions give 
HFR 
n. 1n 
F2 w 
(16) 
(17) 
. 
(18) 
(18) implies that labour is allocated efficiently and (17) means 
that rent from each share-cropped plot equals the marginal product of 
land on the plot. 
We, therefore, have allocative efficiency similar to that on fixed rent 
tenancies. With appropriate modification in (14) and (15) these results 
are easily generalised to inputs other than labour. If P and x 
are the vectors of input prices and inputs other than labour respectively, the 
landowner's maximand is 
Maximize nrF(n , L, x) (19) 
r , L, n, x 
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subject to (1-r) Fn, L, x) -Px wL (20) 
Upon substituting from the constraint we have 
Maximize n(F -Px- wL) (21) 
and the first order conditions are i 
H F, R 
nin 
F2 w 
F. P. 
Again, we have allocative efficiency. 
Cost sharing. 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
The model represented in (4)' assumes r tobe fixed and allows 
the tenant to make the allocative decisions. We saw in (5) and (6) 
that this leads-to allocative inefficiency. In the model represented 
in (14), on the other hand, the allocative decisions about the rental 
share r, the number of plots and the amount of stipulated labour 
are made by the landowner subject to the constraint of tenant's 
foregone income through wage, contracts. Evidence from Pakistan (which 
we shall discuss in Chapter 3) suggests thatitypically., the rental share 
is fixed and cost sharing is widely practised. We shall next consider 
the effects of incorporating these, two features in our share-cropping 
models. 
Landowner's income from rent needs tobe adjusted to take into 
account his share in the cost of production. We shall assume for- 
simplicity that only labour costs are important'and these costs are 
shared bya proportion a by the landowner. Assuming r to he fixed 
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landowner's problem may be written as-:, 
Maximize nrFan 
n, L, a 
subject to 
(1-r) F+awL (25) 
Assuming that the constraint' binds, we have 
rF-aF- wL (26) 
Now the maximand may be re-written as 
Maximize r(F (L, 
n) 
-w L) (27) 
Now the problem is similar to that in (16) and we have efficiency 
in share-cropping. 
Bliss and Stern (1980 ) have shown that more general cost 
sharing arrangementsin which the landowner agrees to share the costs of 
a vector of inputs chosen by-the share-cropper, result in. -input levels 
which can be shown to be the same as achieved by stipulation. They show 
that the optimum share with cost-sharing is less than that for stipulation 
although the net rent is the same. 
We may summarize the discussion of this section with the help of 
Table 2.1. 
The table indicates that inefficiency arises only when, the tenant 
is allowed to make allocative decisions regarding land and labour. We 
have seen, however, that such a situation does not define equilibrium. 
The excess demand for land under such an arrangement gives the landowner 
bargaining power in determining the contract. This bargaining power 
results in arrangements. all of which are efficient in resource allocation. 
42. ' 
Table 2.1 Tenurial arrangements influencing efficiency in resource use 
All i d i i 
< Choice of variables 
ec on ocat ve s 
maker land, labour rental share, cost share, 
land, labour land, labour 
Share-cropper inefficiency efficiency a efficiency 
b 
Landlord - efficiency efficiency 
Fixed-rent tenant efficiency - - 
a: with landlord determining rental share 
b with landlord determining cost share 
Our analysis of share-cropping contracts without uncertainty indicates 
that different tenurial contracts can be shown to be equally efficient in 
resource allocation. Our analysis does not tell us why different 
contracts coexist. It is instructive to speculate on some of the determinants 
of the choice of a rental contract under certainty. 
It can be seen from Table 2.1, that'whenever tenants are free to 
choose inputs whose costs are not shared with the landowner there is 
likely to be inefficiency. Let us consider'the circumstances under 
which this is likely to occur. 
The first circumstance is when tenants have security of tenure so 
that they cannot be evicted. This may happen 'due to strict Government 
legislation. ' Such legislation often contains the clause that the tenant 
must cultivate land efficiently. However, this clause'is rather 
difficult to implement. Such a situation would take'us straight to the 
case' described by Marshall (in the first quote). Clearly, fixed-rent 
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contracts will be preferred by landlords. 
In our analysis so far we. have assumed that there are no enforcement 
costs of share-cropping contracts. This, of course, is not true. 
Efficient share-cropping contracts require the stipulation of more than 
one variable input and periodic evaluation. This requires detailed 
supervision which is costly. Supervision costs are. determined not just 
by the wages of the "munshi" (bailiff) since most landowners are aware 
that "munshis", in turn, need to be supervised. 
Costs are likely to vary across landlords depending on foregone- 
opportunities. For a local shopkeeper, who rents out land, -the cost may 
be the trade lost during the period of supervision., However, for 
landowners whose profession requires them to reside in towns (e. g. land- 
owning lawyers, doctors, etc. ) the opportunity cost of supervising efficient 
cultivation is quite high. An extreme example is that of the absentee 
landowner'for whom the opportunity cost of supervising land may be very 
high. Consequently, the absentee landowners may be unable to stipulate 
inputs. This results in inefficiency. Under these circumstances fixed- 
rent contracts may be chosen. 
The persistence of share-cropping contracts characterized by 
inefficiency reported in several empirical. studies (Bell (1977)) may be 
explained by the argument above that assumes fixity of lease. _- 
Other reasons for choosing share-cropping contracts may'arise on 
account of the functioning of rural credit markets whereby landowners,, `' 
and through them the tenants, are allowed access to capital. We shall 
take up this discussion in detail in chapters 5 and 6. Share-cropping 
contracts also enable tenants to share the superior managerial skills 
of the landowners (acquired through their contacts with the, Government 
extension, services). Similarly, landowners may, decide that they can 
spread their skills through share-cropping more easily than through 
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direct supervision of hired labour. 
Section 2.2.2 Uncertainty' and tenancy 1- 1.1 ' 
Our discussion of tenurial contracts without uncertainty indicated 
that under fairly plausible conditions share-cropping contracts may 
be shown to be as efficient as fixed-rent tenancies and owner-cultivation. 
We then discussed the circumstances under which share-cropping contracts 
became more attractive to landowners and tenants compared to other contracts. 
The prevalence of these circumstances may explain the popularity of such 
contracts in countries like Pakistan. . 
We shall now introduce uncertainty 
into agricultural production and discuss its implications for the choice 
of rental contracts. 
Uncertainty in crop production implies that output on the farm is 
a random variable which may be influenced by factors other than the 
cultivation practices of the farmer. Given this uncertainty and given 
also risk aversion, farmers will allocate resources in such a manner that 
risks associated with the returns on their investments on inputs like 
seeds, fertilizers, water and labour time are minimized. Thus 
resource allocation on the farm may be influenced in an important way 
by factors such as the size of farm and the nature of the rental contract 
because they affect risk aversion. In Section 2.1 of this chapter we 
discussed the influence of the size of farm on resource allocation under 
uncertainty. In this section we shall discuss the role of rental contracts 
in risk dispersion. 
We shall first briefly consider the nature of risk dispersion that 
may be achieved with the three important rental contracts that concern 
us. Under owner-cultivation the entire risk of decisions regarding 
resource allocation on the farm are borne by the cultivator himself. 
Under fixed-rent tenancies landowners and tenants decide on the rent and 
45. 
fix it at the beginning of the crop season so that the entire risk is 
borne by the tenant. Under share-cropping tenancy, however, although 
the share proportion is determined at, the beginning of the crop season, 
the actual value of crop output going to the landowner and the tenant is 
determined after the harvest. This implies that the risk is-shared 
between the landowner' and the tenant. Thus given uncertainty , the 
attraction of share-cropping contracts' is that they enable 
the sharing of risk associated with the allocative decisions regarding 
crop production. 
We shall next discuss some of the circumstances'under, which share- 
cropping contracts become redundant. We shall then argue that in the 
real world these circumstances may not prevail so that share-cropping'°' 
may be an attractive contract for risk averse landlords and tenants. 
Share-cropping may become redundant if effective crop insurance 
exists in the agricultural sector. By-paying a premium, owner-cultivators 
andfixed-rent tenants could insure themselves against poor yields. 
However, crop insurance in Pakistani agriculture is virtually non-existent 
for a number of reasons including the moral hazard problem., Given the 
range of crops grown and the small size of holdings, it is likely to be 
difficult for the cultivator and the crop insuring institution to agree 
on the nature and degree of risk. 
Another situation in which share-cropping becomes redundant is when 
tenants can combine fixed-rent contracts with wage contracts (the cultivator 
bears all the risk in the former and no risk in the latter contract)-so that 
the risk dispersion achieved by such a combination of contracts. is the 
same as that achieved by share-cropping contracts. To see this, let us 
consider a tenant who has a production function given by 0 F(H, L) 
which displays constant returns to scale. If he allocates (1-r) 
units of land and labour to cultivation under fixed-rent tenancy and 
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sells r units of labour at the going wage rate, his income is given by: 
10 F( (1-r) H, (1-r) L)- R(1-r) H+ wrL] (28) 
1 
Since we have assumed constant returns to scale, (28) may be written as: 
(1-r) 0 F(H, L) - R(1-r) H+ wrL 
or 
(1-r) 0 F(H, L) + [wL - R(1-r) HJ (29) 
The. first expression in (29) is the tenant's income under share- 
cropping tenancy. It equals (29))i. e. the income with a mixed contract, 
only if the expression in the square brackets equals zero. This happens 
when : 
wrL = R(1-r) H (30), 
or 
RH r 
wL 1-r 
(30)'" 
which implies that factor shares under mixed contracts should be the 
-same as the distribution of the share of output between landowner and the 
share-cropping tenant. 
Now if share--cropping is introduced in a system with given values 
of rental R and wage rate w, then the only possible values of crop 
share r are those that satisfy (30) (Newbery (1976)). A higher 
value of the share going to the tenant (landowner) would be unacceptable 
to: the landowner (tenant) since the alternative of ihixing contracts 
according to (28) is always possible. Newbery also shows that the 
competitive wage-rent equilibrium is efficient in the sense of Pareto 
optimality with respect to ex-ante expected utility. Thus if share-" 
cropping-is superimposed on the efficient rent-wage system, then according 
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to (30) share-cropping is redundant. 
There are a number of reasons why mixing of the two contracts may 
not be as attractive as share-cropping in the real world. The first 
set of reasons arises on account of costs involved with a successful 
mix of contracts. Each of the two contracts is likely to involve 
search. The time required for finding contracts that allow an appropriate 
mix of the two contracts may be fairly long. This may imply high search 
costs so that tenants may opt out for share-cropping. A simi. lar argument' 
applies for landowners., However, in their case, costs of search may be 
relatively lower since - as we have seen in the previous section - share- 
cropping contracts involve supervision (enforcement) costs. 
From the landowner's point'of view. the relative attraction of 
share-cropping contracts will be influenced by the nature of uncertainty. 
If uncertainty is multiplicative share-cropping contracts may be redundant 
provided (30) holds. However, if uncertainty enters the production 
function sequentially, share-cropping contracts may have certain advantages. 
Sequential uncertainty implies that agricultural production involves 
different activities at different time periods and that the outcome of past 
activities can be influenced by decisions in the current activity. For 
example, if insufficient rain falls after sowing, yields may be improved 
through irrigation at a later stage. Self-cultivation with hired labour 
may require very close supervision by the landowner to ensure that 
appropriate tasks are performed when the contingencies arise (Recd (1974)). 
On the other hand, share-cropping contracts may be free from detailed 
specification of tasks and therefore are better suited to meet such 
contingencies. 
Another approach to uncertainty in agriculture distinguishes choice 
uncertainty from outcome uncertainty (C. H. H. Rao (1971)). The two aspects 
of outcome uncertainty - multiplicative and sequential - have been 
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discussed above. Choice uncertainty refers to the risks associated with 
entrepreneurial decisions. Such decisions assume importance when 
output is produced for; the market and choices have to be made regarding 
the appropriate crop mix when prices fluctuate and about the schedule_ 
of delivery of the produce to the market. Subjective evaluation of 
risky investments plays an important role here, and it. is, likely to vary 
across individuals. The problems of moral hazard may, prevent successful 
share-cropping contracts between landlords and tenants particularly 
under the plausible assumption that risk aversion is a function of wealth. 
Thus in regions where choice uncertainty. is important - in regions where 
a wide range of crops can be grown - fixed-rent contracts may be preferred. 
Throughout our analysis we have assumed a perfectly competitive, 
certain labour market. 'A number of arguments may be advanced to suggest 
that labour markets are less integrated than the neo-classical paradigm 
assumes. For instance, tenants may attach high costs to working for 
other farmers so that traditional cultivators may be unwilling to work 
as wage labourerg on other farms. For such cultivators the risk 
dispersing option of mixing fixed-rent contracts with wage labour may 
not exist. 
Assuming that the desirability of working for others is not very 
different from the desirability of working for oneself, there is still 
the problem of uncertainty in the labour märket. The tenant may not 
find as much work as he likes at the going wage rate within a reasonable 
distance of his tenanted plot, or the wage rate itself may be random. 
Both these uncertainties in the labour market may make'share-cropping 
contracts more attractive. ' 
Section 2.3.1 Technological change 
The technological change initiated in the mid-sixties in the 
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agricultural sectors of several developing countries is called the 
"Green Revolution" by optimists. However, there is a pessimistic view 
as well. Pessimism with the technological change stems from concern 
with problems of initiating and sustaining the spread. of new technology 
(Falcon (1970)) and the impact on income distribution (Byers (1972), 
Griffin (1974)). Two views prevail amongst the optimists. The first 
sees the Green Revolution as a Hirschman-like phenomenon applied to 
agriculture whereby the introduction of a new input, high yield variety seeds, 
starts a chain reaction that ultimately pushes out the production 
possibility' frontier of the entire economy. Empirical evidence from 
South Asia suggests that this is a considerable exaggeration of the 
impact of the new technology (Griffin, (1974)). A more realistic view 
is that in regions where the complementary input, irrigation, 
is available, some new strains of crops such as wheat, and, rice have,, 
registered dramatic increasesin yields. This has resulted in widespread 
adoption of the new technology, increasing the total value of food 
production. This, however, may have worsened income distribution where 
land is concentrated amongst a few large landowners and factor market 
imperfections work out to their advantage. In this section we shall 
discuss the likely impact of technological change on the relationship 
between farm size and productivity. 
'Green revolution'technology is defined by inputs such as high yield 
variety seeds, fertilizers and water. The new technology has been introduced 
for a number of crops such as wheat, rice and more recently tobacco and cotton. 
The initial success story with the most dramatic consequences, however, 
was wheat. Several Mexican dwarf wheat varieties were tried in research 
stations in Pakistan in 1961. The potential for the successful spread of 
the new variety in the, ideal soil and climatic conditions of the Indus 
Basin were soon realised. By 1965 a modest beginning was made by sowing 
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12,000 acres of dwarf wheat. By 1974 nearly 8.5 million acres were sown 
with the new'variety which is sixty per cent of the total area sown with 
wheat (Griffin (1974)). ," 
Dwarf wheat varieties have a short growing period, short stems 
and excellent tillering. With proper fertilization and irrigation water, 
yields per acre were doubled compared to the traditional varieties, 
resulting in a growth rate of wheat' production of nearly nine per cent 
(Griffin (1974)). 
In order to encourage the use of new high yield varieties of wheat, 
the Government subsidised inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and tube- 
wells. Price support programmes. were initiated to enable farmers to 
get high returns without increasing the price of food in the urban 
centres. To sustain this success, investment was made to set up research 
stations for continued improvement in crop strains. The Ministry of 
Agriculture started an ambitious' extension programme in order to 
provide information to farmers on the scientific methods of cultivating 
the new varieties. 
We shall now examine the hypothesis that given market imperfections 
the introduction of technological change is likely to increase. the 
difficulty of access to inputs by small farmers (Griffin (1974)). ' Both 
direct and indirect methods were used by the Government to introduce 
high yield varieties in Pakistan. Appeals were made-to large farms 
directly by functionaries'of the Ministry of Agriculture. In a field 
survey conducted in Khanewal, Lowdermilk (1972) reports that Government 
extension workers visited large farms more frequently than small farms. 
At the same time seeds, fertilizer and tube-well irrigation were made 
available at subsidised rates at specific distribution points. We - 
shall examine how the latter method is likely to affect the rural factor 
markets. 
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The pattern of the location of distribution points may favour 
large landowners to the extent that they are usually located, in small 
rural towns where. large landowners already have interests due-to 
residence or political ambitions. The marginal cost of transporting 
inputs for them may be close to zero. The small farmers, on 
the other hand, have to make several trips that involve both travel 
costs as well as the opportunity cost of a day's labour on the farm. 
Usually, the distribution points are regulated by Government bureaucracy 
in order to ration the. new inputs that are in short supply. Large 
landowners with better contacts are able to jump queues. Small farms, 
on the other hand, have to incur higher 'transaction' costs. 
Another method of encouraging the use of new inputs is to provide 
subsidised credit. This method works, to-the advantage of lar&e land- 
owners particularly due both to the 'transaction' cost element discussed 
earlier and the ease of access to Government loan, giving institutions, 
It may be. argued that this policy channels-scarce capital into less 
productive use since larger farms with easy access to credit may use,,;, 
the loan to purchase tractors (we shall discuss this in detail in Chapter. 
6). 
It may be argued that uncertainty prevailing in agriculture may 
also contribute'to differential access to new inputs. Investment in 
new inputs is likely to be risky since returns are unknown. To the 
extent that large landowners are less risk averse due to their greater 
wealth, they are more likely to use new inputs compared to the small- 
farmers. 
Thus it seems plausible that encouraging the use of new inputs 
through subsidies and rationing results is worsening the factor market 
imperfections faced by the small farmers. This'-suggests that small 
farmers are less likely to adopt new technology. Empirical data from 
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Pakistan, however, does not substantiate this, Lowdermilk (1972) 
reported that although large farms initiate the use of new inputs, 
small farms catch up (in 2-3 years in his sample of-farms from 
Khanewal),, so that ultimately there is no significant differerence 
due_to. farm size in growing new dwarf varietiesaof wheat. Griffin 
(1974) has given evidence from a number of countries which shows that both 
small as well. as large farmers adopt the new. technology.. Salam (1978) 
has given evidence from a sample of farms across different districts, 
of Punjab in Pakistan which also suggests no difference in input use 
due to farm size. 
How. can we reconcile the evidence to the, argument of differential 
access to inputs ? One explanation may be that, because of its impact 
on yields of food crops even small farmers find it'attractive to invest 
in new inputs. This raises-demand encouraging the growth of-inter- 
mediaries who make inputs available at a price lower than the opportunity 
cost at Government distribution points. Thus village 'arhtias' and 
shopkeepers oftgn sell fertilizer and/or lend cash to the small farmers. 
These intermediaries may be prepared to meet transportation and transaction 
costs of inputs' particularly if high yields of food crops releases land 
for growing more cash crops which they purchase. Thus new technology, 
instead of worsening the functioning of rural factor markets, may in 
fact improve its working. This does not show up in quantitatively 
measurable variables since the change is both subtle and quite complex. 
The incentive for the growth of intermediaries may not necessarily be 
the difference in the price of inputs but rather the increase in 
revenues through commissions earned on the tied purchase of crops grown on 
land released from food crops.. 
It may be argued that small farmers 'are discouraged from adopting 
new technology due to the adverse distribution of sources of irrigation. 
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Where irrigation is regulated by the Government through a network of 
public canal irrigation, access to water is relatively more equal. 
But subsidy on tube-wells that favours large farmers may worsen the 
distribution of irrigation water (Falcon (1970)). In Pakistan 
however, most tube-wells have excess capacity which is utilized by 
the larger farmers by selling water to the small farmers who do not- 
own tube-wells. Thus a lively market in tube-well water has emerged 
that passes on some of the benefits, of Government subsidy to the small.. 
growers. Similar markets operate for. hiring. tractor services. 
Many large holdings in Pakistan are divided up into small plots 
and rented out to share-cropping tenants. The introduction of new 
technology may be encouraged by landlords by sharing costs of 'new 
inputs. Such risk sharing tenurial arrangements reduce the riskiness 
of new technology thus spreading its use. This is substantiated by 
Lowdermilk (1972) from evidence 'ih Khanewal where he found that tenant 
operated farms adopt new technology more readily compared to owner 
operated farms. in comparable size categories. 
Our discussion suggests'three explanations for small farmers' 
intensive use of the new inputs associated with'the 'green revolution' 
technology. These are growth of intermediaries, the development of 
markets for factor services and the cost-sharing role of the landlord 
on tenanted farms. In Chapter 6 we shall consider the evidence 
regarding input use for our sample of farmers in the light of these 
explanations. 
Section 2.3.2 Impact of technological change on the size-productivity 
relationship 
A number of studies, e. g. Bhattacharia and Saini (1971) in India 
and Salam (1978) and Khan (1979) in Pakistan, report that with the 
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introduction of new technology associated with the 'green revolution, 
the size-productivity relationship has changed,. since large farms, 
with greater access to new inputs have higher yields than small farmers. 
These results, however, need careful scrutiny. In their study, 
Bhattacharia and Saini (1971) report a positive relationship between 
farm size and productivity for farms studied in the post-green revolution 
years. In their calculations they have used the gross crop Acreage 
as a measure of size. We have already noted in Section 2,1 the problems' 
associated with such a measure. Salam's results are most curious since 
his reported tables show that small farms use new inputs either more 
intensively than large farms or have comparable intensities. His 
conclusion, therefore, that as a result of the 'green revolution' 
technology, "the previously known phenomenon of. relatively higher crop 
yields per acre on the small farms as compared to large farms, prevailing 
under traditional agriculture is-disappearing" does not follow from the 
evidence he has presented. 
We shall empirically test the argument that 'green revolution' 
technology results in reversing the traditional inverse relationship 
between size and productivity. This will be done both in Chapter 4 as 
well as in Chapter 6. In Chapter 4 we shall estimate production 
functions and comment on the intensity of use of modern inputs in the 
light of our values of estimated marginal products.. We, shall compare 
returns to specific inputs with returns to scale to discuss resource 
allocation on small, medium and large farms in our four villages. In 
Chapter 6 we shall examine the direct evidence on use of modern inputs 
in the villages. This analysis will enable us to determine directly 
whether size is important in determining the intensity of use of inputs 
such as fertilizer, tube-well irrigation and ploughing with tractors. 
6 
t 
55. 
Section 2.4 Rural-urban Migration 
In the present section we, shall review models of rural-urban 
migration. Models of migration, typically, (e. g. Barnum and . Sabot 
(1975), Greenwood (1969), Levy and Wadycki (1972) etc. ) are concerned 
with the following migration function : 
Mmf (d, ' x) (1) 
where M measures the number of migrants. The important argument in 
the functional relationship is d which measures the present value of 
the expected income differential between urban and rural areas for 
potential migrants. ' 
YR(tý 
t-ý (l+r) 
where Yu is expected urban income, YR is expected rural income, 
r is the interest rate and t is the time subscript that takes 
values 1....... n. All other economic variables relevant to the 
migration decision such as the cost of job search, cost of transfering 
residence and the cost of'living differences between urban and rural 
areas are subsumed in x. (Other important variables determining` 
migration such as costs of cultural adjustment, psychic costs of working 
in an urban environment etc. are also subsumed in x .) 
The migration function (1) is such that 
of 
>0 with Lim f(d, x) =0 8d d-+O 
These models perceive migration as a process of adjustment in the 
labour market.; The argument is that if we take the labour market of 
the economy as a whole, wage differentials between rural and urban 
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labour markets result in labour moving from low wage rural areas to 
high wage urban areas and this results eventually in an equilibrium 
in the economy-wide labour market. Allowing for uncertainty the 
Harris-Todaro (1970) condition in the economy-wide labour market may 
be expressed as 
PW=W 
ma 
(2) 
where, Wm is the wage in the urban sector labour market, Wa is the 
wage in the rural labour market from which the migrant comes and P 
is the perceived probability of finding a job in the urban sector. 
, 
The equilibrium condition (2) allows us to compute the rate of 
unemployment in the urban sector with the assumption that the perceived 
probability of finding a job in the urban sector is given by : 
E 
E+U (3) 
where E is the number of jobs in the urban sector and U is the 
number of unemployed workers in that sector. The model described above 
makes certain assumptions about the urban labour market. One is that 
the periodic job selection process is random whenever the number of 
available jobs is exceeded by the number of job seekers. Another is 
that all jobs are turned over in each period. It is also assumed that 
the urban sector labour markets are homogeneous. 
Given Wm , Wa and E we can solve for usince 
(2) and (3) together imply that 
E Wa 
E+U T- 
m 
(4) 
Typically, in developing countries the ratio 
c a- 
equals 
'-S 
or 
m 
(Turnharn (1971)) so that (2) gives urban unemployment rate of 
67% or 75%. This would appear to be a considerable over-estimation 
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given that measured urban unemployment in LDC's is below 10% (Stern 
(1977)). 
More recently, extensions of migration models have been carried out 
in an attempt to get reasonable. predictions of urban unemployment. The 
assumption implicit in equation (3) of the model above , that all 
jobs are turned over in each period, has been examined critically by 
Johnson (1971). He introduces work-sharing arrangements between 
employed and unemployed members of the migrant families in his model 
to get lower' predicted unemployment levels in the urban areas. 
A major extension of the basic model. has been made by Fields (1974). 
He introduces expected utility as the potential migrants' maximand 
rather than'expected income. This enables greater flexibility in 
the prediction of unemployment rates since risk aversion of the individual 
is introduced into the argument. The model presents an explicit 
discussion of the perceived probability of finding a job. Features of 
the urban labour market like the existence of the informal sector and 
preferential hiring policies for specific groups such as the educated 
migrants are also considered explicitly, in the. extension. 
An important objective of the recent modifications in the Harris- 
Todaro model is to identify variables that can be easily observed and 
measured so that econometrically testable migration functions can be 
specified. ' It is hoped that such specifications will result both in 
more realistic predictions of urban unemployment as well as in the 
identification of important variables for policy recommendations. 
Several versions of the empirical migration functions based on 
the theory. outlined above have been estimated. Broadly speaking, 
two methodological approaches have been adopted. In one, 'macro' 
migration functions are estimated. The dependent variablepsually, 
is the number, of migrants (defined, for example, by their length of 
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stay) in the urban areas (Greenwood (1971a)) or the ratio of migrants 
to the potential migrants in the source areas (Barnum and Sabot (1975), 
Huntington (1974), Levi and Wadycki'(1972)) while the` explanatory 
variables are the regional characterstics of rural and urban areas 
determined by the theoretical models. Although such 'macro' functions 
are important in determining variables that induce inter-sectoral 
migration (such as. the difference in wage rates in the two sectors), 
they do not inform us about the characteristics of the migrant. Thus 
the distinction between the potential migrant. and the decision to 
actually migrate is not brought out. 
An alternative approach is to study 'micro' functions of migration. 
These functions enable us to determine the probability that an individual 
migrates. There are many examples of 'micro' functions-in the literature 
on migration. We shall consider in detail Hay's study (1974) in 
Tunisia. The objective of our discussion is to establish a point of 
departure for our own empirical investigations to be presented in 
Chapter 7. 
Hay's study is. a good example of an empirical migration function 
based on models that are concerned mainly with the impact of migration 
on the urban job markets. Hay writes his migration function as 
M f(S, Sk, INF, AGE,. AGE2, MAR, HAMAN, Yc) 
where M takes value I for migrant, 0 otherwise. 
S is years of schooling. 
Sk equals 1 when the potential migrant has job learned skills, 
0 otherwise. 
INF equals 1 when the potential migrant knows someone in the 
'-urban areas before migrating, 0 otherwise. 
MAR equals 1 for married migrants, 0 otherwise. 
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HAMAN equals the number of hectares per active man farmed 
by the potential migrant's household, 
Yc is the annual. cash income of ; the potential, migrant. from 
wages earned from non-farm employment in rural areas. 
It is hypothesized that S, Sk, INF and AGE encourage migration 
while AGE, HAMAN and Yc discourage migration. No a priori predictions 
are made about the influence of MAR on migration. 
It is not clear in Hay's migration function whether the potential 
migrant's decisions are based largely on his individualistic considerations 
or whether he is the head of household who, decides for other household 
members as well, by moving the whole household to the urban areas. The 
model is concerned with explaining the probability of finding a job in 
the urban areas which, in turn, implies a concern with the urban-end 
consequences of migration. It is clear that in Hay's migration function, 
except for HÄMAN and Yc , all the explanatory variables are urban-end 
variables in the sense that they determine the potential migrant's 
probability of-finding a job in the urban areas. If we assume that the 
decision making unit for which hay's migration function is relevant, is 
the individual migrant, the role of HAMAN is not clear. It may be 
interpreted as indicating that the potential migrant belongs to that 
class-of cultivators for whom the land-man ratio has reached the critical 
level so that, as head of household, the cultivator is prepared to 
abandon cultivation altogether. But this implied pattern of migration 
is contrary to what is observed in many LDC's. ' 
Empirical evidence from India and Pakistan (Stark (1975), Eckert 
(1972)) suggests that most of the migrants are unmarried, young and 
belong to cultivating households that continue to live in the village 
with crop cultivation as the major economic activity. Frequently, it is 
the recently matured son of the household who migrates (see Connell et at. 
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(1974)). Remittances from the migrant member to his household are 
commonly observed (Ali Mohammed (1973)). Thus the empirical evidence 
suggests, that'the decision to migrate may be a joint household decision, 
in which remittances from migrant members are seen as the result, of an 
attempt to allocate joint household resources. This suggests a need 
to take a closer look at models that emphasize village-end variables 
in a migration function in which the unit of observation is a 
household with potential migrant members. 
Empirical migration functions such as those of Hay discussed above 
are derived from models that specify income as the maximand rather than 
utility (see (1') above. If migration is the result of a decision to 
maximize, household welfare, the distinction may be quite, important. 
For example, an important variable subsumed in the vector x of (1) 
may be the disutility due to the psychic costs of breaking up the 
household unit (even if it is temporary as Stark (1975) has argued). It 
is not clear then whether this important factor should be simply 
subsumed in x. In a more realistic theoretical model it ought to 
have a more active role. We shall next consider models in which both 
village-end variables as well as utility are taken into account explicitly. 
We shall first consider a simple model of migration in which village- 
end variables are the ones that matter in arriving at decisions. The 
argument is usually made in terms of land-man ratio for a unit of 
observation (L. G. Reynolds (1969) and studies cited in J. Connell et al. 
(1974), Lipton (1976)). The argument may also be presented in terms of 
the available food per capita (Stark (1975)) where the observable unit 
is a cultivating household in the village. The production function is 
given by 
F g(H, L) (5) 
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where F is food, H is land and L is labour. 
Let the rate of growth of population for the observed unit be 
n and m the rate of migration. The rate of growth of labour force 
in the unit is (n-m) which is positive but less than n. We shall assume 
that the rate of growth of land is less than that of the labour force, i. e. 
d(log H) < d(log L) 
dt dt 
or to take a convenient special case 
d(log H) y d(log L) 
dt dt 
for0<y <1 
Now change in the available food per worker is given by : 
d(F/L) [IF dL 
+ 
aF dH 
L-F dL L2 (6) dt ai dt air d dt 
Now d(log L) 
a1 
dL 
n-m (7) dt L dt a 
so that dL dH - 
dt L(n - m)' and dt -y H(n-m) (8) 
Substituting (7) and (8) in (6) we have 
d(F/L) 
= 
(NPL L -+- MPH Hy- F) (n-m) (9) 
dt 
L 
Assuming that g displays constant returns-to scale and y<1 
the first expression of the right hand side of (9) is negative--so that 
the condition for d(FIL) to be positive is m>n. 
dt 
There is a simple intuitive argument underlying the model presented 
in equations (5) to (9). The argument is that typicallypin rural-economiesd 
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the-creation of employment opportunities does not keep pace with 
population growth since land is in fixed supply. This results in a 
fall in the available food per capita within the economic unit. - To 
check this from falling below some critical level the unit encourages 
migration. 
An interesting`fe-ature of'the model outlined above is that migration 
may result primarily from the rural-end considerations such as the fall 
in available food per'member in the economic unit below some acceptable 
critical level. 'This simple model has been extended and made'more 
realistic in a number of'ways by Stark (1975). We shall discuss his 
model next: 
Stark begins by establishing the unit of observation in his model. 
He quotes evidence that suggests that typically a migrant is a young, 
unmarried male (often the recently matured eldest son ) who has strong 
links with the rural household. ' These links are maintained after 
migration through a steady flow of remittances back to the family farm. 
At any point in time the equilibrium for the household regarding 
its allocation of endowments of land and labour, is determined by the 
condition that the marginal utility of labour used to produce food on the 
family farm equals the marginal disutility of labour. 
This static equilibrium of the'household cultivating land with 
traditional technology is disturbed over time by the changing demographic 
structure of. the family. The food requirements of a growing family 
increase with the result that the marginal utility of food rises over 
time. This process continues till the oldest son reaches maturity. At 
the time of his-maturity the household may choose between allocating 
the maturing son's labour on the family farm or encouraging him to 
migrate to an urban job market. This decision depends crucially on 
the nature of the production function. It is argued by Stark that under 
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traditional methods of cultivation, food output is inelastic with 
respect to labour. An alternative for the household, is to shift to 
a different production function characterized by new technology. 
Typically, inputs required by the new technology are high yield variety 
seeds and fertilizer. 
Shifting to the new production function requires the existence of,, 
investable surplus as well as the ability to bear greater risk (if 
higher, risks are associated with the new technology). If rural capital 
markets function properly the required surplus could be borrowed. Also 
if crop insurance exists, risks associated with the new technology may, 
be dispersed. However, given that capital markets. are notoriously 
imperfect and crop insurance does not exist, the twin objectives 
of accumulating, investible surplus and risk dispersion may be achieved 
through migration. Remittances from the migrant sons provide funds for 
purchasing the new inputs and at the same time, by providing an alternative 
source of income, allows the household 'to disperse risks associated with 
the new technology. Assuming the existence of surplus labour on'the 
farm an additional source of surplus may be the food foregone by the 
migrant son. 
There are a number of stages in the argument where things could 
go wrong and the resulting surplus may not be as big as the model 
predicts. For example, the son may sever links with the family once 
he is in the city or he may not get a job and may have to be supported 
by his household for some time. Also, there may be considerable 
uncertainty in getting an urban job so that risk dispersion may not 
be achieved perfectly. 
The model discussed-above may be contrasted with that of (1). 
It will be seen that the main difference lies in the relative importance 
given to the urban-end variables in the former and the village-end 
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variables in the latter. Further, -the decision-making process in, 
the latter suggests, joint household decisions while-the models underlying 
(1) usually argue in terms of an individual migrant optimizing income 
or utility. - The implications of the two approaches for empirical 
migration functions are also likely to be different. 
In Chapter 7 we shall develop a migration function in which village- 
end variables are considered important. Using a dummy dependent variable 
we shall attempt to estimate the probability of a household having a 
migrant member. This will require a discussion of probit analysis 
which, we shall argue, is the appropriate procedure for estimating the 
probability of migration. 
Section 2.5 Concluding Remarks 
Our discussion in this chapter indicates some important theoretical 
and empirical aspects of the four issues that concern us in this study. 
For each of the issues we have traced the development of the theoretical 
arguments and indicated the main controversies. We also discussed 
some empirical evidence and methodological issues. 
An important objective of our discussion was to present a theoretical 
analysis of the role of rural factor markets in the four issues discussed 
in this study. We argued that rural land and labour markets are 
important in explaining the relationship between size and productivity. 
Tenancy is also influenced in an important way by these two factor 
markets. We suggested arguments indicating that credit market is 
important for tenancy and also in determining access to modern inputs 
and that it may influence the size-productivity relationship as well. 
Similarly, rural-urban migration was discussed in the context of 
operations in labour and credit markets. The discussion has been 
presented to point out the importance of linkages between different 
rural factor markets and hence between the four issues that we propose 
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to study. For example, we have., argued that the issues of rural-urban 
migration and access to modern inputs are inter-linked through the 
working of rural credit markets. We shall refer to such linkages 
throughout our discussion in this study. 
In this chapter we have presented the theoretical and empirical 
background for our more specific hypotheses that will be developed 
and tested using data from Khanewal and the four villages. Thus in 
Chapter 3 we shall look closely at. the empirical evidence regarding 
factor market linkages. Size-productivity relationship and the 
hypotheses explaining it will be taken up in Chapter 4. The two 
theoretical positions regarding tenurial efficiency will be put to 
empirical test in Chapter 5. Access to technology will be the topic 
in Chapter 6 and, finally, a migration model that emphasizes rural-end 
variables will be developed and tested in Chapter 7. The discussion 
in these chapters will be presented with the objective of both testing 
the different theoretical positions. indicated in this chapter as well 
as to suggest some new arguments. r 
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CHAPTER 3 
The ' Markets '' 
Section 3.0 Introduction 
A description of operations in the factor markets is important in 
providing the background in the context of which we shall present our 
analysis in the chapters that follow. In this chapter we shall 
describe the functioning of four important rural markets. These are 
markets for land, tenancy, credit and labour. We are using the word 
market, here, in a much wider sense than the interpretation usually 
given to it by economists. Thus we shall be concerned with a description 
of arrangements in land, tenancy, credit and labour markets by which 
resources exchange hands in our villages. We shall also present a 
descriptionof the agents who participate in these markets. 
In our discussion of the land market in Section 3.1 we shall be 
concerned with the distribution of land amongst the cultivating households 
in the four villages. We shall define our measure of farm area and compare 
its distribution with that of land owned by cultivating households in 
each village. Gini coefficients will be estimated to make these comparisons. 
We shall argue that tenancy markets are important in determining the 
re-allocation of land to make adjustments to factor endowments of. cultivators. 
For example, there may be a high concentration of land amongst the large 
size farms if we consider land distribution by ownership alone. The 
distribution may be less concentrated if we take into account operational 
holdings. This may indicate that operations in the tenancy market enable 
cultivators with excess endowments of labour (given land) to enter into 
an exchange with others who have an excess of land (given labour). 
Operations in the tenancy market will be described in Section 3.2 
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This discussion will be based on evidence collected in our survey of 
farmers in Khanewal. Earlier (in Chapter 1) we discussed the usefulness 
of evidence from Khanewal for our, discussion of the tenancy market. We 
argued that markets for tenancy in Khanewal are similar to those of the 
two irrigated villages, Mehdiabad and Chak. The discussion in this 
chapter is important as a background to the analysis of Chapter 5. 
Given that relevant information is not available in. the two villages, 
data from Khanewal are useful in supplementing the evidence on tenancy 
from the other two villages. Our discussion of the tenancy market will 
provide evidence on the degree of competition amongst the potential 
tenants and landowners. This may indicate the relative bargaining 
power of share-croppers and landowners which, in turn, may influence the 
rental contract. We shall analyse the contract in detail. The 
objective will be to determine the procedure by which contracts are 
enforced to achieve tenurial efficieny. Thus, the choice, of the inputs 
stipulated in the contract, the method of, stipulation, the cost-sharing 
arrangements and" the supervision practices of landowners will be the subject 
of our discussion in Section 3.2. 
In Section 3.3 we shall presenta discussion of the credit markets 
in'our four villages and in Khanewal. Because of the difficulties of 
obtaining quantitative information on rural credit, our discussion will 
focus mainly on the qualitative information. We shall describe the 
agents involved in transactions in this market both on the supply as 
well as the demand side. We shall attempt to determine how rural 
factor markets are inter-linked. For example, we shall investigate 
the importance of landowners as a source of credit for tenants. We shall 
also determine whether agents control both commodity markets as-well 
as the market for credit. We shall then comment on the difference 
between implicit and explicit interest rates. On the demand side, we 
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shall investigate whether tenure and size are important in determining 
access to credit. Evidence will also be discussed in an attempt to 
distinguish between consumption and production loans. 
Finally in Section 3.4 we shall discuss the available evidence in 
the three villages and in Khanewal on the operations in the labour 
market.. Linkages between land and labour markets on the one hand, and 
between land and the commodity exchange markets on the others will be 
discussed. Evidence on permanent hired labour and seasonal labour 
employment opportunities on farms of different sizes and for different 
crops will be presented. 
Section 3.1 The land market 
The distribution of land 
A comprehensive measure of land distribution amongst the cultivating 
households in our villages will indicate a number interesting economic 
facts. The firsx is the distribution of assets in the village. Land 
is the most valuable asset on the farm compared to other assets such as, 
the value of livestock, farm machinery and implementsiand farm buildings. 
The proportion of the value of other assets to the value of land is quite 
low. Besides, the value of other assets is likely to be related to the 
value of land given the complementarity between the two. Secondly, the 
index of distribution of land amongst the cultivating households may 
reflect their relative social status in the village. ' This may determine 
access to inputs such as labour (through"greater bargaining power) and 
other modern inputs (through access to the Government supply system). In 
the discussion that follows we shall focus on the distribution of land 
in the four villages. 
Our measure of farm area throughout the discussion in this study 
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is the operational holding. -We shall define operational holding as 
land owned by a household plus land rented in minus land rented out. 
Thus our measure describes the farm area actually cultivated by households 
at the time of the survey. It may be called, the_net asset position of 
the hosehold where land cultivated is the asset and it takes into account 
the adjustments made by households regarding access to plots.. - For 
example, a household may own n plots of, land and n-1 of these may 
be contiguous while the nth plot may lie at a distance which may 
raise costs of cultivation (when plots are contiguous there are economies 
in digging irrigation ditches, ploughing and protection of crops from 
stray livestock and theft). The households may decide to rent out this 
plot in exchange for a plot rented in from another household which may 
be nearer the n-1 plots. Plots may also be exchanged for their 
suitability for growing different crops. A1solplots may be of unequal 
soil fertilityýso that exchange may result in a large plot being rented 
out and a comparatively smaller plot being rented in. Such exchange 
arrangements were widely reported in all four villages. Net land rented 
in (land rented in - land rented out) by households may also reflect 
adjustments to complimentary inputs such as family labour and draught 
power - given imperfections'in the markets for complementary inputs. 
(This discussion will be taken up in detail in Chapter 5. ) 
An alternative way to'look at land distribution in the village is 
to consider the distribution of land owned. We argued in Chapter 1 
that the issues that we shall be concerned with in this study concern 
mainly the cultivating households in the villages so that we have not 
analysed data on non-cultivating households such as the absentee land- 
lords, landless labourers and village artisans and shopkeepers. 
Therefore, it would not be very useful to discuss the distribution of 
land in terms of a measure such as land owned without taking into 
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account households who lie at the extremes of the distribution and 
who are, usually, absentee landlords and landless labourers. Bearing 
this in mind, we shall present only a summary statistic (such'as the" 
Gini coefficient) of the distribution of land ownership amongst cultivating 
households in the four villages. Using this statistic we shall compare 
the distribution of land owned and land cultivated and comment on the 
role of the tenancy market in changing the distribution of land. 
The distributions of operational holdings amongst the cultivating 
households in-the four villages are given in Tables 3.1 - 3.4. 
In Khunda (Table 3.1) there are 14 farms that cultivate less than 
5 acres each. A majority of these are tenanted holdings where land 
is rented in from one of the three big Ialiks ' (landlords) who own 
land in the'village. At the other extreme of the distribution there 
is one farm which spreads over 375 acres of good, -fertile land. It 
belongs to one of the more 'progressive' self -cultivating, 'Maliks'. 
Majority of the cultivators in the village lie in the 7.5 -12.5 size-category 
They are mostly owner-cultivators who cultivate, on average, about 
11 acres each. -Altogether they cultivate nearly 
18%-of the land. in 
the village. 12.5-25.0 size-category is also prominent where nearly 
30% of the farms and 26% of the land in the village is concentrated. 
Most of the farms here are owner-cum-tenant farms. The non-cultivating 
'Maliks' in the village have been active in the national politics of. 
the country. Both, because of the. size of their holdings and their 
strong connections in the Government, they wield considerable influence 
in the village. They have successfully circumvented the three major 
land reforms 
11 introduced by the Government. However, there is a long 
1/. The land reforms were initiated by the Government of Daultana 
(1951-52), Ayub Khan (1960-61) and Bhutto (1971-72). 
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Table 3.1 Distribution of operational Holdings in Khunda 
Size-category Number of farms Percentage Acres Percentage 
Under 1 acre 
1.0-2.5 acres 4 2 5.50 0.13 
2.5-5.0 acres 10 5 39.00 0.90 
5.0-7.5 acres 17 9 115.35- 2.67 
7.5-12.5 acres 72 37 799.50 18.53 
12.5-25.0 acres 57 29.5 1142.25 26.47 
25.0-50.0 acres 22. 11. 778.10 18.02 
50.0-150.0 acres, 11 6 1061.20 24.58 
Above 150 acres 1 . 0.5 375.00, 8.69 
TOTAL . 
194 100, 4315.90 . 100 
* Operational Holding = Landowned + Land rented in - Land rented out 
Table 3.2 Distribution of operational Holdings in Jatli 
Size-category 
Number of Percentage Acres Percentage 
Under 1 acre 15 9 11.87 0.99 
1-2.5 acres 20 12 39.38 3.28 
2.5-5.0 acres 67 39 257.26 21.43 
5.0-7.5 acres 15 9 90.56 7.55 
7.5-12.5 acres 34 20 324.25 27.00 
12.5-25.0 acres 16 9 27600 23.00 
25.0-50.0 acres 2 1 60.00' 5.00 
50.0-150 acres 2 1 141.00 11.75 
Above 150 acres 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 171 100 1200.32 100 
* Operational Holding - Land owned + Land rented in -'Land rented out 
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and interesting history of tenant-landlord struggle over tenancy and 
ownership rights in land in the village. A detailed account of this 
history is presented in a paper by a member of the Islamabad research 
team (see Nigar Ahmed (1980)). 
Our other 'barani' village, Jatli, is a village of fragmented 
holdings with a large number of farms cultivating very small plots of 
land. Table-3.2 shows that 50% of the farms in the village cultivate 
less than 5 acres each. Altogether, such farms account for nearly 
25% of the land in the village. At the other extreme there are two 
holdings in the village in the 50-150 acre size-category. Between 
them they cultivate 12% of the land in the village. These are owned 
by families with a long tradition of serving in the military. Although 
their influence in the village is quite strong, there are fewer tensions 
between them and the rest of the cultivators as compared to Khunda. 
This'is partly accounted for by the fact that they are mainly self- 
cultivators who do not rent out land on'tenancy. Owner-cum-tenant 
farms are concentrated mainly in the 7.5-12.5 acre size-category. 
Altogether, ' 20% of the farms and 27% of the land in the village is 
cultivated in this size-category. 
In Table 3.3 we have presented the distribution of operational 
holdings in Mehdiabad. It can be seen that nearly 20% of the farms- 
cultivate less than 5 acres each. Altogether they cultivate 3% of the 
land in the village. At the other extreme are 7 farms, belonging to 
the descendants of'Syed Mehdi Shah, who., between them, cultivate nearly 
48% of the land in the village. Syed Mehdi Shah came to the village 
at the turn of the century soon after the area was settled by the 
British Government (previously he owned land in District Attock)and 
brought with him tenants as well as technical know-how. His farming 
practices were cited as an example to other farmers in the area by the 
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British revenue officers. He started his farm on an estate of 525 acres. 
Since then more land has been added by his descendants to the total area 
originally cultivated. "Some land is also rented in. The influence ofv 
the Syed family is an important factor in the socio-economic life of 
the village. Most of the cultivators in the village (33% of the total) 
belong to the 7.5-12.5 size-category and cultivate between them 17% 
of the land. A majority of the pure tenants in the village lie in the 
12.5-25 acre size-category while most of the owner-cum-tenants are 
concentrated in the 2.5-5.0 acre size-category. The practice in the 
village is that large landowners (there are 9 non-cultivating landlords 
in the village) rent, out land in large blocks to carefully selected 
tenants who are well-known for their husbandry, skills. Typically, such 
tenants do not own any land of their own. 
The distribution of operational holdings in our other canal-irrigated 
village, Chak 305, is presented in Table 3.4. There area large number 
of medium-sized farms in Chak (45% of the farms cultivate 66% of the total 
area) cultivating on average 13.67 acres each. Another 40% of the farms 
cultivate less than 5 acres each. There is only one large farm in the 
village, cultivating about 52 acres of land. Because of this pattern 
of land distribution there is no dominant family in the village and the 
spirit of co-operation and mutual help is quite strong. The incidence 
of tenancy is quite low. Most of the tenants rent in land on fixed-rent 
tenancy and also own some land (see Table 1.1, Chapter 1). They are 
concentrated mainly in the 7.5-12.5 acre size-category. 
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Table 3.3 Distribution of operational Holdings in Mehdiabad 
Size-category Number of farms Percentage Acres Percentage 
Under 1 acre 0 0 0 0 
1-2.5 acres 6 8.57 11.25 
. 
0.75 
2.5-5.0 acres 8 11.42 30.62 2.04 
5.0-7.5 acres 8 11.42 51.66 3.44 
7.5-12.5-acres 23 32.86 253.24 16.85 
12.5-25.0 acres 11 15.71 204.15 13.58 
25.0-50.0 acres 7 10.00 235.27 15.65 
50.0-150.0 acres 6 8.57 542.00 36.06 
Above 150 acres 1 1.43 175.00 11.64 
TOTAL 70 100 1503.19. 100 
Operational holding - Land owned + Land rented in - Land rented out 
Table 3.4. Distribution' of operational Holdings* in Chak 305 
Size-category Number of farms Percentage Acres Percentage 
Under 1 acre 3 2.73 3.00 0.29 
1-1.25 acres 7 6.36 12.41 1.21 
2.5-5.0 acres 34 30.91 131.00 12.74 
5.0-7.5 acres 13 11.82 80.30 7.81 
7.5-12.5 acres 33, 30.00 339.63 33.04 
12.5-25.0 acres 17 15.46 343.75 33.44 
25.0-50.0 acres 2 1.82 66.0 6.42 
50.0-150.0 acres -1 0.91 51.99 5.06 
Above 150 acres 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 110 100 1028.08 100 
Operational holding - Land owned +t Land rented in - Land rented out 
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We shall next discuss the summary statistic that'we shall use to 
compare the distributions of operational holdings and land ownership in 
the four villages. 
The measure that we have used to evaluate inequality of land 
distribution amongst the cultivators in our four villages is the Gini 
coefficient, It may be written as : 
G1 (Hý - Hi) (1) 
2n2H 
i 
1- 
2n2H 
i Min ( H. - Hi) (2) 
a1+ (1/H) -( 2/n 
2H) (H1 + H2 + ..... + nHn) (3) 
for H1 > H2 > ....... > nHn 
where n, : the number of cultivators 
IT : the mean. size of. holding 
H. : the size of holding of the ith cultivator 
ij : identify cultivators i, 'j :" ' 
One way of looking at the Gini coefficient is in terms of the Lorenz 
curve depicted below. 
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In Figure 3.1 the percentage of the bottom x'% of the cultivators 
in the total farming population of the village is represented on the 
horizontal line while the percentage of land cultivated by the bottom x% 
of the cultivators is given on the vertical line. If land is perfectly 
equally distributed the Lorenz curve is identical with the 45° line 
and the value of the Gini coefficient is 0. Any distribution away from 
perfect equality_pushes the Lorenz curve towards the bottom right-hand 
corner of the box and thus increases the size of the shaded area which 
is measured by the value of the Gini coefficient. 
Each of the expressions (1) - (3) for the Gini coefficient has its 
own interpretation.. Thusy(1) suggests that if a cultivator with a smaller 
holding, in any pairwise comparison, feels inferior and if this feeling 
can be measured to be proportional to the difference in the size of 
holding between the two, then the Gini coefficient is the addition of 
all such feelings. The welfare 'function underlying the Gini-coefficient 
can be identified in expression (2). The welfare function is such that 
the level of-welfare for any pair of cultivators is given by the minimum 
of the two cultivators. Finally, (3) suggests that the implicit welfare 
function underlying the Gini-coefficient is a rank order weighted sum 
of different person's size of holding. As such, it is sensitive not to 
the various sizes of holding but to the number of cultivators falling 
between the size-categories. This is a weakness of the measure. Another 
weakness is that it does not imply a strictly concave welfare function 
(which is a particularly desirable property when discussing social welfare - 
Atkinson (1970)). 
With this discussion of the definition and the problems surrounding 
the Gini-coefficient, we are now ready to look at. the value of the 
coefficient measuring the distribution of land-among cultivators in our 
villages. These are given in Table 3.5. In the Table, two sets of 
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values are given. The first row gives the values of Gini-coefficients. 
for the distribution of land owned . by the cultivators while the 
second row gives the values for operational holding. The values of, 
the ratio of the two coefficients are given in the third row. 
Table 3.5 Gini coefficients of land holding in the four villa 
Village Khunda Jatli Mehdiabad" Chak 
Gini coefficient , 
Gini coefficient 1 0.64 0.49 0.63 0.43 
(land owned) 
Gini coefficient II 0.48 0.47 0.59 0.42 
(operational holdings) 
Ratio of I &'II 1.33 1.04 1.07 1.02 
It must be remembered that our measures of inequality are likely 
to be underestimated since the holdings of non-cultivating landowners 
have been excluded from our calculation. Underestimation may-also be" 
due to the exclusion of the landless-in the village. 
The values of the Gini coefficient given in the second row of 
the table allow a comparison of the distribution of operational 
holdings in the four villages. We can see straight away from the 
values that land is unequally distributed in all the villages. However, 
Mehdiabad stands out sharply against the other villages in that land 
is more unqually distributed in this village compared to the others. 
We saw earlier that in Mehdiabad most of the land is owned 
by the Syed family. 'The remaining land is cultivated by a large 
number of small farmers. It is interesting to note in 
Khunda that despite. the presence of : three or four big 'Maliks' 
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who own most, of the land in the village, the distribution of landholdings 
is no worse than in Jatli where the largest holdings are fewer and smaller 
in size. This is explained by our observation noted earlier that only 
one of the big 'Maliks'in Khunda self-cultivates his land. The others 
rent theirs out to a large number of small cultivators. The importance 
of the tenancy market in the redistribution may be seen clearly by 
considering the first row in Table 3.5 which gives the values of the 
Gini-coefficients of land owned in the four villages. In both Jatli 
and Chak the incidence of tenancy is low so that the values of the-two 
Gini--coefficients are not very different. In Khunda and Medhdiabad, 
however, tenancies are widespread. Consequently the values of the Gini- 
coefficientI are higher than those of Gini-coefficient II. (The difference 
in the values would be even greater if we include non-cultivating 
landlords and landless labourers in the calculation of the Gini-coefficient 
I. ) The third row in Table 3.5 gives the values of the ratio of Gini- 
coefficientsI and II. This value is highest in Khunda which underlines 
the importance-of the tenancy market in this village. 
It is useful to compare our values of the, Gini-coefficient for-the 
four villages with those for Pakistan and Punjab reported by Naseem (1979). 
Using very aggregate data from the agricultural census, 1972, Naseem 
gives the values of Gini-coefficientsl and II for Punjab to be 0.63. 
and 0.48 respectively. Thus, except in Mehdiabad , the distribution of 
operational holdings in our villages is not very different from Punjab 
as a whole. Further, the comparison of values of Gini-coefficient I 
in our villages with that of Punjab indicates that the pattern of land 
ownership in Khunda and Mehdiabad is more typical of the Punjab pattern 
as compared to the pattern in Jatli and Chak. 
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Concluding remarks 
Our discussion of the land market indicates that land ownership in 
all four villages is concentrated amongst the large owners. However, 
transactions in the land market occur frequently in all the villages' 
through the market for tenancies. These markets enable landless tenants 
to have access to land, on the onehand, and on the other allow landowners 
with land in excess of their labour endowments to acquire labour. In 
this manner land markets are closely inter-linked with markets for 
labour. 
The importance of tenancy in redistributing land raises a number 
of issues. One is the, issue of the incidence of tenancy which requires 
a discussion of the determinants of tenancy and will be taken up in 
Chapter 5, Section5.2. Another issue. is this ; it. may be argued that 
the redistribution of land through operations in the tenancy market 
enables the cultivation of excess land which would, otherwise, perhaps 
not be cultivated, or it may be cultivated inefficiently compared to 
cultivation by tenants (landowners may be reluctant to sell land for 
a number of reasons connected with the security of land as an asset 
and also because of the social status attached to land ownership). _ 
An, 
alternative procedure would be to achieve redistribution through land 
reform whereby land is transferred to other cultivators giving them 
ownership rights in the land. We may compare the two methods of 
redsitributing land by determining whether tenants are as efficient 
as owner-cultivators in resource allocation on the farm. This will 
be the topic of our discussion in Chapter 5, Section 5.1. 
Section 3.2 Tenancy contracts 
In Chapter 2, Section 2.2 we discussed the theory of share-cropping 
tenancy. We stressed that the nature of the contract is important in 
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determining the economic efficiency of different tenurial arrangements. 
Thus the Marshallian tradition that asserts tenurial inefficiency assumes 
that the decisions regarding resource allocation on the rented farm 
are made by the tenant alone. We then discussed theoretical models 
that suggest that with proper supervision, input stipulation and cost- 
sharing arrangements landowners can ensure that their share-cropping 
tenants allocate resources efficiently. In this section we shall present 
a general discussion of share--cropping arrangements on the basis of 
evidence collected in Khanewal. (Later, in Chapter 5, we shall give 
a general description of contracts in the four villages. ) Our main 
objective will be to identify the factors contributing to the land- 
. owner's 
bargaining strength that enableshim to stipulate levels of 
inputs in the contracts. This involves a detailed discussion of the 
market for tenancies and the terms of the contract under which tenancies 
are held. We shall attempt to gauge the landowner's bargaining strength 
by observing the behaviour and responses of tenants regarding agricultural 
activity. We shall determine whether some of the landowner's bargaining 
power can be explained by his control over'other input markets such-as 
labour and capital and the'degree of his influence in markets for 
agricultural output. A detailed discussion of'the sharing arrangements 
will be presented. 
Evidence on the terms and conditions governing share-cropping 
contracts was collected in a survey conducted in Khanewal subdivision 
of the Punjäb. We have already described the survey in detail in 
Section 1.2 of Chapter 1. For the purposes of this section it is important 
to remember that in our sample of 90 farmers, 54 were share-croppers 
chosen from ten villages to reflect the settlement schemes adopted in 
different areas within Khanewal subdivision. 
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Size of the plot 
Share-croppers in our sample - usually. come from a traditional 
cultivator background. 28% of the sampled share-croppers reported 
owning some land before acquiring the current status of a landless 
share-cropper (we did not include owner-cum-tenants in our sample). 
The average-size of plots, once owned, was 4 acres. 12% of the share- 
croppers reported having relatives who own, land, while 30Z have 
relatives who are also share-croppers. 
The average size 'of holding of a tenant in our sample is 14.07 
acres with a standard deviation of 7.98. The smallest tenant cultivator 
has 2 acres and the largest 50 acres. The 14 acre holding is also the 
modal plot in-our sample. ` In Khanewal size of the plot is often 
measured in terms of bullock capacity rather than acreage. Thus a 
14 acre plot corresponds to a pair of standard bullock capacity to 
plough for a crop season. Clearly, some adjustment is made due to 
differences in the quality`of land. 
We shall now present arguments to ascertain whether the 14 acre 
unit - if it were to be considered the equilibrium size of the share- 
cropped plot -- could have resulted from a Cheungian process in which 
the landowner selects the number of plots, or the Marshallian, whereby 
the tenant is free to choose the amount of land he cultivates. 
In the Marshallian framework a tenant increases income by increasing 
the size of holding. Bullock capacity is not a binding constraint on 
the tenant since his objective is extensive cultivation (see Section 2.2, 
Chapter 2), which may be achieved by spreading the existing endowments 
of labour and bullock power over a large land area. Our evidence that 
tenants usually own a pair of bullocks that can cultivate 14 acres in 
a season suggests, however, that the constraint of bullock capacity may be 
binding on the tenant. Thus the Marshallian reasoning is not a convincing 
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explanation of the size of the plot in our sample. 
Cheung's analysis suggests that given the share-proportion a 
landowner may extract more rent from the tenant by reducing the size 
of plot with the constraint that the tenant's income does not fall 
below what he could earn in the labour market (see Section'2.2, Chapter 
2). Given that astandard pair of bullocks cultivate 12-14 acres of 
land, a reduction below this size is likely to result in excess capacity 
of bullocks (and of human labour because of the high correlation between 
the two in agriculture). Given the difficulties for cultivators of 
obtaining seasonal employment, this is likely to lower the tenant's income 
compared to what he could earn as a permanent labourer. On the other 
hand, a larger"plot, "given the share proportion, is likely, to reduce 
the landowner's total income., It appears, therefore, that while the 
landowner has the bargaining power to determine the size of plot, 
he is constrained not only by the tenant's opportunity cost of foregone 
income A la Cheung, but also by bullock capacity. The. latter constraint 
may become lesg'important with increasing mechanization. A detailed - 
discussion of the impact of mechanization on the tenurial contract will 
be presented in Chapter 5. 
The market for tenancies 
Clearly, the degree of a landowner's bargaining'strength is likely 
to influence the nature of, the tenurial contract regarding input 
stipulation and cost-sharing arrangements. It may be argued that this 
strength is greater if several small tenants bargain with a few large 
landowners who act as monopolists in-the tenancy market. Alternatively, 
tenants are likely to have greater bargaining strength compared to 
landowners if land is rented in from several relatively small landowners. 
We shall examine this issue empirically. 
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Out of our 54 sampled share-croppers, 27 (50%) rent in land from 
one main landowner, 18 (33%) rent in land from at least two landowners, 
while only 9 (17%) rent in land from three landowners. It appears that 
sharecroppers in Khanewal distinguish between three types of landowners 
on the basis of the size of holding and the amount of land rented from 
each. - The main landowner usually owns a large amount of land (our 
sample average is 101.54 acres) and is-the main source of'share-cropped 
land. The second landowner is relatively small (sample average is 43.85 
acres) and the third landowner is smaller still (sample-average is 10.81 
acres). Thus the second and third landowners are relatively less important 
sources of rented land. 
Land owned by most landowners is in large contiguous units. The 
average number of fragments per farm being 1.42. x: There are a few 
exceptions to this pattern. At least one landowner's holding was 
divided into 9 fragments and another's into 6 fragments. 74% of the' 
main landowners had all their land in the same village. We noted three 
landowners who-owned land in other districts so that the average distance 
amongst the plots was over 50 miles. In most cases of fragmented 
holdings,, where fragments of land were owned outside one village, the 
average-distance between fragments was less than 4 miles. 
Our evidence suggests that although some share-croppers rent in 
land from more than one landowner the main source of rented land is 
usually one big landowner. Land is rented in from other landowners 
only if it. is contiguous with the land already rented in the village. 
Share-croppers reported that typically the main landowner has three 
other share-cropping tenants while the less important landowners have 
at least one other share-cropping tenant. All three categories of 
landowners have some land under self-cultivation and/or under fixed- 
rent tenancies. Most share-croppers thought that there was no difference 
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in the quality of land they rented in and the land self-cultivated by 
the landowner and/or rented out by him on fixed-rent leases. 
The overall picture that emerges suggests that typically-the 
rental'contract is negotiated in a situation where landless, traditional 
cultivators are confronted by fairly large landowners who have a 
reasonably good knowledge of cultivation practices given that they also 
self cultivate land. Thus while stipulating inputs on share-cropped 
land, landowners or their representatives may expect an allocation of 
resources that is at least comparable to that of the otherýallocatively 
efficient) tenurial, arrangements. 
The relative strength of share-croppers and landowners in the market 
for tenancies is likely to be influenced not only by the available 
opportunities in other markets (fixed-share tenancies or self-cultivation 
for landowners and wage employment for tenants) but also by the availability 
of other similar contracts in the market for share-cropping tenancies. 
All the share croppers we interviewed thought, without exception, that 
it would be quite easy for their landowners to get other share-croppers. 
On the other hand only 30(56%) of share-croppers thought they could 
rent land easily on share-cropping contracts from other landowners. 
Only 13 (24%) share-croppers thought that they could get land in the 
same or nearby villages (within. a radius of 4 miles). Most of the 
difficulties of obtaining other contracts were reported to be on account 
of what we may describe as search costs. Negotiations for tenancy 
contracts are conducted, typically, at the beginning of the kharif 
season. In Khanewal the period between rabi (wheat) and kharif 
(cotton) seasons is quite brief. This results in high search costs of 
obtaining new contracts, - particularly when some travelling is involved. 
The cost is usually perceived in terms of the impact on yields of late 
sowing of the kharif crop. 
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Our brief discussion of the market for share-cropping tenancies 
suggests that it is likely tobe a seller's market. This implies that 
landowners are likely to have a relatively strong bargaining' position 
compared to the share-cropping tenants. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
suppose that landowners can stipulate inputs to ensure efficient 
allocation by their share-croppers ä la Cheung. We shall next discuss 
the inputs stipulated by the landowners and the cost-sharing arrangements 
contracted on share-cropped land. 
Input stipulation and cost-sharing 
In labour intensive agriculture input stipulation may be achieved 
by specifying the intensity of effort, i. e. labour effort per acre. 
The supervision costs of ensuring 'appropriate' labour effort per acre 
are likely to be quite high. Less costly alternatives may be the 
stipulation of mandays per crop or the number of household members 
working on the plot. Both these checks of labour effort are used by 
landowners. However, the most effective method and the least demanding 
in terms of supervision is to stipulate activities. Most agricultural 
activities in Khanewal are labour intensive. At the same time they 
reflect technical norms (e. g. the number of ploughings, irrigations 
and weedings per acre). The sequential nature of these activities also 
helps to reduce the cost of supervision forthe landlord. In our discussion 
of the empirical evidence, input stipulation by the landowner will be 
interpreted as activity stipulation. 
Restricting ourselves to wheat crop only, six major agricultural 
activities can be identified for our sampled farmers. These are : canal 
irrigation, tube--well irrigation, bullock ploughing, fertilizer application 
and seed application. The level of activity is determined by the number 
of times each activity is performed for the first four activities 
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and quantities applied for the last-two. We shall be concerned., 
primarily with-the share-cropper's. response to our question regarding 
decision-making on agricultural activities., Whether the, level of 
each activity (e. g. the number of ploughings and irrigations) of a- 
share cropper is the same as that of cultivators under other tenurial 
arrangemnts is an interesting issue. in itself and will be discussed 
in Chapter 6. 
We argued earlier that when tenants are free to make decisions 
concerning resource allocation, we have a situation characterised by 
Marshallian inefficiency. In Table 3.6, column 2 illustrates' this 
argument in terms of ' decisions' regarding agricultural activities. 
More than 50% of the share-croppers in our sample reported that they 
were free to choose' the level of. activities, the exception being 
fertilizer application. We shall interpret column. 3, which indicates-, 
joint decision making by the landowner and tenant to be the Cheungian 
input stipulation case since, given their strong bargaining position, 
landowners' 'suggestions' are likely to carry more weight in this 
decision-making process. Column 4, then, captures the response of the 
exceptionally 'frank' Cheungian tenant who admits to the landowner., 
being the real decision-maker,. On the basis of the response presented 
in Table 3.6 one might be led to conclude that input stipulation in 
the Cheungian sense is less frequently witnessed in Khanewal as 
compared to the Marshallian situation where the tenant has the freedom 
to decide. 
In Table 3.7 we have presented tenants' response to our question 
regarding cost-sharing arrangements. Column 4 indicates that more than 
50% of the share-croppers report that landowners share half of the costs 
(i. e. the same share-proportion as in output) of canal irrigation, tube- 
well irrigation and-tractor ploughing. A vast majority of the tenants 
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bear all the costs of'bullöck ploughing and seeds. I It is interesting` 
to note that despite joint decision-makiig regarding fertilizers most 
of the costs are borne'by the share-croppers. Another notable feature' 
is that where tractor cultivation is concerned3tenants pay, at most, 
2/3rds of the cost - never full as in the case of some other inputs. 
Finally, only two share-croppers reported that their landowners pay 
all the costs of canal irrigation. This was done (we were told) to 
conceal share-cropping tenancy from the Government functionaries. The 
costs of canal irrigation are paid to the canal 'patwari' and records 
indicating cost-sharing of irrigation may be used as evidence of share- 
cropping tenancies and subjected to land reform regulations. 
Table 3.6 Activity stipulation on share-cropped tenancies in Khanewal 
(1) 
Activities 
(2) 
Tenant's 
decision 
entirely 
(3) 
Joint 
decision 
(4) 
Landowner's 
decision 
entirely 
(5) 
Number of 
share- 
croppers 
Total 
1. Canal irrigation 39, (75) 12 (23) 1 (2) 52 
2. Tube-well irrigation 23 (52) 21 (48) - 44 
3. Bullock ploughing 46 (92), - 4( 8) - . 
50 
4. Tractor ploughing 31 (89) 4 (11) - 35 
5. Fertilizer applicatio 18 (35) 32 (62) 2 (3) 52 
6. Seed application 24 (56) 19 (44) - 43 
Figures in brackets are percentages 
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Table 3.7 Cost-sharing proportions on share-cropped tenancies in Khanewal 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All 1/3 1/2 . All Number Tenant Landowner Landowner Landowner of share- 
Activities 
croppers 
Total 
1. Canal irrigation 4( 8) 1( 2) 45 (87) 2 (3) 52 
2. Tube-well irrigation 1( 2) 1, ( 2) 42 (96) - 44 
3. Bullock ploughing 46 (92) - 4 ( 8) 50 
4. Tractor ploughing - 16 (46) 19 (54) 35 
5. Fertilizer application 51 (98) - 1 ( 2) - 52 
6. Seed application, 36 (84) - 7 (16) - 43 
Figures in brackets are percentages 
We argued in Chapter 2 that input stipulation and cost-sharing are 
alternative methods of achieving efficient resource allocation on 
share--cropped Tand. Considering columns 3 and 4 of Tables 3.6 and 3.7 
respectively we may note that input stipulation/cost-sharing exists for 
four of the six major agricultural activities that we have identified 
for our sample of farmers for wheat crop. Thus except for bullock 
ploughing and seed application, the majority of the share-croppers in 
our sample conform to the'efficient' Cheungian assumptions regarding 
input stipulation and cost-sharing. 
Next,, we shall discuss the arrangements by which a landowner in 
Khanewal ensures that the tenants apply the stipulated inputs. 
Contract enforcement 
Input stipulation will work toward efficient allocation of resources 
if landowners can devise ways of ensuring that the share-cropping tenant 
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uses the stipulated inputs. Similarly, cost-sharing may also influence 
resource allocation if the landowner can ensure that.. the share-cropper 
actually fulfills his part of the-contract. To ensure-that contracts 
are fulfilled landowners may have to supervise cultivation either themselves 
or through hired managers. In Table 3.8 we present the pattern of 
landowner supervision of share-cropped land. 
Most effective supervision-is achieved when the landowner visits the 
plot at least once a week. In several discussions with agricultural 
extension workers and landowners we learnt that a weekly visit was the 
norm for most 'progressive' landowners. The practice of a monthly 
visit is due to the tradition that sprang up in certain parts of Khanewal 
where landowners had to travel several miles to visit their tenanted land. 
The holding usually comprised of a number of large blocks at some distance 
from each other. This practice appears to be dying now because of both 
Table 3.8 Landowner's supervision of rented-out plots in Khanewal 
(Number of share-croppers) 
At least 
one visit 
Main 
landowner 
2nd 
landowner 
3rd 
landowner 
Every week 37 (69) 14 (77). 5 (72) 
Every month 4. ( 7) 1 ( 6) 1, (14) 
Every crop, season 6 (11).. 1 ( 6) - 
Every year 7 (13) 2 (11) 1 (14) 
Figures in brackets are percentages 
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Table 3.9 Duration of the lease of rented-out plots in Khanewal 
(Number of years) 
Duration of Lease 
Main 
Landlord 
2nd 
Landlord 
3rd 
Landlord 
Average duration of the lease 11.78 - 8.28 8.57 
Minimum duration 1 1 1 
Maximum duration 45 30 30 
improvements in roads, public and private transport and division of 
property over time. Landowners residing in rural areas visit their 
tenanted plots at least once a week while those with urban business, 
professional or political interests visit once every crop season - 
usually at harvest time. We also learntthat absentee landowners may 
be defined to be those landowners who visit once a year to make their- k 
presence known The supervision element in such visits-is rather small. 
From Table 3.8 it may be seen that 69% of the share-croppers report 
at least a weekly visit by the main landowner. The proportion of 
share--croppers reporting weekly visits by their 2nd and 3rd lanowners 
is even higher. This may be explained partly by the size-effect. The 
two less important landowners, on average, own smaller holdings and 
therefore can supervise land more closely. At the other extreme, the 
main landowner of at least 13% of the share-croppers in our sample are 
absentee landowners. 
Apart from direct supervision involving a visit to the plot at 
least once every week there are other methods by which the landowner 
can enforce the contract. One such method is the control over the 
duration of the lease (Marshall (1950); Johnson (1950); Cheung (1969)). 
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In order to ensure the application of stipulated inputs it is not necessary 
to have a high turnover rate of share-croppers but to maintain the threat 
of eviction. Evidence from Khanewal suggests that the latter 
is the usual practice. In Table 3.9 it will be seen that the average 
duration of the lease is quite long (share-croppers reported the duration 
to be more than eight years for each landlord). However, the threat 
of eviction is felt quite strongly. 46% of the tenants in our sample 
thought that their landowner would find'it quite easy to evict them while 
60% of the tenants have experienced eviction during their lifetime. 
This threat and the fact that it is relatively easy for the landowners 
to find other tenants together, ensure that share-croppers allocate the 
inputs stipulated in the contract. 
Landowners may exercise control over the tenants also through 
the traditional structures of the rural society. The role of kinship 
in peasant behaviour has been analysed in a number of studies (Ahmed 
(1977), Alavi (1972), Barth (1980)). These studies suggest that peasants 
are concerned with the welfare of much larger units than just the 
immediate' household (defined in terms of the number of people sharing 
the hearth). Thus, paternal relatives are considered members of the 
household even if they live separately. Large landowners often rent 
out land to brothers, or"paternal cousins who cultivate land separately. 
One reason why such contracts exist in Khanewal may be the nature of 
canal colony' settlement schemes. Land in Khanewal was'made arable 
by the provision of canal water Ond then auctioned off. The buyers 
were mainly non-cultivating landowners. At the same time migration 
was encouraged from northern and central districts of Punjab so that 
section of. 'biratheries' settled down together in the newly-established 
villages in the canal colonies. The landowners owning large parcels 
of land rented them out in smaller units to tenants who were often 
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related to each other (or came from the same 'biratheri').., In our 
sample 30% of the tenants reported that their cousins/uncles were 
also share-croppers who rented land from the same landowner. 
", ý Given the rapid rise in rural population and the abundance of 
tenants (as share-croppers or fixed-rent tenants) a. landowner needs-to 
have one-fixed-rent tenant to define a standard of efficiency on his 
land.! 
/ 
He can then ensure that his share-cropping tenants achieve 
that-standard of efficiency either through input stipulation and/or 
cost-sharing. To enforce the contract he may combine direct supervision 
with the threat of eviction of a recalcitrant tenant and then let. - 
kinship do the rest for him. The efficient share-croppers will usually 
coax their inefficient relatives to work harder. A gröwingrrend in .. 
Khanewal is to have different tenurial contracts within the same 
'biratheri'. Thus a landowner may have a share-cropper-on one parcel 
of land and a fixed-rent tenant on the other and the two may be 
related to each other. 
Section 3.3 The credit market 
We shall next present some details concerning the operation of 
rural credit markets-in the four villages and in Khanewal. 
Information on rural borrowing in Pakistan is difficult to 
obtain. The general problemsof obtaining quantitative information in 
a survey such as ours have already been mentioned in Chapter 1. We 
faced some of these problems when we sought information on borrowing 
by households. Loans are often rolled over from one crop season to 
1/. Assuming that land is homogenous and the landowner can observe 
the input/output configuration on the fixed-rent tenancy. 
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another, different sources charge different interest rates and several 
types of loans (cash or kind) may be taken from various sources to meet 
different needs. This places great demand on the small cultivator's` 
memory to recall all the relevant information, " so that the reported 
answers should be considered as approximations to the actual quantities 
transacted. -' Another important reason is due to the social stigma" 
attached to going into debt. This is particularly true for borrowing 
for consumption. The tendency, therefore, is to underreport the 
amount of loans taken. 
In Pakistan there is a religious reason that tends to complicate 
matters further. The Islamic tradition considers the concept of interest 
rates to be unethical and, therefore, strictly forbids both the payment 
and charging of interest rates. There appears to 
be no prohibition on charging implicit interest rates through inflating 
profit margins -a trick often resorted to by loan-giving institutions 
throughout the history of Islamic nations (see Rodinson (1977)). In 
practice, of course, there is considerable borrowing and lending with 
both implicit as well as explicit interest rates being charged. However, 
few agents operating in the capital markets openly admit to either paying 
or charging interest rates. It is interesting to note, however, that 
this applies mainly to private money lending and not to Government loan- 
giving agencies. 
To the extent, therefore, that loans are taken from non-Government 
resources, cultivators tend to under-report the amounts borrowed and 
fail to report interest rates paid. Given the difficulties of obtaining 
information on the amounts3we have restricted our main investigation to 
the qualitative variables only. Thus we shall discuss the credit markets 
in terms of the types of agents operating in the market and the use to 
which credit is putýin the four villages. Greater detail will be provided 
for our sample of farmers in Khanewal. 
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On the supply side of the rural credit markets we. shall discuss 
the sources of credit. There are four broad categories of creditors. 
in our villages. An important source is friends and the 'biratheri'. We 
noted in Section3.2the importance of 'biratheri' in the social structure 
of the village. An important function of the 'biratheri' is to provide 
interest-free loans to members. The second category consists of three 
sets of suppliers of rural credit. All three charge implicit rather 
than explicit interest rates. They are all involved in the exchange of 
commodities in the rural areas and are known as middlemen/arhtia/shopkeeper. 
The middleman, 'beopari', goes from village to village buying small amounts 
of agricultural produce from the growers and sells them'to large dealers 
in market towns ('arhtias') either for a commission or a small profit. 
He extends small loans to the cultivators in exchange for a promise that 
the crop would be sold to him and not to any other dealer. The prices 
'that he pays to the growers are usually not very different from those 
of other categories of middlemen. The implicit interest rate is charged 
in terms of the profit foregone by the cultivators by not participating 
directly in the"hommodity markets in the town. The main recipients of 
the loans extended by the 'beopari' are the small cultivators. The 
'arhtia', on the other hand, deals in large quantities of crops and is 
usually based in a market town. He may, occasionally, charge explicit 
interest rates on the loans extended but mainly the interest rate is 
implicit and arises through the foregone profits that the tied growers 
could get by dealing directly with the wholesalers in urban centres. 
The 'arhtia' extends loans in both cash as well as in kind. The main 
recipients of loans are the large growers. The main source of consumption 
loans for the small cultivators is the village shopkeeper. The usual 
practice is not to lend money but to sell consumable items (such as 
flour, vegetables, oil, soap and cloth) on credit. The implicit interest 
rate that he charges is in terms of the higher prices paid for commodities 
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purchased on credit. 
The third category of suppliers of rural credit are landlords. 
Cultivators who are non-landowning tenants borrow from landlords.. Only 
exceptionally do landlords charge interest rates'on loans, the exceptions 
being those landlords who are also 'arhtias'. Loans taken from landlords 
are used both for production as well as consumptionl'. Traditionally 
consumption loans were important and were part of the patronage extended 
by the 'landlord to the tenant. With the introduction of 'green revolution' 
technology, production loans have assumed greater significance. Landlords 
extend loans to tenants to encourage them to use modern inputs. We shall 
discuss this arrangement in detail. in Chapter 5. : ý, 
Another category of suppliers of rural credit in'the four villages 
are banks and co-operatives. Banks are both private as well as publicly 
owned. 'We shall refer to their rules of extending credit in the discussions 
that follow. 
The evidence concerning the sources of credit in the four villages 
and in Khanewal-is presented in Table 3.10. The main source of borrowing 
in the four villages are friends and relatives. The percentage of farmers 
borrowing from this source is-over 80% in all villages except Mehdiabad 
where slightly fewer farmers borrow from this source. The next important 
source of credit in'the villages is the middleman/arhtia/shopkeeper 
category. '(The low figure in Chak is due to the lack of response of' 
owner-cultivators to questions regarding credit sources. ) Banks and 
1/. It is hard to distinguish between the different uses to which a 
loan may be put. For example, a cultivator who borrows to purchase 
fertilizer frees an equivalent amount of his own resources for 
consumption so that it is hard to determine whether the loan is 
used to finance production or consumption. 
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co-operatives follow next in terms of importance. Except in Jatli, 
landlords extend credit to tenants but are usually the least frequently 
cited source of credit in the villages. In Khunda, the investigating 
team was told during casual conversations that landlords often extend 
loans to their tenants. However, no tenants reported4taken credit from 
landlords in response to'the specific questions in the questionnaires. 
On the demand side of the credit market, friends and relatives 
are the most important sources of credit for tenants and owner-cum-tenants, 
(to keep things simple we shall not distinguish between share-cropping 
tenants and fixed-rent tenants in this section). Banks and co-operatives, 
on the other hand, are important to owner-cultivators and owner-cum-tenants 
only. No tenants in any of the villages report borrowing from this source. 
This is probably due to the stringent requirements of collateral and 
other lending policies of these institutions. Except in Chak, owner-cum- 
tenants do not borrow from their-landowners. This suggests that due to 
ownership of land this tenurial category does not depend on landowner's 
patrongage. There appears to be no clear pattern concerning borrowing 
from the category middleman/arhtia/shopkeeper. The only safe statement 
that we may make is that, typically, it is the small cultivators who 
borrow from this source. 
In Khanewal the pattern of borrowing from different sources of credit 
changes considerably, compared to the four villages. The most frequently 
cited source of borrowing is the bank/co-op category. This is indicative 
of the effectiveness of the vast network of credit institutions in 
Khanewal. Branches of private commercial banks and the Agricultural 
Development Bank are supplemented by co-operative societies in facilitating 
the extension of loans to the growers. It may be noted in Table 3.10 
that nearly twice as many owner-cultivators report using these facilities 
compared to tenants. For tenants both landowners and middlemen/arhtia/ 
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Table 3.10 Sources of credit in the four villages and in Khanewal 
(Percentages of cultivators)- 
Relations 
& friends 
Middleman/, 
ahrtia/ 
shopkeeper'. 
Bank/co-op Landowner 
Khunda 
Owners 76 6 18 
Owner-cum-tenants 100 - - - 
Tenants 92 8 - N/A 
All 89 7 14 - 
Jatli 
Owners 62 24 14 - 
Owner-cum-tenants 67 18 15 - 
Tenants 100 - - - 
All 81 14 5 
Mehdiabad 
Owners 50 21 29 - 
Owner-cum-tenants 70 10 20 - 
Tenants' 70 15 - 15 
All 63 16 14 7 
Chak 
Owners 87 N/A 13 - 
Owner-cum-tenants 67 10 19 4 
Tenants 82 9 - 9 
All 82 3 13 2 
Khanewal 
Owners 5 5 90 - 
Tenants 15 22 33 30 
All 11 14 57 18 
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shopkeeper category are infrequently cited sources of credit partly due 
to the size'effect; the mean holding of owner-cultivators is quite high 
in our sample which improves access to banks and co-operatives. The mean 
distance from the source of credit for owner-cultivators in our sample" 
in Khanewal is 12 miles and, for tenants 3.5 miles. This is reflective 
of the modal credit source for the two categories of cultivators.. Owner- 
cultivators borrow mainly from banks with branches in important market 
centres while tenants borrow from relations and friends and middlemen/arhtia/ 
shopkeeper categories that are located near the village. 
The percentages of cultivators participating in the credit market in 
each of the villages and in Khanewal are presented in Table 3.11. 
Table 3.11 Participation in credit markets in the four villages and in 
Khanewal 
(Percentages) 
Owners Owner-cum- 
Tenants 
Tenants All 
Khunda 88 75 81 75, 
Jatli 50 65 100 53- 
Mehdiabad 90 80 . 74 79 
Chak_ 28 47 46 33 
Khanewal 83 - 59 68 
In all the villages except Chak more than half the cultivators 
participate in the rural credit. market. Participation is much higher 
in Khunda and Mehdiabad compared to the other two villages. We noted 
in the previous section that these two villages also have the most 
unequal distribution of land. We have also seen that the disbursement 
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of credit is such that it is easier for large farmers to borrow. Greater 
percentage of farmers borrowing in Khunda and Mehdiabad may therefore be 
explained by the greater concentration of land amongst the large farmers. 
This-view is further strengthened by the evidence on participation rates 
of owner-cultivators. These are very high for owners in Khunda and in 
Mehdiabad. Low participation in Chak may be explained partially in terms of 
the difficulty of access to Government lending institutions ; the nearest 
institutional source for credit being at a considerable distance from the 
village. In none of the villages tenants appear to be at any particular 
disadvantage regarding participation in the credit market. In Khanewal, 
as discussed earlier in Chapter 1, the sample of farmers was purposively 
selected in order to test hypotheses concerning economic comparisons 
between share-cropping tenancies 'and owner-cultivators. Therefore, we 
have no data on the owner-cum-tenant category. - Participation rate in 
the rural credit market is quite high both'for owner-culttvators as well 
as tenants. 
Noting the need for caution in interpreting quantitative information 
regarding borrowing in the credit market that we mentioned earlier, we 
have presented the average amount borrowed per cultivator in the four 
villages in Table 3.12. It may be seen that amounts borrowed per 
cultivator are considerably larger in the irrigated villages compared to 
the 'barani' villages. This may be explained by the greater need to 
borrow for purchasing farm input in the canal irrigated areas. 
As we shall see in Chapter 6, the use of modern inputs is more 
widespread in the canal irrigated villages. Within tenurial categories) 
the average amounts borrowed are highest for owner-cultivators in the 
'barani' villages. In the canal irrigated villages, however, the average 
amount is highest for owner-cum-tenants. This is mainly due to borrowing 
for tractor purchase which suggests a tenurial pattern. Tractors are 
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Table 3.12 Average amounts of credit taken in the villages and in 
Khanewal 
(Rs per cultivators) 
Khunda Jatli Mehdiabad Chak Khanewal 
Owners 5600.63 3688.28 7580.56 3434.09 13054.48 
Owner-cum- 1858.33 2255.85 13550.00 8577.88 - 
tenants 
Tenants 1390.29 1666.67 5697.00 2040.00 1001.07 
All 3000.73 3404.23 8026.82 4526.39 6826.88 
used on own farms and are also rented out. In the 'barani'-villages 
only owners engage in the market for tractor services. However, in 
the canal irrigated villages it is mainly owner-cum-tenants who engage 
in'such markets. Cultivators in this tenurial category may have greater 
endowment of. labour and other complementary inputs compared to owned land. 
These, resources, maybe allocated partly on additional land rented in and 
partly in organising the market for tractor hiring. Amongst the two 
canal irrigated villages, average borrowing is lower in Chak for all 
tenurial categories. This may be explained by the difficulty of access 
to Government credit institutions noted earlier. In all the villages 
the average amount borrowed per tenant is lower compared to all other 
categories. This suggests that although tenants participate in the 
credit market, the difficulties due to the requirements of collateral 
imply lower amounts borrowed compared to other tenurial categories. In 
Khanewal the average amount borrowed by owner-cultivators is considerably 
higher than the average amount borrowed by the tenants. Explanations 
that take into account both the source of borrowing and the use to which 
loans are put will be presented by considering in detail the evidence on 
the credit market in Khanewal. 
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The difference between indebtedness and participation in the credit 
market may be seen by considering the data in Khanewal. In Table 3.12 
we reported the amount borrowed per cultivator, in the previous annual 
cropping season. In Table 3.13 below we present evidence on the percentage 
of cultivators and the amount outstanding, taking into account the, loan 
taken in the previous year. This is our measure of indebtedness. 
Table 3.13 Loans outstanding in Khanewal 
(in Rupees) 
Percentage of farmers Mean loan outstanding 
, with outstanding loans of farmers who have 
taken loans 
Owner-cultivators 52 . 8089.17 
Tenants 43 221.96 
There is not much difference between the tenurial categories in terms 
of the frequency of the incidence of indebtedness among the cultivators. 
However, owner-cultivators carry over 40 times as much debt as tenants 
into'the next cropping year. 
-" We shall next present in Table 3.14 the most frequently cited use, 
of loans taken by cultivators in the four villages-and in Khanewal. Here, 
again, we shall discuss use in4terms of four-categories: ' The first is 
credit taken for food consumption. As discussed earlier the most common-=- 
source for such borrowing is the middleman/arhtia/shopkeeper category 
and the most frequent borrowers are'small, owner-cultivators. Tenants- 
are the least frequent borrowers for consumption. This may be, explained 
partly by the fact that tenants. get gifts from landowners. Such gifts', - 
are considered to be part of the patronage extended by the landowner and, 
as such, is not considered borrowing. Typically, it is the small owner- 
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cultivator who borrows for consumption. We noted that in the 'barani' 
villages., at least, borrowing for food consumption is overwhelmingly, 
the most frequently cited reason for borrowing. The second category 
represents the ceremonial need for borrowing. In both 'barani' villages 
it appears to be important. Surprisingly, -amongst the tenants, the 
incidence of borrowing for this reason is the highest. This does not 
imply that tenants spend more than other cultivators on such-ceremonies. 
It may suggest either, that owners and owner-cum-tenants are better 
prepared for such contingencies as compared to tenants or that they may 
prefer to raise the necessary cash requirement either through renting 
out land or selling land than. go into debt. A tenant, on the other hand, 
does not have recourse to the latter. It'is possible1also, that because 
of greater mobility and insecurity of tenure tenants may be less well- 
prepared to meet such contingencies. 
The next two categories represent demand for production loans. 
Information concerning borrowing for the purchase of livestock is 
presented for the canal-irrigated villages only. This is not because 
this reason for borrowing is unimportant in the two 'barani' villages. 
On the contrary, these two villages belong to an area that is-famous 
throughout the country for-the sturdy 'dhani' breed of bullocks that is 
indigenous-to the region. Throughout the year special weekly markets 
are organised in important market towns in the region for exhibition 
and exchange of-'dhani' bullocks. Cultivators in our two 'barani'-villages 
participate in these markets regularly. It is quite likely, therefore, 
that some borrowing takes place to finance this market. Dueýto lack of 
foresight explicit questions were not asked in the questionnaire concerning 
the operation of bullock markets.; In both canal irrigated villages, where 
questions were asked, it turns out that purchasing livestock is the most 
frequently cited reason for borrowing in Mehdiabad and the second most 
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frequently cited reason in Chak. This requires further discussion. 
A point that will be taken up in Chapters 4 and 5 is that markets 
for services of bullocks are virtually non-existent in any. of the villages 
(or in Khanewal). We shall argue in Chapter 5 that the absence of 
bullock markets results in cultivators' adjusting their size of holding 
to endowments of bullock services.. Once the optimal size of holding 
has been determined the cultivator is committed to it for the entire 
annual crop season. If., during the crop season, his bullocks fall ill 
or die or,. due to changes in weather, he wishes to alter cultivation 
practices (so that greater use, of bullock services is required) the cultivator 
has to purchase a new bullock. The amount involved is often quite large 
(the price of a bullock in the area is in the region of Rs 4000). 
The cultivator, therefore, has to borrow to finance the purchase. 
The least frequently cited (less than 20% of farmers)reason for borrowing 
in all the villages is the purchase of farm inputs 
1ý 
. Tenants in 
neither Jatli nor Mehdiabad borrow to purchase inputs. This does not 
necessarily imply that tenants do not use new inputs (as we shall see 
in Chapter 6) but that they may use sources of credit other than 
borrowing in the rural credit market for financing the purchase of new 
inputs. (In Chapter 7 we shall argue that remittances from migrant 
household members may be an important alternative source for the purchase 
of new inputs. ) In Mehdiabad, landowners share costs of new inputs with 
their tenants (see Chapter 5) to encourage input use. A common practice 
in the village is to pay. the tenant's share of costs while purchasing 
inputs at the beginning of the cropping season and then to deduct the 
cost from the tenant's. share in the harvest. 
Borrowing for the purchase of inputs may be further disaggregated 
into borrowing for specific inputs. This has been done in Table 3.15. 
The main inputspurchased are seeds, fertilizers, and services of tractors. 
1/. Here we are referring to inputs such as the new H. Y. V1 seeds and 
chemical fertilizer. 
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Table 3.14 Use of credit in the four villages and in Khanewal 
(Percentage of cultivators) 
Food 
consumption 
Marriage/ 
death 
Purchase, of 
livestock 
Purchase of 
farm inputs 
Khunda 
Owners 70 30 N/As - 
Owner-cum- 80 20 13 
tenants 
Tenants 51 49 N/A 19 
All 56 43 N/A 15 
Jatli 
Owners 54 
, 
45 N/A 14 
Owner-cum- 62 39 N/A 8 
tenants 
Tenants 33 67 N/A - 
All 54 45 N/A 13 
Mehdiabad 
Owners 21 21' 7 29 
Owner-cum-, - 10 50 17 
tenants 
Tenants 14 19 48 - 
All 13 18 36 12 
Chak, 
Owners 83 5 7 13 
Owner-cum- 67 - 10 6 
tenants. . 
Tenants 55 9 27 . 17 
All 77 '4 11 11 
Khanewal 
Owners 6 3 N/A 49 
Tenants 31 ' '-' 69 N/A 53 
A111 . 21 43 N/A 51 
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In Mehdiabad loans are taken also to hire services of tractors and for 
purchasing pesticides. 
In Khanewal borrowing for direct consumption of food is the least 
frequently cited of all the. reasons for borrowing. However, this should 
be accepted with caution since the average size of owner-cultivators is 
quite high in our sample. When we consider tenants alone, marriage/death 
category is the most frequently cited reason for borrowing. Production 
loans are taken most frequently for the purchase of fertilizer both by 
owner-cultivators as well as share-croppers. This is explained by the 
fact that loans extended by banks/co-ops and 'ahrtias' are usually kind 
loans. The latter are also commission agents to manufacturers of 
fertilizers. A number of 'arhtias' informed us that they insist on 
giving kind loans to the cultivators since that encourages the use of 
the latest varieties of fertilizers suited to the soils of the region. 
This increases cultivators' yields and consequently the revenues of 
'arhtias'. The other frequently cited reasons for borrowing by the large 
cultivators in our sample are the installation of tube-wells and the 
purchase, of tractors and plant protection services. 
The most frequently cited interest rates paid by cultivators in 
Khanewal on loans taken from banks/co-ops category range between 10% and 
14%. 29% of the borrowers reported that usually rendering labour services 
on the farms of relatives and friends is a condition for borrowing from 
them. Thus implicit interest may exist not only in terms of profit margins 
as discussed earlier but also-in terms of labour services. 
An indicator of the ease-with which the small cultivator can borrow 
is the facility to roll over 'loans from one cropping season to another. 
This may help in reducing the risk of borrowing since in times of 
harvest the pressure to pay back the loan is reduced and thus bankruptcies 
are avoided. For our sample in Khanewal, 37% of the interviewed cultivators 
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Table 3.15 Allocation of production loans to specific uses in the 
four villages 
(Percentageof cultivators) 
Khunda Jatli Mehdiabad Chak 
Credit taken 
for-seed 
Owners 0 0 33 
10 
Owner-cum- 0 0 0 11 
tenants 
Tenants 20 0 0 33 
All 17 0 8 14 
-Credit taken 
for fertilizer 
Owners 0 12 29 9 
Owner-cum- 0 8 8 .0 
tenants 
Tenants 0 0 - 25 
All 0 11 9 7 
Credit taken for 
hiring tractors 
Owners 0 9 0 11 
Owner-cum- 0 0 0 0 
tenants 
Tenants 5 0- 0 12- 
All -, 3 7. 0 11 
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reported that their, creditors allowed them to rollover. loans. 
It was discussed earlier in this section that tenants may be at a 
disadvantage compared to other cultivators"in borrowing from banks/co-ops 
since those institutions require land as a collateral. One-'way'to 
overcome this disadvantage is"for the' landowner' to agree to be'a guarantor 
to the loan-giving institution. However, at times of'-conflicting interests 
between landowner and share-cropper (in terms of resource allocation on 
the rented plot) the former may refuse to underwrite the loan and thus 
may make it difficult for'the tenant to borrow from this source of credit. 
In our sample of farmers in Khanewal, 24% of the-tenants reported that 
their landowners usually agree to underwrite loans. However,, tenants 
borrowing from the middleman/arh tia/shopkeeper. category-reported that, 
landowners' refusal to underwrite did not affect their ability to borrow, 
since the ability to borrow from this source of credit is dependent 
mainly on the value, of-crops produced on the-farm. 
Concluding remarks 
In our discussion of the sources of rural credit we attempted to 
establish that landowners are an important source of credit for the 
tenants. There is little evidence that they earn interest on loans 
given to tenants. Instead the provision of loans appears to be apart 
of the patronage traditionally extended by the landowners. The evidence, 
also indicates that landowners give loans`to encourage tenants to use new 
inputs. Thus landowners in our villages and in Khanewal appear to act 
somewhat, differently from Bhaduri's landlords (1971) for'whom incomes 
earned from 'usu ry' are important and who discourage productive use of 
loans. 
The most important source of borrowing for cultivators is the 
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'biratheri'. However, the''biratheri' extends-loans mainly for non- 
productive needs. One cannot describe'this source-as-an exploiting 
monopoly-inýthe supply of, credit since interest rates are usually not 
charged. -Banks and co-operatives are, an important, source of. credit 
mainly for-production loans and primarily, for the large farmers. Loans 
are usually earmarked for specific inputs and., thereforelcontribute in 
raising, yields as well as in changing the cropping pattern. (In Khanewal 
88% of the farmers reported that their cropping patterns had,, changed as 
a result of borrowing from this source. ) 
For most tenants middleman/arhtia/shopkeeper category is-the most 
important source of production loans. As we have argued, this"category' 
operates through-the commodity market. There is an incentive for them 
to allocate-their loanable funds to the most efficient cultivators, since 
their revenues are linked to the crop output'delivered'to them. : Thus 
their operations are likely to influence yields, on the farm. 
On'the basis of the evidence that we have presented in this section, 
rural credit markets appear to be linked to rural markets for crop output 
because the creditor and the purchaser of crop output is usually the 
same agent. The total profits of the agent are determined by the joint 
activity in the two markets. Such linkages rarely exist between the 
land and credit markets. Occasionally, tenants borrow from landowners 
but that is not directly related to landowners' income which arise mainly 
in terms of their share in crop output. In very rare cases landowner, 
creditor and the purchaser of output is the same agent-(an occasional 
'arhtia'). In such cases the inter-linkages between the three markets 
are strong. 
The collateral requirement of borrowing from banks/co-operatives 
suggests another type of linkage between land and credit markets. Tenants 
may borrow from these institutions only if the landowners agree to be 
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guarantors of loans. In this indirect manner the landowner may acquire 
control over both the land as well as the credit market. This joint 
control of the two markets may be used by the landowner to frustrate 
land reform regulations that attempt to give greater security of, tenure 
to the tenant (see R. Herring (1979) for a detailed discussion of the 
issues involved). 
The two important types of market linkages that we have 'suggested 
in this section are linkages between credit and output markets and between 
credit and land markets. ' One consequence of such linkages may be that 
the controlling agent, e. g. the 'arhtia' or the landowner, may exploit 
the linkages to his advantage as a monopolist controlling the two markets 
in which the small owner-cultivator or the tenant operates. Examples 
of landowners acting as exploiting monopolists in land and credit markets 
were noted particularly in Khunda and Mehdiabad where land is very 
unequally distributed. In a detailed study of the history of tenant- 
landlord litigation in Khunda, Nigar Ahmed (1980) has documented many 
cases in which big landlords were able to frustrate land reform regulations 
regarding tenants' security of tenure because of their control over both 
land and credit markets., Many instances were also reported in the 
villages where growers claimed that they were paid lower prices for their 
produce and charged higher prices for inputs sold by 'arhtias'. 
But linkages in markets. also work towards improving the overall 
productivity of cultivators. Thus 'arhtias' may encourage small farmers 
to grow new high yield variety-strains of crops by assuring sales outlets. 
Similarly, landowners' better access to credit institutions may also 
result in the use of new inputs by the tenants. This view of linkages 
is stengthened when we consider that for efficient farming trust and 
co-operation between landowners and tenants on-the one hand and 'arhtias' 
and growers on the other are very important. Thus market linkages are 
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often likely to result in efficient cultivation. 
Section 3.4 The labour market 
I 
Implicit in our discussion of the tenancy market presented in 
Section 3.2 was a description of the operation of the rural labour 
market. We argued in Section 1 that tenancy may result when adjustments 
are made in the relative factor endowments of landowners (who have an 
excess of land given labour) and tenants (who have an excess of labour 
given land). This argument will be taken up again in great detail in 
Chapter 5. 
It is likely that in certain agricultural areas, the equilibrium 
size of the plot (note our discussion of Section 3.2) is too small to 
generate sufficient income for the share-cropping tenants to meet the 
food requirements of the family. Tenants may then hire out their labour 
services in the labour market during certain parts of the year. Evidence 
from Khunda and Mehdiabad (Table 3,16)-suggests that landowners are an 
important' source-of employment for share-croppers. Owner-cum-share-croppers 
report working for their landowners less frequently but the incidence 
level remains quite high. This evidence suggests that there may be 
important linkages between the land and labour markets in a more direct 
sense than that suggested by operations. in the tenancy market. With a 
change in technology (particularly with the introduction of tractors 
along with improvements in crop yields) landowners may prefer to cultivate 
land themselves rather than share-crop it. However, mechanization affects 
only ploughing. Other important farm activities such as sowing and 
harvesting remain labour intensive (see Binswanger (1977) and the detailed 
discussion in Chapters 5 and 7). A device for ensuring appropriate 
supply of labour at peak periods by self-cultivating landowners may be 
to provide small plots to labourers on share-cropping contracts. Thus, 
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Table 3.16 Tenants reporting employment on landowners' farm 
(percentage of tenurial category) 
Tenurial category Khunda Mehdiabad 
Sharecroppers 
Owner-cum-sharecroppers 
79 
26 
88 
50 
Table 3.17 Tenants employed by landowners who do not receive wages 
in cash or kind in Khunda 
Tenurial category Percentages of employed tenants 
Sharecroppers 
Owner-cum-sharecroppers 
8 
Table 3.18 Employers of members of share-cropper households in Khanewal 
(Percentages) 
Employers . ý. Ist member 2nd member 3rd member 
Landlord 18 7 7 
Family farm 36 50 40 
Arhtia 36 7 - 
Other non-- -9 29 47 
cultivators 
For the ranking of members see text on p. 113. 
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with the introduction of new technology, the role of.. the tenancy-market 
may change in the sense that open operation in the labour market. may 
become the dominant feature of tenancy contracts. (These arguments will 
be taken up in considerable detail in Chapter 5. ) Evidence presented 
in Table 3.17 suggests that at least in one of the villages, Khunda, 
employment on the landowner's farm may be part of the share-cropping 
contract so that no explicit payments are made for hiring share-cropper's 
labour on the landowner's farm. 
Further evidence suggesting linkages between land and labour 
markets may be seen in Table 3.18 where evidence is presented from 
Khanewal. In our interviews during the field survey we asked questions 
about the employment of household members other than the head of household. 
It appears that after the family farm the second most important employer 
of members of the tenant household is the landowner (ist, 2nd and 3rd 
categories of household members reflect the ranking in terms of their 
importance as earners for the family as indicated by the head of the 
household during interviews). It is interesting to note that the 'arhtia' 
is an important source of employment in Khanewal. In the absence of 
appropriate empirical evidence we can only speculate on the reasons for 
this. We were given the impression in Khanewal that 'arhtias' are an 
important class of entrepreneurs in small agricultural towns. They 
invest profits earned in agricultural commodity exchange in commercial 
and small--scale industrial enterprises which then generate employment 
opportunities. Household members of cultivators who have been dealing 
with the 'arhtia' for a long time in commodity exchange, may. get preference 
in employment. This arrangement, therefore, is suggestive of an important 
linkage between labour and the agricultural commodity markets. 
Finally, the evidence on employment created on different farm 
size categories (these will be defined rigorously in Chapter 4) is 
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presented in Table 3.19. The biggest employers of permanently hired 
labour are the large cultivators in three of the villages where data 
are available (Table 3.19 a) while small cultivators appear to rely 
mainly on family labour. 
The crop-wise employment pattern of seasonal labour in the four 
villages is presented in Tables3.19 b-e. The evidence suggests 
that the incidence of seasonal employment is high for wheat/groundnuts 
in the 'barani' villages, wheat/cotton in Mehdiabad (although sugar- 
cane is also important) and wheat/sugarcane in Chak. 
Large farmers appear to be the most important source of 
employment for seasonal labour as well. It is interesting to note 
that in the irrigated villages, employment of casual labour is higher 
by the large cultivators compared to other size categories. 
Seasonal labour in Khunda is used mainly for wheat harvesting and 
peanut picking . Peanut crop was 
introduced in the village. (as well 
as in Jatli) five years ago and has resulted in high demand for. seasonal 
labour. ' Wages are paid both in cash and in kind. Meals and tea are 
provided as well. For wheat harvesting the wage rate is 1/10th of wheat 
harvested while for peanuts it varies between Rs 0.50 and Rs 0.75 per 
kilo. It appears that wages for wheat crop have doubled over the last 
5 years when they were 1/20th of the wheat harvested. Most of the 
seasonal labour in the village comes from outside the village. Seasonal 
labourers who reside in the village are paid the same wages as those 
hired from outside. 
Evidence from Mehdiabad indicates that most of the casual labour 
is hired from amongst the residents of the village. During the wheat 
harvest two major activities are reported for which labour is hired. 
One is threshing and the other is winnowing. The rate for threshing 
is 1/10th of the produce and has increased in the last 5 years by nearly 
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Table 3.19 a 
Percentage of farms using permanent farm labour 
Khunda Jatli Mehdiabad -Chak 
Small 0 1.6 14.3 0 
Medium 0 0 26.0 16.7 
Large 20.0 - 90.0 50.0 
Table 3.19 b 
Percentage of farms using seasonal labour in Khunda by different crops 
Wheat Groundnuts 
Small 0 9.1 
Medium 0 31.3 
Large 6.0 53.4 
Table 3.19 c 
Percentage of farms using seasonal labour in Jatli by different crops 
Wheat Groundnuts Bajra 
Small 53.0 56.5 6.1 
Medium 70.6 70.6 11.8 
Large 80.0 "'61.0 20.0 
Table 3.19 d 
Percentage of farms using seasonal labour in Mehdiabad by different crops 
Wheat Sugarcane Maize Cotton 
Small 0 16.7 0 28.6 
Medium 60.0 50.0 0 20.0 
Large 63.0 54.0 60.0 71.4 
Table 3.19 e 
Percentage of farms using seasonal labour in Chak by different crops 
Wheat Sugarcane Maize 
Small 10.0 33.3 0 
Medium 12.5 25.0 0 
Large 53.0 64.0 6.0 
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25%. For winnowing the wage rate is 1/20th of the produce. Sugar-cane 
cutting is paid by the day. The rate is Rs 10/- per day while 'gur' 
(unrefined sugar) making is paid at the rate of 1/20th. of the produce. 
Female labour is used mainly for cotton picking. The wage rate is 1/20th 
of the produce. 
Concluding remarks 
Our evidence indicates that labour markets are active in all four 
villages and in Khanewal. Casual employment is widespread-on all categories 
of farms. An important employer of tenant household's labour is the self- 
cultivating landowner. It is interesting to note that real wages for 
casual employment in the villages-have been increasing in the last five 
years. An important new trend is the increased use of permanently hired 
farm labour. This may be explained as a consequence of mechanization 
which lowers the incidence of tenancy. 
In this chapter we have presented a discussion of the working of 
rural factor markets in the villages and have pointed out some important 
linkages. This will provide a rich background for our formal analyses of 
production, tenancy, technological innovation and migration which will 
be presented in Chapters 4-7. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Relationship between Farm Size and Productivity 
Section 4.0 Introduction 
The analysis of production must lie at the core of an attempt to 
explain the economics of the village farming community. The economics 
of crop production in a village is complicated, being concerned with, 
among others, issues such as the optimal size of farm, tenancy, adoption 
of-modern technology and migration. We noted in Chapter 2 that these 
issues are inter-related. To simplify matters we shall treat each of 
the issues separately. In this chapter we shall concentrate on the 
relationship between the size of farm and productivity. 
The relationship between farm size and productivity is analytically 
interesting for many reasons. An analysis of the relationship indicates 
the special features that enable the efficient size-category of farms to 
use inputs more intensively than others. ' These features may be inherent 
to specific fartss and non-marketable such as the quality of soil and 
farm supervision. Other reasons may arise due to imperfections in rural 
factor markets that enable some farm categories to have easier access to 
inputs compared to others. The organization of farms (i. e. whether farms 
use family labour or hired labour) may also be important in determining 
differences in the use of inputs. Thus the analysis of the size-productivity 
relationship helps us to understand the working of rural factor markets. 
The empirical investigation of the nature of the relationship 
between farm size-and productivity is important in determining public 
policy towards agriculture. Land reforms are a popular component of 
agricultural policy in many developing countries. The stated objectives 
of land reform are to make land less unequally distributed and. to increase 
agricultural output.. It is implicit in the twin objectives that small 
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farms are more productive than large farms. The empirical analysis 
presented in this chapter will attempt to determine the validity-of this 
assumption. Another aim will be to verify the magnitude of the difference 
in productivity across farm size. 
Often the objective of agrarian policy is to intervene indirectly 
through fiscal means mainly by the provision of input subsidies. Thus 
an understanding of the working of input markets is invaluable in designing 
an efficient policy. It is hoped that our empirical investigation of 
the size-productivity relationship in the four villages of Punjab will 
clarify some of the issues involved. 
The discussion of the size-productivity relationship is primarily 
concerned with the issue of efficiency. Therefore, a theoretical 
discussion of the different measures of efficiency may be necessary to 
clarify the concepts. The discussion will enable us to compare the 
usefulness of different measures such as ratios of output per unit of 
an input; or output per unit of cost. More comprehensive measures of 
efficiency thatrequire the estimation of production functions enable us 
to distinguish between technical and allocative efficiency and to evaluate 
the practical relevance of these two concepts. In Section 4.1 of this 
chapter we shall present a brief discussion of some` measures of 
efficiency. 
The empirical analysis of the size-productivity relationship 
presented in this chapter relies on the concept of a production function. 
In Section 4.2.0 we shall briefly introduce the notion of a production 
function, postponing the discussion of the specification of a production 
function and the theoretical problems of estimating using 
the ordinary least squares procedure to Section 4.2.3. The variables 
to be explained, i. e. the value of output in each village, are explained 
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in Section 4.2.1. The important crops that constitute the value of total 
output on the farm will be discussed. The explanatory variables,: farm 
inputs, are defined in Section 4.2.2. We shall, discuss some of the 
problems of measurement and aggregation and then present a detailed 
account-of the working of factor markets. The dualistic nature of-some 
of the factor markets will be explained. -Considering the labour market, 
we-shall present the-theoretical arguments that distinguish between 
family and hired labour. (The theoretical discussion will be presented. 
here in order to refine some of the arguments already given in Chapter 2. ) 
Some explanations will be offered for the non-existence of bullock markets 
in our villages. The importance of access to capital markets for using 
inputs such as high yield variety seeds and fertilizers will be discussed. 
In Section 4.2.3 we, shall take up the issues left over from Section 4.2.0. 
We shall specify the production function that we shall use and the 
functional form that we shall estimate. The theoretical problems arising 
from the underlying simultaneity in the decision-making of farmers regarding 
inputs and outputs will be analysed. We shall argue 
that the parameters that we obtain by using our estimation procedure are 
consistent and, unbiased. 
Empirical results and their interpretations are provided in Section 
4.3. In Section 4,3.1 we present the empirical evidence for the four 
villages using a production function in which land is the only input. 
This corresponds to the criterion of output per acre. We distinguish 
between technical efficiency and the intensity of land use. Using 
covariance analysis we shall rank villages according to both measures of 
efficiency. A 'test' of the functional form used in this section will 
be provided by considering the goodness of fit using different functional 
forms for one of the villages. Interpretations and explanations for the 
results will be offered in Section 4.3.2. The three hypotheses suggested 
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in Chapter 2 as explanations for the relationship in theIndian context 
will be examined carefully in the light of evidence from our villages. 
The importance of intensity of cultivation will be analysed. The role 
of frag mentation and the hypotheses regarding the influence of family 
labour on the size-productivity relationship will be examined. The 
relationship will be estimated for owner-cultivator farms only to isolate 
the influence of tenancy on the relationship. Finally, the relationship 
will be estimated for small farms only in each-village to suggest that, as 
a group small farms use land more intensively compared to other farms. 
Cross-village comparisons will be made and explanations offered for the 
differences, in the intensity of land use. 
In Section 4.4.1 a production function with three inputs, viz. land, 
value of seeds and fertilizers and the value of draught power, will be 
estimated for each village and for each"size-category in a village. 
This will enable us to comment on returns to scale in each village and 
to comment on hypotheses regarding market imperfections that determine 
the difference, access to inputs and therefore the intensity of use. 
We shall also discuss the importance of uncertainty in resource allocation 
on the basis of the evidence in this section. Our discussion, here, will 
be a preliminary examination of evidence on input use. A detailed analysis 
of the direct evidence on the use of inputs associated with the 'green 
revolution' technology will be presented in. Chapter 6. 
Section 4.1 Measures of efficiency 
A 
, comprehensive 
measure of economic efficiency was suggested by 
Farrell (1957). It requires the estimation of a production isoquant 
that, indicates the efficient combinations of inputs to produce a unit 
of output. The. isoquant is estimated from the input combinations of a 
sample of observations with each observation representing an efficient firm. 
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It is the isoquant of the hypothetical; efficient production unit 
which is used as the standard for measuring the efficiency of the units 
in the sample., This method distinguishes. between. technical and price 
efficiency. For the two input case, it may be illustrated in the. diagram 
below. 
x2 
P 
0 
Figure 4.1 
In the diagram,, II' is the estimated, efficient, isoquant for the 
hypothetical production unit. For a unit that yields the input combination 
C, for a given output, technical efficiency,, TE 
Ob 
while price 
efficiency is, PE _ 
6b. Economic efficiency (EE) is the multiple 
of the two ratios, i. e. EE = 
Oa Ob x Oa 
0C 0C Ob 
H. Leibenstein (1966) has argued that empirical evidence from the 
U. S. and several other European countries suggests that allocative efficiency 
is not a very important c? mponent of the overall economic inefficiency. 
He discusses a number of studies that show that the welfare loss of monopoly 
and restrictive trade practices is rather small and ranges between 1 and 
0.01% less than the possible revenues of efficient allocation. As opposed 
to this, evidence is presented to indicate that improvement- in technical 
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efficiency) by improving managerial practices, can lower costs by up to 
30% of the existing costs. 
Seitz (1970) has extended the theoretical concept of economic efficiency 
by introducing the notion of scale efficiency (SE) . He argues that 
economic efficiency may be defined separately for production units operating 
at different scales. ' The product, EE x SE, then gives an over all measure 
of efficiency. This measure enables us to identify-the optimal scale of 
operations from the point of view of minimum cost for the industry as 
a whole. 
Clearly, the theory of economic efficiency is fairly advanced and 
precise measures of different aspects of economic efficiency have been 
specified. In practice, however, data requirements of these measures are 
quite stringent. As a resultj in the agricultural sector most discussions 
of economic efficiency have been conducted using the traditional measures. 
The most commonly used measure is output per acre of land. 
The importance of land in the production process stems in part from 
the belief thai'land ownership determines access to other inputs and 
thus influences productivity. Further, in economies with land scarcity, 
public policy discussion is often dominated by. considerations of reforms 
that seek to rearrange patterns of land ownership. It is argued that 
large holdings are inefficient compared to small holdings. in our review 
of literature in Chapter 2 we discussed some of the studies that 
give empirical evidence that suggests the existence of an inverse 
relationship between size and productivity. In the policy conclusions 
of these studies it is argued that land reforms will not only bring about 
a more equal distribution of land but will increase the efficiency of 
agriculture in terms of output per acre. 
Evidence. on the relationship between size and productivity has been 
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interpreted"in another way. If small holdings are more efficient than 
large holdings, public policy that encourages co-operative farming should 
be abandoned since it results in consolidating the unit of operation and 
thus causes inefficiences. 
It may be argued that neither of the two implications mentioned 
above are tenable since output per acre is not a meaningful measure 
of efficiency in a changing agricultural setting. For example, cultivation 
practices are influenced by the 'green revolution' technology inputs. 
Thus, the availability of land may no longer be as binding a constraint 
as it is under more traditional methods of cultivation. 'Green revolution' 
technology requires greater cash outlays on new inputs (such as high 
yield variety seeds and, fertilizers) as well as on fixed inputs (such as 
tube-wells and irrigation ditches). The availability of new inputs 
enables variations in the intensity of cultivation., In this sense, with 
the introduction of new technology land becomes .a 
less binding constraint. 
This implies that a more comprehensive efficiency measure such as the 
ratio of present net value of agricultural inputs to the value of output 
may be needed. This can be calculated by imputing the price of the, 
services of land and adding this to the expenditure on other inputs. - 
However, imputing the price of services of land is riddled with pitfalls 
of the type faced in capital . 
theory. In pricing the services of land, 
V 
allowances have to be made for quality; otherwise7the imputed price-is 
too aggregated a measure-of land input. 
An alternative measure of efficiency used is the cost-output ratio 
(cost is measured in terms of total expenditure on variable inputs). 
Here a problem arises on account of imputing the value of bullock services. 
Unlike other inputs, there are no markets for services of bullock labour 
in many regions of Pakistan. (In Section 4.2.2 we shall discussýin 
detail the reasons for the absence of bullock markets in our villages. ) 
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Besides, this measure of efficiency ignores land completely. 'This is 
unsatisfactory given that even in the technologically most sophisticated 
agriculture, land continues to be an important input. 
From the above discussion it is clear that while output per acre 
as a measure of efficiency is relevant, it is far from comprehensive. 
The other criteria, such as the capital-output and cost-output ratio, 
are also imperfect. 
A comprehensive approach to comparing efficiency across different 
farm categories is implicit in Farrell's (1957) arguments discussed 
earlier. It requires the estimation of production functions. We shall 
take up this discussion in Section 4.2. 
Section 4.2.0 The single input production function 
The analysis of production in the present chapter will be conducted 
by estimating production functions for farms in our villages. We, 
shall first estimate a production function with land as the only input. 
This will enable us to comment on the size-productivity relationship. 
In Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 we shall discuss the values of the parameters 
of single input production functions. In Section 4.4 we shall present 
a discussion of production functions with three inputs ; land, draught 
power and new inputs such as seeds and fertilizers. This will enable 
us to comment on returns to scale and differences across farm size in 
the intensity of input use. 
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Clearly, the concept of a production function is än, essential tool in 
our discussion of efficiency iyt agricultural production in the villages. 
Thus we shall first introduce the notion of a production function. 
Intuitively and at a'very general level a production function describes 
a relationship between a given quantity of output and the quantity of 
inputs it takes to produce that output. It is essentially a technical 
relationship between output and inputs, e. g. 
Yf (x1 .........., x 
may be called a production function such that Y , 
is output produced by a 
combination of inputs xi . This general relationship has been given more 
specific functional forms resulting in a family of production functions 
much used in economic analysis. Some. examples are Cobb-Douglas, Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution, Input-Output. and Linear Programming 
production functions. The, first two are examples of neo-classical,, 
production functions that give-smooth production isoquants. 
The mathematical properties of production' functions as merely 
technical relationships between outputs and inputs are, in themselves, quite 
interesting. However, these properties acquire significance for 
economic theory when they are used in conjunctions with optimizing economic 
behaviour of producers. For example, profit maximizing, or its dual, 
cost minimization'behaviour by producers, when the underlying technical 
relationship between inputs and outputs is given by, the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, results in hypotheses on productivity change and 
technical and cost efficiency that can be empirically tested (Nugent 
and Yotopoulos (1976)). 
In Sections-4.2.1 and 4.2.2 that follow we shall present a 
discussion of the output and input variables that describe the production 
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function that we shall estimate. In Section 4.2.3 we shall discuss some 
properties of the Cobb-Douglas production function that we shall use 
in our analysis. The mathematical transformation of the production 
function to be estimated using the ordinary least squares regression 
method will be specified. Finally, we shall discuss some problems of 
estimation concerning the ordinary least squares method that 
arise from the underlying optimizing behaviour of'farmers in our villages. 
Section 4.2.1' ' The Value of Farm Output 
The variable to be explained in our regression analysis for the 
four villages is the total value of crops produced on the farm. (In one 
of the villages, Jatli, the value of wheat output and the value of 
kharif output will be used as additional dependent variables ). It may 
be argued that taking total farm value as a dependent variable involves 
aggregation biases and that this assumes away the complicated decision- 
making process by which farmers allocate inputs with a view to maximizing 
returns on-individual crops. We are sceptical about this implied description 
of farmers' behaviour. In our interviews we observed that farmers are 
remarkably aware of, and concerned with, the entire annual cropping season. 
For example, farmers are well aware that the impact of inputs such as 
fertilizer overlaps cropping seasons. Thus more fertilizer used during 
the rainy season was understood to contribute to the yield of the following 
kharif crop grown on the same plot of land. 
The use of total value of farm output as the dependent 
variable may be undesirable since it implies that farmers are 
not flexible regarding input allocation within the annual cropping season 
to adjust to'changes in output demand and climate. We shall argue 
that drastic variations within annual crop seasons are likely to 
be due to random factors whose effect cancels out in the long run. In a 
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normal year farmers have a reasonable knowledge of the annual cropping 
pattern at the beginning of the year. This is-borne out also by the 
importance attached by farmers to crop rotation which involves 
planning of crops and hence commitment of resources. We shall, therefore, 
argue that it is reasonable to assume that farmers maximize the total 
value of crop output for given inputs. 
Total value of output in our regression analysis is composed of five 
crops in the 'barani' villages and four crops in the canal irrigated villages. 
Two comments may be made here. Firstly, we restricted ourselves only 
to the main crops grown in the villages. This is necessitated by the 
method of data collection which involved reliance on farmers' recollection 
of quantities of inputs used and outputs produced. We felt that detailed 
questions on less important crops resulted in much guess-work by 
farmers so that the quality of data thus collected may not be very 
4.. 
good. (For a discussion of the survey methodology, see 
Chapter l. ) 
Secondly, we have included more crops for the 'barani' villages as 
compared to canal irrigated villages. This appears unsatisfactory, 
given that canal irrigation enables greater cropping intensity and a 
wider choice of crop varieties. Our experience suggested that in practice 
farmers in irrigated areas have a wider choice of minor crops (such as,.,, 
vegetables, fruit and oil seeds) that take up a small percentage of the 
cultivated area. Most of the land is used for growing a few main. crops. 
that have long maturing periods. The standard practice in canal irrigated 
areas is to grow cotton and maize in the 'kharif' season with wheat as 
the main 'rabi' crop, while sugarcane is a year round crop. Fodder 
crops are important in both 'rabi' and 'kharif' seasons, but the output 
is rarely quantified since it is fed directly to livestock (often livestock 
is left to graze the standing fodder crop. ). In the 'barani' villages 
wheat is the main 'rabi' crop. In the 'kharif' season groundnuts, maize 
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pulses and bajra are grown. The percentage of acreage devoted to these 
crops varies considerably with access to irrigation. Farmers with 
direct access to wells grow mainly groundnuts while farmers without 
access to wells grow mainly maize., in the 'barani' areas the greater 
variation in the cropping pattern may be due to the greater variability in soil 
fertility, as compared to the canal irrigated villages. Tables 4.1 and 
4.2 list the crops grown and their prices in the four villages. 
The unit of measurement for all crops is maunds (= 40 Kg. ). Price 
of each crop in each village is the modal price received by farmers at 
harvest time. 
Table 4.1 Crops and prices in the 'barani' villages 
(Rs per maund = 40 kilos) 
Crops Price in Khunda Price in Jatli 
Wheat 35.20 36.25 
Groundnut 118.00 120.00 
Maize 31.00 30.00 
Bajra 27.50 28.00 
Pulses 28.75 29.00 
Table 4.2 Crops and prices in the canal irrigated villages 
(Rs per maund = 40 kilos) 
Crops Price in Mehdiabad Price in Chak 
Wheat 36.26 35.62 
Cotton 97.20 80.00 
Maize 38.97 36.20 
Sugarcane 77.99 109.55 
1/. The big difference in the prices for cotton and sugarcane between Chak 
and Mehdiabad is explained by the quality of soil for cotton and access 
to a sugar mill for sugarcane. The cotton varieties sown in Chak are 
inferior that respond to less regular supply of water. The presence 
of a sugar mill near Chak increases the demand and hence influences price. 
In'Mehdiabad, sugarcane is grown mainly for domestic consumption.. 
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We may now proceed to define the dependent variable for each farmer 
in 'baranit and canal irrigated villages, -: 
TPROD (barani) = 0WPW + °GPG + OMM + OBPB + OPPP 
TPROD (canal irrigated) OWPW + 00P0 + 0mpM-+ 0SPS 
"F 
where TPROD total value of crop output, 0 is output, 
P is price for each crop in each village, 
subscripts W, G, M, P, C and S refer to wheat, groundnut 
maize, bajra, pulses, cotton and sugarcane respectively. 
In village Jatli total value of 'rabi' crop is 
PRODW = OwpW 
while the total value of the 'kharif' crop is 
PRODK = 0GPG + 0M M+ OBPB +' 
6 PPP 
Section 4.2.2 The Inputs 
Land 
Land measured in acres is the most important independent variable for 
the analysis presented. in Section 4.3. It is also the most difficult to 
measure as a pure input not contaminated by the influence of other important 
inputs applied in the process of production. Ideally, we should measure 
land in terms of annual value of land used in the production process. 
Inherent in this measure is a correction for soil fertility and locational 
differences of individual parcels of land. We did not have access to such 
an ideal measure. Our data provide two types of information on land. One 
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is the total size of holding in acres and the other is the total cropped 
area in acres. Size of holding as a measure-of land has the disadvantage 
of including fallow land and ignoring differences in soil fertility. 
But the advantage is that little guesswork is-involved in its measurement. 
It is there to be seen and any exaggerated claims are soon toned down 
in the presence of other respondents. Measurement in acres, however, 
may lead to a problem of dimensionality when everything else in the 
production process is measured in value. But, our main objective in this 
analysis is to explain the observed phenomenon of diminishing returns to 
land so that a unit of measure in terms of land size is necessary. 
The alternative measure is a farm's total cropped area.. This 
measure excludes fallow land but has all the other features of the 
size of holding measure. However, in the relevant literature (Rao (1966), 
Rudra (1968 ), Bharadwaj (1974)), a controversy revolves around the merit 
of using this measure. It has been argued that an important explanation 
of higher productivity on small farms is their ability to crop land more 
intensively than the large farms. In taking the total annual cropped area 
as the, measure of land input we may correct for the higher cropping 
intensity on small farms compared to the large farms and thus may get 
constant returns to land. In Section 4.3. we shall specifically test 
whether differences in cropping intensity may be suggested as a possible 
explanation for the existence of the inverse relationship between size 
and productivity. 
Another problem in using size of holding as a measure of land 
input. is that while reporting the farm size, farmers tend to truncate the 
area to the nearest integer. Complicated fractions are avoided being 
the most frequently quoted fraction. This results in the clustering of 
observations around integers and halves. An explanation for this may be 
that while the farmers (especially the smaller farmers) tend to do most 
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of their calculations in 'bighas'(= 0.5 acre) in our unirrigated villages 
and 'kanals' (= 0.25 bigha) in our 'barani' villages, the interviewers 
insisted (wrongly with hindsight) on eliciting responses in terms of 
acres. Thus, strictly speaking, our measure of the size of holding is 
discrete rather than continuous. 
Agrarian issues in Pakistan have been discussed in the context of 
three size-categories (sizebeing defined in terms of acres owned or rented 
or a combination of the two). These are small, medium and large farms. 
Agricultural land is divided into two broad ecological zones; 'barani' 
and irrigated. A straightforward rule of thumb (that equates 2 'barani' 
acres with 1 canal irrigated acre in terms of productivity) is then applied 
to get a national distribution of farms and acreage in-the 
three size-categories. According to this criterion the size-categories are: 
Table 4.3 Size-categories of farms in 'barani' and canal irrigated areas 
Small Medium Large 
'Barani' areas 0-25 25-50 Above 50 
Canal irrigated areas 0-12.5 12.5-25 Above-25 
See, e. g. Farm Management Surveys, Ministry of Agriculture, Government 
of Pakistan, 1967,1968,1969,1971; Chaudry and Herring (1974). 
This classification involves considerable over-simplification. Not 
all canal irrigated land consists of uniform soil fertility. Also, 'barani' 
land with access, to well-irrigation 
1" 
yields crop output that is comparable 
to yields in canal irrigated areas. More importantly, at a disaggregated 
1/. Direct evidence on well-irrigation in our two 'barani'villages is 
not available. However, the Agricultural Census of 1972 indicates 
that subdivisions Pindi Gheb and Gujjarkhan (from which Khunda 
, 
and Jatlijrespectively., were selected) have 1.4 and 1.3% of-the 
total acreage irrigated by wells or tube-wells. 
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level of analysis small, medium and large sizes are relative. For 
instance, - a farmer cultivating 121 acres in the 'barani' village Jatli 
defined himself as a large farther (as did his neighbours) while a farmer 
owning the same amount of land in village Khunda considered himself to be 
a medium-size farmer. 
. 
Area cultivated'in acres is a useful criterion for defining small, 
medium and large farms if it can capture the scale effect within the 
village. The scale effect in Pakistani agriculture is important since 
it involves differences in economic behaviour that result in differences 
in productivity. This behavioural variability is captured in'arguments 
that specify dualistic rural factor markets (Sen (1966), Mazuwdar (1965)). 
It is argued that small farms are, typically, family farms where decisions 
regarding resource allocation are governed by rules that-are different 
from those of medium and large size farms (where market allocates the 
resources). It is important, therefore, to isolate meaningful cut-off 
points that distinguish between different size-categories in the sense 
discussed above. Clearly, these cut-off points, if they exist, are 
likely to be village-specific. 
We decided on our village-specific cut-off points ter 
observing the pattern of residuals around the predicted line estimated by 
a loglinear regression of the value of output on the size of holding. 
This was done for each of the four villages. The estimated Durbin-Watson 
statistics (Table 4.6) indicate that error terms are not independently 
distributed across households arranged in higher order of size. A plot 
of the pattern of error terms in each village suggests that the village 
population of farmers can be broken down into three broad categories. The 
cut-off points for these three categories, in terms of acres were then 
used to define small, medium and large farms in the four villages. These 
are given in Table 4.4 below. 
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Table 4.4 Size categories of farms defined in the four villages 
Small Medium Large 
Khunda "0 -9 9- 22 Above 22 
Jatli 0-5 5- 10 Above 10 
Mehdiabad 0-7 7 13 Above 13 
Chak 0-4.5 4.5 - 9.5 Above 9.5 
The mean size of holding, total acreage and the number of cultivators 
in each size""category, in each villageaare given in Tables 4.23 to 
4.27 in the Appendix. 
Draught power 
Draught power is an important input in agricultural production. The 
local 'rule of thumb' 'prescribes a fixed-proportion relationship between 
draught power and land (a pair of bullocks for every 121 acres). In 
practice, however, there is considerable deviation from the conventional 
norm because of'"the substitutability between human and bullock labour. 
(A good ploughman can get more out of a pair of bullocks compared to 
another. ) Another notable'feature of draught power is the non-existence, 
at least in our villages and in Khanewalyof markets for bullock services. 
(Bliss and Stern (1980), also, report the non-existence of a bullock 
market in Northern India. ) There are informal exchange relationships 
that are probably governed by pricing rules that involve bartering of 
services. We did not attempt either to identify or to quantify such 
prices. (An interesting phenomenon is the growth of cultivation with 
tractors. This has resulted in a lively market for tractor services. ) 
1/ 
Our measure of draught"power,, as an input in the production process,. 
is the total value of draught animals. It is a stock measure when, in 
fact, we should use a flow measure. However, that involves pricing 
1/. We shall take up the issues regarding tractor use in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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services of draught animals. But we have noted above that markets for 
such services do not exist. An alternative is the number of bullock 
days used for all the crops in the annual cropping season. In the. 
absence of systematic book-keeping we could, at best, hope to get an 
estimate of the number of tillings per crop and from that calculate the 
draught power used in all the crops. This is a fairly complicated 
procedure and one not adopted luring the collection'of data. We 
decided, therefore, to use the value of draught animalslas a measure of 
draught power on the farm) as the explanatory variable in our regression- 
analysis. 
In the two 'barani' villages data are available only on the value of 
livestock owned by a household. We are, therefore, constrained to use 
this measure as a proxy for the-value of draught power. -Thus., in the two 
'barani' villages, we expect the estimates of marginal productivity of 
draught power to be biased since the'total value of livestock over- 
estimates the total value of draught animals. 
Seeds and fertilizer 
Our measure of variable capital used on the farm is'the most 
satisfactory of the inputs we have used. It measures the total value of' 
seeds and fertilizer used in the annual cropping season. The majority 
of farms in our villages report that these are the two most important 
farm inputs on which expenditure is incurred. In the two canal irrigated 
villages the use of fertilizer as well as new high yield variety seeds 
is very widespread. Farmers show considerable knowledge of both the 
risks and increments in yields associated with the new varieties of 
seeds. Different combinations of nitrogenous, phosphate and sulphurous 
chemicals are used to enrich soils of different fertility. In the 
'barani' villages, however, traditional seeds are still in wide use. The 
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adoption of new varieties -is quite slow. This is partly a reflection of 
the fact that in the absence of controlled irrigation, variance in the 
yields of new varieties is quite high (perhaps higher than for traditional 
varities that 'are naturally drought resistent) which results in caution 
in their application. In Khunda, the use of fertilizer is limited to 
a few farms only. This is due to a widespread and well-founded belief 
amongst farmers in the village that crops are 'burnt' by the use of,, 
fertilizer, if it does not rain at the right time. The few farmers who 
do use fertilizer have access to well irrigation. In Jatli, well-irrigation 
is quite widespread. This may explain the greater extent of fertilizer 
use in this village. 
Labour 
Farm labour as an input in the production function is of considerable 
interest. However, the economic implications of the value of the 
coefficient on labour change with-the way labour is measured. (This may 
not be true in 9rganized labour markets where there may exist"a relation- 
ship of proportionality between hours worked and the number of workers 
(Sen (1966)). When mandays worked is used as the measure of labour the 
coefficient yields an estimate of the marginal product of labour. When, 
however, the number of workers is used as the explanatory variable, the 
estimates give the marginal product of a labourer. This distinction lies 
at the core of a long debate concerning the existence of surplus labour 
or disguised unemployment in developing countries (Sanghavi (1969), 
Schultz (1964), Jorgensen (1967)). An implication of the existence of 
surplus labour is that a part of the labour force may be removed from 
the agricultural sector without affecting total output. This 
is fundamental to the model of development suggested by Nurkse (1953). 
He makes the extreme assumption that the existence of surplus labour implies 
that the marginal product of labour is zero. Sen (1966) however, has 
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shown that this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
the existence of surplus labour. For surplus labour to exist on a 
farm, output must remain constant when a family member leaves, the farm 
and that can happen even if the member's marginal product is positive. 
All that is required is that the remaining members work a little harder. 
This follows from the assumption of constant marginal disutility of 
labour for family members working on the farm so that total labour on 
the farm remains unchanged. 
Bliss and Stern (1980) have extended Sen's basic ideas to show 
that the existence of surplus labour depends on whether or not farms 
are optimally organized. They compare the allocation of labour on 
farms where individual members make decisions independently, with farms 
where allocative decisions are made jointly. Taking the latter to be 
the more realistic case, they argue that5in equilibrium1family farms 
are optimally organized since the opportunity cost of labour of all members 
equals the marginal product of farm labour. It is then shown that 
optimally organized farms are not characterized by the existence of 
surplus labour. 
Their analysis suggests that the way a farm is organized has 
important implications for the production functions to be estimated. 
If farms are organized such that allocative decisions are taken jointly, 
optimization results and the production function to be estimated should 
have the number of labourers as an argument. The production function 
displays constant returns to scale given that the underlying production 
function in which labour, correctly measured in mandays or hours, has 
constant returns. This does not follow for other types of farm organization. 
The other much--discussed issue is the existence of dualism in the 
labour market (Sen (1966), Mazumdar (1965)). This aspect of the labour 
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market will be discussed in detail in Section 4.3.2. *Basically, the 
theory posits that farms using family labour cultivate more intensively 
compared to farms that use hired labour. Here, again, measurement of 
farm labour is critical. Total farm labour in man days (Saini (1971), 
Bardhar. (1973), Junankar (1976), Lau and Yotopoulos (1971)) gives 
a coefficient value that measures the joint effect of both family as 
well as hired labour. This measure of labour is used due to the 
difficulty of eliciting from the farmers the quantities of the two 
distinct labour inputs in terms of man days. An appropriate measure of 
labour input is obtained by breaking down farm labour into its main 
activities, i. e. ploughing, irrigating, hoeing, sowing, harvesting and 
threshing. The first three activities are performed mainly by family 
labour. Hired labour is used for the last three activities. Aggregating 
labour days spent on these two categories of farm activities and using 
these two measures of labour input in the production function would 
provide a method of testing hypotheses concerning the dualistic structure 
of the labour market. 
In our estimation of the production function we used the number of 
adult male family workers working on the farm, as the measure of labour 
input. This is the only reliable measure of labour input in our data from 
the four villages. The regression results indicated that in none of 
the four villages is this variable statistically significant. We may 
interpret this result in two ways. One is that the marginal product of 
a labourer is zero but we would have to be agnostic regarding the existence 
of surplus labour. The other interpretation is that village economies 
are competitive, labour market is governed by the rule that equates 
marginal product with the wage rate, and output is proportional to land 
(Bliss and Stern (1980)). We did not include this variable in our 
final regressions. 
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Irrigation 
In the estimation of production functionsin the four villages we 
have left out one variable that may be argued to be important'. This 
is irrigation. In Tbarani' areas access to irrigation can improve 
yields dramatically. Similarly in the canal irrigated areas the 
practice of supplementing existing irrigation by tube-wells is very 
widespread and has been shown to be quite profitable (G. Muhammed (1965)). 
Tube-wells are virtually non-existent in Chak and 
in the two 'barani' villages. In the former5the sub-soil water is 
saline whereas in the latter the rocky terrain makes it very expensive 
to drill tube-wells. In Khunda, two large farmers are building small 
private dams while in Jatli some well-irrigation is used. Due to the 
lack of data for irrigation in three of the four villages., we have 
excluded the analysis of the direct impact of irrigation on productivity. 
We shall, however, comment on irrigation by comparing our evidence on 
yields in villages where tube---well and canal irrigation is readily 
available with yields in other villages. 
Section 4.2.3 The functional form 
The basic equation used for the analysis of the size-productivity 
relationship is.:: .. 
TPROD s 'f(HOLDCULT) 1 
(1) 
where TPROD is total value of output 
HOLDCULT is the size of holding in acres 
In order to test the hypotheses advanced as theoretical justification 
for the existence of the inverse relationship between size and productivity, 
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two other equations were estimated. These are : 
TPROD = f(HOLDCULT, FRAGMNTS) (1,1) 
where FRAGP+NTSis the number of fragments of the farm. 
And 
TCROP - f(HOLDCULT) (1.2) 
where TCROP = the total cropped area of the farm. 
In the perfect neo-classical world (1) is the complete production 
function. However, the village economy, is not perfectly neo-classical 
so that two additional variables were included to get a basic general 
production function. 
TPROD a f(HOLDCULT, WAMALVAL, MIUT) (2) 
where WAMALVAL is the value of draught animals 
MIUT is the expenditure on seeds and fertilizer 
We believe that the three inputs in (2) describe the important 
inputs used in the production process except irrigation (see Section 4.2.2). 
We have (also in Section4.2.2)given reasons for not including labour input 
in (2). An additional reason is that part of labour's contribution may 
if 
already be captured in the three inputs specified in (2). An important 
reason for choosing the three inputs is that in order to carry out a 
comparison of the villages we must maintain uniformity. The three 
inputs in (2) are the only important inputs in the production process that 
are common to all four villages and for which data are available. 
1/. This is on account of the stronc complementarity between human 
and bullock labour. 
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In the estimation of (1) and (2) we experimented with linear 
and loglinear functional forms. In the linear form (1) becomes: 
TPROD - CONSTANT +a HOLDCULT (1') 
In the linear form the relationship between size and 
productivity, depends on the value of the constant term, The relationship 
is inverse, positiveor constant depending on whether the constant term 
is positive, negative (and statistically significant) or equals zero. 
(11)was 
estimated for one village, Jatli, for illustrative purposes only. The 
results for the three dependent variables (TPROD, PRODW and KPROD) 
have been reported in Table 4.5a. 
The log-linear form for both (1) and-(2), consistently-gives higher 
2 
R values of. the regression equations. Most of the results reported in 
this. chapter are based on, this functional form. The, theoretical 
implications of, the log-linear form are quite interesting. The functional 
form traces back to a Cobb-Douglas production function which is the 
commonly estimated agricultural production ( Heady and Dillon (1961)). 
Writing (1) and (2) as Cobb-Douglas production functions we have : 
TPROD =A 
DOLDCULT] 1( 3) 
where A is a multiplicative technology parameter 
al is the elasticity of land'measured in acres' 
TPROD -A 
EH0LDcT1wAMv2M1uT3J 
where ' arethe elasticities of WAMALVAL and MIUT, respectively, 
Taking logs of (3) and (4) we have : 
LTPROD - log A+ al LHOLDCULT (5) 
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and, 
LTPROD = log A+ ai LHLDCULT + a2 LWAMAVAL + a3 LMIUT (6) 
(5) implies that the relationship between size and productivity is 
negative, positive or constant depending on whether al 1. This 
equation has been estimated for all four villages and also for the 
small farmers, separately., in the four villages. Thus several versions 
of (5) have been estimated. 
We shall interpret the constant term log A in (5) and (6) 
as the measure of technological efficiency. For a given a, a production 
function with a higher value of log A in one village (or size-category), 
will be interpreted to imply greater technical efficiency for that 
village compared to other villages ( or size-categories). In terms 
of Farrell's measure of technical efficiency (Section 4.2) this implies 
an isoquant that lies below II given that II' measures the technical 
efficiency of the other villages (or sizes-categories) (holding output constant) 
We shall often compare the estimates of equations (5) and (6) for 
different villages (sizes). To do so we shall use formal statistical 
tests to indicate differences between villages (sizes). Two standard 
procedures are available. One procedure is to use the Chow test (1960). 
This test involves the comparison of residual sum of squares of the 
restricted equation . 
(RSS) with those of the unrestricted equation 
(URSS) In the restricted equation, we hypothesize the coefficient 
values to be the same for all villages. In the unrestricted equation we 
allow the coefficients to be different in all villages. The computed 
statistic has an F distribution. If, for example, two groups art 
to be compared the restricted equation is estimated by pooling observations 
for the two groups. The unrestricted residual sum of squares are then 
calculated'by the addition of (pRSS) for each of the two estimated 
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equations for the two groups. The computed statistic is : 
F 
(RRSS - URSR )/ (k + 1) F (k+1), (n +n -2k-2) URSS / (n1+n2-2k-2) 12 
A drawback of this procedure is that it tests the. overall relationship 
between two (or more) groups without specifying whether the tested 
differences are on account of the slope coefficients or intercept 
terms. 
An alternative approach is to incorporate dummy variables for both 
slope as well as the intercept term in equation (5) (or (6)). So that 
for'comparing two villages, V0 and V1 I we have : 
LTPROD - log A+ a0D1 + a1 LHOLDCULT + a2D11 (7ý 
where D1 -1 when an observation comes from V1 ,0 otherwise 
D11 = HOLDCULT when an observation comes from V1 90 otherwise 
. r. ýý,. 
If a0 is statistically signficantly different from zero the 
coefficient on the intercept term for V1 is (log A+ a0) while the 
coefficient on the slope term for V1 is (a1 + a2). The intercept 
and slope term coefficients for V0 are log A and al respectively. 
This method allows us to distinguish between sources of difference between 
the two groups. A problem with this approach arises due to the 
possibility of multicollinearity between the independent variables, Dl 
and D11 1which reduces the reliability of the estimates. We should, 
therefore, interpret our regression results with some caution. 
Equation (6) has been estimated for all four villages, for three 
size categories (small, medium, large) in each village, for 'barani' and 
irrigated farms separately and finally for all the farms in the four 
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villages taken together. Thus altogether,, nineteen regressions based 
on equation (6) have been estimated. 
The log form used in our regression analysis is restrictive in one 
important sense. It allows for the inclusion of only those households 
who have non-zero values for the variables in (5), (6) or (7). Thus 
we have been forced to drop some households. However, the number of 
households thus left out is rather small. 
The estimation of Cobb-Douglas production function yields elasticities 
that have - straightforward economic interpretation s. Marginal 
productivities are easy to calculate (since elasticity nmp) and 
returns to scale follow directly : Thus 
S Ea. i 1to3 
i 
and we have increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale according 
as S< '1. However, we need to make the strong assumption of unit 
elasticity of stbstitution between inputs. But this has been shown to 
be a reasonable assumption (Bardhan (1973)). 
We shall next discuss some estimation problems associated with the 
behavioural production function of the type that we propose to analyse 
Suppose we specify a production function 
Q f(X,, 
where Q is output, X1 is land, x is the vector of all other inputs. - 
In the perfect, neo-classical, world all inputs (including management) 
are perfectly divisible and marketed, and the function, f is the same 
for all farmers. Cost minimization with prices the same for everyone., 
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implies that factor ratios are equal for all farmers. Output, therefore, 
is proportional to land. There would be no point in including other 
inputs in the production function since they would be perfectly collinear 
with land; the estimated parameters of such a production function would 
be unreliable. 
The other problem arises due to the simultaneous nature of decision- 
making that underlies behavioural production function. Profit maxim- 
ization by farmers given perfect markets and the absence of uncertainty 
leads to inconsistent and biased estimates of parameters when -11 
ordinary least square regression procedure is used.. This is due to 
the correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term, 
(Marschak and Andrews (1949), Walters (1963a)). An example of this, in 
the Indian, contextfmay be seen in the controversy between Hopper (1965, 
1967) and Nowshirvani (1967)). 
Hopper (1967) 'estimated production functions using ordinary least 
square regressions (for 43 farms in a village in Northern India) in 
which expected. output on the farm was regressed on inputs actually used. 
He concluded that in technologically stagnant agriculture, resource 
allocation is rational in the sense that farmers seek to maximize profits 
from given inputs and their prices. Questioning Hopper's estimation 
procedure, Nowsht-rwani (1967) argued that profit maximizing farmers 
adjust inputs given their knowledge of the residuals . Thus farmers 
with higher residuals apply more inputs to equate the value of marginal 
products with input prices and we have a situation where both output as 
well as inputs are correlated with the error term. This violates a 
basic assumption of the ordinary least square regression procedure and 
the estimated parameters are inconsistent and biased. Thus no conclusions 
regarding allocative efficiency can be drawn from Hopper's estimates. 
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Our village economies are different from the neo-classical paradigm. 
Factor markets in our villages are imperfect in a number of ways. 
Differences in access to inputs result in different factor prices across' 
farm size. The dualistic nature of factor markets was discussed in 
detail in Section 4.2.2. Further3response to uncertainty in agriculture 
also varies across farmers. An additional feature of our village 
economies is the differences in skills across farmers. These skills 
cannot be marketed easily so that the assumption of identical production 
functions for all farmers is unrealistic. In our discussion of the 
measures, of explanatory variables in the previous section, we noted a 
number of problems due to inaccuracies in measurement. All these features 
of our villages imply that factor price ratios are likely to vary across 
farms so that output may not be strictly proportional to'land and the 
multicollinearity between inputs may not be a serious problem. Differences 
in skills across farms and measurement problems are also likely to produce 
variation across farmers so, that the production function is a meaningful 
concept in our villages. Finally, farmers may have only an imperfect 
knowledge of their residuals so that inputs may be adjusted imperfectly. 
This adjustment may also be influenced by differences in factor price 
ratios across farms. Thus the problem of inconsistency and bias pointed 
out by N,; wsh irwani may not be very serious for the parameters that 
we shall estimate. 
Definition of variables 
The variables that we shall use in our discussion in the remaining 
sections of this chapter are as follows 
TPROD, PRODW, KPROD = value of total, wheat and kharif output. 
HOLDCULT a Size of holding (= land owned, + land rented in - land 
rented out) 
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FRA('MNTS a Fragments 
TCROP = Total, cropped area on the farm 
WAMALVAL = Value of draught animals on the farm 
MIUT = Value of expenditure on seeds and fertilizers 
In many cases we shall be using log forms of variables, in which 
case letter L will be attached in front of the variables. For example, 
Log 10 TPROD = L(TPROD) 
Dummy variables will also be used but these will be defined whenever 
they are used. 
Section 4.3 The evidence and some explanations 
Section 4.3.1 The regression results 
In the present section we shall present our regression results. In 
Section 4.3.2 we shall offer some interpretations and explanations for 
our results. 
We first take village Jatli as an example and report the results 
for the size-productivity relationship by estimating both linear and 
log-linear forms. The results are given in Table 4.5 a and b. The R2 values 
o¬, the regressions 
for all three dependent variables TPROD, PROW, and 
KPROD., are quite low for the linear form. The values of the intercept 
term (CONSTANT) are consistently positive implying diminishing returns 
to land. This result is confirmed by the estimates-for the log-linear 
form presented in Table 4.5 b. The value for the slope coefficient 
is less than one for the three dependent variables. Judging by R2 
values the log-form is a better fit. A comparison of the slope coefficients 
of ROLDCULT for PRODW and KPROD indicate that diminishing returns 
set in earlier (i. e. for a smaller size of holding) in the 'kharif' 
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Table 4.5 a Regression of output on the size of holding in Jatli 
(linear form)' 
EPENDEFT 
Si" VARIABLE -- 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
TPROD PRODW KPROD 
HOLDCULT 73.86 47.96 25.91 
(34.56) 2/ (40.06) (16.51) 
CONSTANT 1430.06 860.20 569.86 
(106.91) (106.34) (65.90) 
R2 0.16 0.18 0.08.. 
N 183 183. 183 
Table 4.5 b Regression of output on the size of holding in Jatli 
(log-linear form) 
EPENDENT 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES - 
VARIABLES 
TPROD PROW KPROD 
HOLDCULT 0.71 0.62 0.58 
1 (278.67) (265.64) (54.00) 
CONSTANT 2.71 2.51 2.35 
(6884.96) (6899.09) (829.72) 
2 R 0.62 0.61 0.26 
'N 171 - 171 101 
1/. For definition of variables, see 145,146. 
2/. In all the tables that follow values in brackets are F values. 
itaJF) 
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season. Another result worth noting is that when the entire annual 
crop output, (TPROD) , is taken into consideration the coefficient 
value of HOLDCULT is higher relative to the two separate crop seasons. 
. 
["Te shall comment briefly on the results presented in Table 4.5 a, 
and 4.5 b., since this is the only occasion when we present results for 
different crop seasons . Poor returns per acre on the larger farms in 
the' 'kharif' season may be explained by the popular practice of leaving 
land fallow for grazing etc. by such farms. Large farms may choose to 
have a larger value of livestock rather than grow 'kharif' cash crops 
such as groundnuts, particularly when-the-requirements of irrigation 
are greater for the 'kharif', season crops. We noted in our discussion 
in Section4'. 2.2that, typically, a smaller proportion of the total farm 
area is irrigated on the larger farms. Further, rearing livestock may 
be less labour intensive compared to growing groundnuts. Earlier 
(Chapter 3, Section 3.4) we noted the impact of the introduction of 
groundnuts on the rural labour market. We shall be arguing later in 
this section that small farms have a distinct advantage over large 
. ft 
farms regarding'both the quality as well as the quantity of labour. 
In Table 4.6 we have presented results, based on the log-linear form 
the relationship between size and productivity in the four villages. It 
can be seen that diminishing returns are strongest in Khunda followed by 
Jatli and Mehdiabad. In Chak, the coefficient value for HOLDCULT is 
0.90 which is closest to constant returns. 
In Table 4.7 we have grouped together our villages into 'barani' 
(rain fed) and irrigated villages. It can be seen that the value of the 
coefficient for HOLDCULT is smaller in the 'barani' villages compared 
to the canal irrigated villages and the differences are rather large. An 
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Table 4.6 Regression of Total Value of Output on the size of holding 1, 
Dependent variablem. log 10. (TPROD) (log-linear form) 
VILLAGES 
INDEP. VARIABLES Jatli Khunda Mehdiabad Chak 
log 10 (HOLDCULT) 0.71 0.67 0.78 0.90 
(278.67) V (102.62) (104.85) (203.28) 
CONSTANT 2.71 2.30 3.18 2.89 
(6884.96) (784.59) (1280.63) (2346.01) 
R2 0.62 0.35 0.60 0.67 
N 171 189 71 104 
S. E 0.31 0.29 0.23 
R. S. S. 7.44 17.91 5.51 5.22 
3 D. W. 2! 1.93 1.70 1.41 2.33 
1/. For definition of variables, see pp. 145,146. 
2/. Values in brackets are F values. 
3/. To calculate the Durbin-Watson statistic, D. W., we arranged 
households by increasing order of HOLDCÜLT. D. W. statistics 
in all four villages are significant. N, S. E. and R. S. S. 
are the number of households, the standard error of the regression 
and residual sum of squares, respectively. 
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Table 4.7 Regression of Total Value of Output on the size of holding IL 
Dependent variable : log 10 (TPROD) 
1J (log-linear form) 
VILLAGES 
INDEP. VARIABLES 
ALL VILLAGES BARANI VILLAGES 
IRRIGATED 
VILLAGES 
log 10 (HOLDCULT) 0.52 0.39 0.89 
(136.13) (104.85) (328.31) 
CONSTANT, 2.86 2.76 2.96 
(3741.97) (4735.35) (3353.00) 
R2 0.20 0.23 0.66 
-N 535 360 175 
S. E - 0.46 0.32 0.26 
R. S. S. 
r 
105.93 
_ 
37.37 
i 
12.01 
. 
11 1/. For definition of variables, see pp. 145,146. 
2/. Figures in brackets are F values. 
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important explanation may be the availability of irrigation facilities to 
the large farms in the canal irrigated villages. This improves the 
fertility of soil and increases yields. Thus, differences in,, the fertility 
of soil,, across farm size, may be less marked in the canal irrigated 
villages. We shall be arguing later that. soil fertility may be a 
crucial factor in determining the nature of the relationship between 
size and productivity. 
We used a formal statistical test to determine whether the differences 
in the slope and intercept of the four villages were significant. We 
estimated a regression equation in which the differences in the two 
parameters are captured by introducing two dummy variables, each, for 
Jatli, Mehdiabad and Chak and comparing their estimated values with 
those of Khunda. Our regression equation is : 
LTPROD - CONSTANT + a0D1 + a0D3 + a0D4 + a1 L HOLDCULT + a1D11 
-f + a1D31 + a1D41 
where Dl, D3, D4 are the intercept dummies for Jatli, Mehdiabad and 
Chak respectively. 
and Dli, D31, D41 are the slope dummies for Jatli, Mehdiabad and 
ChakIrespectively. 
Results for the regression equation are presented in Table 4.8. It 
can be seen that the slope dummy for Jatli, D11, is statistically 
insignificant. This implies that one cannot reject the hypothesis that 
returns to land are similar in the two 'barani' villagesýJatli and 
Khunda. The slope dummy for Mehdiabad, D31, is significantly different 
from zero at 10% level of significance. This is quite low and suggests 
that we must be cautious in accepting the apparent differences in returns 
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Table 4.8 Regression of Total Output on size of holding for all villages 
Dependent variable.! loe 10 (TPROD) (log form) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
1ý 
log 10 (HOLDCULT )r 
D 11 
D 31 
D 41 
CONSTANT 
D1 
A3 
D4 
R2 
F 
N 
S. E. 
R. S. S. 
4 
ALL POPULATION 
0.67 
(143.42) 
0.04 
(0.30) 
0.11 
(1.54) 
0.24 
(6.55) 
2.30 
0.41 
(26.61) 
0.88 
(69.90) 
0.59 
(38.65) 
0.73 
201.90 
535 
0.26 
36.12 
1/. For definition of variables, see pp. 145,146. 
2/. Figures in brackets are F values. 
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to land between Mehdiabad and Jatli. For Chak, however, the coefficient 
value for the slope dummy, D41, is statistically significant and is 
quite high. We can be confident in interpreting this'result as indicative 
of the difference between this village and the 'barani' villages regarding 
returns to land. 
A similar interpretation of the intercept dummies indicates that 
differences between villages are quite sharp where technical efficiency 
is concerned. The three intercept dummies are significantly different 
from zero. 
In Table 4.9) below) we have ranked the four villages ( using criterion of 
statisticallysignificant differences in slope and intercept dummies) 
according to the magnitude of returns to land and technical efficiency. 
Table 4.9 The ranking of villages by criteria of efficiency 
Village Technical Efficiency Returns to land 
Khunda 
.0 0 
Jatli 1 0 
Mehdiabad 3 1 
Chak 2 2 
On the basis of the regression results presented so far we may 
suggest the following conclusions regarding the relationship between farm 
size and productivity: 
(i) 'Returns to land diminish as the size of holding increases 
in all four villages. 
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(ii) Returns to land are higher in the irrigated villages as 
compared to the 'barani' villages. 
(iii) Within 'barani' villages, technical efficiency is. higher in 
Jatli. Returns to land are similar. 
(iv) Within irrigated villages, returns to land are higher in 
Chak. ' We. cannot comment on the relative technical efficiency 
since the coefficients of HOLDCULT are significantly 
different in the two villages. 
Section 4.3.2 Some explanations 
Conclusion (i) is consistent with the empirical results found in 
India (discussed in detail in Chapter 2) where a much larger data base 
was used to show the existence of an inverse relationship between the size 
of holding and productivity in different agricultural zones. If we 
accept the statistical nature of this relationship, we have to provide 
economic reasons for its existence. Three hypotheses may be suggested_ 
here : -ý 
H. 1 Small farms are endowed with superior quality of land as 
compared to large farms. 
H. 2 Small farms allocate greater labour per unit of land compared 
to large farms. 
H. 3 Small farms are better endowed with some essential complementary 
input such as irrigation. 
The empirical validity of all three hypotheses has been investigated in 
the Indian context. We nöted that Khusro (1964) estimated the relation- 
ship between size of holding and productivity correcting for differences 
in soil fertility. He used land revenue as an index of soil fertility. 
This measure is not satisfactory since land revenue reflects considerations 
other than principles of taxation (thus land revenue is often much below 
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w 
the pure economic rent of ,a 
parcel of land). However, in the absence 
of a more reliable measure of fertilityjthis proxy variable gives good 
results in Khusro's regression analysis. With its introduction, the 
elasticity coefficient of the size of holding approaches unity , 
indicating 
the importance of H. 1 in the existence of the inverse relationship. 
Our indirect test for H. 2 is the pattern of cropping intensity on 
farms of different size.. The results are given in Table 4.10.. 
Table 4.10 Regression of total cropped area on the size of holding 
(log-linear form) 
Dependent variable log of Total Cropped Area 
1ý 
VILLAGE 
INDEP. VAR 
. 
IABL 
Khunda Jatli Mehdiabad Chak 
log (HOLDCULT) 0.79 0.84 0.89 0.91 
(280.94) Y (706.40) (156.62) "(197.68) 
CONSTANT 0.20 0.11 0.02 -0.18 
(11.68) (19.20) (0.06) (8.66) 
2 
R 0.60 0.81 0.69 0.66 
N 189, 171 71 104 
1/. For definition of variable, see pp. 145,146. 
2/. Figures in brackets are F values (t - 
FF) 
In all the villages the estimated value of the coefficient of 
log (HOLDCULT) is significantly less than one when the dependent variable 
is the log of total cropped area. This indicates that cropping intensity 
declines as the size of holding increases in all villages. 
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In a labour intensive technological environment it is reasonable 
to assume that labour requirements increase proportionately with cropping 
intensity. Our results, therefore, imply that the small farms use more 
labour on the farm. (This result is to be contrasted with those presented 
in Table 4.12 and discussed later in this section). 
C. H. H. Rao (1968)advanced H. 3. He found that the introduction of 
an additional variable, such as percentage of area under irrigation, 
increases the value of the. land coefficient. This implies that an 
important explanation for hither output on small farms may be their 
better access to irrigation. 
We have seen that the empirical validity of the three hypotheses is 
well-established in the Indian context . But there are a priori 
arguments that form the rationale for the hypotheses before they are 
empirically tested. We shall discuss some of these a priori justifications 
in order to examine their relevance to our four villages. 
Sen (1964) suggests a demographic argument for justifying H. 1. He 
argues that given some initial . state of land distribution, high quality 
land yields higher output and thus is able to maintain larger families. 
This process takes place in an environment where laws of inheritance 
ecourage fragmentation of, farms. The outcome is a higher concentration 
of small size farms on better quality land. The plausibility of this 
argument rests on the assumption of a closed village economy with few 
possibilities of emigration. This is quite reasonable since migration 
possibilities for the small peasant proprietor have opened up (on any 
meaningful scale) in the last twenty years (Helbock, (1975), Eckert (1972)). 
It may be too early yet for migration to reverse the process of land 
concentration (through the consolidation of small farms). 
An implication of Sen's argument is that in villages where the 
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the demographic process is in its early phases (so that 
differences in the soil fertilitybetween large-and small farms are not 
so sharp), we should expect to observe greater value of the land 
coefficient (when log of output is regressed on the log of land) as 
compared to villages where the demographic process has been in operation 
for a longer period of time. This implication is confirmed by our 
conclusion (ii) based on the evidence presented in Table 4.6. We saw 
that in both the canal irrigated villages the value of the land coefficient 
is considerably higher than in the two 'barani' villages. The two canal 
irrigated villages lie in the canal colonies that were opened up for 
settlement in the early decades of this century. The two 'barani' 
villages, on the other hand, are several centuries old. It is reasonable 
to argue that the higher coefficient values in the canal irrigated villages 
are on account of the earlier phases of the demographic process as 
compared to the two 'barani' villages. Higher technical efficiency in, ' 
Chak and Mehdiabad, compared to Khunda and Jatli, may be explained by the 
availability of canal irrigation. 
An alternative process by which small farms get concentrated on 
better quality land is the distress sales argument suggested by Bhagwati' 
and Chakravarti (1971). It is argued that at times of'distress farmers 
hold on to the most fertile portions of their land. The worst parcels 
of land'are sold off and these are bought by the larger farmers. Thus., 
larger farms have poorer quality of soils compared to small farms. This 
argument goes further than H. 1 and asserts that, because of the distress 
sales process the large farms have a greater number of fragments per 
farm. This lowers the return to land on the large farms by increasing 
the costs of cultivation. 
The evidence on fragmentation from our four villages has been 
presented in Tables 4.11 a to 4.11 c. Tables 4.11 a and b indicate that 
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while the total number of fragments per farm are indeed greater on the 
large farms, +fragments per acre are greater on the small farms. It is 
not clear which of the two variables is important in causing diseconomies 
due to fragmentation. In Table 4.11 c we have presented the regression 
estimates of an equation in which, in addition to HOLDCULT,, we introduce 
fragments as- an explanatory variable. (The variable is significant 
in Jatli only. ) For the distress sales argument to holdI the"introduction 
of fragments in the regression equation should result in raising the value 
of the coefficient HOLDCULT since the new variable picks up the 
influence of fragmentation on the returns to land across farm size. 
However, Table 4.11 indicates that the value of the coefficient on HOLDCULT 
falls, compared to its value given in Table 4.6, as a result of introducing 
the additional independent variable . 
On the basis of the evidence from our villages, we would have to 
be sceptical about the validity of the distress sales argument advanced 
in support of H. 1. The evidence, however, is indirect. In-a detailed 
village survey it should be possible to check 'patwari' records to see 
. ft 
whether land sales, in fact, took place at times of distress and whether 
land exchanged hands between farmers who are currently small and large farmers 
in the village. The quality of land thus exchanged can also be determined. 
Unfortunately we do not have access to 'patwari' records to comment on 
this aspect of the distress sales hypothesis. 
It is worth noting that the coefficient value of FRAGMNTS is 
significantly positive in Table 4.11 c. One interpretation of this 
might be that the number of fragments per farm are really a proxy for 
a size effect that influences access to resources that raise the total 
value of output on the farm. In Chapter 6 we shall discuss some of the 
arguments that suggest that large farmers have better access to'the new 
'green revolution' inputs. It may be argued that, typically, it is only a 
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Table 4.11 a Numberof fragments per acre on farms of different size 
categories 
Khunda Jatli "Mehdiabad Chak 
Small 0.48 1.96 0.30 0.44 
Medium 0.22' 1.25 0.11 0.21 
Large 0.07 o. 89. -,, 0.06 0.11 
Table 4.11 b Number of fragments per farm on farms of different size 
categories 
Khunda Jatli Mehdiabad Chak 
Small 2.20 5.05 1.35 1.11 
Medium 3.08 9.41 1.16 1.41 
Large 2.52 14.71 1.54 i. 80 
Table 4.11 c. Regression of the total value of output on HOLDCULT and 
FRAGMNTS 
1 in Jatli (log form) 
Dependent variable L(TPROD) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES STATISTICS 
L(HOLDCULT) 0.65 
v 
L(FRAGMNTS) 
(168.64) 
L(FRAGMNTS) 0.11' 
(4.00) 
CONSTANT 2.66 : 
Z 
R 0.63 
F -_143.19 
N 170 
1/. For definition of variables, see pp. 145,146. 
2/. Figures in brackets are F values. 
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sub-set of the large farmers who are 'progressive', in terms of the use 
of new inputs, Further, such farmers may have increased the size of 
their holdings out of the savings accumulated from the returns to their 
entrepreneurial abilities . Such additions to the original farm size also 
increase the number of fragments on the large farms as seen in Table 
4.11 b. Thus the introduction of fragments in the regression equation 
acts as a proxy for the true variable which may be entrepreneurial 
ability. 
The third argument suggested in support of'H. 1 is that tenancy 
contracts result in better. quality land on large farms being parcelled 
out to small tenants (Khusro (1964)). The theoretical issues involved 
in determining tenancy contracts are complicated and are the subject of 
a whole chapter. We shall postpone the discussion on tenancy 
to '" Chapter 5. For the moment)we shall consider the empirical evidence 
to test Khusro's argument that the inverse relationship between size and 
output may be explained by the concentration of tenanted holdings amongst the 
small farms. In Table 4.12 we have presented the regression results 
showing the relationship between size and the total value of output for 
pure owner-cultivators. 
Table 4.12 Regression of the value of total output on 'the size of 
holding on owner-cultivated farms only (log-linear form) 
Dependent variable ; L(TPROD) 
VILLAGE 
Khunda Jatli' Mehdiabad Chak 
INDLP. VARIABLP 
L(HOLDCULT) 0.66 0.69 0.73 0.89 
All coefficients are significant at 5% level. 
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Clearly, the inverse relationship persists. Also, `' the coefficient 
values are not very different from those reported for all farmers in 
Table 4.6 on p. 149 '. This' suggests that the presence of tenants does 
not affect . the 
basic inverse relationship between size of holding and 
the value of total output. 
Our discussion indicates that the strongest argument in support of 
H. 1; thereby justifying our conclusion (i) that there exists an inverse 
relationship between size and productivity, is the demographic argument 
suggested by Sen. We have also noted that an extension of this argument 
explains'our conclusion (ii). 
It is important to note that the three arguments given in support 
of HA make the common assumption that the quality of soil is an 
exogenous factor that is beyond the control of the farmer. It is not . 
, certain, however, that land quality 
is exogenous. It can be improved by 
careful agricultural practices ( such as crop rotation, application of 
manure etc. ). To the extent, therefore, that quality of soil itself is 
determined by the size of farm, we should be careful in interpreting H. 1 
as an explanation for the existence of the inverse relationship between 
size and productivity. 
Next, we shall consider H. 2 and H. 3 as possible explanations of 
the existence of the inverse relationship. 
H. 3 suggests that the inverse relationship between size and 
productivity; is explained by the abundant availability of some important 
complementary factor, such aspirrigation. Higher percentage of irrigated area 
on small farms (when irrigation is not the result of a public project, 
such as1canal irrigation), may be accounted for by any of, the three 
arguments advanced in support of H. 1. Irrigation is now treated as'another 
feature of soil quality. Thus)in many rural areas of Punjab, farm 
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size is described not so much by acres owned but in terms of the number 
of wells owned. In the division of plots the source of, and access to,. 
irrigation is an important consideration. Thus Sen's demographic argument 
is likely to hold for H. 3 as well. Similarly, the distress sales 
hypothesis implies that land at a greater distance from the irrigation 
source is likely to be put up for sale first. Further, tenants minimizing 
risk will insist on access to the source of irrigation, while renting land. 
Thus H. 3 is really the same as H. 1 and the two hypotheses have similar 
implications for the relationship between size, and productivity. 
A rationale for H. 2, the labour-based hypothesis explaining our, 
conclusion (i), may be sought in the dualistic structure of the rural 
labour market4 In the context of our discussion dualism implies the 
existence of two main farm categories : farms that use mainly hired 
labour and family farms. The two sets of farms are distinguished by-. --, 5"- 
the difference in the opportunity-cost determining the. allocation of ° -. 
labour. Small farms work with (O Wer opportunity cost, of-labour than 
large farms, The wage gap implied for the two sets of farms (or 
sectors) is the main feature of several growth models (Lewis (1954), Fei 
and Ranis (1964), Jorgensen (1961), Dixit (1968), Stern (1972)). 
Several arguments may be suggested to explain the existence of the gap. 
There are at least two variants of the surplus labour argument discussed 
in Section 4.2.2 that may be suggested as possible explanations. 
One is the assertion of the existence of zero marginal productivity of 
labour on family farms while the labour-hiring farms are argued to have 
a positive marginal product of labour. We have already seen that the 
existence of zero marginal productivity is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for the existence of surplus labour. Both1intuitively 
and empiricallyjit is hard to accept that the marginal product of labour 
can be zero. Surplus labour with apositive marginal product, as an 
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explanation for the wage gapyis more'plausible but we have seen in 
Section 4.2.2 that on optimally organized' farms where decisions are taken 
jointly surplus labour may not exist. 
The existence of the wage gap may be explained by the high psychic 
cost of hiring out labour services in the market as opposed to working 
on the family farm where joint family decisions may make work 
less painful. This would imply a lower disutility of work on 
the family farm compared to the labour-hiring farms. Another argument 
may be that farms purchasing labour in the market are prepared to'pay 
higher wages to reduce turnover rate and thus improve efficiency. Yet' 
another set of arguments may be advanced on the basis of the hypotheses 
suggested by the literature on efficiency wages (Stiglitz (1976), ' 
Leibenstein (1966)` Bliss and Stern (1977)). The last two lines of 
reasoning imply that the wage gap may be explained by the desire of labour- 
hiring farms to achieve higher productivity through greater. labour effort. 
The implication of the existence of wage gap is that the small 
farms have lower-opportunity cost of labour and therefore allocate more 
labour per unit of land compared to the large farms. The conceptual 
problem with this argument arises on account of the empirical evidence' 
that shows that small farms not only use hired labour but also sell 
labour services in. the market (Rao (1968), Khusro (1964)). 
This suggests that small family farms participate actively in the 
rural labour market. Thus, while allocating labour on their farm they 
should treat the going market wage as the true opportunity cost of labour. 
The use of a lower opportunity cost can be justified only in terms of 
an absence of search and transportation costs when working on the 
family farm. The psychic factor discussed above may also be important. 
Mazumdar (1965) has given a rigorous analytical argument to explain 
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why the marginal cost of , labour. supply 
is. lower on the family farm. He 
divides the agricultural season into a slack and a busy season. In the 
busy season the marginal cost of labour supply is the same for the family 
farm and the large farm, But in the slack season small farms use only 
family labour so that the marginal cost of labour for such farms is lower 
than for the large farms in the same period. Therefore, the overall 
marginal cost of the supply of labour being a, composite, of the two seasons, 
is lower for family farms. 
A comprehensive test for the argument presented'above-requires 
the marginal product-of labour (measured in mandays) on small farms to 
be'lower than on the large farms. We have already seen (Section 4.3.2) 
that we do not have a measure of labour input in mandays. We, therefore, 
used an alternative procedure for testing H. 2 and the arguments 
supporting it. 
1ý 
Evidence from the four villägesýpresented in'Section 4.3.4, does 
not support the view that small farms rely exclusively'on family labour 
or that large farms use hired labour only. In order to test H. 2 we- 
introduced intercept and slope dummies for hired'labour into a regression 
of TPROD on HOLDCULT . DL is the intercept dummy taking the value 1 
if a farm uses hired labour, 0 otherwise, while D1L is the slope dummy. 
If H. 2 is true., we expect the value'of'the coefficient of Ditto be' 
significantly negative implying that the'cöefficient value of HOLDCULT 
for farms using hired labour in comparison to farms using family 
labour only. The coefficient of HOLDCULT, therefore, measures'the 
relationship between size and productivity for farms using family labour 
only. The coefficient sign for'the intercept dummy, DL, will indicate 
1/. Several farm management studies conducted'in Pakistan (Farm 
Managament Surveys 1967,1969,1971) consistently report that 
small farms use greater labour in mandays per acre compared to 
medium and large size farms. 
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whether farms using hired labour are technically more efficient. The 
results for three of the villages are presented in Table 4.12. (Chak 
has been excluded because data on hired labour are not very reliable in 
this village. ) We see from the table that the slope dummies are 
statistically insignificant in all three villages. This implies that 
there is no significant difference in productivity between family farms 
and farms using hired labour, We therefore reject H. 2. Further, in 
Jatli, the intercept dummy is significantly positive. This may reflect 
differences in attitude towards technologically advanced practices of 
cultivation. It suggests that farms hiring labour seek to maximize 
profit and thus use inputs such as fertilizer and high yield variety 
seeds more intensively, given that their rates of return are quite high. 
In Chapter 2 we discussed a model suggested by Srinivasan(1972) 
which indicated that allocation of higher labour input on small farms 
may be explained as rational farmer response under uncertainty. It 
was shown that given Arrow's postulates on relative and absolute risk 
aversion and a market wage rate that exists with certainty, farmers 
allocate more labour on irrigated land than on unirrigated land since 
the expected return on the former are higher. He then assumes that 
small farms., in general, have a higher percentage of cultivated land 
under irrigation. From these two results it follows that small farms 
allocate more labour per acre and hence get more output per acre. 
Although the analytic rigor of Srinivasan's conclusions is appealing, 
their validity depends crucially on the assumption about the nature 
of risk aversion. Bliss and Stern (1980) have shown that when absolute 
risk aversion is important in the decision making of the farmer, i. e. 
farmer's income from the less risky (non-farm assets) increases, the 
allocation of the variable input and hence output may be proportional 
to farm size. 
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Table 4.13 Regression of total value of output on the size of holding 
and hired labour (log-linear form) 
Dependent variable : L(TPROD) 
1/ 
VILLAGES 
INDEP. VARIABLES 
Khunda Jatli "Mehdiabad 
L(HOLDCULT) 0.64 0.69 0.93 
(53.80) (107.33) (9.45) 
DIL 0.03 -1.10 -0.16 
(0.04) (1.22) (0.27) 
CONSTANT 2.32 2.65 3.08 
DL -0.02 0.20 0.06 
(0.004) (9.58) (0.03) 
R2 0.36 0.66 0.62 
F 33.98 107.42 36.35 
N 189 171 71 
.. 
1/. For definition of variables, see pp. 145,146. 
2/. Figures in brackets are F values. 
The regression equation is : 
L(TPROD) = CONSTANT = a0 DL + a1L(HOLDCULT) + a2D1L 
DL''is the intercept dummy in each village. 
D1L is the slope dummy in each-village. 
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to'farm size. 
It is not generally true that small farms have a higher percentage 
of acreage under irrigation . We have already discussed the existence 
of the inverse relationship between size and productivity in the two 
canal irrigated villages (Table 4.6). However, in neither of the two 
villages is there a systematic difference in access to irrigation between 
large and small farmers as far as canal irrigation-is concerned (which 
is the main source of irrigation). In Mehdiabad, our only village 
with tube-well irrigation, large farms appear to have-reater-access' 
to water (Table 4,. 4). We see, -therefore, that Srinivasan's'argument 
rests on assumptions that are not'always'supported by evidence. 
Table 4.14 'Tube-well irrigation in Mehdiabad 
(li. (2) 
Small 6.00 6.00 
Medium 10.00 8.40 
Large 30.00 37.70 
(1) is the percentage of farmers reporting the use of tube-wells.., 
(2ý is the percentage of area irrigated with tube-wells. 
A variant of H. 2 the labour-based hypothesis is that by and large, 
on small farms, the proportion of family labour to hired labour is higher 
compared to the large farms. This facilitates supervision so that the 
quality of labour as opposed to its quantity is likely to be better on small 
farms contributing to greater productivity. Another aspect of supervision 
is concerned with general farm management that comes with familiarity with 
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the farm and the tasks performed on it. The size factor here is likely 
to be crucial. Given the general state of technical knowledge and the 
practice of self--managing the farm, a small farmer is likely to be better 
acquainted with the farm and the tasks that need doing as compared to a 
large farmer. Thus, overall management is likely to be better on small 
farms. 
H. 1 to H. 3 suggest different arguments for expecting higher productivity 
on small farms as compared to large farms. We have seen that on the basis 
of the evidence available from our villages we would have to be'sceptical 
about the validity of H. 2 and H. 3. -Regarding H. l, Sen's argument (that 
suggests favourable. endowment of soil fertility on the small farms as a 
consequence of the demographic patterns) is the most appealing explanation. 
However, we stress that we do not have sufficient data to test comprehensively 
each of the three hypotheses in the four villages. A somewhat indirect 
test of the three hypotheses, taken jointly, can be carried out by 'a "h 
re--arrangement of the data. Each of the hypotheses suggests that small 
farms are'more efficient because they are endowed with some special factor 
that is qualitatively (land) superior or quantitatively in greater 
abundance (labour), compared to large farms. We should, therefore, expect 
small farms to be characterized by constant returns to land whereas the 
entire village population is characterized by diminishing returns to land 
due to the lower productivity of large farms. 
Table 4.15 presents the regression results for small farms when 
LTPROD is regressed on LHOLDCULT in the four villages. In each village, 
small farms are defined according to the criterion discussed in Section 4. 
2.2 It can be seen that small farms in Chak, Khunda and Mehdiabad have 
approximately constant returns to land. Thus an overall test suggests 
that small farms behave differently from large farms. This difference 
may be explained mainly by the access to better quality soil. Factors 
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such as greater use of labour and better supervision may also be 
important. 
Table 4.15 Regression of total value of output'on the size of holding 
of small farms only (log-linear form) 
Dependent variable : L(TPROD) 
1/ 
VILLAGE, 
IND. VARIABLES 
Khunda Jatli Mehdiabad Chak 
L(HOLDCULT) 1.02 0.67 1.03 1.05 
(16.33).! / (77.98) (31.19) (26.57) 
CONSTANT 2.03 2.71 3.02 2.83 
(89.87) (5004.01) (628.98) (759.71) 
2 R 0.31 0.45 0.60 0.47 
N 39 99 23 32 
i/. For definition of variables, see pp., 145,146. 
2/. Figures in brackets. areý F values. 
. ft 
The arguments presented above may, now be used to explain conclusions 
(iii) and (iv) based on Table 4.9, p. 153, which state that technical 
efficiency is higher in Jatli (given that the returns, to land are similar) 
compared to Khunda amongst the 'barani' villages, and returns to land 
are higher in Chak amongst the two canal irrigated villages. We have 
seen that small farms (due to a combination of H. 1, H. 2 and H. 3) have 
constant returns to land while the village aggregate farming population 
shows diminishing returns. This suggests that in villages with a high 
concentration of land amongst the small farmers, we should expect to see 
relatively higher village-wide returns to land. -In Chapter 3 we argued 
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that the Gini coefficient is a good measure of the concentration of 
land in the villages. In Table 4.16 we have reproduced the values of 
the Gini coefficient for land concentration in all, four villages. 
Taking the two irrigated villages first, we note-that the value of the 
Gini coefficient is lower in Chak compared to Mehdiabad. This is due 
to the fact, noted in Chapter-3, that the percentage of farm area 
amongst the small farms is greater in Chak than in Mehdiabad. The 
characteristicsof small farms (suggested by H. 1 to H. 3) that result 
in their intensive cultivation practices may then explain the higher 
village-wide returns to land in Chak. 
In the two 'barani' villages, higher technical efficiency in Jatli 
compared to Khunda, given similar returns to land, suggest'that the 
production function in"the former lies above that of the latter. Our 
measure of returns to land indicates the intensity of cultivation. 
Similarity of the'values of this measure in the two villages indicates 
the similarity in the intensity of' cultivation. Comparing the Gini 
coefficients of land concentration in the two villages (from Table 4.16) 
we note that land concentration reveals a similar pattern in, the two 
villages. The size-effect on the village-wide production function, 
therefore, is not very different in Jatli compared to Khunda. Greater 
technical efficiency in Jatli may then be explained mainly, in terms of 
the greater use of modern inputs such as'high yield variety seeds and. 
chemical fertilizer by all farmers in the village compared to farmers in 
Khunda. 
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Table 4.16 Gini coefficient of land concentration in the four villages 
Barani Canal irrigated 
Villages Khunda Jatli' Mehdiabad Chak 
Gini coefficient 0.48 0.47 0.59 0.42 
In Chapter 2 we discussed empirical studies that assert a positive 
relationship between size and productivity. The argument is that in 
areas where 'green revolution' technology is widespread large farms have 
greater access to new, superior, inputs (such as high yield variety seeds, 
fertilizers and tube-wells) which raise their yields compared to small 
farmers. Further evidence-for this conclusion is seen in the changes 
in relative incomes in favour of large S, I as a'result of introducing 
'green revolution"technology (Griffin (1974)). 
We believe that neither the change in relative incomes nor higher 
yields on some large farms imply a reversal of the inverse size-productivity 
relationship. It is probably true that some large farms do use more 
inputs per acre which result in higher yields than those of small farms. However 
this is not true, generally. for all large farmers. Further, the reversal 
of the relationship is not a necessary condition for changes in relative 
incomes in favour of E(Lrge farmers. Incomes on large farms may have 
increased both due to the addition in total cultivated area as well as 
due to greater yields relative'to what the large farmers were getting 
before. Whether the increase in yields is'high enough to reverse the 
overall size-productivity relationship requires more careful empirical 
verification'than that presented in 'the literature so far. Certainly, 
in our villages there'isfno evidence to suggest that the sign of the 
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the size-productivity relationship has been reversed. 
We shall take up this discussion again, in Chapter 6 on technology. 
Section 4.4 Production Function with three inputs 
In the previous section we were concerned with explanations of'the 
greater intensity of land use by the small farms. In Section 4.1 we 
presented. a detailed discussion of the measures of economic efficiency. 
In the light of that discussion our concern in Section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 
has been with a partial measure of efficiency which is the value of output 
per unit of an input (in this case land):, In. agriculture land may be 
treated as a comprehensive input only in certain special circumstances. 
For example, we argued in-Section 4.2.0 that in a perfectly neo-classical 
world there would be no need to. have any input other than land in the 
production function, However, we have seen that our village economies 
are, characterized. by market imperfections so that for a comprehensive 
discussion of economic efficiency in our villages we should estimate 
production functions that include other inputs in addition to land. In 
the present section we shall estimate production functions with-three 
inputs, i. e. land, draught power and the value of modern inputs such- 
as seeds, and fertilizers. 
An important aspect of the debate on 'green revolution' technology 
is the differential access to inputs across farms of different size (see 
Chapters 2 and 6). The argument here is that small farms have better 
access to traditional inputs such as the quality of soil and family 
labour (Section 4.3.2). With the introduction of new inputs, however, 
access to"capital becomes quite important. Here large farms may have 
an advantage. The results based on the comprehensive measure of economic 
efficiency that we shall estimate and discuss in this section will be 
contrasted with the results of Section 4.3.1. This will bring into 
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sharper focus the arguments in the debate on-size and productivity., 
We shall next report the results for production functions using 
the three inputs which were discussed in Section 4.2.3. 
Production functions are estimated for each size-category in each 
village, for all farms in each village irrespective of size differences, 
for each ecological zone and finally for the entire farming population- 
in the four villages taken together. 
In Table 4.17 a, we have presented the results for the village level 
production function in each village. R2 values for all four villages 
are quite high for cross-section data. Nearly all of the estimated 
coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant. 
In Jatli the coefficient on MIUT is insignificantly different from 
zero. This is probably due to an error in the specification of the 
production function. We expected high use of MIUT in Jatli because 
of the presence of a model Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP) 
Centre (see Chapter 1). ' Being situated near Islamabad it is the pride 
of IRDP centres and is often shown to important Government and other 
visiting dignitaries. As a consequence, farmers residing in the village 
have greater access to subsidised inputs such as. seeds and fertilizers. 
Another exceptional result is the negative sign of the coefficient for 
WANALVAL in Chak. (However, it has a low significance level. ) This- 
may be explained by the choice of WAMALVAL as a proxy for draught 
power. As argued earlier (Section4.2.2) the consequence of this proxy 
variable is to exaggerate the value of services of draught power used 
in 
. crop production. Therefore1the coefficient 
is probably underestimated. 
Thus, we shall have to interpret this result with some caution. The 
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last result to be noted in Table 4.17 a is the computed value of the 
returns to scale factor 
11 in the four villages. It can be seen that, 
except in Jatli, the village economies are characterized by constant 
returns to scale. In Jatli., diminishing returns are probably due to 
the specification error discussed above. 
1/. The test of the statistical significance of constant returns to scale 
may be incorporated explicitly into the estimation procedure as a 
restriction on parameters. We have used the alternative approach of 
=adding up the coefficients and then testing whether the sum is 
significantly different from one. Our procedure is based on a standard 
result in econometrics (see, e. g;, Johnston (1972) pp. 166-167 and. 
Searle (1971) p. 55) 
If 9 =(61..... 8. )' ). is distributed with mean 0 and has variance 
covariance matrix E", then any homogenous linear combination of the 
elements of 9 say (as in our case) f(e)=_S= 01+02+e3 has mean 0 
and variance 
POP E f' (8) 
if 3f 
, 
of of 
äe1 a02' äe3% äe[; 
] of .., of ae3 
(111) var Al cov 0192 cov 0102 1 
cov 02$1'var 82 cov 6283 1 
cov 6301 cov 0302 var 03 1 
_j 
L 
_j 
a var 01 + var 02 + var 03 +2 cov 0102 + 2, cov 0203 
+2 cote 8193 
Thus from the variance, covariance matrix, for the regression reported 
in Table 4.17 a it is easy to calculate the var of S. We can then 
test whether the calculated value of S is significantly different 
from 1. 
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In Table=4.17 b we have presented marginal, products of each of the 
three inputs-in the four villages. It is fairly straightforward to 
calculate these given that our underlying production function is Cobb- 
Douglas (see Section 4.2.3).. Marginal product of MIUT in Jatli has 
not been reported because the estimated coefficient value of MIUT is 
statistically insignificant. Further, the marginal product of WAMALVAL 
has to be interpreted carefully given our earlier argument that WAMALVAL 
exaggerates the value of services of bullocks used in the production 
process. The range. of marginal product for land across the four villages 
is worth noting. (It reflects the rental value of an acre of land in the 
villages). The exceptionally low value for Khunda is reflective of the 
poor quality of soil in that region (see Chapter 1 ). The value of the 
marginal product for MIUT is indicative of the importance of uncertainty 
in the calculus of farmers. It may imply that farmers are governed by 
a decision rule for factor allocation that equates the marginal cost 
with the value of marginal product times a factor of uncertainty, i. e: 
M. C a VMP x0(0<9<1 is a measure of risk) 
It is worth noting that our estimates of marginal results are 
similar in magnitude to those reported by Bliss and Stern (1980) for 
Palanpur village in India. The value of the estimated marginal product 
for MIUT is twice as high in Chak compared to Mehdiabad. ' This is 
probably due to the lack of tube--well-irrigation in Chak. The new inputs 
used in the irrigated areas respond best to controlled irrigation. Farmers 
in Chak have access only to canal irrigation while farmers in Mehdiabad 
have access to both canal as well'as tube-well irrigation. With less 
control over irrigation, cultivation. is more risky for farmers in Chak 
compared to farmers in Mehdiabad. In other words, the value of' 0 
is lower for farmers in Chak, correspondingly the ex-post value'of MIUT 
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is higher. It is difficult to compare the marginal product of MIUT 
for Jatli and Khunda with-those of the irrigated villages because of 
the ecological differences which result in the. -two villages using. very 
little 
of the modern inputs (see Section 4.2.2). 
Results presented in Table 4.17 a. suggest that at least three of 
the villages, i. e. Khunda, Mehdiabad and Chakare characterized by 
constant returns to scale. (For Jatli we shall have to be agnostic 
since the production functidn is probably misspecificed. ) This result is 
to be contrasted with the result (i) of Section 4.3.1 in which we 
suggested that returns to land diminish as the size of holding increases 
in all four villages. I `` 
We shall next present a discussion where we shall argue that constant 
returns to scale for a production function with three inputs may exist 
at the same time as diminishing returns to land indicated by single 
input production functions. We shall explain this in terms of differences 
in the intenstities of factor use by farmers in different size-categories. 
To do so we shall estimate the three input production functions for each 
size-catergory of farms in all four villages. This will allow us to 
compute marginal products and then comment on intensity of use. First, 
we shall present a priori arguments to indicate the anticipated relative 
intensity of factor use by different farms. 
WAMALVAL, with all its measurement problems noted in Section 4.2.2, 
is our measure of the value of the services of draught power used on 
the farm. Should we expect large farms to have some inherent ability 
enabling them to use draught power more intensively compared to the 
small farms ? The answer, at least on a priori grounds, is ambiguous. 
We argued in Section 4.2.2 that markets for the services of bullocks 
are non--existent in our villages. Thus larger farmers' greater access 
to capital does not enable them to purchase greater bullock services. 
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But bullock services may be exchanged on the basis of other non-market 
arrangements (such as social obligation etc. ). But this implies that 
small farmers are likely to have greater access to bullock services since 
they are more likely to be involved in traditional peasant economic 
systems which are characterized by non-market exchange arrangements 
(Sen (1966)). Further, the maintenance of bullocks is a very labour 
intensive activity since regular feeding of bullocks requires growing 
fodder crops. Also; in bullock cultivation there isa strong, complement- 
arity between bullock and labour use because at least one person is 
required to operate a pair of bullocks. Thus greater availability of 
labour on the small farms is likely to result-in the greater use of 
WANALVAL and hence a lower value for its estimated marginal product, 
The other variable in the production function is MIUT, the value 
of seeds and fertilizer used on the farm. It is'easy to see that large 
farms have better access to these inputs compared to small farms"because 
of the facility in borrowing from Government and commercial institutions 
(see'Chapter 3),, -' Further, returns from applying new varieties of seeds 
and fertilizer can be improved through greater information about the' - 
basictechnology. Here also, large farms may have better access due to 
contacts with Government extension agencies. Access to capital markets 
and-information about the technology is likely to lower the perceived 
risk'of cultivation for large farmers. This may also result in greater 
application of seeds and fertilizers. On a priori grounds, therefore, 
it may be argued that large farms are likely to use the new inputs 
more intensively compared to the small farms. (These issues will be 
taken up again in detail in Chapter 6. ) 
Our discussion implies that the addition`of WAMALVAL and MIUT 
in the production function reported in Table-4.17a I 
is likely to give 
results that are different from a production function in which land 
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alone is the input. In the latter, small farms have advantages on 
account of both greater availability of labour and better quality of 
soil. In the former, WAMALVAL may work to the advantage of small 
farmers but the coefficient of MIUT is likely to show greater 
intensity of use on the large farms. If the overall effect is stronger 
for MIUT , there may be diminishing returns to 
land when returns to scale are 
constant. This argument requires empirical verification. To do so, we 
have estimated the three input production functions for small, medium 
and large farms in all four villages. The results are reported in 
Table 4.18 through 4.21. 
Our results indicate that in all four villages, for small and 
large farms the marginal product of WAMALVAL,, is consistently higher 
than that for the medium sized farms. Further, we find that the marginal 
product is consistently and appreciably lower for the small-farms as 
compared to the large farms. On. the basis of this evidence we may 
conclude, that small farms use draught power more intensively compared 
to the large farms. The more interesting conclusion, however, is that 
the medium sized farms use draught power more intensively than either of 
the other two categories of farms. This result may be interpreted to 
suggest that medium sized farms have neither the disadvantages of small 
farms regarding access to capital markets, nor those of the large farms 
regarding the availability of human labour required to apply draught 
power on the farm. 
Next, we turn to the discussion of MIUT . In Tables 4.18 and 
4.19 we have reported the results for the two 'barani' villages. It can 
be seen from part 'b' of both tables that the value of the marginal product 
is higher for the large farms as compared to both medium and small farm 
categories. This implies that large farms use variable inputs such as 
seeds and fertilizers less intensively compared to the other two categories. 
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The results for Mehdiabad (Table 20) and Chak (Table 21) indicate, 
however, that the value of marginal product of MIUT is lower on large 
farms, compared to the other two farm categories, which suggests greater 
intensity of use of-seed and fertilizer by the large farms. These 
results should be viewed in the light of the fact (noted in Section 4.2.2) 
that Khunda and Jatli, are 'barani' villages where the use of fertilizer 
is not widespread and the use of strains of high yield variety seeds is 
somewhat' limited. On the other hand, both Mehdiabad and Chak villages 
are from an area that is technologically one of the most advanced districts 
of Punjab (see Chapter 1). Our results, therefore, appear to support the 
view that new inputs are likely to be used more intensively by the large 
farmers because of imperfections both in the capital markets as well as 
in the Government extension services. This may explain why we observe 
constant returns to scale along with diminishing returns to land in both 
Mehdiabad and Chak. (In Chapter-6 we shall discuss the direct evidence 
on the use of new inputs , and the 
importance of the size of farm in determining 
the adoption pattern of 'green revolution'technology. ) 
. ft 
In Jatli, diminishing returns to land are likely to be observed 
along with decreasing returns to scale in a correctly specified production 
function. In Khunda, the medium size farms use WAMALVAL as well as 
MIUT, more intensively than-the other farm categories. It is possible 
that in Khunda constant returns to scale are observed along with 
dminishing returns to land due to the concentration of farms in the 
medium size category. 
We may compare returns to land and scale in the two 'barani' 
villages taken together with the two canal irrigated villages and also 
comment on results for all villages taken together. If we assume that 
the two groups of villages enable us to construct zones that are - 
representative of the province, we may generalise our results. From 
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Table 4.17 ä Estimated elasticities for the three-input production 
functions (log-linear form) 
Dependent variable : L(TPROD) 
11 
Villages 
Indep. Variables 
Khunda Jatli Mehdi. abad Chak- 
L(HOLDCULT) 0.14 0.62 0.36 0.59 
(3.06) (178.13) (16.18) (49.62) 
L(WAMALVAL) 0.21 0.19 0.45 -0.06 
(9.69) (13.97) (18.11) (1.03) 
L(MIUT) 0.66 0.01 0.22 0.42 
(56.07) (0.16) (8.90) (48.67) 
CONSTANT 0.45 2.08 1.34 2.33 
R2 0.60 0.63 0.74 0.77 
"F 74.72 87.54 55.61 77.71 
N 188 159 64 75 
Return to 31 1.01 
0.81 1.03 0.95 
Scale- (0.20) (3.71) (0.25) (0.42) 
1/. For a finition of variables, see -pp. 145,146. 
2/. Figures in brackets are F-values 
3/. See footnote on p. 174. 
Table 4.17 b Estimates of marginal products based on the elasticities 
given in Table 17 a (above) (in Rs) 
Villages 
Inputs 
Khunda Jatli Mehdiabad Chak 
HOLDCULT 11.61 171.78 292.51 360.95 
WAMALVAL 0.04 0.111 1.34 -1.04 
MIUT 2.69 - 2.43 5.21 
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Table 4.18 a Estimated elasticities for the three input production 
function for farms in different size categories in Khunda 
Dependent variable : LTPROD 
1/ (log-linear form) 
k 
CateSize gories 
3/ 
Indep. Variab es 
Small Medium Large 
All 
Farms 
L(HOLDCULT) 0.26 0.42 -0.15 0.14 
(0.84) ?/ (2.61) (0.55) (3.06) 
L(WAMALVAL) 0.25 0.19 0.26 0.21 
(2.14) (2.61) (4.41) (9.69) 
L(MIUT) 0.57 0.48 0.81 0.66 
(8.52) (15.35) (19.61) (56.07) 
CONSTANT 0.44 0.69 0.35 0.45 
R2 0.53 0.19 0.55 0.60- 
F 13.00 7.34 19.14 74.72 
N 39 97 52 188 
1/. For definition of variables, see pp. 145,146. 
2/. Figures in brackets are F-values. 
r. 
3/. Size-categories are defined in Section 4.2.2. 
Table 4.18 b Estimates of marginal products based on elasticities 
given in Table 4.18 a (above) (in Rs) 
Size 
Categories Small Medium Large All 
Inputs 
Farms 
HOLDCULT - 41.10 - 11.61 
WAMALVAL 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04 
MIUT 2.60 0.79 3.85 2.69 
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Table 4.19 a Estimated elasticities for the three-input production 
function for farms in different size-categories in Jatli, 
Dependent variable : L(TPROD) 
Y (log-linear form) . 
Size 3/ Categories - 
Indep. Variables 
Small Medium Large All 
Farms 
L(HOLDCULT) 0.50 
. 
1.45 0.16 0.62 
(36.08) (13.78) (0.74) (178.13) 
L(WAMALVAL) 0.15 0.09 0.24 0.19 
(4.53) (0.53) (7.07) (13.97) 
L(MIUT) 0.01 -0.07 0.14 0.01 
(0.08) (1.54) (3.65) (0.16) 
CONSTANT 2.27 1.87 2.23 2.08 
R2 0.39 0.27 0.39 0.63 
F 18.45 5.15 4.25 87.54 
N 89 46 24 159 
1/. For definition of variables, seepp. 145,146. 
2/. Figures in brackets are F-values. 
3/. Size-categories are defined in Section 4.2.2. 
Table 4.19 b Estimates of marginal products based on elasticities 
given in Table 4.19 a (above) (in Rs) 
Size. Small Medium Large All Category Farms 
Inputs 
HOLDCULT' 185.45 423.83 - 171.78 
WAMALVAL 0.07 - 0.20 0.11 
MOT - -0.89 1.48 - 
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Table 4.20 a Estimated elasticities for the three-input production 
function for farms in different size-categories in Mehdiabad 
Dependent variable : L(TPROD) 
Y (log-linear-form) 
Size 3/ Categories -- 
Indep. Variables 
Small Medium Large All 
Farms 
L(HOLDCULT) 0.53 0.48 0.47 0.36 
, 
(3.48).! 
/ (0.98) (5.41) (16.18) 
L(WAMALVAL) 0.63 -0.19 0.64 0.45 
(11.08) (1.56) (11.96) (18.11) 
L(MIUT) 0.24 0.30 0.13 0.22 
(4.53) (3.41) (1.00) (8.90) 
CONSTANT 0.55 3.35 0.71 1.34 
R2 0.76 0.35 0.74 0.74 
F 13.91 3.50 17.15 55.61 
N 17 24 23 64 
1/. For definition of variables, see pp. 145,146. 
2/. Figures-in brackets are F-values. 
3/. Size-categories are defined in Section 4.2.2. 
Table 4.20 b Estimates of marginal products based on elasticities 
given in Table 4.20 a (above) (in Rs) 
Size 
Category Small Medium Large All 
Inputs 
Farms 
HOLDCULT 814.29 490.26 336.53 292.51 
WAMALVAL 1.49 -0.48 2.12 1.34 
. MIUT _3.16 
3.37 1.39 2.43 
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Table 4.21 a Estimated elasticities for the three-input production 
function for farms in different size-categories in Chak 
Dependent variable : b(TPROD) 
1/ (log-linear form) 
Size 
3/ Categories - 
Indep. Variables 
Small Medium Large All 
Farms 
L(HOLDCULT) 0.97 0.85 0.37 0.59 
(10.44) ?/ (10.77) (8.37) (49.62) 
L(WAMALVAL) -0.16 -0.09 0.44 -0.06 
(1.33) (1.78) (9.96) (1.03) 
L(MIUT) 0.73 0.46 0.23 0.42 
(26.67) (18.67) (5.04) (48.67) 
CONSTANT 1.83 2.07 1.34 2.33 
R2 0.82 0.57 0.67 0.77 
F 13.41 12.47 24.79 77.71 
N 13 32 41 75 
1/. For definition of variables, see pp. 145,146. 
2/. Figures4n brackets are F-values. 
3/. Size-categories are defined in Section 4.2.2. 
Table 4.21 b Estimates of marginal products based on elasticities 
given in Table 4.21 b (above) (in Rs) 
Size 
Category Small Medium Large All 
Farms 
Inputs 
HOLDCULT 660.49 516.27 226.47 360.95 
WAMALVAL -0.20 -0.09 1.25 -1.04 
MIUT 3.75 5.17 2.97 5.21 
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Table 4.22 a Estimated elasticities for-the three-input production 
function for farms in different size-categories in barani, 
canal irrigated and in all villages,, 
Dependent variable : L(TPROD). 
1/ (log-linear form), 
Villages 
Indep. Variables' 
BARANI" 
-Villages 
CANAL 
IRRIGATED 
Villages 
ALL 
VILLAGES 
HOLDCULT 0.33 0.50 0.23 
(30.61) (59.72) (14.88) 
WAMALVAL 0.20 0.09' -0.06 
(9.58) (2.14) (1.04) 
IIUT -0.07 0.04 0.48 
(2.31)" (70.31) (107.06) 
CONSTANT 2.20 1.95 2.16 
R2 0.26 0.74 0.34 
F 33.47 131.34 82.47 
N 290 139 487 
Return to 0.46 0.99 0.65 
Scale (21.37) (0.95) (45.43) 
1/. 
. 
For definition of variables, see pp. 145,146. 
2/. Figures in brackets are F-values. 
Table 4.22 b Estimates of marginal products based on elasticities 
given in Table 4.22 a (above) (in Rs). 
Villages BARANI CANAL ALL 
Villages IRRIGATED VILLAGES- 
Inputs Villages 
HOLDCULT 23.05 375.13 95.62 
WAMALVAL 0.03 0.34 -0.82 
MIUT -0.17 4.54 4.21 
186. 
Table 4,7 (Section 4.3.1) for a single input, production function the 
returns to land for the three groups are 0.39,0.89 and 0.52 respectively. 
From Table 4.22 we can 'see'thatfor returns to scale, in the corresponding 
groups, the estimated values are" 0.46,0.99 and 0.65. Given the arguments 
presented above, we may suggest'that in the irrigated areas access to 
new inputs is easier for the large farmers hence returns to scale are 
almost constant despite the small farms' more intensive'u6e of land. In 
the 'barani' areas the concentration of farms in the medium size category 
improves returns to scale but diminishing' returns to land persist along 
with overall decreasing returns to scale. Similarly, taking all four 
villages jointly, we have-diminishing returns to land along with decreasing 
returns to scale. 
Section 4.5 Conclusions" 
On the basis of the empirical evidence available in our four villages 
it may be concluded that small farms have a higher total value of output 
per acre compared to large farms. Further, the difference in the total 
value of output per acre between small and large farms is smaller in the 
irrigated villages compared to the 'barani' villages. 
The inverse relationship between size and productivity is due to 
the higher cropping intensity on the small farms. A number of hypotheses 
may be suggested to explain this. The-important two are that a) due to 
historical-demographic reasons small farms have a higher proportion of 
good quality soil and b) due to imperfections in the labour market small 
farms use family labour more intensively. The first hypothesis is 
partially confirmed by the evidence that in the canal colony villages 
that have been settled comparatively recently, and where the demographic 
process has not worked itself out completely, returns to land are 
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higher than in the two 'barani' districts. We do not'have direct 
evidence on the use of family labour on the small farms. However, small 
farms are not dependent entirely on family labour ; the use of seasonal 
labour is widespread. A test of the labour based hypothesis revealed 
that in none of the villages farms using mainly hired labour are less 
efficient compared to farms using mainly family labour. In Jatli, 
labour-hiring farms appear to be more productive, confirming the 
hypothesis that farms using wage labour are technologically superior 
to other farms. Thus the labour based explanation for the inverse 
relationship is not supported by the evidence in our villages. We 
must add, however, that ours is, at best; an indirect test of the labour 
based hypothesis. A more direct test would require evidence which 
shows that the marginal product of labour (measured in standard units 
of mandays) on small farms is lower than on large farms. 
The smaller difference in the value of output per acre between small 
and large farms in'the two irrigated villages compared to the two 'barani' 
villages partially confirms a'variant of the land based hypothesis. The 
argument here is that small farms have greater access to irrigation, 
which improves the yields. In the irrigated villages access to irrigation 
is relatively more even across farm size compared to the 'barani' villages. 
Yet another variant of the land based hypothesis suggests that 
the concentration of small farms on good quality soil is due to sales 
at times of distress. This resulted in poor quality land being sold 
to other farmers. The latter emerged, in'due course, as large farmers. 
The process suggests fragmentation of land on the large farms. The 
evidence from our villages suggests that while fragments per farm are 
greater on the large farms, fragments per acre are greater on the small 
farms. Assuming the latter to be more important, correcting for 
fragmentation in the size-productivity relationship, lowers the value of 
188. 
the land coefficient. We are thus led to a rejection of the distress 
sales hypothesis. 
It appears that share--cropping tenancy is not important in 
determining the size-productivity relationship. The relationship 
persists in all four villages even after all the share-cropped farms 
are excluded from the village farming populations. 
Taking small farms alone we find that constant returns to land 
operate in all villages except Jatli. The small farms are a homogenous 
group that appear to have access to a combination of special inputs that 
distinguishes them from the larger farms. The inputs may be better 
supervision of the farm, or access to better quality land. We must, 
however, be cautious about the land based hypothesis since soil fertility 
itself may be a function of how efficiently a farm is run. Further, on 
the basis of our rather weak evidence we cannot reject, confidently, 
the importance of the labour based hypothesis. 
Our results further suggest the importance of the distribution of 
land in a village in determining efficiency of land use, through, perhaps, 
an influence over the access to other complementary inputs. (This issue 
will be taken up in some detail in Chapter 6. ) However, our results appear 
to refute . the assertion that better access to modern inputs by the large 
farmers has changed the sign of the size-productivity relationship. 
Comparing returns to one input, land, with returns to scale using 
a three input production function, we note that the latter are constant 
while the former are diminishing in Khunda, Mehdiabad and Chak. We explain 
this in terms of differences in the intensity of factor use. The 
three input production function indicates greater-useof seeds and fertilizers 
by large farmers in the irrigated villages. This, in turn, may be 
explained by better access to capital markets and better information 
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regarding' cultivation practices, both of which may lower risks. This 
is not true in the 'barani' villages where traditional inputs are in 
use. In these villages, the medium size farmers use, seeds and fertilizers 
more intensively compared to the other categories. Our results further 
show that draught power is used most intensively by the medium'size 
farmers in all villages. This may be due to the relative ease of access 
to capital markets for such farmers (which makes the purchase of bullocks 
easy) compared to the small farmers, 'and greater availability of labour 
compared to the large farmers. 
In this chapter we have commented on the intensity of factor use 
by farms in different size-categories by estimating marginal productivities 
for three input production functions. -Differences in input intensities 
have been explained in terms of differential access to traditional and 
new inputs. However, we have restricted ourselves to an examination of 
the use of seeds and fertilizers- only. This was done to make cross- 
village comparisons. In Chapter 6 we shall examine the access to input 
argument (particularly with respect to inputs associated with the 'green 
revolution' technology) in detail. In that chapter we shall examine 
the direct evidence from our villages and from Khanewal on the use of 
inputs such as fertilizers, tube-well irrigation, canal irrigation 
and tractor ploughing by farms differentiated by. size-categories as well 
as-tenurial status. 
190. . 
APPENDIX To ChIAPTER 4 
Table 4.23 a The distribution of land in small, medium and large size- 
categories by tenurial status in Khunda 
(total acreage) 
Tenurial 
Status 
Size 
Category 
All 
Farms 
Owner- 
culti- 
vators 
Pure 
-tenants - 
share- 
croppers 
Owner Pure Owner- 
----cum---e fixed- cum-fixed 
share- rent rent 
croppers tenants tenants 
0-8.99 255.15 46.60 202.15 - 6.40 - 
(42).! 
/ (10) (31) (1) 
9-21.99 1402.75 256.90 1071.57 - 74.28 - 
(100) (20) (76) (4) 
22 and 2658 1291.10 891.00 - 475.90 - 
above (52) (13) (28) (11) 
Total 4315.90 1594.60 2164.72 - 556.58 
(194) (43) (135) (16) 
1/. Figures-in brackets are number of'farms 
Table 4.23 b Mean size of holding by small, medium, large size category 
and by tenurial status in Khunda 
(Means) 
Tenurial- 
Status 
Size 
Categories 
All- 
Farms 
Owner 
culti- 
vators 
Pure 
tenants 
share- 
croppers 
Owner Pure 
-cum- fixed- 
share- rent 
croppers tenants 
Owner- 
cum-fixed 
rent 
tenants 
0-8.99 6.08 4.66 6.52 - 6.40 - 
(6) 1/ (3) (9) (1) 
9-21.99" 14.03 6.52 14.10 - 18.57 - 
(33) (16) (50) (13) 
22 and 51 99.32 31.82 - 43.26 - 
above (62) (31) (41) (86) 
Total 22.25 37.08 16.04 - 34.86 - 
(37) (50) (13) 
Figures in brackets are percentage of acreage. In the last row 
percentages are for distribution of land across tenure. 
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Table 4.24 a The distribution of land in small, medium and large size- 
, categories by tenurial status 
in Jatli 
(total acreage) 
Tenurial 
Status 
Size 
Category 
All 
Farms 
Owner 
culti- 
vators 
Pure 
tenants 
share- 
croppers 
Owner Pure Owner- 
-cum- fixed- cum-fixed 
share- rent rent 
croppers tenants tenants 
0-4.99 233.51 216.25 4.00 - 13.26 - 
(87) 1/ (82) (1) (4) 
5-9.99 296.56 221.00 14'. 31 - 61.25 - 
(46)' (36) (2) (8) 
10 and 670.25 589.25 - - 81.00 - 
above (38) (31) (7) 
Total 1200.32 1026.5 18.31 - 155.51 - 
(171) (149) (3) (19) 
1/. Figures in brackets are numbers of farms. 
Table 4.24 b Mean size of holding by small, medium, large size category 
and by tenurial status in Jatli 
(Means) 
Tenurial 
Status 
Size 
Category 
All- --- 
Farms 
Owner 
culti- 
vators 
Pure 
tenants 
share- 
croppers 
Owner- -- Pure 
-cum- fixed- 
share- rent 
croppers tenants 
Owner- 
cum-fixed 
rent 
tenants 
0-4.99 2.683 2.64 4.00 - 3.31 - 
(20) (21) (22) (9) 
5-9.99 6.45 6.14 7.16 - 7.66 - (25. ) (22) (78) (39) 
10 and 17.64 19.00 - - 11.57 - 
above (59) (57) (52) 
Total 7.00 6.89 6.10 - 8.19 
(86) (2) (13) 
Figures in brackets are percentage of acreage. In the last row 
percentages are for distribution of land across tenure. 
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Table 4.25 a The distribution of land in small, medium and large size 
categories by tenurial status in Mehdiabad 
(total acreage) 
Tenurial All Owner Pure Owner Pure Owner- 
Status Farms culti- tenants -cum- fixed- cum-fixed- 
Size vators share- share- rent rent 
Categories croppers croppers tenants tenants 
0-6.99 78.53 29.25 12.66 12.00 21.62 3.00 
(20) 1/ (10) (2) (2) (5) (1) 
7-12.99 281.14 17.50 136.39 110.00 17.25 - 
(26) (2) (12) (10) (2) 
Above 13 1143.52 578.75 19.00 195.65 - 350.12 
(24) (9) (1) (7) (7) 
Total 1503.19 625.5 168.05 317.65 38.87 353.12 
(70) (21) (15) (19) (7) (8) 
if. Figures in brackets are number of farmers 
Table 4.25 b Mean size of holding by small, medium, large size category 
and by tenurial status in Mehdiabad 
. ft (Means) 
Tenurial 
Status 
Size 
Category 
All 
Farms 
Owner 
culti- 
vators 
Pure 
tenants 
share- 
croppers 
Owner 
-cum- 
share- 
croppers 
Pure 
fixed 
rent 
tenants 
Owner- 
cum-fixed 
rent 
tenants 
0-6.99 3.93 2.93 6.33 6.00 4.32 3.00 
(5) (5) (8) (4) (56) (1) 
7-12.99 10.81 8.75 11.37 11.00 8.63 - 
(19) (3) (81) (35) (44) 
Above 13 47.65 64.31 19.00 27.95 - 50.02 
(76) (93) (11) (61) (99) 
Total 21.47 31.28 11.2 21.18 '5.56 44.14 
(42) (11) (21) (3) (24) 
1/. Figures in brackets are percentage'of acreage. In the last row 
the percentage distribution of acreage is across tenure. 
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Table 4.26 a The distribution of land in small, medium and large size- 
categories by tenurial status in Chak 
(total acreage) 
Tenurial 
Status 
Size 
Categories 
All 
Farms 
Owner 
culti- 
vators 
Pure 
tenants 
share- 
croppers 
Owner 
-cum- 
share- 
croppers 
Pure 
fixed 
rent 
tenants 
Owner- 
cum--fixed- 
rent 
tenants 
0-4.49 97.41 92.16 4.00 1.25 - - 
(34) Y (32) (1) (1) 
5-9.49 246.43 175.88 - 5.00 18.00 47.55 
(37) (27) (1) (2) (7) 
9.50 and 684.24 407.74 110.25 - 75.50 90.75 
above (39) (21) (8) (4) (6) 
Total 1028.08 675.70 114.25 6.25 93.50 138.30 
(110) (80) (9) 
. 
(2) (6) (13) 
1/. Figures in brackets are the number of farmers. 
Table 4.26 b mean size of holding by small, medium, large size category 
and by tenurial. status in Chak 
,, r 
(Means) 
Tenurial 
Status 
Size 
Category 
All Owner Pure Owner Pure Owner- 
Farms culti- tenants -cum- fixed cum-fixed- 
vators share- share- rent rent 
croppers croppers tenants tenants 
0-4.49 2.87 2.88 4.00 
(10) Y (14) (4) 
5-9.49 6.66 6.51 - 
(23) (26) 
9.50 and 17.55 19.42 13.78 
above (67) (60) (12) 
Total 9.35 8.48 12.69 
(66) (11) 
1.25 
(20) 
5.00 
(80) 
3.13 
(0.6) 
9.00 
(19) 
10.88 
(81) 
15.58 
(9) 
6.79 
(34) 
15.13 
(66) 
10.64 
(14) 
1/. Figures in brackets are percentages of total acreage. In the. 
last row the percentage distribution is across. tenure. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Tenancy 
Section 5.0 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 Section 2.2 it was pointed out that tenancy is an 
important production arrangement in Pakistani agriculture. The discussion 
of the theory of tenancy was also presented in that chapter. In this 
chapter we shall attend to two empirical issues concerning tenancies in 
our villages. These issues are, efficiency regarding inputs used and 
output produced on farms with different tenurial arrangements, and the 
identification of the factors explaining the incidence of tenancy. 
The predominant unit of production in our villages is the self- 
cultivated farm of a landowner who does not rent in additional land. 
The next most frequently occurring tenurial category is the pure share- 
cropping tenant, follwed by owner-cum-share-croppers. Another tenancy 
contract in our-villages is fixed-rent tenancy, where rent is determined 
at the beginning of the cropping season. In the two 'barani' villages 
this contract does not exist. In the irrigated villages there are two 
types of fixed-rent tenants; pure fixed-rent tenants who own no land of 
their own'and fixed-rent tenants owning some-land, i. e. owner-cum-fixed- 
rent tenants. 
Table 5.1 shows the distribution of tenancies in our four villages 
and Table 5.2 gives the percentage of area cultivated under different 
tenurial arrangements. It can be seen that there is considerable 
variation within villages regarding the distribution of households and 
land amongst different tenurial categories. 
Share-cropping contracts in Pakistan are governed by rules prescribed 
in official policy. The last tenancy policy came into effect in 1972. It 
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specifies the proportions in which inputs and outputs are shared between 
the landowner and his share-cropping tenant. The landowner is entirely 
responsible for the payment of land revenue, water rates, expenditure on 
seeds and other cesses. The, cost of inputs such as fertilizer and 
pesticides is shared equally by the landowner and the share-cropper. Their 
respective shares in the produce of land are fixed in the ratio of 40: 60. 
The landowner is forbidden from levying any cess or taking free labour 
from the share-cropper. In addition, laws governing eviction are specified 
in order to give greater security of tenure to the tenant (Chaudhry and 
Herring (1974)). 
In practice, however, share-cropping contracts in our villages are 
governed by a complex variety of informal arrangements between the land- 
owner and his tenants. These arrangements deviate from the legally 
prescribed terms of the contract. In our villages fertilizer costs and 
water rates are equally shared, between share-cropper and landowners, 
while seed costs are met entirely by share-croppers. . 
Output is nearly 
always equally shared between landowners and share-croppers. During the 
course of our discussion in the sections that follow in this chapter we- 
shall point out other informal arrangements between landlords and tenants 
that are village specific. 
Fixed-rent tenants in our villages are mainly cash rent tenants 
The usual practice is for the lessees to pay half the contracted cash rent 
in advance of the annual cropping season and the other half at the end of 
the season. There are no government regulations on the rent that a land- 
owner may charge for his land. Landowners do exercise discretion on some 
occasions when harvest is unusually bad by foregoing part of the amount 
outstanding at the end of the season. Regarding the duration of the lease, 
the practice is that the lease lasts over a complete annual cropping season. 
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Table 5.1 Distribution of households by tenurial categories 
(number of farms) 
Tenurial Pure Pure Pure Owner- Owner- 
Categories Owner- Share- Fixed- cum- cum- Total 
Culti- croppers cash tenants tenants 
vators Culti- (share- (fixed- 
Villages vators croppers) leasers) 
Khunda 43 135 - 16 - 194 
Jatli 149 3 - 19 - 171 
Mehdiabad 21 15 19 7 8 70 
Chak 80 9 2 6 13 110 
Table 5.2 Distribution of land by tenurial categories 
(percentages) 
Tenurial Pure Pure Pure Owner- Owner- 
Categories Owner- Share- Fixed- cum- cum- Total 
Culti- croppers cash tenants tenants 
vators Culti- (share- (fixed- 
Villages vators croppers) leasers) 
Khunda 37 50 - 13 - 100 
Jatli 86 2 - 13 - 100 
Mehdiabad 42 11 21 3 24 100 
Chak 66 11 1 9 13 100 
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The discussion hereof-the salient features of-the market for 
tenancies in the four villages is brief. Our objective is to provide a 
general background in which the market for tenancies operates. Data 
were collected in. Khanewal that describe the nature of tenancy contracts in 
great detail. The discussion based on these data was presented in Chapter 3. 
In Section 5.1 we shall examine the issue of relative efficiency of 
owner-cultivated and share-cropped farms. For some of the villages we 
shall attempt a more disaggregated crop-level analysis of important 
crops to ascertain whether overall differences in efficiency are accounted 
for by specific crops or cropping patterns. This will indicate whether 
seasonal variations in related factor markets (such as labour) are 
important in determining the,, relative efficiency of tenurial contracts. 
The test for efficiency will be carried out by comparing pure owner- 
cultivators with pure share-croppers as well. as by comparing performance, 
on owned and share-cropped portions of land for owner-cum-share-croppers. 
Other hypotheses concerning differences-in labour inputs, cropping 
intensity and the choice of cropping patterns will also be tested. The 
empirical results will be discussed in the light of theoretical predictions. 
We shall present arguments to suggest that under certain"labour market 
regimes share-cropping farms may, in fact, be-more productive than owner- 
cultivated farms. 
Our main concern in Section 5.2 will be with testing a model explaining 
the incidence of tenancy in our villages. We shall argue that tenancies 
are contracted as a consequence of attempts by owners of factors to adjust 
factor ratios to the endowments when markets. for 
factor services are imperfect. We shall identify the main sources of factor 
market rigidities in the village economies. An attempt will be made to 
explain the variation in the success with which cultivators adjust their 
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factor ratios in our four villages. The impact of tractor cultivation 
and rural-urban migration opportunities on the adjustment,, process will.,, 
be discussed in the concluding Section 5.3. 
Section 5.1 Efficiency comparisons between tenurial contracts 
Section 5.1.1 Criteria for comparisons 
In this section we present a discussion of the criteria we shall use 
for testing the differences amongst alternative tenurial arrangements. 
Our main concern is with a comparison of the efficiency of resource use 
between owner-cultivators and share-cropping tenants. 
We shall first summarise the a priori arguments discussed in detail 
in Chapter 2. We saw that there are three main arguments in the controversy 
on the efficiency of share-cropping tenancy. The first argument is 
Marshallian in spirit. It is argued that share-cropping tenancy results in 
a disincentive to the cultivator, so that the allocation of variable inputs 
on the share-cropped farm is inefficient compared to the owner-cultivated 
farm whenever the landowner is unable to exercise strict supervision. 
The second line of argument is derived from Cheung (1969), (but is 
implicit in Marshall's argument - see Chapter 2 Section 2.2 )). It is 
recognised that in labour surplus economies with land scarcity, landowners 
have a superior bargaining power in tenancy markets. This enables them 
to ration land amongst the tenants and to prescribe the quantities of 
variable inputs (such as labour) to be used on the rented land., In this 
manner they can ensure that share-cropped land is cultivated as efficiently 
as owner-cultivated land. 
The third argument asserts (Johnson (1950), Bliss and Stern (1980)) 
that most share-cropping contracts involve cost-sharing. We have seen 
in Chapter 2 that under cost-sharing arrangements, the disincentive 
argument regarding share-croppers' use of variable inputs no longer holds, 
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so that share-croppers`in this regard are as efficient`as owner-cultivators. 
There are no a priori grounds for choosing any of the three arguments 
presented above as the single correct description of tenancy markets in 
our four villages. In discussions with cultivators in the four villages 
the general impression we get is that the landowner exercises considerable 
discretion in renting out land to tenants. This is particularly true in 
Mehdiabad and Chak and to a lesser extent, in Khunda. In Jatli the 
situation is somewhat different. There is a long tradition in this village 
of household members joining Government services such' as the police and 
the military. The policy of recruiting soldiers in this region was started 
in the British colonial period to reduce pressure on land. Later it 
became a tradition enshrined in the lofty label of 'martial race'. Because 
of this outlet there are no pure share-cropping tenants in Jatli. Land 
is rented on share-cropping contracts only by those households who- already 
own land in the village . 
The traditjpn of joining the police and the military services prevails 
to some - extent in Khunda as well which is situated on the periphery of 
the 'martial race' region. For a description of landowners' bargaining 
power in Mehdiabad and Chak, we may refer to our discussion of Chapter 2 
on the nature of contracts in Khanewal. We have argued that this discussion 
is relevant since there are many similarities. both'institutional and 
ecological between the villages in. Khanewal and Chak and Mehdiabad. 
The extent of supervision varies considerably amongst landowners 
within the villages. Small landowners who live in the village supervise 
land closely. The standard practice for small and medium size landowners 
with commercial interests outside the village is to pay one weekly visit 
to the plot. It is difficult to decide which of the two methods of 
supervision is better. The former method leads to 'excessive' supervision 
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and often results in tension between the, landowner and his share-cropping 
tenant. But-it results in the landlord having a. very good knowledge of 
the 'norms' of agricultural activities such as ploughing, irrigating and 
hoeing. Landowners with commercial interests outside the village forego 
some of the detailed knowledge of cultivation 'norms' but generally 
appear to be better acquainted with the new techno[o9ical innovations such 
as new high yield variety seeds, fertilizers and pest control. This is 
because their commercial interests bring them in close proximity to the 
various Government agricultural extension services that are located in 
small rural towns. Thus they are better placed to encourage and exhort 
their share-cropping tenants to use new innovations and thus attain yields 
comparable to share-croppers who are more closely supervised by their 
landowners in the day-to-day cultivation of the plot. 
Supervision is most lax when it comes to the large landowners. The 
standard practice is for the landowners to'visit the plot once`a month 
or occasionally once'every crop season. Most of the transaction between 
landowners and tenants is conducted by the 'munshis' (bailiffs). In 
theory it is possible for landowners to hire efficient 'munshis' with 
considerable managerial skills so that supervision on their share-cropped 
plot is as efficient as that of the small landowners. We got the impression, 
however, that in practice 'munshis' are retained by most big landowners 
not so much for their managerial skills as, for long-standing loyalties - 
often the criterion seemed to be sheer sychophancy. In Chapter 3 we 
have presented a more detailed discussion of the supervision practices 
of landowners using data from Khanewal. Villages Chak and Mehdiabad in 
this chapter reflect the situation in Khanewal fairly closely. 
We said in Section 5.0 that cost-sharing is far from complete in our 
four villages. The practice is for the water and fertilizer costs to 
be shared in the same proportion as the'share of output. Seed costs (which 
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are a substantial component of, costs especially in Khunda) are paid 
entirely by the share-cropper. A detailed discussion of the cost-sharing 
arrangementswhich carries over for the canal irrigated villages was also 
presented in Chapter 3 using data from Khanewal. 
Our discussion,, so far suggests that we cannot choose between Marshallian 
and Cheungian theoretical positions on the efficiency of share-cropping 
tenancy merely by observing the conditions of the contract in our villages. 
Formal tests are required to determine relative efficiency of owner- 
cultivators and share-croppers. This needs a discussion of criteria' that 
we shall use to test relative efficiency. 
Value of output 
We shall start our analysis by using total value of output per acre 
as a measure of efficiency., This is a good summary statistic in that 
it captures the pattern of allocative decisions of the different types 
of cultivators. Thus if the value of total output is higher on owner- 
cultivated farms as compared to share-cropped farms in any given village 
we shall argue that the share-cropped farms in the village are character- 
ized by the Marshallian disincentive effect. Otherwise the Cheungian 
position holds.: 
We shall disagreggate efficiency measured in terms of yields further 
into the component crops. This will be done*for some of the villages for 
selected crops that are important in the cropping pattern. Output per 
acre of such crops on owner-cultivated farms will be compared with share- 
cropped farms. 
Input use, 
Fertilizer : 
A 
_direct 
test of the incentive effect that may cause differences in 
the efficiency of various tenurial arrangements) is to consider input use 
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per acre on the farms. The application of fertilizer per acre is ideally 
suited to capture the disincentive effect of input, use when-costs are 
not shared between landlords and tenants. In our four, villages fertilizer 
costs are nearly always shared. However, within each village there is 
considerable variation amongst landowners regarding the timing of payment 
of their share of the, cost.. Some landowners pay their share of costs at 
the time of harvest (by converting it into equivalent'maunds'of crop 
output). Other landowners share cost at the time of purchase of, fertilizer. 
Still others purchase fertilizer themselves and deduct. the share-cropper's. 
share of,, the cost at harvest time from the total crop produce. 
All the-cost-sharing arrangements discussed above can be observerd 
in our'four villages. But we were unable to get detailed information 
to quantify the number of each type of arrangement in any of the-four 
villages. We suspect, however, that the disincentive effect due to the 
timing of. cost-sharing is small in our villages since, fertilizer is 
usually applied at the landowner's insistence. (For the practice in 
Khanewal, see Chapter 3). He-is, therefore, prepared to extend credit 
to the share-croppers (or, as in many cases, actually purchases fertilizer 
himself), in order to ensure, its application-Y. Supervision at the time 
of fertilizer application is generally considered to be an important 
element in the overall supervision of the share-cropped farm. We expect 
that on. account of both these factorsifertilizer, use is no different on 
share-cropped farms-as compared to owner-cultivated farms. 
Cultivator-land ratio 
The theory of share-cropping tenancy suggests that landowners find 
this tenurial contract attractive because of imperfections in the labour 
market that result in the wage rate being greater than the opportunity cost 
It is possible that access to liquidity may affect the chances of 
a tenant getting land on rent. This point will be taken up again in 
Chapter 7. 
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of labour. This discouragesi'self-cultivation with hired labour (see 
the discussion in Section 2.2, Chapter 2). Another' attraction could 
be due to the high search costs of finding the right type of farm worker 
for the required farm activity. As Ia result'of'share-cropping tenancy 
landowners can ensure a regular, certain flow of labour services whose 
quality is known'to the landowners. This comes about because in a labour 
surplus economy landowners can ration land and thus select the 'best' 
share-croppers. 'Share-cropping tenancy contracts, therefore, may be'` 
interpreted as an institutional arrangement whereby a landowner, owning 
land in excess of what he can cultivate with his own labour resources, 
ensures the appropriate supply of labour and'thus achieves the correct 
land-labour ratio on the farm. This'suggests that given constant 
returns to scale, labour input per acre on self-cultivated and'share- 
cropped'farms would be the'same. 
Tractor cultivation is on the increase in both 'barani' as well as 
irrigated villages (see Section 5.3). This is primarily due to the 
increased croppr ng intensity that becomes possible with tractor 
cultivation (Binswanger (1977)). Increased tractor cultivation is likely 
to affect the share-cropping contract particularly as an institution 
for ensuring appropriate supply of labour on the farm. Let us reconsider 
the form of tractorization that is taking place in our villages. Tractor 
cultivation is practised by both large as well as small cultivating 
households because of the development of active markets for the services 
of tractors. Cultivation with hired tractors requires cash outlays 
before the crop is harvested which implies borrowing in the rural credit 
market. (This is particularly true for small farmers. Large farmers 
may hire tractors by reducing their cash balances rather than borrowing 
in the credit market. ) The self-cultivating landowners may find it 
easy to borrow because of their ability to pledge their land as collateral. 
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Share-cropping tenants, on the other hand, can borrow only if the 
landowners areIprepared-to pledge land-on their behalf or if landowners 
provide the necessary credit for hiring tractors. Both these options 
may be unattractive-to landowners. Pledging land on behalf of`share- 
croppers so that they may borrow from Government credit institutions)-- 
may provide proof of the"existence of a share-cropping contract. This 
may be considered by landowners as detrimental to their interests.. -- 
(Given an"environment-of. tenancy reforms, this may result'in a transfer 
of ownerhsip rights to the share-cropper. )' Lending cash-to the share- 
cropper may be unattractive if landowners have other non-farming 
commercial interests with high rates of return that do not allow the -- 
holding of idle. cash balances for long periods of time. -Under these 
circumstances share-croppers may be unable to borrow cash in order to 
meet the cost of hiring tractors. This may lower cropping intensities 
and thus the total value-of output on, - 'share-cropped farmsas compared 
to' owner-cultivated farms Given this (and also unchanged output 
shares) landowners may insist on contracts requiring higher labour'- 
inputs on the share-cropped plot in order to'equate the cropping intensity 
with owner-cultivated farms that use tractors for cultivation. A viable 
method of ensuring 'appropriate' labour input is to stipulate the number 
of workers per acre. We expect that under the circumstances described' 
above landowners are likely to insist (and given scarcity of land 
due to a growing rural"population of tenants they will-get) higher 
cultivator-land ratio on the share-cropped-'plots as compared to the 
cultivator-land ratio on owner-cultivated farms. We. _shall 
formally 
test this hypothesis using data from our villages. 
-Values of livestock... 
Farming in our four villages is described by agronomists as 'mixed 
farming'. This implies that farms do not specialise in any one crop 
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or any other. single agricultural produce such as dairy and livestock. 
Most crops suited to the ecology of the region are grown on the farm 
along with fodder for livestock bred for draught power, _milk 
and meat. 
An interesting feature of breeding livestock on share-cropped farms is 
that the value of livestock is not shared with the landowner. Occasionally, 
the landowner may leave his own livestock (usually milch animals) on 
the share-cropped farm to be looked after by the tenant, (and-thus may, 
ensure appropriate sharing of fodder crops or other cereal crops with a 
large fodder content). But this happens rarely, particularly if the 
landowner lives at a distance from the farm, since that may result in 
neglect of the landowner's livestock or pilferage of milk by the share- 
cropper. It was frequently noted during the survey that tension between 
landowners and tenants arises on account, of the latter's 
desire to cultivate more area of the farm with fodder crops (or at least 
those crops with a greater fodder content) while the former wanted more 
area for cash crops. It appears that the share-cropper has an incentive 
to allocate more resources to growing crops whose output is not shared 
equally with the landowner. To the extent that value added*on the farm 
on account of livestock production is not shared equally with the land- 
owner, the cropping pattern on share-cropped farms is likely to favour 
livestock production. In our formal statistical test of this hypothesis 
we shall use the final output - total value of livestock per acre on the 
farm - as a summary statistic reflecting resource allocations that 
influence the choice of the cropping pattern=on the farm 
i1 
1/. It may be noted that cropping patterns do not allow distinction of 
plots on the basis of suitability of fodder or cash crops. Fodder 
crops are usually planted between other crops in a fairly sophisticated 
pattern of crop rotation to avoid the depletion of nitrogenous content 
of the soil. If plots were to be distinguished,. fixed-rent tenancies 
may be preferred by landowners on plots that are suited for growing 
fodder. 
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Another reason for expecting higher value of livestock on share- 
cropped farms is that an essential asset for the 'marketability' of a 
tenant is the possession of a strong bullock and other draught animals. 
Assuming that the birth of a bull has a probability which is equal to 
that of the. birth. of a cow, share-croppers may be forced to maintain a 
larger total, value of livestock - in order-to have a larger stock of 
draught animals, - compared to owner-cultivators, to ensure their continued 
marketability-as share-cropping. tenants. 
Tosuamarise, our criterion variables for testing the hypotheses' 
discussed so far are': "` 
1. Total value of output per acre 
2. Output per acre for selected crops. 
3. Fertilizer use per acre. 
4. Adult males working on the farm per acre. 
5. Value of livestock per acre. 
Section 5.1.2 Test statistics 
We shall briefly discuss the statistics that we shall use to test 
for significant differences between different tenurial arrangements on 
the basis of criteria discussed in the previous section. 
For evaluating the relative efficiency of farmers on the basis of 
total value of output per acre we shall use regression analysis. Our 
equation to be estimated is : 
LTPROD - log A+ a1LHOLDCULT + a2DTEN (1) 
where LTPROD - log of total value of output, produced on the farm 
LHLDCULT log of size of holding measured in acres. 
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log A: constant 
DTEN : dummy for tenancy which"takes the value 1 for 
a share-cropper, 0 otherwise. (Thus the 
influence of pure share-cropping tenancy is being 
considered here. See the discussion below on data. ) 
For the remaining criterion variables there are two ways of testing 
for differences between self-cultivating landowners and share-croppers. 
One is to test for significant differences in the criterion variables by 
comparing farmers who do not share-crop at all (i. e. pure owner-cultivator 
farmers) with those farmers who are purely share-cropping tenants. For 
each of the criterion variables we shall test whether the differences 
in the means of the two types of farmers are statistically significant. 
We shall assume that the observations on the two"groups-of farmers have 
been selected from their respective normally distributed populations. 
Given this assumption our choice of the test statistic will be determined 
by a test that indicates whether-the variances of the two normally 
distributed populations from which the two samples of observations have 
been drawn are the same. The appropriate test-statistic 
E (Yli - Y1) r (Y 2i - Y2 i 
S 
Ml-1 M2-1 
where Yii is the criterion variable observation for individual i 
in Group 1. 
Y2i is the criterion variable observation for individual i 
in Group 2. 
Y1 and Y2 are the respective-sample means of, the two Groups. 
M1 and M2 are the number of observations in Groups 1 and 2. 
The statistic S has an F -distribution with M1-ýl and M2-1 
degrees of freedom. The samples'are defined so that the ratio S is 
greater than unity (Bliss and Stern (1980)). 
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If S indicates that there is no significant difference between 
the variances of the observations for the two Groups the statistic that 
we shall use to test for differences in the means of the two Groups is : 
R .. s 
Y1 - Y2 
, W 
ý 
where W2 
M+M rE (Yli-Y1+ E (Y2i-7y 12 M1+M2-2 
R., has at distribution with M1 + M2 -2 degrees of 
freedom (Bliss and Stern (1980)). 
If, however, variances of the two populations are significantly 
different the test statistic we shall use is : 
V 
ýY1 - Y2) - (1J - 112) 
22 S11Ml + S2/M2 
,. 
where Yl , Y2 are sample means, 
2 '2 SZ are the sample variances, S1 
and p1 and u2 are the population means. 
V does not have at distribution. However probabilities for 
the statistic may be approximated by treating its distribution as a 
t-distribution and by calculating the degrees of freedom as : 
(S1/M1) 
`+ 
(S2/M2" )]. 
- d"f. - H. G. Blalock ( (1972)) 
(S1/M1)2/M2 + (S2/M2)2/M2-I 
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An alternative method of testing for differences between self- 
cultivating and share-cropping arrangements is to consider 
only those households that are self-cultivating landowners as well as 
share-cropping tenants (i. e. owner-cum-share-cropping tenants) and 
compare the values of-criterion variables on their self-cultivated and 
share-cropped plots of land. It has been, argued (Bliss and Stern (1980), 
Bell (1977)) that this method is more suitable for testing Marshallian 
versus Cheungian positions on the disincentives of share-cropping since 
we can control for all other differences between individuals who self- 
cultivate and those who share-crop. The appropriate test statistic here 
is : 
Z=X 
where x= Yi-Y2 ;x 
Y1-Y2 
;2E (xi-x) /n-1 , 
n 
n is-the number of observations, 
and" S2 is the variance. 
Z has at distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom (Bliss 
and Stern (1980)). 
The null hypothesis for each of the criterion variables is that there 
is no significant differerence between the means of the two Groups. 
For most of the criterion variables that we shall discuss the theory 
is unambiguous about the direction of the difference between the means of 
the two Groups. This suggests that one-tail tests are required. However, 
we shall be agnostic and use two-tail tests for accepting or rejecting 
the hypotheses. This will allow us to test whether share-croppers have 
lower yields than owner-cultivators, and vice versa. Our criterion for 
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rejecting a null hypothesis will be to consider the two-tail probability 
of the hypothesis being true. If it is less than 5% we shall reject 
the null hypothesis. 
Section 5.1.3, Data 
Table 5.1 of Section 5.0 presents the distribution of cultivating 
households according to the different tenurial categories in the"four 
villages. This distribution will form the basis for selecting villages 
for making comparisons between owner-cultivators and 'share-croppers 
on the basis of the criteria listed in Section 5.1.1. 
We have argued that one approach that we shall adopt for testing 
differences in efficiency is to use a dummy for share-cropping tenancy 
in a regression equation where total value of output is the dependent 
variable. Table 5.1 shows that using the dummy variable approach will 
imply including owner-cum-tenants also amongst the owners. But this 
is likely to introduce biases while testing for tenurial efficiency 
1ý. 
In our regression analysis, therefore, we shall exclude tenurial 
categories other than pure owners and pure share-croppers. Another 
feature to note for regression analysis is that in Jatli there are only 
3 pure share-croppers. It does not make much sense to use a dummy for 
share-croppers in this village. We, therefore, do not report regression 
results for this village. 
A : 'consequence of using equation (1) is that the logarithmic form 
does not allow us to use observations that take zero value for the two 
variables in the equation. (We have already discussed in Chapter 4, 
1/. If share-croppers are inefficient then the inclusion of owner-cum- 
tenants amongst owners will imply that to the extent output is lower 
dueýto share-cropped plots of owner-cum-tenants, their inclusion 
lowers the value of the estimated coefficient for owners. 
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Section 4.2, why we may expect some farmers to have positive values for 
variable HOLDCULT and zero value for TPROD. ) Given this, and the fact 
that we are using pure owners and pure share-croppers in the regression 
analysis, the number of, observations in each, village for estimating 
equation (1) are reduced further. 
Z In the'previous section we argued that we shall use two approaches 
in'testing for'differences between owner-cultivated and share-cropped 
plots. One is to'compare pure owners with pure-share-croppers and the 
other is to'compare, efficiency on owned and share-cropped land for the 
same farmer. (i. e. owner-cum-. share-croppers). In order to use either 
method we need enough observations in each village to fulfil basic 
requirements. of degrees of freedom for the. statistical tests. Table 
5.1 indicates that for comparing pure. owner-cultivators. and pure share- 
croppers Khunda is the most appropriate village. The number of observations 
for the. two tenurial categories in the village are 135 and 73 respectively. 
Mehdiabad, is the next 'best' village. In the other two villages, the 
number of observations are insufficient. We shall, therefore, use Khunda 
(representing 'barani' villages) and Mehdiabad (representing irrigated 
villages) to test our hypotheses concerning differences in efficiency 
between owner-cultivators and share-croppers. 
For a comparison of relative efficiency on owned and share-cropped 
land for the same farmer, column 3 of Table 5: 1 indicates that only Jatli 
and Khunda villages provide sufficient observations. This is unfortunate 
since both are 'barani' villages. It would have been more reassuring to 
have made efficiency comparisons in the irrigated villages as well. 
There are two additional categories in Table 5.1. These are 
tenants who are pure fixed rent leasers of land and owner-cum-tenants whose 
rented portion is on fixed rent lease. Theory predicts that we should 
not expect any differences-in efficiency between such tenancies and self- 
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cultivation of landowners., We shall test this accepted result using 
data from Mehdiabad. 
In our discussion of the regressionresults. that will be, reported 
in Table 5.5, Section 5.1.5, we shall argue that in Khunda we need to 
compare intensity of cultivation on owner-cultivated land with that of 
share-cropped land. Furtherwe shall compare the per acre outputs of 
these two categories of farmers for two crops: wheat and groundnuts - 
the former being the major 'rabi' crop while the latter is the major 
'kharif' crop in Khunda. This will help us to comment on differences 
in efficiency by crop seasons on different categories of farms. 
The other village for which we have sufficient data for pure- 
share-croppers and owner-cultivators is Mehdiabad. _, 
In this village 
we shall compare the mean value of output per acre and fertilizer 
use per acre on wheat for the two categories of farmers. We are constrained 
to a comparison of fertilizer use in Mehdiabad only because in Khunda 
fertilizer use is limited to a few large farmers (see Section 4.2, 
Chapter. 4) . ,,. 
A comparison of adult males per acre on owner-cultivated and share- 
cropped farms will be made in Khunda and Mehdiabad only for reasons 
already discussed. The per acre value of livestock'on the two tenurial 
categories will also be compared for these two villages. 
The comparison of mean output yields on owner-cum-share-cropped 
farms will be carried out in Khunda and Jatli. We have not tested for 
differences in input use on farms because during interviews it 
became increasingly clear (as reported by the research team at Quaid-e- 
Azam University) that the reliability of data on input use reported 
separately for own and share-cropped lands is doubtful. There was much 
guesswork and approximation involved on the part of both the interviewers 
as well as the farmers. Therefore, data collection on input use on the 
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two separate plots was discontinued. 
Finally, the comparison of owner-farmers and fixed-rent tenants will 
be restricted to-, the mean values of, total output for farmers, in 
Mehdiabad only. 
In Table 5.3 we summarise the criterion variables, the tenurial 
categories selected for making comparisons and the villages in which 
comparisons will be made. 
Table 5.3 Criterion variables, tenurial categories and villages for, 
making efficiency comparisons 
Criterion variables Tenurial 'categories Villages 
1. Total value of output (i) Owner-cultivators -Khunda, Mehdiabad 
per acre with share-croppers Chak 
(ii) Owner-cum-share- 
Khunda, Jätli' 
croppers 
(iii)Owner-cultivators- 
with fixed-lease Mehdiabad 
tenants 
2. Intensity-of culti- Owner-cultivators with Khunda 
vation share-croppers 
3. Main Rabi crop (wheat) "r Khunda 
output per acre 
4. Main Kharif crop 
(groundnuts) output Khunda 
per acre 
5. Fertilizer use per_ "" Mehdiabad 
acre 
6. Adult males per acre ºý Khunda, Mehdiabad 
on the farm. 
7. Value of livestock per Khunda, Mehdiabad 
acre 
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Section 5.1.4 Results 
In Table 5.4 we present the results of a regression analysis that 
seeks to establish the relative efficiency'of owner-cultivators and 
share-croppers. -. The theory. suggests that we should, expect the value 
of the coefficient on DTEN to be either insignificant (a la Cheung) 
or significantly negative (a la Marshall). This would imply, respectively, 
that share-cropping tenants are as efficient as owner-cultivators or 
that share-croppers are less efficient. 
In' Chak, the value of DTEN is 0.09 and its F-value indicates that 
it is statistically insignificant. Thus in Chak share-croppers are as 
efficient as owner-cultivators. In Mehdiabad the F-value is 3.98 which 
is significant. ---In Khunda, however, the_F-value 
is rather high. 
In both villages the coefficient of DTEN is positive suggesting that 
share-cropping tenants are more'efficient than owner-cultivators. This 
suggests a result contrary to theoretical predictions and needs an 
explanation. 
In our villages, 'landowners have strong bargaining power in the 
market for tenancy. This is likely to be exercised mainly in the choice 
of share-croppers and in stipulating the desired labour input on the 
farm. Another feature that adds to the landowners' monopoly power 
is the prevalance of uncertainty in the rural labour market due to 
the limited employment opportunities for the landless. It is possible,. - 
therefore, that landowners'dictate greater labour input on share-cropped 
land as compared to owner-cultivated land. An indirect measure of labour 
input is, the intensity of cultivation. In Table 5.5 we present results 
of. a T"-test on the difference in the cropping intensity (defined as 
cropped area as a"percentage of the size-'of holding) on owner-cultivated 
and share-cropped farms. 
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Table 5.4 Regression results for a test of tenurial efficiency 
Dependent variable . LTPROD 
V 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Khunda Mehdiabad Chak 
LHLDCULT 0.64 0.72 0.88 
(87.05) 2/ (58.19) (171.31) 
DTEN 0.18 0.19 0.09 
(11.07) (3.98) (1.27), 
CONSTANT 2.18 3.15 2.89 
R2 0.35 0.64 0.71 
F 45.38 31.69 94.22 
N 173 38 82 
1/. For definition of variables, see pp. 206,207.2/. 
Figures in brackets are F-values. 
Table 5.5 .. T-test for differences in mean cropping intensity of 
owner-cultivators and share-croppers in Khunda 
No. of Mean Standard T- 2-tail 
Cases cropping Deviation. Value probability 
intensity 
owner-cultivators 42 129.78 113.34 
1.86 '0.07 
Share-croppers 131 96.52 '43.73 
( F-value of test for differences in population variance is-6.72 
which indicates significant difference. The reported T-value,,, 
therefore, is an estimate when variances are unequal. ) 
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The 2-tail probability in the table is 7% which is higher than the 
conventional, significance level of 5% and thus'we accept'the hypothesis 
that there is no difference in-the mean cropping intensities of owner- 
cultivators and share-croppers. Our'hypothesis that' suggests' that 
landowners' bargaining power enables them to get higher intensity of 
cultivation on share-cropped farms appears to have been rejected. - But' 
let us consider the argument in detail. ' 
It has been argued by Khusro (1964) that larger holdings are divided 
up into small holdings and rented out by landowners to take advantage of 
higher productivity on small farms., Our discussion in Chapter 4'identifies 
the-sources of higher productivity on small farms. These are summed up in 
greater intensity of cultivation due-to'essentially two factors : better 
quality soil (Sen (1964)), and greater labour effort (Sen (1964), Srinivasan 
(1972), on small farms. ' In Khunda the-average size of a share-cropped 
farm is 16.04 acres while the average size of an owner-cultivated farm is 
37.97 acres.. However, we have seen in Table 5.5 that intensity, of culti- 
vationis not significantly different on the two types of farms. In what 
sense, then, do share-cropped farms reflect higher'productivity on account 
of the size factor ? Higher cropping intensity implies greater farm area 
under crops. However, in villages such as Khunda, the soil is of poor 
quality and does not allow much addition to the cropped area. But any 
given cropped area can yield more output, per acre if greater effort is 
made on it. This effort translates in terms of agricultural activities 
such as deeper ploughing, greater weeding and hoeing, etc. It may be 
argued that it is due to higher effort per acre that small, farmers in 
Khunda are more productive than large farmers. We have seen that, on 
average, share-cropped farms are nearly half the size of owner-cultivated 
farms. Therefore, part of the higher productivity on share-cropped farms 
in Khunda may be explained by the size- effect. - 
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Another reason for expecting greater labour effort on share-cropped 
farms as compared to owner-cultivated farms has already been discussed 
in Section 5,1.1. We argued that concentration in the land market is 
likely to result in higher stipulated labour input per acre. We also saw 
that it is not supported by a test on differences in the intensities of 
cultivation on the two categories of farms. However, this ought not to 
be construed as evidence of landowners'. limited bargaining power, since 
that may be exercised through stiputation of higher labour per cropped 
acre on share-cropped farms as compared to owner-cultivated farms. 
The other component of the size-effect, better quality of soil on 
small farms, is more difficult to verify. In discussions with farmers our 
impression was that there is little difference in the quality of soil 
between owner-cultivated and share-cropped farms. (For a discussion on 
this aspect see Section 3,2 Chapter 3, based on our Khanewal survey. ) Thus 
higher productivity on share-cropped farms in Khunda may be explained 
mainly by greater labour effort on such farms due to (a) size effect, 
(b) landowners' bargaining power in the land market and (c) as argued 
earlier, extension of credit by landowners to their tenants that may increase 
access to nqw inputs on share-cropped farms as opposed to other small 
owner-cultivated farms, and thus may increase productivity. 
This result has an important implication for the theory of share- 
cropping tenancy. Neither Marshallian nor Cheungian theoretical traditions 
allow for this result. This may be due to the assumption regarding the 
labour market in the two traditions. Marshallian tradition assumes 
competition in both land and labour markets (Bardhan and Srinivasan (1971)). 
The Cheungian tradition allows for landowners' strong bargaining power in 
the land market but maintains competition in the labour market. This 
acts as a constraint on the landowner so that he cannot demand greater 
labour effort than that supplied by owner-cultivators on their own farms. 
218, 
This is due to the assumption that the opportunity cost of labour is the 
same for owner-cultivators' labour effort as thatfor share-croppers'. It 
is. plausible to argue (on the basis of our observationson the working of 
the village labour-markets)-that owner-cultivators have a higher expected 
wage rate due to their ability to sustain themselves during the period of 
job search. For landless share-croppers the cost for job search is likely 
to be considerably higher so that the expected wage rate is likely to be 
lower. - -/. This enables the landowner to stipulate greater labour 
(measured in time units or effort) on the share-cropped land.. 
We disaggregated the results presented in Table 5.6 by crop seasons 
to pinpoint the source of higher productivity on share-cropped lands. 
Results for differences in the two most important crops, wheat and groundnuts, 
are presented in Table 5.6 for Khunda. The results suggest that differences 
in total output per acre between owner-cultivators and share-croppers are 
mainly due to differences in output per acre for groundnuts. Share- 
cropped farms'have a 'very high mean yield of groundnuts which is significantly 
different from the mean yields-of owners at, 5%, level of significance. (For 
wheat, we reject the hypothesis of significant difference between the mean 
yields on owner-cultivated and share-cropped farms. ) 
This result has an interesting implication in the context of our 
argument regarding landowner's strong bargaining power that enables him 
1/. This argument will be developed further in Chapter 7. To anticipate, 
it will be argued that the. incidence of rural-urban migration is 
tower amongst share-croppers compared to owner-cultivators because 
they have husbandry skills that encourage them to stay in the rural 
areas. Their expected wages, therefore, are determined in the rural 
labour market, while those of the owner-cultivators are determined 
in the urban labour markets where wages are higher, particularly 
in the slack agricultural season. 
219. 
Table 5.6 T-tests for differences in the mean value of output per acre 
by crop seasons on owner-cultivated-and share-cropped farms 
in Khunda 
No. of 
Cases Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
F- 
Value 
T- 
Value, 
2-tail 
probab- 
'ility 
WHEAT 
Owners 42 3.70 '1.76 
2.54 -0.15 0.88 
Share-croppers 131 3.76 2.81 
GROUNDNUTS 
Owners 28 1.28 3.60 
4.88 -5.79 0.001 
Share-croppers 51 8.84 7.95 
Indicates. that T-value has been computed when the population 
variance is not the same for the two groups. 
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S 
to stipulate higher labour effort on share=cropped plots. We argued 
that the bargaining power is greater when the expected wage rate is low 
for share-croppers. In the. slack season ('kharif' employment opportunities 
in. 'barani' areas are particularly low. --Groundnut season corresponds with 
sharecroppers' low expected wages. This enables the landowner to stipulate 
higher labour effort resulting in higher output per acre on share-cropped 
farms as compared to owner-cultivated farms. Thus, it appears that there 
maybe seasonal variations in landowners' bargaining power in the land 
market which are reflected in the relative efficiency of owner-cultivated 
and share-cropped farms. 
For Mehdiabad we report results for output per acre and fertilizer 
use, per acre for wheat in Table 5.7. We find no significant difference 
between share-croppers and owner-cultivators for the mean values of the 
two criterion variables. 
In Table 5.8 we present results that enable us to test our hypothesis 
on higher stipulation of labour on share=cropped land in terms of. the 
number of'workers per acre in order to compensate for the lack of share- 
croppers' ability to hire tractors. We find that in Khunda, share-cropper 
families have, on average, greater number of adult males engaged on the 
farm as compared to owner-cultivators. This difference is significant at 
5% level of significance. In Mehdiabad, the difference in ADMCULT on 
the two types of farms is statistically insigntficant. 
Our hypothesis that suggests higher value of livestock on share- 
cropped farms as compared to owner-cultivated farms due to non-sharing 
of the annual value of livestock is accepted in Khunda but rejected in 
Mehdiabad (Table 5.9). An explanation for this is that in Mehdiabad 
landowners insist on selling the fodder crop and sharing the revenue 
(In the irrigated areas, fodder crop fetches high prices. ) Further the 
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Table 5.7 T-test for differences in the mean values of wheat output 
Per acre and fertilizer use per acre on owner-cultivated 
and share-cro pped-farms- in Mehdiabad 
No. of 
Cases 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
F- 
Value 
T- 
Value 
2-tail 
Probab- 
ility 
WHEAT output per 
acre 
Owners 21 27.00 8.02 
1.05 1.16 0.25 
Share-croppers 15 23.94 7.81 
FERTILIZER use 
per acre 
Owners 21 1.29 0.84 
2.94 0.40 0.69 
Share-croppers- 15 1.20 0.49 
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Table 5.8 T-tests for differences in the mean value of adult males 
per acre on owner-cultivated and share-cropped farms in 
Khunda and Mehdiabad 
No. of 
Cases 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
F- 
Value 
T- 
Value 
2-tail 
probab- 
ility 
KHUNDA 
Owners 73 0.05 0.11 
5.01'. -4.13* "0.001 
Share-croppers 135 0.15 0.25 
MEHDIABAD 
Owners 21 0.33 0.47 
5.79 0.40 0.69 
Share-croppers 15 0.28 0.19 
implies T-value is computed when Group variances are unequal. 
Table 5.9 T-tests for differences in the mean value of livestock 
per acre on owner-cultivated and share-cropped farms in 
Khunda and Mehdiabad 
No. of 
Cases Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
F- 
Value 
T- 
Value 
2-tail 
probab- 
ility 
KHUNDA 
Owners 73 286.18 361.55 
8.13 -3.23 0.001 
Share--croppers 135 608.21 1030.49 
MERD IABAD 
Owners 21, 
_1490.52 
2769.88 
0.01 0.80 0.43 
Share-croppers 15 1057.35 1489.16 
* implies T-value is computed when Group variances are unequal'_ , 
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crop is sown between the two main crop seasons to-'enrich-the soil with its 
nitrogenous content. (The aim is to achieve nitrogen fixation. Fodder 
is rarely ploughed into the soil. ) Thus its planting and harvesting is 
part of landowners' supervision. However, in Khunda livestock feed mainly 
on grass that sprouts on the farm after the winter and summer rains. The 
other components of feed are farm wastes. Both are hard to quantify 
and thus hard to share. The share-cropper has the advantage of greater 
knowledge of such 'waste'. Landowners may even encourage-greater size 
of sharecroppers' livestock in Khunda for the benefit they provide to 
the farm through farmyard manure. This is an important source of soil 
fertility in Khunda where the use of chemical fertilizer is quite low. 
We argued in Section 5.1.2 that a particularly appropriate-test for 
differences between the value of total output per acre of owner-cultivators 
and share-croppers may be the test of differences for the two categories 
of land for owner-cum-share-croppers. We present the result for such a 
test for Khunda and Jatli in Table 5.10. In both villages we find no 
significant diU erences in the mean values of total output.,. 
In Khunda the Cheungian result for owner-cum-share-croppers underlines 
the importance of landowners' strong bargaining power_vis-a-vis. the 
share-cropper. Those share-croppers who also own land have a higher 
opportunity cost of labour (and thus a higher wage rate) as compared to 
landless share-croppers, since they can always rely on their own piece 
of land if things get really bad. This improves their bargaining position 
so that, at best, landowners can expect to get as much output on the share- 
cropped land as on the self-cultivated land. 
Theory predicts that we should expect to observe no differences on 
owner-cultivated land and fixed-rent farms. This conclusion is supported 
by the empirical evidence in Mehdiabad. The results are given in Table 5.11. 
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Table 5.10 T-tests for differences in the mean value of total output 
. on owned and rented plots of owner-cum-share-croppers in 
Khunda and Jatli 
No. of 
Cases Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
T- 
Value 
2-tail 
probab- 
ility 
KHUNDA 
Own land 95.40 87.08 
16 -0.21 0.84 
Share=cropped 101.69 67.32 land 
JATLI 
Own land 323.22 184.13 
20 -48.18 0.40 
Share-cropped 0 0 
land 371.40 236.22 
Table 5.11 T-test for differences in the mean value of total output on 
owner-cultivated and fixed-rent farms in Mehdiabad 
No. of' 
Cases Mean 
Standard. F 
Deviation Value 
T 2-tail 
Value probab- 
ility 
Owners 21 937.09 462.08 
1.79 -0.65 0.52 
Fixed-rent 19 1020.00. 345.26 tenants 
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Section 5.2.0 The incidence of tenancy 
In a world without uncertainty where perfectly competitive markets 
exist for inputs and outputs (and all inputs are divisible), households 
have identical production functions and constant returns to scale operate, 
there is no need for tenancies. A landowner increases the area he would 
like to cultivate to any size he desires by purchasing the requisite- 
complementary inputs. In such a world, returns to management-equal profits 
from own-cultivation (Bliss and Stern (1980)). The existence of tenancies 
in this neo-classical world may be explained purely in terms of historical 
factors that determine institutional arrangements. Neither 
the Cheungian 
nor the Marshällian analysis of tenancy (discussed in Section 5.1 of 
this chapter) is really relevant.. , 
In the real world, however, markets are imperfect, many inputs are 
characterised by indivisibilities, managerial skills vary across 
individuals and uncertainty prevails. ' All of these factors either 
separately or through their interaction may result in the existence of 
tenancies. In. the present Section we shall discuss and then empirically 
test a model of tenancy that captures such departures from the ideal neo- 
classical world. The model was developed by Bliss and Stern (1980) and 
it is particularly suited to village economies. _ 
Section 5.2.1 The Model 
The Bliss and Stern model (henceforth B-S model) explains the functioning 
of the tenancy market in a village (Palanpur in India) in terms of 
short term adjustments. They observe that markets in the village are 
different from the neo=classical paradigm in a number of ways. The most 
important difference, as far as the creation of tenancies is concerned, 
is the degree of imperfection in the labour and bullock markets. Labour 
market imperfections arise both due to high costs. associated with finding 
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a job outside the family farm as well as due to the disutility associated 
with working for others. Further, family members working outside the 
family farm may not be available. to meet the seasonal requirements of. the 
family farm because, of the high costs of mobility (e. g. difficulties of 
finding jobs that allow seasonal leave of absence from work). 
Imperfections in the'bullock market arise because of the absence 
of markets for the services of bullocks. Also, it is difficult to 
arrange exchanges of bullocks of varying strength to suit 
the seasonal demand for draught power on the farm. 
In the village economy draught power and family labour are the two 
most important inputs used in the production process. Due to imperfections 
in their markets size of the economically-efficient farms may be restricted. 
Farm size may be defined in terms of desired cultivated-area (DCA) i. e. 
DCA -q (WAMALVAL ," ADMCULT) (1) 
where WAMALVAL is the value of draught power owned by the household, 
ADMCULT is the number of adult males working on the family farm 
and q is a non-decreasing function. 
The lack of markets for the two inputs implies that DCA is more 
or less predetermined for the household at the beginning of the crop season. 
If the household's DCA is less than the total land it owns then it leases 
land out otherwise it leases land in, i. e. 
NLI - DCA - LANDOWN (2) 
where " NLI is Net Land Leased in. LANDOWN -isýthe total-land owned 
by the household. ,I1 
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The model, therefore, postulates that given imperfections'in bullock 
and labour markets. Radjustmentsin land-labour factor ratios on"the farm are 
made through'the market for tenancies. An adjustment mechanism is then 
outlined so that (2) may be rewritten as : 
NLI -h( DCA -; LANDOWN ) (3) 
The adjustment mechanism h is governed by the following rules : 
(i) h (0) -0i. e. the farmer cultivates his desired cultivated 
area when it equals his LANDOWN. 
(ii) 0< h' <1i. e. an excess of DCA over LANDOWN results 
in land being leased in but there are costs of operating 
in the tenancy markets so that full adjustment is not 
achieved. 
(iii) There is no'interaction between LANDOWN and DCA. The 
possibility of LANDOWN determining DCA due to greater 
access to credit is not allowed. 
The adjustment mechanism incorporated in the function h captures 
the difficulties associated with obtaining land on lease. These will 
vary across both potential tenants, as well as potential landowners. Tenants 
who are well-known in the village for their hard work find it easier to 
get'land on lease. In our villages, for'instance, landowners ranked tenant 
households by their ability to work hard and generally preferred to rent 
out land to tenants belonging to 'biratheries' 
11 
that are well-known 
for their sound cultivation practices. Similarly landowners owning land- 
with rich soil and less fragmentation find it'easier to get tenants. 
Generally speaking, however, it appears that leasing out is easier than 
leasing in. The adjustment mechanism discussed here has a parallel in 
the capital stock adjustment models of investment theory. In these models, 
1/. These have been discussed in Section 3.3, Chapter 3. 
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however, there is a logical inconsistency. Difficulties of adjustment 
to the desired capital stock are grounded in uncertainty. But these 
uncertainties are also likely i6 influence the 'desired' capital stock. 
In the B-S model these logical inconsistencies are avoided by separating 
the contractual uncertainties of adjustment from the determination of 
the desired cultivated area. 
Substituting from (1), (3) may be rewritten as : 
NLI -h(q (WAMALVAL, ADMCULT) - LANDOWN ) (4) 
Taking a local approximation (4) becomes 
NLI = constant +r qw WAMALVAL +r qa ADMCULT -r LANDOWN (5) 
where qw is the partial derivative of q with. respect to WAMALVAL, 
qa is the partial, derivative of q with respect, to ADMCULT 
and 
dh 
d DCA - LANDOWN) 
The equation to be estimated is : 
NLI a1 + a2 WAMALVAL + a3 ADMCULT - a4 LANDOWN +U (6) 
where al is the constant term a2 -"r qw ; a3 -r qa ; a4 ar 
and U is the error term with mean 0 and constant variance. 
The model suggests another equation for estimation. Total. area 
cultivated (TCULT) . 
by a household is defined to be : 
TCULT - LANDOWN + NLI (7) 
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Considering (1) and (2) this implies that 
TCULT = DCA =q (WAMALVAL, ADMCULT) (8) 
A linear approximation to (7) gives ; 
TCULT - constant + qw WAMALVAL + qa ADMCULT (9) 
The adjustment process in (9), of course, is very strong. It implies a 
complete adjustment of total cultivated area to the desired cultivated 
area, i. e. h-1. We shall test this empirically. 
Section 5.2.2 
Labour markets in our four villages are characterised by considerable 
imperfections. Of the two 'barani' villages, employment opportunities 
in Khunda are few even during the harvest season. Farm employment outside 
the family farm is restricted because of the general agricultural conditions 
of the 'barani' regions (see Chapter 3). The traditional pattern in the 
village is to seek non-farm employment in services such as the police and the 
military. The other alternative is to migrate to Rawalpindi3at a distance 
of 25 miles from the village. This non-farm employment pattern suggests 
that seasonal adjustment in ADMCULT in Khunda is quite difficult so that 
the assumption of a given ADMCULT at the start of the season is realistic. 
Long run adjustments do take place so that as employment opportunities 
increase outside the. farm ADMCULT is reduced with the consequent reduction 
in DCA and NLI: ' The other 'barani' village, Jatli, is somewhat different. 
It is situated very close to the national highway. Consequently, labour 
mobility is high. Being a centre. of the Integrated Rural Development 
Programme (see Chapter 3), there is a high proportion of households using 
tractors which relaxes the constrAints imposed due to the lack of markets 
for services of bullocks. These are important factors in influencing 
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agricultural activity in the village. This sets Jatli apart from 
the other three villages so that we do not expect the B-S model to be 
a good description of the tenancy market in this village. 
Although non-farm employment opportunities in the irrigated villages 
are considerably greater than in the barani' villages, the incidence of 
non-farm employment is not very widespread in Mehdiabad and Chak. This 
may be due to the disutility of working for others by the traditional 
cultivating 'biratheries', particularly in the same village. Some family 
members move to another village or to the nearest rural town in search 
of employment. Such moves imply that costs of seasonal adjustment of 
ADMCULT back on the farm are high. 
We have already seen in Chapter 4 that markets for the services of 
bullocks are virtually absent in all four villages. There is some exchange 
of bullock services but it is quite informal and hard to measure because 
money is not used in the transaction. 
It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that DCA is predetermined 
at the start of-the season by the availability of WAMALVAL and ADMCULT 
to a cultivating household. Given this DCA, a cultivator adjusts his 
total cultivated area by participating in the market for tenancies and 
thus adding to or subtracting from the total land that he owns. 
Equations (9) and (6) of the basic B-S model,. therefore, are a reasonable 
representation of the tenancy markets in three of our villages. However, 
within the villages there are likely to be important structural differences 
affecting the adjustment mechanism postulated in. the model. We shall test 
these differences empircally and., comment on them. 
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Section 5.2.3 
The two versions of the basic B-S model of tenancy include the 
following variables :° 
Dependent variables NLI ; TCULT. 
Independent' variables : WAMALVAL ; ADMCULT ; LANDOWN. 
We have already defined all the variables listed above except TCULT. 
This variable measures area cultivated with important crops 
i'in 
the 
four villages. It takes into account different cropping patterns in the 
'barani' villages and irrigated villages. In the two 'barani' villages 
TCULT is defined as 
TCULT = CULTW +'CULTG + CULTM + CULTB + CULTP 
In the two irrigated villages 
TCULT - CULTW + CULTC + CULTM + CULTS + CULTF 
where CULT refers to area cultivated under a crop and the suffix 
are 
W: Wheat' ;G: Groundnut ; M: 'Maize ;B: Bajra 
P: Pulses ; C': Cotton '; S: Sugarcane ;F: Fodder 
We shall estimate equations (6) and (9) in our four villages for 
all cultivating households. Full time landless labourers and landowners 
who do not cultivate at all will be excluded, since a number of other, 
factors not used in the construction of DCA are important in their 
decision not to cultivate. Both these categories of household have 
livestock (and therefore possible WAMALVAL) as well as family members 
1/. In our discussion of Section'4.3, Chapter 4, we have given reasons 
indicating that the area under the important crops is a good 
approximation of the total cropped area. 
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(and therefore potential ADMCULT) yet their DCA is 0. In this case 
it is difficult to interpret the meaning of DCA. Clearly factors other 
than the availability of WAMALVAL and ADMCULT are respons ible for 
DCA being 0. A possible explanation may be traditional attitudes 
toward the'Kammi'castes that supply both full time as well as part time 
labour on the farm. These are traditionally landless castes. In other 
studies of Pakistani villages it has been reported that the pattern appears 
to be that nearly 20-22% of village labour force belongs to these castes 
(Gough and Sharma (1973), Barth (1965), Ahmed (1977)). These are 
descendants of traditional non-cultivating village castes whose numbers 
have increased due to high unemployment amongst the traditional village 
craftsmen (Ahmed (1977)). Landowners rank them lowest as potential 
tenants so that even if they do have access to WAMALVAL and ADMCULT 
their DCA may be 0. Landowners may, on the other hand, choose not to 
cultivate at all themselves because the highest ranking religious, foreign 
or local castes have traditionally considered it demeaning to cultivate land 
themselves (Ahmed (1977), Barth (1965)). (This attitude may change as 
profitability of agricultural cultivation increases and the labour effort 
required becomes less harsh with increased mechanisation. ) Another 
reason for landowners' DCA being 0 may be due to employment in the 
non-farm sector in a nearby rural town or, as in the case of some small 
landowners, because of commercial interests as shopkeepers within the 
village. Since none. of these factors are accounted for in the formulation` 
of the DCA and non-cultivating households in the three equations to be 
estimated, their inclusion in the regression analysis is likely to result 
in specification errors. We shall therefore exclude these households 
while estimating equations (6) and (4). 
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Section 5.2.4 Regression results 
In Table 5.12 we present the means and standard deviations of the 
variables used in our regression analysis. 
The B-S model suggests that on average NLI in the villages should 
be zero. In our villages NLI has positive values because of transactions 
with'other villages. In Jatli a surprising feature is the low man-land 
ratio. This may be explained by the existence of better employment 
opportunities for Jatli households because of the ease of access to the 
urban employment centres - the village being situtated near the main 
national highway linking Lahore and Rawelpindi. This low man-land ratio 
appears to affect the value of WAMALVAL for households in the village, 
which is very low compared to households in the other villages. This 
suggests a complementarity between human, bullock and, perhaps, tractors. 
In Table 5.13 we report the estimated results of the basic B-S model. 
This corresponds to our equation (6). The estimated coefficients of 
equation (9) are reported in Table 5.15. 
The estimated R2 values in Table 5.13 indicate that the basic B-S 
model is a good description of the tenancy market in Khunda but is 
less appropriate in Mehdiabad and Chak and quite inappropriate in Jatli. 
The R2 values are 0.77,0.35,0.28 and 0.008 in the four villages 
respectively. The F-statistics indicate that the values are significant 
at 1% level of significance in Khunda, Mehdiabad and Chak, and insignificant 
in Jatli. 
In Khunda the estimated values'of coefficients on WAMALVAL and 
LANDOWN are significant at 5% level of significance. However, the 
coefficient on ADMCULT is significant at 10% level. In Mehdiabad all 
three coefficients are significant at 5% level. In Chak the coefficient 
on LANDOWN- alone is significant at 5% level. The coefficient on ADMCULT 
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Table 5.12 Means and standard deviations (in brackets) of variables 
used in the regression analysis 
Khunda Jatli Mehdiabad Chak 
NLI 9.63 1.25 8.16 1.75 
(27.17) (6.84) (17.30) (5.36) 
WAMALVAL 3217.61 849.16 
. 
5669.22 3281.64 
(3647.92) " (1487.65) (7541.14) (3734.71) 
ADMCULT 1.62 0.98 2.53 1.61 
(1.15), (1.45) (1.86) (1.18) 
LANDOWN 9.56 5.78 
. 10.78 7.20 (33.95) (5.30) (27.97) (8.16) 
TCULT 20.92 7.55 18'. 82 5.79 
(32.93) (6.05) (27.55) (5.09) 
N 
, 
194 179, 73 114 
-1/. For definition of variables, see p. 226. 
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is significant at 10% level. The coefficient on WAMALVAL is not 
significant in this village. In Jatli none of the coefficients on 
the three independent variables are significant. The signs of all the 
statistically significant coefficients in the three villages are in 
accordance with the theoretical predictions of Section 5.2.1. 
Weryargued in Section 5.2.1 that the value of the coefficient on 
LANDOWN will indicate whether or not full adjustment takes place to 
the Desired Cultivated Area. The value of 1 implies that the model 
as presented in equation (9))is the true description while a value of less 
than 1. would imply that there are difficulties in complete adjustment. 
Our estimated coefficients on LANDOWN in Khunda, Mehdiabad and Chak 
are respectively -0.76, -0.29 and -0.35, which are all significantly 
different from 1 (alternatively I lies outside the confidence interval 
constructed allowing 5% chance of committing type 1 error). Thus the 
adjustment mechanism is important in our villages and the relevant model 
is that of equation (6). -- 
An interesting feature of the values of the coefficient on HOLDCULT 
is that they allow the ranking of the villages according to the difficulty 
of adjustment (the difficulty increases as we move away from 1). Thus, 
adjustment is least difficult in Khunda, followed by Chak and Mehdiabad. 
We have observed that our model of equation (6) is inappropriate for 
Jatli. This is not very surprising when we consider that of the four 
villages, Jatli conforms least to the traditional rural setting of the 
Punjabi villages. Being close to the national highway, households in Jatli 
have easy access to urban labour markets. This affects the cultivation 
practices in the village. We have already noted the high use of inputs 
such as fertilizer and the high incidence of tractor use in this village. 
As we shall see in Chapter 7, the incidence of non-farm incomes is also 
high in this village. Clearly there are non-traditional factors 
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Table 5.1 3 Estimation of B-S Model-Equation (6) 
Dependent variable : NLI 
1ý 
Villages 
Indep. Variables 
Sunda Jatli Mehdiabad Chak 
ADMCULT 1.48 -0.44' 2.53 -0.58 
(3.10)! / (1.46) (5.11) (2.23) 
WAMALVAL 0.00218 0.00016 0.00099 0.00016 
(56.77) (0.204) (11.50) (1.82) 
LANDOWN -0.76 0.00013 -0.29 -0.35 
(632.57) (0.0001) (11.50) (40.59) 
CONSTANT 7.49 1.55 -0.70 2.85 
R2 0.77 0.008 0.35 0.28 
F 214.46 0.50 12.14 14.07 
S. E. of 13.07, 6.87 
. 
14.30 4.61 
regression , 
1/. For definition of variables, see p. 226. 
2/. Figures in brackets are F-values. 
-ý 
237* 
determining behaviour in, this village., These factors are also likely 
to affect the decision to'rent land. The excellent connection with the 
urban labour markets has the consequence of removing some of the constraints 
on the working of the village labour market. Further, a highly'developed 
market for tractor services removes the rigidities in the market for 
bullock draught power. Since our model stresses the importance of these 
two variables in determining tenancy, we shall conclude that it is not 
appropriate for, villages where non-traditional factors operate to. remove 
the traditional constraints on markets for factor services. 
The reported estimates of coefficients on ADMCULT and WAMALVAL 
in Table 5.13 are actually multiples of two factors as suggested in the 
theory underlying the three equations as discussed in Section 5.2.6.. 
The coefficients on WAMALVAL - and ADMCULT, therefore, -, are composites 
of-the influence of the relevant independent variables as well as the 
influence of LANDOWN. In Table-5.14 below, we present the coefficient 
values capturing the influence of the re(evant independent variables alone. 
(We do not report the results for village Jatli here because we have seen 
that our., model for tenancy is inappropriate for this village. ) 
Table 5.11, Influence of factors 
Y 
on the net land rented in 
Villages 
Khunda Mehdiabad Chak 
Inputs 
ADMCULT 1.95 7.23 2.07 
WAMALVAL (x 1000) 2.87 3.41 0.57 
LANDOWN -0.76 -0.29 -0.35 
1/. For definition of variables, see p. 226. 
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The values of the coefficients for each village indicate, respectively, 
the increment in the Net Area Leased In, at the margin, due to an increment 
of one adult. male cultivating the family farm, a one thousand Rs worth 
of"increment in the value of draught power and an increment"of`an acre of 
land owned. 
;, hF ý. 
Our estimated values may be compared with those estimated by Bliss 
and Stern in Palanpur. These are approximately 1,3 and 0.78 respectively 
for their measure of the three variables (after converting their measure 
of the dependent variable (bighas) into acres). The difference between 
these values and those of our villages suggests the village-specificity 
of the model. Two points need explanation. One is the relative importance 
of, factors explaining the difference. between the estimates in Palanpur 
and our villages and the other, is the across village variation for our 
three villages. 
Our estimates suggest that in Khunda and Chak an additional 
cultivator per household results in an addition of nearly two acres of 
land leased inwhile in Mehdiabad the addition is of 7 acres. The 
exceptionally high value in Mehdiabad is difficult to explain. - There is 
nothing obviously superior regarding the ability of cultivators in this 
village compared to Chak. The high value may reflect landowner preferences, 
or the greater ability to rent land in a village where canal irrigation is 
regular and tenants have easy access to tube-well water. The generally 
higher values of this coefficient in the Punjabi villages compared to 
Palanpur may be due to differences in the population pressure on land in 
the two regions. 
Table 5.14 indicates that a thousand Rs worth of draught power in 
Khunda and Mehdiabad results in an increment of approximately three 
acres of land. This compares quite well with the results in Palanpur. 
The value in Chak is exceptionally low (nearly a sixth of the other villages). 
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This may be explained by the high percentage of land cultivated with 
tractors in"the village. 
The estimated results of equation (9) are presented in Table 5.15. 
The value of R2 falls in Khunda and in Chak. The coefficient on 
WAMALVAL is significant in all four villages indicating the importance 
of draught power in determining total area cultivated. Some of the other 
results of this equation have already been discussed in relation to the 
results of the basic model of equation (6). Our conclusion is that the 
complete adjustment of total cultivated area to the desired cultivated 
area1suggested by the model of equation (9)ý is not supported by empirical 
evidence. 
Table 5.15 Estimation of B-S Model-Equation (9) 
Dependent variable : TCULT 
1/. 
Villages. 
Independent 
Variables 
Khunda Jatli Mehdiabad Chak 
ADMCULT -2.36 0.06 -0.75 1.03 
(2.09) (0.04) (0.30) (7.01) 
WAMALVAL 0.0059,. 0.00086 0.0027 0.0003 
(131.76) (7.77) (64.23) (5.19) 
CONSTANT 5.70 6.75 5.44 3.21 
2 
R 0.41 0.05 0.32 0.11 
F 66.76 4.31 37.13 6.86 
S. E. 25.39 5.94 19.46 4.85 
1/. For definition of variables, see p. 226. 
2/. Figures in brackets are F-values. 
240. 
Section 5.3 Conclusions -I 
In Section 5.1 we have argued that the relative efficiency between 
share-cropped and owner-cultivated farms is determined by the, landowners' 
bargaining power.,. The Cheungian result that suggests that there is no-, 
difference on the two types of farms, holds. true when labour markets are 
such that share-croppers' alternative employment opportunities are high. 
In areas with high uncertainty of getting employment in. labour markets 
(such as our village Khunda), landowners have superior bargaining power 
which, they may exercise . 
by, demanding greater labour effort on the share- 
cropped farm as*compared to owner-cultivators. 
There is likely to be, some conflict, between landowner and tenant ., 
regarding acreage under fodder. cultivation.,., To the extent that fodder 
is not shared equally between landowner and tenant the latter. is likely 
to grow more. fodder. crops in order to raise the value of his livestock. 
In regions-with-low use of chemical fertilizers, -landowners may actually 
encourage share-croppers to, have larger , 
values. of livestock for their 
farmyard manure-p .. 
Owner-cum-tenant farms are Cheungian regarding relative efficiency 
of their owned and rented. plots, since landowners'. bargaining power 
vis--a-vis this category of farmers is constrained by the latter's ability. 
to sustain themselves even if they are unable to rent land. Because of the 
general land scarcity, low employment opportunities in. the, non-farm 
sector and active landowner supervision, the Marshallian disincentive- 
effect does not hold in our villages, 
Our results further suggest that the seasonal variations in 
employment opportunities are likely to affect landowners' bargaining power 
vis-a-vis the share-croppers. 
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Finally, our results suggest that other forms of tenurial contracts, 
such as fixed-rent-tenancies are as efficient as farming by owner- 
cultivators. 
In this chapter we have not presented a detailed discussion regarding 
the impact of tenurial arrangements on the use of modern inputs such as 
tube-well irrigation and cultivation with tractors. We did, however, 
discuss fertilizer'use, but with'respect only to Mehdiabad. In Chapter' 
6 we shall take up these', issues again and attempt to analyse the impact 
of tenurial arrangements on the adoption of the 'green revolution! 
technology in'the four villages and in Khanewal. " 
In determining the incidence of tenancy in Section 5.2,, we argued that 
factor market imperfections regarding services of labour and bullocks 
are quite important. Participation in the tenancy market increases when 
bullock services cannot be easily hired and when non-farm employment 
opportunities are low. The model that we have estimated assumes that 
such rigidities exist in theshort'run and describes the adjustments 
taking place through the markets for tenancies. 
An important way in which rigidities in the markets for 
labour and bullock services may be affected is due to the introduction 
of tractor cultivation. Tractors may not necessarily increase productivity 
but they do substitute human and bullock labour on the farm (Binswanger 
(1977)). This is likely to influence the markets for tenancies given our 
description of the workings of the market. It is important, however, to 
distinguish between tractor ownership and tractor use, since the impact 
of the two-on the tenancy market is Likely to be different. The distinction 
may be made on the basis of whether or not markets for tractor services 
exist. 
Official policy has encouraged the use of tractors by incorporating 
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a clause in land reform regulations that allows the retention of additional 
acreage (up to 30 acres) by landowners above the land ceiling, if a tractor 
is purchased for cultivation (Chaudry and Herring (1975)). The import of 
tractors has been encouraged through fiscal measures such as low import 
duties and low taxes on diesel fuel. 
The overall evidence on the impact of mechanization from Punjab and the 
four districts to which our villages and Khanewal belong is given in Table 
5.16. It appears that owners of tractors increase the area they cultivate 
after the purchase of tractors. In Punjab, on average, those cultivators 
who increase their acreage , 
increase it by 49.24 acres per farm. Some'- 
of this acreage may represent purchase of additional land but it is more 
likely that the bulk of it represents land resumed for self-cultivation 
that was previously rented out. (It is interesting that this increase 
in acreage is quite close to the recommended acreage, 50 acres, for the 
most popular make and horsepower-of tractor, the Massey-Ferguson 35. ) 
This evidence suggests that the rigidities of-bullock and labour 
markets may no t nger be important. Clearly, if perfect markets for 
tractor services existed there would be no need for tenancies_at, all,, as 
the B-S model describes. Landowners could easily adjust tractor services 
given endowments of land. However, markets for tractor services (although 
they exist widely as we shall discuss in Chapter 6) are imperfect, so that 
adjustments by small landowners who cannot purchase or have easy access 
to tractors may still be described by the B-S model. 
Despite the availability of tractors., tenancies may continue to play 
an important role due to rigidities in managerial skills. Tractors may 
easily displace a tenant's human and bullock labour, but it is a poor 
substitute for his skills of husbandry. With the development of markets 
for tractor services, landowners may rent out both tractors as well as 
land. In Khanewal we were informed of a tenancy contract that is gaining 
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Table 5.16 Area added to farming by private tractor'owners after 
the purchase of tractors 
Total Owners Owners 3 as % Area Mean area 
Owners reporting report- of 1 added added 
no add- ing 
ition addition 
(No. ) (No. ) (No. ) (percent- (acres) (acres) 
age) 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
Punjab 26230 18185 8045 31 396140 49.24 
Rawalpindi 162 75 87 54 1290 14.83 
Campbelpur 342 221 121 35 °22414 185.24 
Lyallpur 2406 1809 597' 25 18473 30.94 
Multan 3110 2285 825 27 36994 44.81 
Source : Pakistan census of Agricultural Machinery 1975. 
considerable popularity. In this contract landowners rent out land as well 
as tractors to share-croppers and lower tenants' share of output from to 
anywhere between 1/5th and 1/8th. Other cases were pointed out where 
small landowners reduced their area cultivated (by renting out land) in 
order-to sell tractor services (since household members are needed as 
tractor drivers). 
Evidence from two of our irrigated villages on tractor use (to be 
discussed in Chapter 6), indicates that tractor cultivation is quite wide- 
spread. This suggests a need for caution when interpreting our results 
on the incidence. of tenancy, in Section 5.2. 
ý_ 
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CHAPTER 6 
Technological innovation 
Section 6.0 Introduction , 
In this-chapter we shall discuss the evidence on the use'of 'green 
revolution' technology inputs by farmers 'ctifferentiäted by size and 
tenurial arrangements. We shall also comment on the impact of technol- 
ogical change on the relationship between size and productivity}and on 
rental contracts and point out the adjustments made in rural markets to 
accomodate the new technology. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we presented an empirical investigation-of the 
issue of efficiency in agricultural production. In Chapter 4 we discussed 
the relationship between size and productivity. We observed that the 
evidence in all four villages indicates that output per acre is a'declining 
function of thA size of holding. ' We offered a number of explanations for' 
the existence of the inverse'relationship in terms of the working of rural 
factor markets. We argued that rural land and labour narkets are such that 
small farmers cultivate more intensively by applying more family labour on 
better quality soils as' compared to large farmers. Attitudes towards risk 
may also be important in explaining the inverse relationship. In Chapter 5 
we presented a discussion of the relationship between tenancy and product- 
ivity. We argued that share-cropping tenants may be as efficient in 
production asaowner-cultivators and fixed rent tenants prnvided cost-sharing 
and supervision arrangements are built into rental contracts. . 
In Chapter 2 Section 2.3 we discussed the nature of technological change =r+. r;. 
in Pakistani agriculture and examined its likely impact on the traditional 
size-productivity relationship. We reviewed, critically, arguments which suggest 
that the adoption pattern of the new technology is such that it may bring 
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about a reversal of the traditional inverse relationship between size and 
productivity. If this argument holds, our observation in Chapter 4 that the 
inverse relpticnship exists in all four villages implies that very little 
technological change has occurred in the four villages. If, on the other 
hand, the direct evidence on adoption suggests that technological change 
has occurred, we need to examine the adjustments that are made in rural 
factor markets to accommodate technological change so that the traditional 
inverse relationship between size and productivity is maintained. In the 
present chapter we shall examine the direct evidence on technological 
change taking place in our four villages and the sample of farmers in 
Khanewaý and discuss the nature of adjustments taking place in rural factor 
markets. 
Let us examine the main argument more carefully. The existence of 
inverse relationship between size and productivity is explained in terms 
of functioning of rural factor markets. 'Green revolution' technology 
requires cash outlays on expensive inputs such as fertilizers, I'. Y. V. seeds 
and tube-wells. Thus rural capital markets are very important in deter- 
mining the adoption pattern of the new technology. Given this importance 
of rural factor markets and given also that typically large farmers have 
better access to these markets compared to small'farmers it may be argued 
that large farmers use the new inputs more intensively compared to small 
farmers so that the traditionally observed relationship between size and 
productivity may be reversed. 
The above argument holds if it. can be shown that small. farmers use 
less of the inputs associated with 'Green revolution' technology as 
compared to large farmers. This requires a careful examination of the 
direct evidence on input use. If we observe that small farmers use new 
inputs no less intensively than large farmers, we need to discuss the 
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nature. of adjustments that take place in the factor markets that facil- 
itate small farmers' access to-new inputs. For example, markets may 
develop for services of new inputs like tube-wells so that small farmers 
can use tube-well irrigation even if they do. not own tube-wells. 
Similarly, for fertilizer. 9local privately owned distribution, points 
(such as the village shopkeeper or 'arhtia') may emerge to compensate 
for the inefficiencies of the government supply depots. In this Chapter 
we shall present a discussion of some of these issues. 
It may be argued that not all tenural contracts facilitate tech- 
nological innovation. For example, we have seen in Chapter 5 that one 
way of achieving efficiency of resource allocation in share-cropping 
tenancies is to allow for cost-sharing arrangements in the contract. 
These arrangements may be'difficult to achieve in an environment of 
changing technology because of disagreements between landowners and tenants 
regarding expected returns to investment in new inputs. This may result 
in lowering the incidence of share-cropping tenancies compared with owner 
cultivation and fixed-rent tenancies. (C. H. H. Rao (1971)). In the 
present Chapter we shall comment on the likely influence of technological 
change on the choice of rental contract by examining the direct evidence 
on use of new inputs by different tenural cateogires in the four villages. 
Using evidence from Khanewal we shall also comment on adjustments made in 
tenural contracts that facilitate adoption of technology. 
A hypothesis that we shall test'in our analysis in this Chapter 
concerns the impact of migration on adoption of new technology. It has 
been argued that rural-urban migration of household members from small 
farms results in remittances back to the farm. This enables the farmers 
to use new inputs and thus to relax the constraints imposed by imperfections 
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in rural capital markets (O. Stark (1975)). In the present Chapter we 
shall briefly examine the evidence concerning this. hypothesis. A more 
detailed discussion of migration will be presented in Chapter 7. 
In Section 6.1 we shall identify the, inputs that we shall examine to 
discuss the pattern of technological change. ' An aggregate overview of 
the pattern and the distinction. between purchase and use of the new- 
inputs will be discussed. Our hypotheses regarding the impact of size 
and-tenancy on use of the new inputs will be discussed in section 6.2. 
Evidence from the four villages and from Khanewal will be presented in 
Section 6.3. Finally, conclusions, will be given in Section 6.4. 
Section 6.1 The relevant variables 
It is difficult to determine the precise vector of activities and/or 
inputs that distinguish new technology from the old. Conceptually a 
distinction may be achieved by considering two farms that are similar in 
terms of factor endowments and produce equal output using identical 
technologies. We may now distinguish between old and new technology by 
changing the inputs used by one of the farms. For example, canal irrigation 
may be supplemented by tube-well irrigation and bullock cultivation may be 
substituted for cultivation with tractors. The new technology will be 
adopted on the farm if, as a result, farm output, net of costs, increases 
(here we have in mind all costs including the opportunity cost of leisure). 
The four inputs that we shall be concerned with in our discussion 
are fertilizer, tube-well irrigation, tractor cultivation, and 
high yield variety seeds. Except for tractor cultivation, the inputs are 
considered essential ingredients of the new "Green Revolution" technology 
introduced in Pakistan in the mid-sixties. Tractor cultivation appears 
to be more a consequence of the introduction of the new technology rather 
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than an essential ingredient. 
A variable that we have included in our discussion is, a measure of 
canal irrigation. This has been done because canal irrigation is an 
essential pre-requisite to the introduction of the new technology, and 
unlike other inputs, it is provided by the public sector. By comparing 
the impact of farm size and tenancy on canal irrigation with their impact on 
other privately purchased inputs (the hypotheses will be spelt out shortly)j 
we shall comment on a special aspect of the role of public policy in 
agricultural development. 
We argued that our main concern will be with those new inputs that 
contribute unambiguously in increasing output on the farm. While this 
may be true of chemical fertilizers, high yield variety seeds, tube-wells 
and canal irrigation, the contribution of tractors to output is less obvious. 
A discussion_of. the way in which tractors may contribute was presented in 
Chapter 5. It may be recalled that two main attractions of tractor cultiv- 
ation are savings in costs of supervising hired labour and increase in 
the cropping intensity. Thus the net contribution of tractors to farm 
output may be-unambiguously positive. 
Section 6.1.2 An aggregate overview and the distinction between 
purchase and use of the new inputs. 
In Table 6.1 below we have compared the use of some of the new 
I 
inputs at both Punjab and the all-Pakistan level over the twelve year {J 
period, 1960-72. This period allows a convenient comparison of the extent { tF' 
to which farmers have switched over to the new technology. The new ts a 
technology was introduced in the mid-sixties and was adopted extensively 
in the irrigated regions of the Punjab over this period. The adoption tppp 
ii 
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in other regions was slower and is reflected in the figures given in 
the Table. 
Table 6.1 Farms using fertilizer, tube-wells and canal irrigation 
as a percentage of all farms in Pakistar. and in Punjab 
(1960-1972 
Inputs Area 1960(1) 1972 
, Fertilizer Pakistan 6 
52 
Punjab 7 55 
Tube-wells Pakistan 0.3 28 
Punjab' -0.4 " 42 
Canal irrigation Pakistan 53(68)' 37(74) 
Punjab 54(70) 26(75) 
Source: Pakistan Census of Agriculture, 1960, Pakistan Census of 
Agrid"ii. lture; 1972. 
1. Figures in brackets are percentage of acreage under all types 
of irrigation 
The comparison of figures in columns (1) and (2) clearly indicates 
sharp discontinuities which may be explained mainly by the introduction of 
the Green Revolution technology. The figures in the last two rows show 
acreage cultivated with canal irrigation. The decline in the proportion 
of total irrigated acreage in the twelve year period is mainly due to the 
greater use of tube-wells. Figures in brackets in the last two rows show 
that total irrigation also registered an increase in this period. For all 
three inputs, the change in Punjab is greater than the change in Pakistan 
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as whole. - 
The importance of-the distinction between-ownership"and use of both 
tractors and tube-wells becomes apparent in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 that show 
that'in Punjab, at least, inability of the small farmers to purchase 
these inputs does not hinder their use. This can be seen by comparing 
Columns (2) and (3) in the two tables. A feature to note is that the 
facility to use inputs is not sharply affected across tenure. Further, 
while both small and large farmers use these inputs even when they, do not 
own, them, the ratio of farmers owning the inputs to those using them 
increases as the size of holding increases. 
Table 6.2 Farms reporting ownership and use of tractors as a 
a percentage of all farms differentiated by size 
and tenure in Punjab 
Tenure 
size- 
categories 
(1) 
All 
owned 
'" 
(2) 
farms 
used 
(3) 
Owner farms 
owned used 
(4) (5) 
owner-cum-ten 
owned 
(6) 
farms 
used 
(7) 
Tenant 
owned 
(8) 
farms 
used 
(9) 
under 1`' 
acre 0.02 20 0.03 20 - 17 - 22 
1.0-5.0 0.10 25' 0.11 23 - 28 '0.10 29 
2.5-5.0 0.07 20 0.12 21 19 22 
5.0-7.5 2 40 0.12 20 0.05 17 0.06 19 
7.5-12.5 3 43 0.45 20 0.20 18 0.10 15 
12.5-25.0 6 46 1 25 0.60 23 0.20 18 
25-50 12 55 5 32 3 33 0.80. 26 
50-150 10 '99- 18 46 14 52" 6' 55 
150 & above 39 67 35 58 47 82 40 95 
Total 1 22 1 23 1 23 0.3 20 
Source: Pakistan Census of Agriculture, 1972. 
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Table 6.3 ' Farms reporting ownership and use of, tube-wells, as a 
percentage of all'farms differentiated by size and 
tenure in Punjab 
Tenure 
size- 
categories 
(1). 
All 
owned 
(2) 
farms 
used 
(3) 
Owner 
owned 
(4) 
farms 
used 
(5) 
owner-cum-ten 
owned 
(6) 
farms 
used 
(7) 
Tenant 
owned 
(8) 
farms 
used 
(9) 
under 1 
acre 0.4(-) 27 0.50 25 - "' 29 - 32 
1.0-5.0 0.80 32 1 29 1 37 0.20. 41 
2.5-5.0 2 37 2 29 2 39 '0.40 42 
5.0-7.5 
,. 
2 40 2 34 2 41 0.60 44 
7.5-12.5 3 43 3' '30 3 43 "0.60 44 
12.5-25.0 6 46 9 42 7 49 1.20 48 
25-50 12 55 18 47 13 55 3 64 
50-150 26 65 30 55 25 . 61 13 - 150 & above 43 70 38 57 * 55 83 43 - 
Total 5 42 37 37 6' 46 '- 47 
Source: Pakistan Census of Agriculture, 1972. 
The widespread use of tractor services by farmers as seen in Table 6.2 
has interesting implications for the development of rural factor markets. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we presented, at some length, the reasons for the non- 
existence of markets for bullock services in Pakistani agriculture. The 
introduction of tractors appears to have removed some of the traditional 
constraints on the development of markets for ploughing. In turn, . this 
removes the constraints on the amount of land that the landowners may 
Cultivate... We briefly discussed . the 
issues involved in Chapter 5. 
The differences in tube-well ownership and use across farms differen- 
tiated by tenure are evident from Table 6.3. This is again explained by 
the existence of markets for tube-well irrigation. The provision of 
tube-well water removes some of the constraints of cultivation imposed by 
the limitations of the publicly provided canal irrigation which is dependent 
on the efficiency of the irrigation department and rainfall to a much greater 
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degree than tube-wells. In Pakistan the development of markets for tube- 
well water rapidly followed the introduction of the 'Green Revolution' 
technology and was instrumental in removing the bottlenecks of-publicly 
provided canal irrigation thus facilitating the,, use of the new inputs. 
The development of markets for factor services may be explained as 
a response of agentsfconcerning resource allocationjin an uncertain environ- 
ment* Costly inputs with excess capacity may be purchased by large land- 
owners as well as middlemen in the rural areas to diversify their investment 
portfolios. - Large owners may purchase tractors or tube-wells with the 
intention of, selling the excess capacity to other farmers who would like to 
use the;. inputs but do not. own them. - This additional source of income may 
reduce the risk of the investment portfolio compared to one where the 
entire income is earned from cultivation alone., Similarly, middlemen trading 
in agricultural commodities (both inputs and, outputs) and providing rural 
credit may also diversify-their, investment portfolios by purchasing tractors 
and tube-wells... On the demand side small owners of land may attach high 
risk to the purchase of an expensive input (they may simply not have access 
to the loans to purchase the inputs). However, payment for input services 
may be considered less risky since the loss is relatively small. For 
tenants, an important explanation for not buying the inputs is insecurity 
of tenure. This is particularly important for investment in tube-wells 
because of'their immobility. Both share-croppers as well as fixed rent' 
tenants are vulnerable to such insecurity. 
Introduction of new inputs may result in weakening traditional social 
relations that discourage development of markets for factor services. For 
example, renting out tractors may not involve the same social taboos as 
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renting out bullocks for ploughing because of the emergence of specialized 
labour such as tractor drivers whose skill is divorced from ownership. 
In the case of the market for tube-well water an important explanation may 
be the increase in capacity for drawing water by electric/diesel motors 
compared to persian wheels which allow irrigation of plots other than those 
in the immediate vicinity. 
Section 6.2 The Hypotheses 
In the preceding discussion we noted the distinction between owner- 
. ..., 
ship and use. We. argued that because of the development of markets for 
factor services small size farmers as well as tenants have access to inputs 
that they do not own. We shall now develop specific hypotheses concerning 
the relationship between the use of inputs and the factors that influence it. 
The factors that we shall emphasize in our discussion are size, nature of the 
tenurial contract and migration. 
.. The Size of Farm 
The relationship between size of holding and use of inputs associated 
with 'Green Revolution' technology may be explained in terms of differences 
across farms regarding access to new inputs as. well as by differences in 
attitudes towards risk-bearing. 
Clearly, if large farms have better access to the new inputs, they ` 
are at an advantage compared to. small farmers and this may explain greater 
use of new inputs on such farms. (The distinction between 'access'"and 
'use' will be'made clear in the discussion that follows). In input markets 
distribution is determined, in part, by the price of the input. If there 
is great demand and markets are competitive many small farmers will be" 
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priced out öf input markets particularly if rural credit facilities are 
inadequate (Byers (1972)). Alternatively, the distribution of, input nay 
be influenced by Government. through. a policy of price controls. This is 
likely to result in a system of patronage which will again favour large 
farmers because of their greater mobility and political connections and 
hence access to the Government supply depots. However, not all inputs that 
constitute modern technology are affected in this manner. Two examples 
can be cited readily and have been discussed in detail earlier in Section 6.2. 
These are irrigation with tube-wells and ploughing with tractors. Both 
inputs require large investment which is likely to be beyond the means of 
small farmers. However, lively markets have developed for the services of 
such inputs. Water for irrigation is purchased by small farmers in fairly 
competitive markets in most regions where tube-wells exist. This is also 
true for tractor services. 
Even if access to input markets does not favour large farmers and 
rural credit markets function quite well, there, may be differences in the 
attitudes of small and large farmers towards new technology due to differ- 
ences in risk aversion. (Our discussion here is concerned with input use 
alone note the distinction between ownership and use pointed out 
earlier). In our discussion presented in Chapter 2, Section 2.1 we argued 
(using the arguments suggested by Srinivasan (1972) and Bliss and Stern 
(1980) that risk is important in determining resource allocation on the farm. 
It was pointed out that the relationship between use of inputs and size of 
holding is determined by differences in relative and absolute risk aversion. 
Thus, if increase in the size of holding lowers absolute risk aversion size 
will be positively correlated with the intensity of input use. on the 
other hand, if relative risk aversion increases with an increase in the size 
of holding intensity of input use declines. We shall extend this argument 
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to the new inputs that define modern technology. 
On the basis of the discussion presented above we shall argue that 
size of holding is an important determinant of use of new inputs. 
Tenancy 
It is argued by Bhaduri (1971) that share-cropping tenancy in India 
is an aspect of, "semi-feudalism" in which landless. peasants, contract not 
only land b*t also credit for consumption from the landoinerýwhc has,, 
monopolistic powers in the two markets. Both rent from land. and interest 
on capital are argued to be important sources of landowner's income. The 
model is developed in the framework of a single commodity (paddy) economy. 
It is shown that if the objective of. the new technology is to raise output, 
debt owed by tenants to their landowner. will be reduced. This will exhaust 
an important source of income for the landowner. At the same time it will 
loosen the landowner's hold over, the tenant because one of the markets in 
which he acts as a monopolist is no longer tightly controlled by him. 
Thus it is in Lite interest of the landowner to discourage share-croppers 
from adopting the new technology. Bhaduri allows for-the possibility where 
the introduction of new technology raises output sufficiently to compensate 
the landowner (through his share in the increased output) for the loss of 
income from usu ry. But, it is argued, that even this is not very attractive 
for the landowner since it reduces his ability to exploit the tenant which 
is greater when he controls both land and credit markets. 
The argument presented above-may be evaluated at two levels. The 
first requires us to verify, empirically, whether the assumptions of the 
model can be generalized. The second requires-us-to determine whether 
the logic of Bhaduri's argument is sound, -and-consistent with the 
conclusions. We have seen in Chapter 31Section 3.2jthat while some land- 
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owners in our villages do exercise control over markets other than land, 
this is not the general practice. Thus landowners rely mainly on their 
rented land as the major source of income. The second assumption implies 
that the introduction of modern technology lowers indebtedness. This 
may be true for consumption loans. 
The demand for production loans,, however, is likely to increase when 
naw technology is introduced since larger cash outlays are required to 
purchase new inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and irrigation water. Thus 
tenants' overall indebtedness is likely to increase. To the extent, there- 
fore that the tenant is dependent on the landowner, the relationship of 
dependence is likely to be perpetuated as a 
, 
result of the introduction of 
the new' technology. Thus it is not necessarily in the landowner's interest 
to discourage adoption of new technology. 
Even if we accept Bhaduri's assumptions, it is not clear, that his 
conclusions necessarily follow. If a landowner has monopoly in more than 
one market, it is possible for him to exercise his monopoly power in one 
of the markets. Thus even if the landowner's income from the interest 
charged on loans given to the tenant is reduced, he can lower the tenant's 
rental share in the tenancy market and thus he may reap, the rewards of 
introducing the new technology. Such control by the landowner in the 
tenancy market is allowed in the model suggested by Cheung (1969) where 
landowner's monopoly in the tenancy market implies that the rental share 
enters the landowner's maximand as a choice variable. Alternatively, it 
can be demonstrated that landowners reap the benefit of new technology by 
constructing models in which tenant's income enters the landowner's 
maximand as a constraint. ( See the discussion in Chapter 2 Section 2.2. ) 
It is important in the discussion of the relationship between tenancy 
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and technology to distinguish' between different types of tenurial arrange- 
ments. Thus owner-cum-tenants may respond differently to the new technology 
as compared to tenants. Amongst the tenants, share-croppers may respond 
differently from fixed-rent-tenants because of the differences in incentives 
or risk, aversion. Owner-cum-tenants are typically large farmers and have 
access-to own wealth. It is likely, therefore, that they may be less risk 
averse than pure tenants (we have already discussed the relationship between 
farm size and the adoption of new technology). -, Fixed-rent tenants bear 
all the risk of cultivation and therefore may be reluctant to adopt the new 
technology if it requires large investment. Share-croppers, on the other 
hand, share risk with their landowners. We have seen in our discussion in 
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Chapter 2 that if the costs of inputs are shared between landowners and share- 
croppers in the same proportion as the share in output, share-croppers are 
as efficient in resource use as owner-cultivators. 
The arguments presented above attempt to explain the relationship 
between different tenurial arrangements and the adoption of modern technol- 
ogy. Our discussion of the sample of farmers in Khanewal given in Chapter 
3 indicates that it is possible for us to evaluate differences in adoption 
of the new technologies on share-cropper farms distinguished on the basis 
of supervision methods of landowners. We argued in Chapter 3 that land- 
owner's regular supervision is likely to keep the share-cropper 'on his toes' 
so that the landowner will successfully coax the tenant into adopting the 
unambiguously profitable new technology. 
A hypothesis that we shall test may be seen to be the reverse of the 
one suggested by Bhaduri. In this scenario it is the tenant who is 
reluctant to-introduce the unambiguously profitable new technology due to 
poor access to new inputs and high risk aversion. The landowner, on the 
other hand, has good access to inputs, as well as credit facilities 
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and Government extension services and also has a 
'relatively 
lower risk 
aversion. This makes him keen to introduce the new technology. It may 
be argued that in such a situation the landowner will attempt to reclaim 
land from tenants for self-cultivation. (This trend has been observed 
in a number of areas where the new technology has been introduced .) 
An., indirect test of this argument may be to determine whether the land- 
owners who have reclaimed land from their tenants use the new inputs more 
intensively compared to share-croppers. We shall attempt such a test for 
our sample of farmers in Khanewal. 
Rural-Urban Migration 
In Chapter 7 we shall analyse, in detail rural-urban migration of 
labour using data from the four villages. In this Section, we shall test 
a hypothesis that. postulates that farmers encourage household members 
to migrate not only because the'farm cannot provide the consumption need 
of the members, but also because migrant members, remit cash back to the 
farm which is used to purchase the new inputs. This hypothesis will be 
elaborated further in Chapter 7. 
In sumnary, our discussion of the impact of size, tenancy and 
migration on the use of new inputs indicates the following. The relation- 
ship between size and input use may be proportional or inverse depending 
on the nature of risk'aversion, and farmers' access to capital markets 
and distribution points. " Onwer-cum-tenants, in general, may be 
expected to use'the new inputs more intensively than share-croppers who, 
in turn, may use them more intensively compared to fixed-rent tenants. 
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Further, share-cropping tenants who are supervised regularly by landowners 
may use the new inputs more intensively than other share-croppers. Finally, 
farmers with migrant members are likely to use more of the new inputs 
compared to other farmers. In the remaining sections of this Chapter we 
shall attempt to verify these arguments using evidence from our four 
villages and from Khanewal. 
Section 6.3.1. The evidence from the four villages and from Khanewal 
In this section we shall present a brief description of the incidence 
of use of the new inputs by different categories of farmers in the four 
villages. For Khanewal we shall also present a time profile of adoption. 
Intensity of use of the new inputs will be discussed in Section 6.3.2. 
In Jatli (Table 6.4a) there are no fixed-rent tenancies. This: " 
explains the absence of entries in Columns 2 and 4. Due to the high 
costs of reaching subsoil water, there are no tube-wells in the village. 
Fertilizer is used extensively. It can be seen that fewer share-croppers 
use fertilizer as compared to owners and owner-cum-tenants. However, 
more share-croppers use modern seeds and tractors compared to the other 
two tenurial categories. 
In Khunda (Table 6.4 b) , also 
there are no fixed rent tenancies. 
It can be seen that apart from tractors, the use of modern inputs is not 
very common. 
In Chak (Table 6.4 c) all cultivators use fertilizers and modern 
seeds, However, because sub-soil water is saline, tube-well irrigation 
is not possible. There appears to be considerable variation across tenure 
regarding tractor use. All fixed-rent tenants use tractors while amongst 
the owner-cum-tenants the incidence of tractor use is quite low.. 
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The use of fertilizers and high yield variety seeds is quite wide- 
spread in Mehdiabad (Table 6.4. d). Comparatively the incidence-of'tube- 
well irrigation is low and shows variation across tenure. " Fixed-rent 
tenants appear to use tractors more frequently than share-cropping tenants. 
In general, however, the variation of tractor use across tenure is rather low. 
This informal presentation of the evidence suggests that the use of 
fertilizers and high yield variety seeds is quite widespread in the canal 
irrigated villages. This confirms the view that irrigation is an important 
ingredient in the new "Green Revolution" technology package. Further., 
where irrigation is available, most farmers use the new input regardless of 
size and tenure (as we shall see, size and tenure are important in determin- 
ing the intensity of use). 
The other result worth noting is that tractor cultivation is wide- 
spread in both 'barani'as well as canal irrigated villages. This is 
indicative of the success of Government subsidy schemes in the spreading 
of the use of factors. 
Khanewa1 
In Table 6.4. e we have presented the use of _ modern. 
inputs by, farmers 
in Khanewal. All three inputs are used by nearly all the farmers we 
interviewed in Khanewal, regardless of the difference in tenure. This 
evidence supports the view that Khanewal sub-division is technologically 
one of the most advanced agricultural regions of Pakistan. 
We-have presented a time profile of the use of three modern inputs 
(fertilizers, tube-wells and tractors) in Khanewal in Table 6.5. If we 
take a three year period for measuring changes in technology, it can be 
seen from Table 6.5 - but moreclearly from Figure 6.1. - that the 
incidence of fertilizer use and tube-well irrigation peaked in late 1960's. 
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Some. years later - in early 1970's - all frequency bars register a fall 
suggesting that by that date few stragglers were left to catch up with the 
new-technology. It is interesting to note the lag of one period between 
the use of tube-wells/fertilizers and tractors. This supports, the view 
that 'Green Revdlution' technology preceded mechanization. An important 
point to note in the heightýof the frequency bars of the three inputs, 'is 
the suggestion of initial variation in response followed by a smooth trend 
in the incidence, of use. This may be explained by-the initial high risk 
associated with the new inputs by farmers as well as the slow development 
of markets for factor services. Initially, fertilizer distribution may 
have been poor and markets for the services of tractors and tube-wells may 
not have existed. However, by late-1960's, 68% of the., farmers,. in our 
sample were using fertilizers and 63% were using tube-wells for, irrigation. 
By early 1970's 51% of the, farmers in the sample had access to tractors 
for cultivation. 
The frequency of use of modern seeds can be seen from Table 6.6. 
The two most popular varieties currently in use are Chenab 70 (C-70) 
and Yakora (58% and 60% of the sampled farmers, respectively report the 
use of these varieties). Another popular seed variety is Noori (342 of 
the sampled farmers use it). 
Table 6.6. b shows the time profile of the use of high yield variety 
seeds by the sample farmers in Khanewal. The table has been compiled on 
the basis of farmers' response concerning the H. Y. V. varieties currently 
in use. Farmers' response to questions concerning the varieties actually 
sown was quite good. However, the response to our questions regarding 
the date of the initial use of the seed varieties currently in use was 
rather poor. We got the impression that apart from a few farmers who keep 
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written farm accounts the majority-did not remember the varieties used 
before 1970's. While presenting the time profile of the use of seeds in Table 
6.6. bß we include the responses of only those farmers who seemed reasonably 
clear about the dates. For example, although Maxi-Pak Seeds(Maxi in 
Tables 6.6. b. ) were very important in bringing about the 'Green 
Revolution' very few farmers were clear about the year'-they first used 
the seeds. On the other hand, farmers were quite clear regarding the. initial 
use of the two varieties currently popular, Yakora and Chenab 70. 
Table 6.4. a. Farmers reporting any use of the new inputs as a 
percentage of all farms in Jatli 
Tenurial fixed owner-cum- owner-cum- 
Categories share- rent share- fixed rent 
owners croppers tenants croppers tenants 
Inputs (0) (1) (; ) (3) (4) 
Fertilizer 75 50 - 70 - 
M: )dern Seed 35 50 - 33 - 
Tractors 47 100 - 45 
Table 6.4. b. Farmers reporting any use of the new inputs as a 
percentage of all farms in Khunda 
Tenurial fixed owner-cum- öwner-cum 
Categories share- rent share fixed rent 
owners croppers tenants croppers tenants 
Inputs (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fertilizer 4 - - 6 - 
Modern Seed 0 - - 0 - 
Tube-wells 2 - - 0 - 
Tractors 54 36 - 81 - 
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Table 6.4. c Farmers repörting'ariy'use of'the'new'inputs as a 
percentage of 'a11 farms ' ir1 Chak 
Tenurial fixed owner-cum- owner-cum 
Categories share- rent share- fixed rent 
owners croppers tenants croppers tenants 
Inputs 
.... .. 
(0) 
.. ..,. 
(1)......... (2). (3)' (4) 
Fertilizer 99 100 100 100 100 
Modern Seed 97 100 100 100 100 
Tube-wells - - - - - 
Tractors 33 33 100 0 21 
Table 6.4. d. Farmers reporting any use of the new inputs as a 
percentage of all farms inMehdiabad 
Tenurial fixed owner-cum- owner-cum 
Categories share- rent share- fixed rent 
owners croppers tenants croppers tenants 
Inputs (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fertilizer 100 100 100 100 100 
Modern Seed 100 100 100 100 75 
Tube-wells 
_ 
29 25 20 13 38 
Tractors 58 19 50'_ 25 75 
Table 6.4. e. Farmers reporting any use of the new inputs as a 
percentage of all farms in'Khanewal 
Tenurial 
Categories Share-croppers 
l1 Share-croppers owners owners 
with no change- with change without change with change 
Inputs. (0) (1) (2) (3) 
Fertilizer 27 26 17 16 
Tube-well 27 26 18 17 
Tractors 27 26 18 17 
Total 27 27 18 18 
1/ Change refers to change reported in farm area in the last five years. 
(see the discussion on data in Chapter 1). 
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Table 6.5' ' Farmers 'reporting `the eär`of lstAise" - of the new inputs 
in Khanewal (square brackets indicate that farmers have 
been bunched into groups of three years) 
nputs 
Year 
Tractors Tube-wells Fertilizer 
1950 1 1 
1951 1 0 2 
1952 
------ ---------- 
1 
--------- 
1953 1 
1954 0 0 3 
1955 
----- -------- ---------- 
2 
--------- 
1956 1 
1957 0 2 0 
1958 
------ --------- ---------- --------- 
1959 
1960 23 56 0 
1961 1 1 
1962 5 
1963 4 1 10 5 
1964 1 
-------- 
4 
---------- 
5 
--------- 
1965 3 7 9 
1966 38 4 16 5 19 
1967 
----- 
2 
-------- 
5 
---------- 
5 
--------- 
1968 2 4 9 
1969 5 10 13 20 13 32 
1970 
----- 
3 
-------- 
3 
--- 
10 
1971 3 
-- -- ---- 
3 
--------- 
2 
1972 6 20 5 11 4 13 
1973 
----- 
11 
-------- 
3 
---------- 
7 
--------- 
1974 8 2 4 
1975 617 58 28 
1976 
----- 
3 
----- -- - 
1 
---------- 
2 
--------- 
1977 1 1 1 
1978 6 1 2 
Figure 6.1 Frequency of the Ist use of inputs by farmers 
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in Khanewal by three-year periods. 
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Table 6.6a Frequency of'use of the eight high'yield variety wheat 
seeds most' frequently used by farmers'in Khanewal 
(on Part or all of the area under wheat crop . 
Seed Variety Percentage of farms 
reporting use 
Pawan 8 
C70 58 
Noori 34 
S. A. 42 
. 
13 
MAXI 9 
L. W. 2 
SA75 6 
YAKORA 60 
Table 6.6. b Time profile of seed use. Number of farmers reporting 
the use of H. Y. V. Seeds by seed variety and year of use 
Seed variety 
Year 
Pawan C70 Noori SA42 MAXI LW SA75 YAKORA 
1965 1 1 
1966 
1967 1 1 
1968 1 1 1 
1969 2 1 1 
1970 3 
1971 1 2 
1972 3 2 
1973 4 2 2 
1974 2 1 1 6 
1975 4 2 1 1 18 
1976 2 2 11 
1977 4 1 1 4 
1978 7 3 2 1 2 3 
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Section'6.3.2. ' The tatistical model of input use 
In the present section we shall discuss intensity of use of the 
new inputs in the four villages and in Khanewal in the framework of a 
simple linear model. We have already presented an informal discussion 
of the adoption pattern of the new technology. The model described here 
will be used mainly to test the hypotheses developed in section 6.2 
regarding the intensity of use of new inputs. Our measure of the intensity 
of use of'an input will become clear when we define the dependent variables 
in' our discussion. 
In its most general form the model suggests that intensity of use 
of the new inputs is afunction of the`size'of holding-and tenurial'' 
arrangements i. e. 
Ni = f(H, T) (1) 
where Ni is the proportion of total acreage under the ith modem input 
H is the size of holding 
T is the tenurial arrangement 
Throughout our discussion H will be measured as a continuous variable 
while we shall use dummies to distinguish between different tenurial arrange- 
ments. . Taking, into account the disturbance term, the linear form of the 
. model 
is 
. 
Ni A+ B1H +I ßý Tý +u (2) 
where j-2... 5 gives the dümnies for the five broad categories of 
tenurial'arrangements in our villages(discussed in Chapter 1). 
According to (2) the differences in the intensity of use of the new 
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inputs due to size are determined by the sign and significance of _B1 
while the significance and sign of B will indicate the difference due 
to a tenurial category on the basis of comparisons with the intercept 
term. 
ýý 
In the estimations of our model in the four villages we shall 
introduce an additional dummy for migration so that in (2) 
j2... 6 where the 6th term is the migration dummy. Keeping in view 
our discussion in Section 6.2 the dummy variable takes the value 1 if 
migrant members-send back remittances and 0 otherwise. The addition 
of the migration dummy to our basic model will result in interaction terms. 
(See below. ) We shall estimate the coefficients of each of these in order 
to determine the impact of migration. 
Taking into account the five categories. of tenurial arrangements 
in the four villages, the migration dummy and the interaction terms, the 
model may be written in full as 
Ni A+ B1A + B2T2 + B3T3 + B4T4 + B5T5 + B6T6 + B7T26 + B8T36 
+ B9T46 + B10T56 +U (3) 
where A. is the constant term 
H is the size of holding measured in acres 
T2 takes the value 1 for share-cropping tenant, 0 otherwise 
ße3 n º" .r rº ýý fixed-rent 
T4 owner-cum-sharecropping tenant, 0 otherwise 
TS owner-cum-fixed-rent. 
T6 households with migrant members " 
T26 is the interaction term for T2 and T6 
T it If of it T and T 36 36 
T it T and T 46 46 
T It T and T 56 56 
U is the error term 
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As we shall see some of the tenancy dummies and interaction terms 
will drop out in some villages given that not all five tenurial 
arrangements exist in all four villages. 
The dependent. variables used in the estimation of (3) are : 
1. The value of fertilizer use per acre on the farm. 
2. The proportion of total farm acreage cultivated with tractors. 
3. The number of standard (see below) tube-well irrigations per farm. 
4. The number of standard (see below) canal irrigations per farm. 
Each of the dependent variables measures the aggregate use of inputs 
for all the crops taken together. The unit of observation in our model is 
the individual farm. A standard irrigation is called a 'Vaar'. It refers 
to the irrigation of all the acreage cropped in a season and is measured 
in terms-of acre feet of water per-cultivated field. 
In. Khanewal-we shall estimate a different version of the model 
described above. Our data for the sample of farmers in Khanewal allow 
us to make subtle distinctions between tenurial arrangements. For example, 
we can distinguish between share-croppers whose total farm area (rented 
in or out) has-remained unchanged in the five years before the survey with 
those whose landowners have reclaimed land. Also, we can make comparisons-_ 
between owner-cultivators whose farm area has remained unchanged with 
those owner-cultivators who have reclaimed land from share-cropping tenants. 
These comparisons will enable us to comment on the ability of share- 
cropping contracts to accommodate technological change. Thus we shall 
test the hypothesis that share-croppers from whom landowners have 
reclaimed land are those who use the new inputs less intensively compared 
to other share-croppers. Another hypothesis we shall test is that owner- 
cultivators who have reclaimed land from share-croppers use the new inputs 
more intensively compared to other owner-cultivators. 
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We also test the hypothesis that share-croppers whose landlords 
exercise regular and close supervision use the inputs more intensively 
compared to others. Further, we shall examine whether cost-sharing 
arrangements affect the intensity of use of the new inputs. 
In order to focus sharply on the tenurial distinctions discussed 
above we shall concentrate on the intensity of input use for the main 
'rabi' crop, wheat. 
In Khanewal the basic model (2) may be written as : 
Ni A+ B1H + B2T2 + B3T3 + B4T4 + B5T5 + B6T6 +U (4) 
where A measures the intercept term for share-croppers whose farm 
area is unchanged. 
H is the size of holding in acres. 
T2 takes the value of 1 for share-croppers whose landowners 
have reclaimed land, 0 otherwise. 
T3 takes the value of 1 for owner-cultivators whose farm area 
is unchanged, 0 otherwise. 
T4 takes the value of 1 for owner-cultivators who have reclaimed 
land for self-cultivation, 0 otherwise. 
T5 takes the value of 1 for share-croppers whose landowners 
exercise regular supervision (i. e. visit the plot at least once 
a week, '0 otherwise. ) 
T6 takes'the value of 1 for share-croppers whose landowners 
share-the costs of modern inputs, 0 otherwise. 
S 
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The dependent variables in Khanewal are: 
1. The value of fertilizer used per acre on the farm for 
wheat crop 
2. The number of standard tractor ploughings on the farm for wheht 
3. The number of tube-well irrigations on the farm for wheat 
4. The number of standard canal irrigation on the farm for wheat 
'Standard' ploughings and irrigations are to be interpreted in the 
same way as in the discussion of the model of input use in the four villages. 
Both equations (3) and (4) are estimated in their linear form. In 
, 
Jatli we also tried the log-linear form but we did-not find much improvement 
in the goodness of fit. Thus we shall present our results on the basis 
of the estimation of the linear form only. 
Results 
We have presented the results of the regressions that test our 
hypotheses concerning the use of modern inputs in the four villages (all 
crops) and in Khanewal (wheat only) in Tables 6.7-6.10. We have marked 
the values of the coefficients on, independent variables with asterisks 
to indicate levels of statistical significance. (The actual regressions 
with the F-values of the coefficients on each independent variable and R2 
values of the regression equations along with the standard errorrare given 
in Tables 6.11 to 6.15 in the Appendix. 
Fertilizer 
The results of tests of our hypotheses regarding per acre fertilizer 
use in the four villages are presented in Table 6.7. It may be seen that 
the size of holding is negatively correlated with the value. of fertilizer 
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used per acre in Jatli, while-in Metidiabad the correlation is positive. 
In Khunda and Chak size is insignificant in determining fertilizer use. 
This is also true in Khanewal (Table 6.10). 
We have seen in our discussion(Section 4.2Chapter 4)that a number 
of arguments may be suggested to explain the greater intensity of use of 
the traditional inputs. by. the. small farmers. Briefly, these arguments. 
are related to the, differences in the quality of soil (Khusro (1974); Sen 
(1964)), labour market duality (Sen (1964)) and attitude towards risk 
(Srinivasan (1972); Bliss and Stern (1980)). Here , however, we have 
to explain why size is not an important factor in determining 
fertilizer use per acre in Khunaa, Chak and Khanewal. In Chak the 
distribution of land is relatively equal so that the comparatively large 
farmers have no special advantages leading to greater intensity of input 
use. (This is confirmed also by the results presented in Chapter 4 where 
we saw that, of all the villages, output per acre in Chak is the closest to 
being invariant with size). In Khanewal large farmers have good access to 
a vast network of extension services set up by the Government. This off- 
sets some of the inherent disadvantages that lower the intensity of input use 
on the large farms. In Khunda the insignificance of size may be due to 
the fact that, as yet, very few farmers use fertilizers (see Table 6.7). 
Once the impact of fertilizer use has been established in that region the 
inverse relationship may assert itself. 
It will be noted that. the size factor is unimportant in different 
ways in Jatli and Mehdiabad. This may be explained in terms of access' 
to. irrigation. Fertilizer use, is crucially correlated with-irrigation. 
In Jatli the, survival of small farms depends importantly-on access to- 
irrigation. Typically, therefore, a greater prrportion of the farm land 
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is irrigated compared to the large farms.. This factor'in conjunction 
with the small farms'. ability to use more labour-(fertilizer 
application increases labour activities on the farm such as the application 
itself, weeding and harvesting), results in a different value for. the 
coefficient compared to Mehdiabad where, although large farms may be at a 
disadvantage regarding the intensity ofýlabour use, they have better, access 
to canal irrigation compared-to the small farms (see-Table 6.9) and hence- 
apply more fertilizer per acre. 
Pure share-cropping tenancy is important only in Jatli in determining 
fertilizer use. The coefficient value indicates that share-croppers have 
a lower intercept compared to the owner-cultivators. These results indicate 
that share-croppers are at a disadvantage where fertilizer use is concerned. 
This is confirmed by the value of the coefficient for owner-cum-share-croppers. 
It is interesting to note, however, that farmers in this tenurial category 
use inputs . more 
intensively compared to pure share-croppers. This may be 
explained by their lowei risk aversion due to ownership of land which is 
less risky compared to rights in a share-cropping contract). It will be 
seen. that in Chak also owner-cum-share-croppers have a lower intercept 
compared to pure owner-cultivators. However pure share-croppers seem to 
be at no particular disadvantage. An explanation for this may be that land- 
owners of pure share-croppers in the village are typically large land-owners 
who cultivate most of their owned land themselves so that, they exercise 
regular and strict supervision. ' They may also share costs with-the tenants. 
Owner-cum-share-croppers, on the other hand, rent in land from landowners 
who usually own small plots of land and who either live away or work. outside 
the village so that their supervision may be lax. This may explain the 
result that owner-cum-share-croppers use fertilizer less intensively 
(on their total holdings) compared to pure share-croppers and owner-cultivator: 
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The impact of tenure on fertilizer use in Khanewal is quite inter- 
esting. There appears to be no difference in use between share-croppers, 
from whom landowners have reclaimed land and those whose total farm size 
is unchanged. However, compared to thesetwo tenurial categories both 
owner-cultivators without change in farm area as well as owner-cultivators 
who have reclaimed land, use fertilizers more intensively. Further, 
owner-cultivators who have reclaimed land from share-croppers have a higher 
intercept compared to the others. 11iis result supports the view that some 
landowners may resume land from their tenants if the latter cannot adopt 
modern methods of cultivation. In the course of our survey in Rhanewal., 
a number of landowners who had recently resumed land from share-croppers 
informed us that they did so not because the share-croppers used the new 
inputs less intensively than'other cultivators (owners or share-croppers) 
but because the landowners had decided to cultivate the land themselves 
with hired managers who recommend both higher doses of fertilizers and new 
varieties of fertilizers. They expected to increase their output consider- 
ably by switching over to the new methods of cultivation. (The choice of 
the tenant from whom land is to be reclaimed appears to depend on the pattern 
of fragmentation.. Usually landowners reclaim land from tenants whose plots 
are adjacent to that part of the landowner's-'holdings that they had been 
cultivating themselves with the old technology. 
It is interesting to note that fixed-rent tenants, whether they are 
pure tenants or part owners, use fertilizer as intensively as pure owner- 
cultivators. This evidence supports the theoretical conclusions of Chapter 5 
in which it is argued that this tenurial category allocates resources in 
the same manner as owner-cultivators. 
In Mehdiabad cultivating households with migrant members who send. 
back remittances use fertilizers more intensively compared to others. 
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In Jatli remittances are an important determinant of fertilizer-use for 
owner-cum-share-cropper category only. We, shall discuss these results further 
in Chapter 7. 
It can be seen in Table 6.10 that in Khanewal regular supervision 
by, the landlord of the share-cropped land raises the intensity of, fertilizer 
use on the farm. 
Tractors 
Our discussion of the impact of the explanatory variables on tractor 
use will be presented using evidence from Jatli and Mehdiabad. 
The three tenurial categories observed in'the barani villages are found in 
Jatli while all five tenurial categories exist in Mehdiabad. The 
results are presented in Table 6.8. For Khanewal the results of tractor, 
use are presented in Table 6.10. It must be remembered that in Jatli and 
Mehdiabad the dependent variable is the proportion of total acreage under 
tractor cultivation while in Table 6+10 for Khanewalythe dependent variable 
is the number of tractor ploughings for-wheat. 
In Table 6.8 we see that size of holding is inversely related to 
tractor use in both Jatli and Mehdi_abad. This is a surprising result since 
greater ownership of tractors by large farms is likely to encourage greater 
intensity of use as well. (This may be explained, in part, by our measure 
of tractor use. It is possible that if intensity of tractor use is measured 
in terms of'the number of, ploughings of afield (as in Khanewal). we are 
likely to observe that large farms use tractors more intensively compared 
to small farms. Further, the value of the coefficient`is greater in Jatli 
as compared to Mehdiabad indicating the better functioning of the market for 
tractor services in Jatli. In Khanewal (Table 6.10) the intensity of tractor 
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use on wheat increases with the size of holding. This is explained partly 
by the greater incidence of tractor ownership amongst the big landowners in 
Khanev-a1 which facilititates intensity of use. 
In both Jatli and Mehdiabad pure'share-croppers use tractors less 
intensively compared to owner-cultivators. In Jatli owner-cum-share-croppers 
also use tractors less intensivety - than owner-cultivators but, more than 
pure share-croppers. Both these results are consistent with our hypotheses 
regarding the impact of tenancy on input use discussed in Section 6.2. It 
is interesting'to note, however, that in Mehdiabad fixed-rent tenants, 
whether pure or part owners, use tractors less intensively compared to pure, 
owner-cultivators. This suggests that in Mehdiabad tenancy disincentives 
concerning tractor use are, explained not in terms of the nature of. tenancy 
contracts (i. e. whether it is fixed rent or share-cropping tenancy) but by 
the pattern of ownership of tractors and the nature of markets for tractor 
services. In Mehdiabad we noted that tractors are owned mainly by owner- 
cultivators and hiring in of tractors is less common than in other villages. 
This argument applies'to Khanewal also where due to the pattern of ownership, 
owner-cultivators use tractors more intensively compared to share-croppers. 
Amongst the owner-cultivators1those who have recently reclai-ied land from 
share-croppers use tractors more intensively compared to all other tenurial 
categories. 
Our results indicate that in Jatli cultivating households with 
migrant members use tractors more intensively compared to others (see Table 
6.8). This is an interesting result and will be discussed further in 
Chapter 7, in the context of an anlysis of the relationship between farm 
mechanisation and migration. 
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Tube-wells' 
Amongst our four villages tube-well irrigation is available'only in . 
Mehdiabad. (In Jatli and, in Khunda the costs of reaching subsoil water are 
very high both because of the depth at which water is found and because the 
soil is rocky, while in Chak subsoil water is saline).. Results of tests of 
hypotheses regarding tube-well irrigation in Mehdiabäd are presented in 
Table 6.9. Amongst our sample of farmers in Khanewal5tube-well irrigation 
is widespread (see Table 6.4. e. ) Result of the tests in Khanewal are 
presented in Table 6.10. 
In Mehdiabad neither size nor tenure are important in determining the 
'vaars' of tube-well irrigations on the farm. This is an important result 
reflecting the efficiency 
In Khanewal (Table 
more intensively compared 
effective supervision use 
Finally, sharing of costs 
with which markets for tube-well water function. 
6.10) owner-cultivators use tube-well irrigation 
to share-croppers. Further, share-croppers with 
tube-well irrigation more intensively than others. 
of tube-well irrigation increases the number of 
irrigations on the share-cropped farm. Thus all cur results on tube-well 
irrigation are consistent with the theory concerning share-cropping tenancy. 
Further, the development of effective markets for tube-well water implies 
that differences in use across farms are determined by the disincentive of 
tenure rather than the problems of access. 
Canal irrigation 
Finally, our tests of hypotheses concerning canal irrigation are 
presented in Table 6.9 for Mehdiabad and in Table 6.10 for Khanewal. 
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In Mehdiabad size and tenancy are positively correlated with the 
number of canal irrigations. This result implies that in the annual 
cropping season large farms and tenants (both share-croppers and fixed- 
rent tenants) irrigate their land more often than small owner-cultivators. 
Amongst the tenants fixed- rent tenants irrigate more often compared to 
share-croppers. Further, -fixed-rent tenants who are part owners, irrigate 
more often than pure fixed-rent tenants. 
Mehdiabad is an old canal-' colony' village where land settlement under 
the British re-affirmed the traditional inegalitarian structures. The 
provision of canal water in the village reflects this structure. Thus 
large lando,, 'ners have better access to irrigation because their farms are 
located close to the 'rajwah' (the irrigation channel). Further, they are 
in a better position to manouvre the canal 'patwari' in the allocation of 
water because as large landowners they extend patronage to petty Government 
servants. This advantage of better access to water is put into effect not 
only for self-cultivation (captured by the positive correlation between the 
size of'holding and canal irrigation) but also while leasing out land on 
tenancy. Large landowners can improve their bargaining position vis-a-vis 
the tenants by offering greater access to irrigation which lowers the risk 
of crop failure. Access may also be determined by the degree of risk 
associated with the tenurial contract. Fixed rent tenants who bear greater 
risks of cultivation comparedto share-croppers are offered better access to 
irrigation. Further fixed-rent tenants who partly own the land they 
cultivate, have better access to irrigation than pure fixed-rent tenants. 
In Khanewal, (Table 6.10) neither size nor tenancy are significant in 
determining the intensity of canal irrigation on the farm. - An important 
explanation for this is that Khanewal sub-division is richly endowed with 
canal water. A major canal, lower Bari Doab, distributes the water of 
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. river, 
Ravi through an elaborate grid of 'rajwahs'. Thus farms do not 
have any special advantage of location as in Mehdiabad. In the south- 
eastern reaches of Khanewal sub-division the quantity of water in the. canal 
declines substantially but this affects all farms regardless of tenure. 
Table 6.7 Estimated values of the coefficients of determinants of 
the intensity of fertilizer use in the four villages 
Dependent variable 
11 
: "value of fertilizer used per'acre 
for all crops 
(linear form) 
Village 
Ind. Variables 
Jatli Khunda Mehdiabad Chak 
Constant 35.23 0.02 87.39 80.14 
HOLDCULT (H) -0.53 -0.0004 0.21** 0.11 
Dummy for share- 
cropping tenancy -31.81 0.08 -13.90 -13.38 
(T2) 
Dummy for fixed- 
rent tenancy (T3) - - 0.24 4.25 
Dummy for owner-cum- * ** 
share-cropping -16.47 -0.002 -17.00 -33.22 
tenancy (T4) 
Dummy for owner-cum 
fixed-rent tenancy - - 10.59 10.23 
(T5) 
-Dummy for migration -1.24 -0.007- 33.81** , _2.97 (T6) 
Dummy for share- 0.62 -0.07 - -36.65 
cropping/migration 
(T26) 
Dummy for fixed-rent, 
tenancy/migration 
(T36) 
Dummy for owner-cum- ** 
share-cropper/ 22.17 -0.01 25.71 54.78 
migration (T46) 
Dummy for owner-cum- 
fixed-rent tenancy/ - - - -25.10 
migration (T56) 
R2 0.25 0.003 0.10 0.05 
1/. The estimates are obtained by using equation (3)discussed in Section 
6.3.2 in the text. F-values and R2 values for the equation in each 
village are given in Tables. 6.11 to 6.14 in the Appendix. 
* Indicates significance at 5 percent level while 
** indicates significance at 10 percent level. 
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Table 6.8 Estimated values of the coefficients of the-determinants'of 
the'intensity of tractor uSe'in Jatli and Mehdiabad. 
I/ I 
Dependent variable 7. Acreage ploughed with tractors as a 
percentage of total farm'acreage 
(linear form) 
Vi 1 late 
2/ 
Ind. Variable Jatli. Mehdiabad 
Constant 2.08 1.89 
HOLDCULT -0.55 -0.01 
T2 -1.73** -1.70 
T3 - -1.66 
T4 -1.01 0.38 
T5 - -1.13 
T6 0.36** 0.56 
T26 0.29 - 
T36 - - 
T46 0.43 -0.99 
T56 - - 
R2 0.22* 0.39* 
1/ The estimates are obtained by using equation (3) discussed in 
r Section 6.3.2 in the text. F-values and Rz values for the 
equation in each village are given in Tables 6.11 and 6.12 in 
the Appendix. 
2/ For definition of variables see Table 6.7 
* indicates significance at 5 percent level, while 
'** indicates significance it 10 percent level. 
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Table 6.9 Estimated values of the coefficients of the'determiriants 
of the intensity'of tube-weil and canal irrigation 
'- in Mehdiabad l/ 
Dependent variable : 'Number'of irrigations on the farm 
Input 
Ind. VariablesV 
Tube-well 
irrigations 
Canal 
irrigations 
Constant 13.99 -3.69 
HOLDCULT -0.02 0.32* 
T2 7.09 12.72* 
T3 -4.37 18.09* 
T4 2.16 '5.99 
T5 -1.55 22.03 
T6 1.39 - 
T26 - - 
T36. 
T46 -3.45 - 
T56 - - 
R2' 0.05 0.42 
l/ The estimates are obtained by using equation (3) discussed in 
r Section 6.3.2 in the text. F-values and R' values for the 
equation are given in Table 6.12 in the Appendix. 
2/ For definition of variables see Table 6.7. 
* indicates significance at-5-percent level while 
** indicates significance at 10% level. 
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Table 6.10 Estimated values of the coefficients of the'determinants of 
the intensity of use of modern inputs' in Khanewal 1 
(linear- form) 
Dependent 
Variables 
Ind. variables 
Fertilizer use 
per acre 
Tractor 
ploughings 
Tube-well 
irrigation 
canal 
irrigations 
Constant 55.51 0.71 -0.05 6.29 
HOLD CU LT -0.09 0.02 0.001 0.004 
T2 13.79 0.08 0.03 1.19 
T3 40.55** 1.45** -3.55* -1.56 
T4 65.30 1.66** 2.92 -0.56 
T5 22.13** 0.62 . 1.05 
* 
- 
T6 27.53 -0.23 2.91* - 
2 R 0.12 0.28 0.18 0.04 
1/ The estimates Pre obtained by using equation (4) discussed. in Section 
6.3.2 in the text. F-values and R2 values are given in Table 6.15 in 
the Appendix. 
2/ 'For the definition of variables see text on pp. 270,271. 
* indicate significance at 5 percent level while` 
** indicate significance at 10 percent level. 
Section 6.4 Conclusions 
The analysis presented in this Chapter suggests the'following broad 
conclusions about the relationships between size, tenure' and input' use. 
; he empirical evidence suggests that size of holding is statistically 
significant in determining fertilizer use' and the coefficient has a negative 
sign in Jatli, implying that small farmers use fertilizers more intensively 
than large farmers and a positive sign in Khunda implying more intensive 
use by large farmers. Further, size appears to be insignificant in 
determining the use of. tube-well irrigation. The impact of size on"canal 
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irrigation is ambiguous-In Mehdiabad size is, significant in determining fertil- 
izer use and has a positive sign while in Khanewal it is insignificant. 'inally, 
when, tractor use is properly defined (in terms of the, number of ploughings), 
the evidence suggests that large farmers use tractors more intensively 
compared to, the small farmers., 
Only the first three inputs raise farm productivity unambiguously. ` 
Tractor` ploughing may increase output "rovided cropping intensity is raised 
andthatdoes not always follow (Binswanger (1977)). Thus except in 
Mehdiabed (where large farmers use more fertilizer and canal irrigation) 
there is. little evidence to suggest that the use of new inputs associated 
with 'green revolution' technology may reverse the traditional inverse 
relationship between size and productivity. 
Our evidence suggests that tenancy is important in determining the 
use of modern inputs. Share-cropping tenants use modern inputs less=- 
intensively than owner-cultivators and fixed-share tenants. "However 
evidence-from lianewal suggests that cost-sharing arrangements and regular 
supervision by landowners can lower the disincentives of investing in new 
inputs. In Khanewal empirical evidence supports the view that landowners 
reclaim land from share-croppers because they wish to use modern inputs 
more intensively than their share-cropping tenants. It appears, there- 
fore, that tenurial contracts may be influenced in an important way by the 
inputs associated with 'Green Revolution' technology. 
Thus our evidence suggests that limited adjustments may take place 
in input markets to loosen the constraints imposed by imperfectionsin rural 
capital markets on input use. Ownership of land improves credit worthiness 
of all farmers. Large farms borrow from formal institutions such as banks, 
while small farmers borrow from village shopkeepers, the 'arhtia' and the 
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'biratberi'. However, tenants who do not own land at all have very low 
credit rating so that unless the landowner agrees to underwrite the loans 
taken by his tenant, it may be impossible for the tenant to borrow. The 
landowner then has the choice of either underwriting loans and making cost 
sharing arrangements with, his tenants, along with regular'supervisionrto 
ensure appropriate intensity of input use or he may-reclaim land for self- 
cultivation and use the modern inputs as intensively as the technology; 
requires. 
Finally the relationship between migration and the use of input 
appears to be complicated. We have presented a first look at the issues. 
Our results indicate a positive correlation between fertilizer 
use and migration. This suggests that remittances from migration may 
be an alternative to borrowing in the village capital markets for purchase 
of the new inputs. However, detailed discussion of theory and evidence is 
required before suggesting this conclusion. We shall attend to this task 
in the next chapter. 
0 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER h 
Table 6.11 'Regression estimates' of' equation'(3)'in Jatli'(see 
text section 6.3.2. 
(linear form), 
Dependent 
Variables 
nd. variableslý 
Value of fertilizer 
-used per-acre 
Area ploughed by 
tractor as per- 
centage of-all farm area 
HOLPCULT. -0.53 -0.55 
(3.36)2 (13.49) 
T2 
S ** 
-31.81 
** 
-1.73 
(1.81) (1.99) 
T4 -16.47 -0.01 
(3.14) (4.40) 
TG -1.24 0.36 
(0.05) (1.60) 
T26 0.62 0.29 
.,, 
(0.00) (0.02) 
T46 22.17** 0.43 
(1.81) (0.18) 
Constant 35.23 2.08 
R2 0.25 0.22 
F 
3.57* 3.79* 
S. E. 23.03 1.71 
N 171 171 
1/ For definition of variables see Table 6.7. 
2/ Figures in brackets are F-values. 
* indicates significance at 5 percent level while 
** indicates significance at 10 percent level. 
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Table 6.12 Regresrion estimates of equation (3). in Melidiabad 
(see text section 6.3.2. 
.. 
(linear. form) 
Dependent 
variables 
Ind. variables . 
Value of 
fertilizer 
usedper. acre 
Area ploughed 
by tractors as 
a percentage 
of farm area 
Number of 
tube-well 
irrigations 
on the farm 
Number of 
canal irri 
gation on 
the farm 
HOLDCULT 0.21 -0.01 -0.02 0.32 
(1.74)2 (3.25) (0.08) (24.23)** 
T2 -13.90 -1.70' . 7.09 12.72* 
(1.10) (17.55) (0.97) (5.44) 
T3 0.24 -1.66* -4.37 18.09* 
(0.00) (19.31) (0.43) (12.84) 
T4 -17.00 0.38 2.16 5.99 
(0.90) (0.47) -(0.05) (0.73) 
T5 (10.59) -1.13* -1.55 22.03* 
(0.43) (5.28) (0.03) (11.14) 
T6 33.81** 0.56 1.39 
(1.94) (0.42) (0.01) 
T46 25.71 -0.99 -3.45 
(0.27) (0.43) (0.02) 
Constant 87.39 1.89 -13.99 -3.69 
R2 0.10 0.39 0.05 0.42 
F 0.94 5.65* 0.43 9.28* 
S. E. 37.71 1.15 20.48 15.72 
N 70 70. 70 70 
l/ For defitior. of variables see Table 6.7, 
2/ Figures in brackets are F-values. 
* indicates significance at 5 percent level while 
** indicates significance at 10 percent level. 
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Table 6.13 Regression estimate'of equation(3) in Khundt (see text 
section 6.3.2. ) -"- 
. . '.. . -(linear form) 
Dependent 
variable 
Ind variables 
Value of fertilizer-used per acre 
HOLDCULT -0.0004 
(0.048)2 
T2 0.08 
(0.25) 
T4 -0.002 
(0.00) 
T6 -0.007 
(0.001) 
T26 -0.07 
(0.05) 
T46 -0.01 
(0.00) 
Constant 0.02 
R2 0.003 
F 0.10 
S. E. 0.75 
N" 194 
1/ For definition of variables see Table 6.7 
2/ Figures in brackets are F-values 
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Table 6.14 'Regression estimates of equation (3) in Chak (see text 
Section 6.3.2 
Dependent 
variable 
Ind. variable 
i 
... . ...... 
Value of fertilizer used per acre 
HOLPCULT 0.11 
(0.03) 
T2 -13.38 
(0.38) 
T3 4.25 
(0.01) 
T4 33.22** 
(1.89) 
T5 10.23 
(0.35) 
T6 2.97 
(0.05) 
T56 -25.10 
(0.48) 
T26 -36.65 
(0.91) 
T46 54.78 
(0.91) 
Constant 80.14 
R2 0.05 
F 0.63 
S. E. 50. '64 
N. 110 
1/ For definition of variables see Table 6.7. 
2/ Figures in brackets are F-values. 
** indicates significance at 10 percent level 
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Table '6.15 Repression estimatos of equation (/? ) in Rhanewal (see text 
Section 6.3.? 
(lincnr roan) 
Dependent 
variables 
. 1/ 
Ind. variables 
Number of 
tube-well 
irrigations 
on the, farm 
Value of 
fertilizer 
used on 
the farm 
Number of 
tractor . 
ploughings, 
on the farm 
Number of 
canal 
irrigations 
on the farm 
HOLDCULT 0.001 -0.09 0.02* 0.004 
(0.03)2 (0.57)" (15.37)' (0.10) 
M-- 0.03 13.79 0.08 1.19 
(0.00) (0.38) (0.004) (0.67) 
T3 3.55 40.55**" 1.45** -1.56 
(6.82) (1.14) (2.18) (0.91) 
T4 2.92* 65.30 1.66** -0.56 
(4.38) (2.87) (2.57) (0.10) 
T5 1.05 (22.13)** 0.62 
(1.29) (1.49) `(0.42) 
T6 . 2.91 
27.53 
(6.81) (0.69) 
Constant" -0.05 55.51 0.71 6.29 
2 R" 0.18 0.17 0.28 0.04 
F 2.86* 2.82* 5.01* 0.85 
S. E. 2.23 44.44 2.37 5.24 
rt 85 85 85 85 
I/ For'definition of variable see'pa--e 270 in'the text. 
2/ Figures in brackets are F-values 
* indicates significance at 5 percent level while 
** indicates significance at 10 percent level 
I 
290. 
CHAPTER 7 
Migration 
Section 7.0. - Introduction 
We shall begin with a general discussion of the extent of migration 
in three of the four villages, i. e. Khunda, Jatli and Chak. Mehdiabad 
will be omitted from our discussion in this chapter because of the low 
incidence of migration (only 3 out of the 70 cultivating households 
reported migrant members in the village). There are several reasons for 
the low incidence of migration in Mehdiabad. One is that the village 
is poorly connected to urban centres. Roads connecting the village to the 
highway leading up to Lyallpur (40 miles away) are unmetaled. Consequently 
bus journeys-take long and the frequency of the service is low.. It is 
worth noting that although the incidence of migration is low amongst the 
cultivating households, there are a few non-cultivating households in 
the village (th. ase are shop-keepers, school teachers, landless labourers) 
who have migrant members (see Naseem (1979). An important explanation 
for the low incidence of migration amongst cultivating households may be 
the employment opportunities' generated in agricultural activities. We 
have already noted in Chapter 6 that the intensity of use of the new 
inputs is quite high in this village. Thus members of both tenant and small 
ownercultivator households get employment-on large farms within the village 
or in the neighbouring villages (the use of the new inputs is widespread 
in the whole region). I- I 
Our analysis in this chapter will be concerned with household units. 
A'household unit with one or more migrant members will be called HHM and 
a household without migrant members will be called HHW Amigrant will 
be defined as a person who is considered to bea member of the household 
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in a village but who was not, living in the village at the time of the 
survey. He is usually a, family member who lives and works in the 
town but remits income back to the household. Commuting is important 
in some of the villages but the problems involved are-somewhat 
different. Thus we shall exclude commuters from our discussion. 
These issues will be taken up in detail when we discuss the variables 
relevant to our model of migration. 
, 
We shall be concerned only with farming households in the villages. 
This will ensure consistency with the analysis presented in the previous 
chapters. Alsojit will enable us to comment on models (such as that... 
of Stark, 1975) that argue that migration may be the result of the 
workings of rural factor markets in developing countries*so that 
there may be a relationship between the choice of techniques in ""' 
agricultural production and rural-urban migration. 
Table 7.1 below gives the distribution of HHM's and HHW's in 
the three villages, 29% of the total cultivating households in the 
three villages have one or more migrant members. The incidence 
of'HHM is highest in Jatli followed by Chak and Khunda. ' Some 
explanations regarding inter-village differences in migration will 
be offered in Sections 7.2 and 7.3. 
There exists evidence to suggest that although migration 
among non-farming households (i. e. landless labourers, artisans 
and shop-keepers) is quite wide-spread in Punjab, its incidence in 
such households is relatively small compared to the incidence of 
migration in cultivating households. In a survey of rural labour in 
Punjab, Eckert (1972) interviewed 384 village households randomly 
, selected 
from 40 villages and reported that 627. of all migrants belong 
to 'k -cultivating households. The considerably higher incidence of 
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Table e 7.1 
Distribution of cultivating households with and w 
members in Jatli, Khunda and Chak (Number o 
"I 
useholds) 
Households with 
migrants. 
HHM 
Households without 
without migrants 
HHW 
Total house- 
holds. THH 
HHM as a 
percentage 
of THH 
Khunda 30 164 194, 16, 
Jatli 79 100 171- 46 
Chak 28 86 110 26 
Total 137 350 475 29 
migration among farming households is also noted in a survey of village 
studies in India by Connell et. al. (1974). In a paper based on the data 
from the villages covered by the Islamabad team, Naseem (1979) reports 
that 78% of the migrants come from farming households. 
The traditional pattern of migration from Jatli and Kunda was 
for migrant males to join one of the services such as the army and the 
police. Since the mid-sixties, with the shifting of the Capital from 
Karachi to Islamabad, other urban job opportunities have - also' opened 
up for potential migrants. More recently, however, overseas migration 
(initially to the U. K. and other European countries but later to the Gulf 
States) has become quite important. * In Jatli there are 27 households 
with members working overseas. In another village, Malinder, located 
in the same sub-division (Gujjar Khan) 24 households reported having members 
who have migrated overseas. 
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Most of. the migrants remit cash back to the village households. 
Table 7.2'below shows the number and percentage'of households receiving 
remittances (however ' small)' from migrant members in the three'villages! 
J. 
The pattern of remittances is"important for the discussion that will 
follow in this chapter. It, indicates that migrant members continue to 
maintain strong links with their rüral'households after migration. This 
suggests that the relevant unit of analysis in a migration model may be the 
household rather than the individual migrant (we shall say more on this 
later). 
-n Table 7.2. 
The Pattern of Remittance amongst Households with Migrant 
Members (HHM) in Kunda, Jatli and Chak 
Number of HHM with 
remittances 
Percentage of all HHM 
Khunda 18 60 
Jatli, 77 98 
Chak 24 86 
Total 119. 87 - 
In the present chapter we shall analyse the broad trends concerning 
migration. In Section 7.1 we shall discuss the specification of the 
migration function that we shall estimate in our three villages. The 
justification for the choice of our unit of observation (which is the 
1/.. Further details regarding remittances are given in Table 7.11 in 
Appendix. 
0 
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cultivating household rather than the individual migrant) will be , 
given. We shall then go on to. discuss our hypotheses that specify 
the relationship between the decision to migrate and the variables that 
may be. important in such a decision., 
IIn Section 7.2 we shall present a migration profile in the 
three villages. This will be a cursory look at the evidence to get a 
general idea regarding the appropriateness of the choice of our 
explanatory variables and whether the 'raw' evidence supports the 
hypotheses formulated in Section 7.1. 
It will be argued that the decision to migrate is a, threshold type 
decision implying a zero-one value for the dependent variable in the 
migration model. This raises special issues concerning the appropriateness 
of estimation techniques. In Section 7.3 we shall use probit analysis and 
the associated maximum likelihood method which yield unbiased and efficient 
Parameter estimators. Some of the specification 
errors resulting from using the conventional ordinary least squares method 
will be pointed out. We shall then present our results derived by using 
the maximum likelihood method. We shall convert the estimated probits 
to probabilities and thus evaluate the probability of migration for the 
'average' household in each village. The concept of the elasticity of 
the probability of migration with respect to the determinants of the 
decision to migrate will be introduced and evaluated. Comparisons will 
be made across villages. 
Finally, we shall present our conclusions in Section 7.4. 
Section 7.1. A migration function for our villages 
We shall first summarise our discussion of migration models presented 
in Chapter 2, Section 2.4. This discussion will suggest the broad 
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framework within which our empirical investigation of migration in 
the three villages will take place. We shall, then construct a 
-migration function that emphasizes that village-end variables (in a joint 
household decision making framework) are also important in the household's 
decision to encourage members to migrate. 
Interest in studying rural-urban migration has arisen mostly on 
account of the concern with the impact that migration is likely to 
have on the urban labour markets and public services. This concern 
is reflected in the theoretical models of migration and the subsequent 
choice of variables in the migration functions empirically estimated. 
We argued in Chapter 2-that for-a number of reasons this may bean 
unsatisfactory approach in explaining migration., There is some confusion about 
the underlying decision making unit, i. e. whether it is the household or 
the individual. The individual's maximand, underlying such models, is taken 
to be-income rather-than utility so that diutility. of labour is ignored. 
In the derived-empirical functions emphasis is placed mainly--on the 
urban=end variables in explaining the decision to migrate. 'This is 
also undesirable particularly in view of the arguments suggested by 
(the model has been discussed, in detail in Stark (1975). He argues 
Chapter-2, Section 2.4) that migration results from households' decision 
to improve welfare by increasing the available food per capita on the 
family, farm when the option exists of adopting a better technology 
for food production. The successful adoption of modern technology 
requires a surplus for investment and alternative income opportunities 
for the dispersion of associated risk. Migration is seen as the result 
of. households' attempt to achieve these twin objectives. '- - 
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Thus the process of technological innovation implies that 
village end variables are also important'in explaining"rural-urban 
migration. In this section we shall develop a migration function} 
that takes into account the impact of operations in the credit'market' 
and farm mechanization on the decision to migrate. We shall also discuss 
the impact on migration of other more 'traditional'-variables-Such as 
education, farm income, non-farm rural income, the size of holding and 
the tenurial status. 
The unit of analysis in our migration function is the cultivating 
household. The assumption is that decisions regarding resource allocation 
and income distribution are made jointly. This may imply either a 
paternalistic (which is more plausible) or a democratic decision making 
procedure. The decisions result in an equal distribution of effort and 
income across adult males of the household. Further, we shall argue that 
household's maximand is utility. Thus the disutility from migration in 
terms of the psychic costs of breaking up the family unit, will be seen 
to be important in the decision making process. 
The dependent variable in our model takes the value 1 if there is a 
migrant member in the household, Ootherwise. This poses special problems 
of estimation which we shall discuss in Section 7.3. The number of 
households with migrant members in each of the three villages to be 
analysed are given in Table 7.1. 
We shall define a migrant to be a person who is considered to be 
a member of the household as defined in Chapter 4sbut who was non-resident 
(see Section 7.0) in the village at the time of the survey. Thus members of 
households who work outside the family farm but return each day, i. e. 
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commuters are not considered to be migrants. This definition of 
migrants is reasonable given that there are, typically, few, employment 
opportunities in the rural areas (apart from peak seasons when, the 
family farm itself may require all the available labour). Thus commuting 
is not a. viable alternative to migration except in villages that are 
situated near cities and have access to public transport. (For an analysis 
of commuters see Akram, 1962). Amongst the three villages that we shall 
study, only, Jatli has access to efficient public transport. However, the 
distance between Jatli and Rawalpindi (the nearest urban job centre) is 
25 miles so that daily commuting is likely to be very costly. 
The, other feature of our definition of the dependent variable is 
that the migrants continue to be treated as members of the rural household. 
Thus we shall attempt to identify the rural end variables that are 
important in the household's decision to maximize welfare through migration. 
Our definition of the dependent variable suggests that. threshold 
effects are involved in migration decisions. 
l/' 
Borrowing the terminology 
. ft 
of biochemistryfwe are concerned with explaining, the important stimuli 
that cause an event to occur (see Finney 1971). Thus we shall estimate 
the probability of a household having, a migrant member given the strength of 
the stimuli which will be indicated by the coefficients on the factors 
influencing the decision to migrate. 
We shall next discuss the explanatory variables in our migration 
function. 
1/. A few households in all three villages report more than one migrant 
member. The maximum number of migrants reported by a household is 
three. 
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An important explanatory variable in our model is output per 
earner in the household (TPRODE)', where earners include both resident 
as well as non-resident adult males of the household. Earlier in 
this section, we noted that migration by family members may be the 
result of the declining value of food per family member, (Stark (1975)). 
Taking total value of farm output as the income generated on the farm, the 
variable TPRODE measures the income per earner in the household. This is 
likely to be closely related to the value'of food per family earner. ri 
We expect the decision to encourage household members to migrate to be 
negatively correlated with TPRODE. 
Implicit in the definition of TPRODE is an important feature of the- 
, 
working of rural labour markets. The implication is that the decisions 
regarding distribution of income on the farm are taken jointly and are 
not necessarily related to the marginal contribution that a family member 
makes to the total family output. Thus TPADDE, rather than the village wage, 
may be considered-the opportunity cost that a household member takes into 
account while deciding whether or not to migrate. Underlying the 
definition of TPRODE, therefore, are strong assumptions regarding the 
working of the rural labour market (see the dicussion in Chapter 4). 
Another interpretation of TPRODE suggests that this variable may 
be positively correlated with the decision to migrate. The importance 
of job search in urban job markets has been noted in a number of studies 
(Harris-Todaro, 1970; Fields, 1975). During the period of searchithe 
migrant has to sustain himself. An important source. of sustenance 
may beJ the' migrant's share in output on the family' farm. The -greater, 
is the value of the share, the longer is the search time that a migrant 
can spend in the urban labour market to look for jobs with high returns. 
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Thus the value of TPRODE may be positively related to the decision 
to migrate. Our empirical test will indicate which of the two effects 
is stronger. 
An important variable in the, model that we shall test is the 
acreage available per earner, HOLDE,, in the farming household.. In a 
village environment, HOLDE is likely to be important in determing the. - 
perceived social status of the household. Social status may. determine the 
type of job markets that"a household is likely to encourage a member to 
participate in. To the extent that higher values of HOLDE suggest higher- 
status in the village, this may result in a search for only influencial 
jobs in the cities (e. g. in the elite services). The scarcity of such 
jobs, relative to the number of aspirants, may lower the probability of 
getting such jobs and thus may discourage migration. Higher values of 
HOLDE may discourage migration in another way. When the farm size increases 
beyond the critical size that can be cultivated by family members, a 
household hires in labour. (An alternative is to rent out land but this 
aft 
will be discussed later in this section). Supervision now becomes 
essential. Thus households that have large acreage of land available per 
adult member, have greater employment opportunities for family members 
as farm supervisors. This may discourage migration. Small farms with 
low land-man ratio, on the other hand, may be characterized by surplus 
labour which may encourage migration 
1ý. 
It has been argued in a number of empirical studies (Greenwood, 1971; 
Hay, 1974; Levy and Wadychi, 1972), that education is a significant variable 
1/, The inclusion of HOLDE along with TPRODE may result in problems of 
multicollinearity in the estimation procedure. We shall take 
up this issue in detail in Section 7.3. 
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in explaining migration. The main hypothesis regarding the'influence 
of education on migration is that the probability of finding a job 
in the urban labour markets is raised through education. This, may 
be true regardless of whether or not education results in real 
differences in skills. For example, employers may use School Certificates 
to screen applicants. Years of schooling may also represent real and 
scarce skills and may thus directly result in segmenting labour markets 
by skills. The influence of technical education on the probability of 
getting employment (and hence on the decision to migrate) is then likely 
to depend on the degree of competition in each of these segregated markets. 
A problem with including the number of, years of schooling as an, 
explanatory-variable, is that because of the dimension of time and the 
degree of planning involved in spending several years in school, the 
decision to migrate may-have been made before the schooling, for particular 
skills and education level begins. This is particularly true in developing 
countries where, on average, the number of years of_schooling required 
for rural jobs is considerably less than the number of years required 
for urban jobs, so that schooling maybe undertaken specifically to get 
urban jobs. Thus because of the time, dimension, there may be a problem 
of simultaneity in an equation that, 'explains' migration in terms. of years 
of schooling. 
In our'model we shall include the proportion of the educated=- 
to the total number of adult males in the household, STUDE, as an 
explanatory variable. We expect the value of STUDE to be'positively 
correlated with the decision to migrate. 
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In the discussions presented in Chapters 3'to 6 we have emphasized 
the-importance of`rural credit in agricultural production. The main 
conclusions may be summarised as follows. In Chapter'3 we presented 
the evidence regarding operations in credit'markets in the four villages. 
The evidence indicates that most cultivators participate in the credit 
markets borrowing funds from sources such as friends/relatives, arhtia/middleman/ 
shop-keeper, landowner, and cooperative"-societies. We indicated that' 
borrowing was undertaken to meet both consumption and production needs 
(we discussed some of the difficulties of distinguishing between the two). 
In Chapter 4 we argued that access to credit is important in determining 
the_use of modern inputs - and therefore productivity, -, on farms in different 
size-categories. In Chapter 5, we indicated the importance. of borrowing 
from the landownar, in determining, productivity on sharecropped farms. 
In Chapter 6 these arguments were verified by examining the direct evidence 
on the use. of modern inputs in, the four villages., We concluded that although 
arrangements regarding institutional. -credit appear, 
to favour large farmers, 
they generally do.. not use the modern inputs more intensively. than small farms. 
We pointed out some alternative arrangements in terms"of factor market linkages, 
that may facilitate small farmers "access' to the new inputs.. For example, 
middlemen who trade in cash crops may extend credit directly in-terms of 
inputs., Also landowners may extend credit to sharecroppers to encourage 
use of the modern inputs. We argued that remittances from migrant members 
of cultivating households may also be important. We have already discussed, 
Stark's model in determining the intensity of input use by small farmers 
(in detail in Chapter 2, Section 2.7 and. in summary early in 'this section), 
which emphasizes the. importance of migration in the adoption of-'green 
revolution', technology. It is argued that migration results from small 
farmers' inability to borrow -funds in the rural credit markets to purchase 
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the new inputs. `Our evidence presented in Chapters 3 and 6 indicates 
both that small farmers frequently borrow funds in the rural credit 
markets and that often they'use the new inputs as intensively as the' 
large farmers. Further,. the evidence in our four villages '(to be 
presented in Section 7.2)'indicates that the incidence of migration is 
also high amongst small farmers. On the basis of'these observations and some 
assumptions regarding operations in the credit markets we shall argue that 
there may be a positive relationship between the ability to borrow in 
the credit market and the incidence of migration.. 
Let us consider three`likely borrowing/repayment schedules in the' 
credit markets in our villages. In one, the household borrows in the lean period 
and repays at harvest time when household members get casual employment. 
In this arrangement migration plays no role. In the second arrangement 
households may borrow large amounts for either purchasing a bulky new 
input such as a tube-well or a tractor or for marriage/death, and pays 
back, in small installments at harvest time every year for several years. 
We assume that tle amount borrowed is too large to be repayed with the 
harvest of one year. 
11 If the creditor agrees to this arrangement 
migration again plays no role. The third arrangement may involve borrowing 
a large amount and then repaying the loan in small but frequent, say, 
monthly, instalments. The last arrangement may be attractive to lenders 
particularly if we allow for risk. Crop output is subject to high risk 
whereas steady employment in the cities, once it has been secured, generates a 
small but regular flow of monthly remittances, and may be considered less 
risky 
, 
bye the lenders. The last arrangement therefore is likely to prevail 
1/ This is quite realistic given that in our villages large farmers borrow 
to purchase tractors or tube-wells and small farmers for, marriage/death 
ceremonies. 
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because of the relatively. strong bargaining position of the lender 
in the rural credit markets. (During our field survey in Khanewal the 
majority of small farmers interviewed indicated that remittances from 
migrant members are important in determining their credit worthiness. ) 
This argument suggests that the migration is likely to be positively 
correlated with the amount that the household owes to creditors. 
Households may borrow also to finance migration. -The amounts borrowed 
may cover more than just the travelling costs. We have mentioned earlier 
that there may be a long search period involved in finding a job in the 
urban labour market. Households may have to borrow to sustain the migrant 
member during this period. This may be another argument for expecting 
a positive relationship between indebtedness and the decision to migrate. 
In our migration function we have'included debt owed per earner, 
DEBTE, in the household as an explanatory variable. We'expect it to take 
a positive sign. 
We argued above that given the functioning of the rural credit markets 
the"need for generating cash, either for consumption directly or for 
investment on the farm, may result in migration to the urban areas. There 
may exist other sources of non-farm income near the villages. In our three 
villages several cultivating households reported resident members who"are 
village shopkeepers. Another frequent source of non-farm income is the rent 
received from land rented out by the family. ( We are distinguishing between 
income from family farms that'are self-cultivated and including it in farm- 
income and income from rented land and including it in non-farm income. ) 
Some of the larger landowners also reported incomes in the form of interest 
rates on bank deposits. (The-returns on deposits, however, are approximate 
since most respondents were reluctant to divulge the amounts deposited in 
the banks). Another important source of income is the employment of 
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resident household members in government services, such as teaching; in.. 
schools and the irrigation department. 
A household may regard remittances by migrant members and non-farm 
earnings of household members who commute to work)as competing sources 
for generating cash flows. For example, it is not-difficult to envisage 
a calculus underlying the household decision in which, in equilibrium, 
the expected marginal return (utility) to the family of investment in 
establishing a village shop equals the expected marginal return (utility) 
from the investment in providing sustenance to a migrant member while 
he is looking for 
,, 
a job in the urban labour market. For the large farmers 
a similar calculus may underlie the decision either to deposit money in a 
bank, and getting an interest rate. or to provide higher education to their 
children who then get urban jobs. Migration, therefore, may be seen as a 
consequence of the difference between the returns from urban job markets 
compared to returns from village-end non-farming alternatives. 
We argued in Chapter 2, Section 2.2. that efficient sharecropping 
tenancies require close supervision which is -costly in terms of the income 
opportunities foregone through employment in the urban centres. A- 
cultivating household with large amounts of land may-, involve all 
members in looking after family land (some members-may work on the family 
farm as. supervisors of-hired labour and others as supervisors of share- 
cropped plots) in order to improve production on owner cultivated as 
well as sharecropped plots. Alternatively, they may forego some of the 
returns of sharecropping (in terms of rents received), either by allowing 
a margin of inefficiency on sharecropped plots because a household member 
who previously supervised the plot has taken up employment in the city, or 
by renting out land on fixed rent tenancies (typically rents on fixed- 
rent tenancies'are lower than on sharecropping tenancies, see Chapter 5). 
An implication of this argument is that when urban employment opportunities 
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exist, ' households renting out land may be indifferent' between inefficient 
sharecropping contracts and fixed-rent tenancies. Another implication 
is that, to the extent that rent from land is an important part of the 
non-farm income of a household, migration and supervision of rented 
plots may compete for household's labour resources. 
In our migration model we have included non-farm income per household 
earners NFYEaas an explanatory variable. We expect it to be negatively 
correlated with the decision to encourage household members to migrate. 
The impact of mechanization (particularly tractorization) on the use 
of labour on farms has been documented in a large number of studies in 
India. The overall conclusion appears to be that despite the increase in 
cropping intensity, tractorization results in displacing labour in the 
sense that the resources invested in purchasing tractors could have been 
invested in expanding irrigation and in the provision of fertilizers 
and seeds This would have resulted in both increased cropping intensity 
as well as an expansion of rural employment opportunities (Binswanger, 1977). 
In a study of Pakistan's Punjab, Mclnerny and Donaldson (1975) report that 
farms using tractors decreased the use of family and permanent hired labour 
by 59% while casual employment increased by 75%. Earlier, Bose and 
Clerk (1969) had argued that private net benefits of mechanization in 
Pakistan may be greater than social net benefits due to the heavy subsidies 
on the import of tractors and. the loss of permanent farm employment in 
agriculture. 
The foregone employment on the family farm may not be perceived 
f .., 
as a private cost if household members can get employment in the urban 
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job centres. Salaam (1976) in a survey of several districts in 
F-entral Punjab presents evidence that suggests that unemployed family 
members tend to'migrate to urban areas to seek employment. In-the 
context of our model of migration, this evidence is important-and leads 
us to suggest an interesting hypothesis which can be tested with data from 
our villages. The first argument (Bose and Clerk 1969), is that mechanization 
takes place on"family farms because private returns are high. The second 
argument (Mclnernyand Donaldson, 1975) is that such migration results 
in the displacemenp of family labour and finally, Salaam'S evidence; - 
suggests that the displaced family members migrate to urban job markets to 
seek employment. Our hypothesis then is that the value of mechanized 
assets per earner in the household, MECE, is positively related to the 
decision to migrate. 
Finally we have included dummies in the migration equation to determine the 
influence of different tenurial arrangements on the decision to migrate. 
The five importap categories of tenure are: owner-cultivation, sharecropping, 
tenancy, sharecropping-cum-owner-cultivation, 'fixed rent tenancy, fixed 
rent-cum-owner-cultivation. Each of the four dummy variables included 
in the equation take the value 1 when the household falls in the relevant 
tenurial category, 0 otherwise, - 
We may now write our migration function as: 
M=f (TPRODE, HOLDE, STUDE, DEBTE, NFYE, MECE, D1EN1, DTEN2, 
, 
DTEN3, DTEN4) 
where M-1 if a household has a migrant, 
0 otherwise. 
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_ 
TPRODE is the value of farm output per household earner.. 
HOLDE is the acreage per household earner. 
STUDE is the proportion of students to household earners. 
MECE is the value of mechanical assets per household earner. 
DEBTE is the value of debt owed per household earner. 
NrYE is the value of non-farm income per household earner. 
DTEN1 -1 if the household is a sharecropper, 0 otherwise. 
DTEN2 =1 if the household is sharcropper-cum-owner. 0 otherwise. 
DTEN3 -1 if the household is fixed-rent tenant. 0 otherwise. 
DTEN4 -1 if the household is fixed-rent tenant-cum-owner cultivator, 
0 otherwise. 
The hypotheses discussed in the previous section suggest that the 
signs of the estimated coefficients on TPRODE, HOLDE and NFYE are expected 
to be negative, while the signs of-the estimated coefficients on STUDE, MECE and 
DEBTE are expected to be positive. 
Section 7.2. -A migration profile in our villages 
We shall begin our empirical investigation by presenting a profile 
of migration in the three villages Khunda, Jatli and Chak within the 
framework of our migration function (3). 
In Table 7.3 below, we have presented a distribution of households 
with migrants (HMM) and without migrants (1111W) by the three she categories, 
small, medium'and large defined in Charter 3 for each village. 
S" >. 
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Table7.3. 
Distribution of HHM's and HHW's 
! /by 
size of holding 
? /in Jatli 
Khunda and Chak (Number of farms) 
Vill Small Farms Medium Farms Lar ge Farms - age 
HHM HHW HHM as HHM HHW HHM as HHM HHW HHM as 
%of 2 of %öf 
total total total 
house- house- house- 
holds holds holds 
Khunda 4 38- 9.5 19 81 19 7 45 14 
Jatli 42, 60 41 24 25 49 13 15 46 
Chak 9 27 25 11 28 28 8 31 21 
Total 55 125 44 54 134 40 . 28 91 31 
1/ HHM - households with migrant members, HHW = households without 
. migrant members. 
2/ For definition of size-categories see p. 133 Chapter 4. 
Table 7.3 indicates that most of the migrants from cultivating households 
in our three villages come from small and medium farm size categories. 
Taking the two size-categories together, the village incidence of migration 
is 17,44 and 27 respectively for Khunda, Jatli and Chak. These figures 
may be compared with those for the large size-category given in the table. 
It may be noted that except in Jatli the incidence of migration is higher- 
amongst small and medium size farms compared to large farms. 
In our migration function (3)'we argued that an important criterion for 
discussing the incidence of migration amongst the cultivation households- 
in our three villages may be the tenurial status of the household. In 
Table 7.4 below we have presented the distribution of HHM's and HHW's in our 
three villages by tenurial status. ----- 
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The table shows that most of the HMI's are pure owner-cultivators. 
This is confirmed in Eckert's (1972) survey of rural labour in the Punjab. 
In Tables 7.5a to 7.5d we have presented the distribution of HHM`s 
and HHW's in the three villages by criterion variables, remittances, non- 
farm incomes, indebtedness and students. '' 
The Tables indicate that a vast majority of migrants send back 
remittances to the village household in all three villages. Further, the 
incidence of migration is higher in all villages, except Chak, for households 
that have no source of non-farm income. Table 7.5c indicates that the 
incidence of migration is higher amongst households that do not have debts 
in Kunda and Jatli, while it is higher for households who havehave debtsin Chak. 
Finally, the incidence of migration is higher amongst households that have 
at least one member who has been to school, as compared to households that report 
no schooling. 
Finally, in Table 7.6 we report the mean values of the criterion 
- variables, "TPRODFE, HOLDE, -MECE, DEBTE, NFYE discussed in the migration 
function (3) for HHM's, HHW's and the entire village population for the 
three villages Khunda, Jatli and Chak. 
Table 7.6 presents the empirical evidence which indicates that on 
average, TPRODE, HOLDE, NFYE and MECE have lower values for HHM's compared 
to HHW's. This evidence supports our hypotheses concerning the first three 
criterion variables but not the hypotheses concerning MECE and DEBTE. 
In Kunda7HHM are more heavily indebted than HHW but not so in Jatli and 
Chak. Finally the evidence on the proportion of students in the households 
also appears to confirm our hypothesis in Kunda but not in Chak and Jatli. 
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Table 7.5.2. 
Distribution of households with migrants HHM and households 
migrants HHW) by whether or not they receive remittances 
(Number of households) 
Without Remittances With Remittances 
HHM HHW HHM as 9 HHM HHW HHM as Z 
of total of total 
households households 
Khunda 12 159 7 18 5 78 
Jatli 2 100 2 77 0 100 
Chak .., 4 ,. 84 4.5 _24- 2 .. 92 
Total 18 343 5 119 7 94 
Table 7.5. b. 
Distribution of hous 
r of households) 
Without non-farm income With non-farm income 
HHM HHW HHM as % HHM HHW HHM as % 
of total of total,, 
households households 
Khunda 27 125 18 3 39 7 
Jatli 68 74 48 ° 11 26` '30 
Chak 21 78 21 7 8 47 
Total 116 277 30 21 73 22 
,,, ., 
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Table 7.5c 
Distribution of households' with migrants (HHM) and households without 
migrants (HHW) by whether or not they owe debt. 
(Numberof households) 
Without debt owed With debt owed 
HHM HHW HHM as % HHM HHW HHM as 
of total of total 
households households 
Khunda 8 40 17 22 124 15 
Jatli 49 44 53 30 56 35 
Chak 16 62 21 12 
. 
24 33 
Total 73 146 38 64 204 34 
Table 7.5d 
istribution of households with migrants (HHM) and households without 
igrants (HHW) by whether or not they have students. 
(Number of households) 
Without Students With Students 
HHM HHW HHM as % HUM HHW HHM as Z 
of total of total 
households households 
Khunda 18 107 14 12 57 17 
Jatli 31 39 44 48 61 44 
Chak 3 25 11 25 61 29 
Total 52 171 69 85 179 90 
A 
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Table 7.6 
Mean values of criterion variables for HUM and HHW 
! 'in Khu 
HHM HHHW All households 
PP RODE 
(Rupees) 
Khunda 517.12 1117.83 1024.93. 
Jatli 702.15 1196.81 978.50 
Chak 1220.33 3085.32 2627.25 
HOLDE 
(acres). 
Khunda 7.98 13.18 12.39 
Jatli 2.55 4.24 3.49 
Chak 2.43 5.32 4.61 
MECE. 
Rupees) 
Khunda 921.25 1558.14 1459: 65 
Jatli 179.26 815.58 534.75 
Chak 1647.53 1873.52 1818.01' 
DEBTE 
Rupees) 
Khunda 1823.02 1171.47 "1272.22 
Jatli 443.22 1258.33 -898.59 
Chak 471.13 776.84 701.75 
NFYE 
Rupees) 
Khunda 461.21 496.05 490.18 
Jatli 83.64 416.55 269.62 
Chak 140.65 168.03 161.31 
STUDENTS 
(Numbers) 
Khunda 0.31 0.28 0.28 
Jatli 0.58 0.86 0.73 
Chak 0.71 0.92 0.86 
1/ HHM is households with migrants; HHW is households without migrants. 
2/ For definition of criterian variables see pp. 306,307. 
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The evidence presented in, Table 7.6 is by no means conclusive. 
These are village averages which may hide several, underlying statistical 
relationships between the, variables, More,, conclusive evidence, requires 
statistical tests of significance. In the next Section we shall discuss 
the statistical procedures that are appropriate for estimating the 
influence of the explanatory variables on the decision-to migrate as specified 
in function (3)., The results based on such tests will then be used to 
determine the validity of our hypotheses. 
7.3. The Estimation Procedure and the Results 
The migration function (3) cannot be estimated sensibly by using the 
ordinary least squares method. To see this let us consider a model such 
that 
M' xß + U' (4) 
where M equals 1 for households with migrant members and 0 otherwise, and 
g is the vector of variables influencing the decision to migrate. . ft 
Clearly, in this model, there are problems of specification. It 
is, hard to imagine a world in which the error term adjusts for the influence 
of explanatory variables when M-0. There are other problems as well, since 
the error term, U, can take only'two values, - ßX and 1- ßX so that U 
is not distributed independently of the explantory variable. This leads to 
nroblems of interpreting the estimated values of the coefficients on the 
explanatory variables and determining their statistical significance (Kmenta 1971 
An alternative procedure is to estimate (3). by using probit analysis 
which involes the maximum likelihood method. We shall outline the theory 
of. the test procedure basing it on the discussion given in Goldfeld and 
Quandt (1972). 
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Let us assume that there exists in nature a random variable, Zip 
for each household i such that if Zi 4 Xi ß the household responds 
by encouraging one or more household members to migrate i. e. M. 1 
and if Zi > X. ß the household has no migrant members i. e. M. = 06 
Zi, therefore, may be interpreted as a threshold variable that determines 
the critical values of the independent variables'at which households 
respond, by encouraging one or more members to migrate. Now we may 
write our migration model as follows: 
1 !1 Xi ß 
( if i 
0 z- 2> Xi 
(5) 
In order to specify the likelihood corresponding to (5) we consider 
the cumulative distribution of: (a) all households in our sample who have 
one or more migrant members and (b) all households who do not have migrant 
members. These may be written as: 
Pr (M. =11 X1 ß) = Pr (1i , x. ß) °f() dL' = F(X. ß) ($) 
Pr (Mi -0 (Xi ß) - Pr (3i > Xiß) - 
Jf()d 
3_ (1 - F(X1ß)) (b) 
Taking (a) and (b) together, the likelihood function may be written as: 
Ln F(X1ß) n[1 F(Xß) ] (6) 
M. a1 M. ýO 
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The choice of the method for estimating the vector ß depends 
. on the 
distribution we assume for Z in (6). In probit. analysiss, Z is 
assumed to be normally , distributed while in logfit analysis it is 
assumed to have a*sech2 distribution. Finney (1971) has argued that 
in practice there is very little difference in the two methods regarding 
the estimated values of the coefficients on the explanatory variables. 
We shall, therefore, assume a normal distribution for Z yielding a probit model 
which we estimate by using maximum likelihood. Maximum likelihood estimates 
of the coefficients on the explanatory variables are asymptotically consistent, 
efficient and normally distributed (Kmenta, 1971). 
In the next section we shall present results of the migration function (3) 
using the probit model. (We also estimated the migration function using the 
ordinaryleast, squares method. The results are reported in Table 7.12 
in the appendix ). 
Results 
Results based on the probit analysis of the migration function (3) are 
presented in Tables 7.7 to 7.9 for Khunda, Jatli and Chak respectively. 
An important result to note in the three tables, is the reported values of 
likelihood ratios and the associated, values. The value of the ratio 
enables us to test the null hypothesis that the explanatory variables are 
statistically insignificant in explaining the decision to migrdte. 
The numerator of the ratio consists of the maximum value of the likelihood 
function (6), obtained when the coefficients on all the explanatory variables 
in (3) are restricted to equal zero while in the denominator the maximum 
value of (6) is obtained without any restrictions on the coefficients. 
For large samples =2 log likelihood ratio has 
2 distribution with K degrees 
of freedom, when K is the number of restrictions imposed on (6). Thus 
in Khunda (Table 7.7)., the'y2 value indicates that the probability of 
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obtaining a value at least as great as'the observed value of -2 log 
likelihood ratio (which is 22.27'in the village), under the null. hypothesis 
that all the explanatory variables are insignificant, is 0.002. Thus we may 
safely reject the null hypothesis. Applying similar reasoning we may reject 
the null hypothesis implying insignificance of the explanatory variables 
in Jatli (Table 7.8) since the x2 value in this village is 0.0001 and 
in Chak (Table 7.9) since the ý2 value is 0.001. 
To comment on the statistical significance of'individual variables 
in the migration function, we use the usual procedure of comparing the 
computed t-statistic of the coefficient with the critical value given 
in the standard tables. Thus in Khunda (Table 7.7), TPRODE, DEBTE, MECE 
and DTEN1 are significant at 5% level while NFYE and HOLDE are significant 
at 10% level. The signs of the explanatory variables are in accord with our 
hypothesis summarised in Section 7.1. p. 307 .A result to note (and one 
for which we presented no a priori arguments) is that in Khunda, the dummy 
for sharecropping tenancy appears to be negatively correlated with the 
decision to migrate. Further, MECE, and HOLDE appear to be insignificant 
in determining the decision to migrate. We shall comment on these results 
again later. 
" In Jatli, (Table 7.8) TPRODE and NFYE . are significant at 5% level 
while DEBTS is significant at 10% level. The signs of these three variables 
are in accord with our hypotheses. Finally, in Chak, (Table 7.9) TPRODE 
and MECE are significant at 5% level while- DEBTE and HOLDE are significant 
at 10% level. The remaining variables are insignificant. The signs of the 
significant variables, again, confirm the hypotheses presented in Section 7.1. 
Further discussion of the results in both villages will be taken up later in 
this Section. 
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Table 7.7. 
Estimated values of the coefficients on the variables-explaining 
migration decisions in Khunda using Probit analysis. 
Dependent variable M. -1 if a household has a migrant member, 
0 otherwise. 
-Explanatory variables Coefficient value t- Statistic., 
TPRODE -0.001 2.5* 
STUDE -0.04 0.15 
DEBTE 0.001 1.98* 
NFYE -0.001 1.59 ** 
MECE 0.000 - 2.78* 
HOLDE -0.03 1.50 ** 
DTEN1 -0.46 1.70* 
CONSTANT 0.13 0: 33 
-2 log likelihoodIatio 22.27 - 
k2 (upper tail)2 0.002 - 
Degrees of freedom 7 
Number of households 194 -. 
1. For definition of variables see pp. 306,307. ` 
2. The tabled I2 is the probability under the null hypothesis (that all 
coefficients on the explanatory variables are zero) of obtaining a log 
likelihood ratio at least as large as observed here. 
* indicates significance at 5%. level while ** indicates significance at 
10% level.. 
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Table 7.8 
Estimated values of the coefficients on variablgs explainin 
migration decisions in Jatli using Probit analysis. 
Dependent variable: M. -1 if a household has a migrantmember, ' 
0 otherwise. 
Explanatory variables 
1ý 
Coefficient value t--statistic 
TPRODE -0.0004 2.19* 
STUDE -0.15 1.19 
DEBTE 0.0005 1.59** 
NFYE -0.00064 2.56* 
MECE 0.00003 0.56, - 
HOLDE 0.01 0.18 
DTEN1 0.11 0.12 
CONSTANT 0.11 0.34 
-2 log likelihood ratio 31.46 - 
2 
, 
(upper tail), 0.0001 
Degrees of freedom 7 - 
Number of households 179 - 
1. For definition of variables see pp. 306,307. 
2. The tabled T2 is the probability, under the null ' hypothesis'(that 
all coefficients on the explanatory variables are zero), of obtaining a log 
likelihood ratio at least as large as observed here. 
* indicates significance at 5% level, while ** indicates significance 
at 10% level. - 
J 
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Table 7.9 
Estimated values'of the coefficientson variables explaining migration 
decisions in Chak using Probit analysis. 
Dependent variable: Mi 1 if a household has a migrant member, 
0 otherwise. 
Explanatory variables Coefficient values t- Statistic 
TPRODE '-0.0004 2.12* 
STUDE 0.004 0.02 
DEBTE 0.0009 S 1.52 ** 
NFYE -0.00001 0.02 
NECE 0.00006 1.78* 
HOLDE -0.12 1.24** 
DTEN1 0.50 0.94 
DTEN2' -3.17 0.47 
DTEN4 0.57 1.19 
CONSTANT -0.25 0.64 
-2 log likelihood ratio 29.41 - 
X2 (upper tail)2 0.001 
Degrees of freedom 9 _ 
Number of households 110 - 
1 For definition of variables see pp. 306,307. 
2 The tabled is the probability under'the null` hypothesis (that all 
coefficients on the explanatory variables are zero) of obtaining 
a log likelihood ratio at least as large as observed here. 
* indicates significance at 5% level, while ** indicates significance 
at 10% level. 
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We mentioned earlier (Section 7.1) that HOLDE may be correlated 
with TPRODE and this may affect our estimates of the coefficients on the 
explanatory variables. In our three villages Khunda, Jatli and Chak, 
the correlation coefficient between HOLDE and TPRODE takes the values 0.61, 
0.54 and 0.37 respectively. This indicates that in Khunda, at least, there 
may be problems of multicollinearity. To check this, we'estimated our 
migration. function without HOLDE. In none of the villages does this 
affect, in any important way, the coefficient values on the remaining 
explanatory variables. Its inclusion, on the other hand, improves the 
values of the loglikelihood ratios in Khunda and Chak. 
In probit analysis, the maximum likelihood estimate of the coefficients 
on the explanatory variables determine the value of B'which is the estimated 
A 
threshold factor in the household's decision to migrate. 9 is also called 
A 
the probit. The value of 9 may be used to evaluate P which is the estimated 
probability that-a household has a migrant member. The relationship between 
and is non linear (it is argued to be S-shaped so that the probability of 
migration approaches the extreme values of 0 and 1 asymptotically. (Finney, 
1971, also see below. ) The estimated values of the coefficients given in, 
An 
Tables 7.7 to 7.9 enable us to evaluate Z and from these values we can 
evaluate P using the standard Probit-Probability tables (Table IX in Fisher 
and Yates, 1964). We have presented the values of P for the three villages 
in Table 7.10. 
The marginal probabilities giving the change in P, the probability of 
migration for a unit change in an explanatory variable may be obtained 
by evaluating the partial derivatives of the estimated probit equation, i. e. 
aP1 exp - (9 - 6X)2 M 
a X. 211 2 äx. 
3 .] 
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Table 7.10 Elasticities of the probability of migration with respect 
to the explanatory variables in Khunda, Jatli and Chak 
-Villages 
Variables 
Khunda Jatli Chak 
Proportion of 0.155 0.441 0.23 
migrants 
1/ 
P 0.319 (0.178) 0.455 0.214 
nTPRODE -1.15 (-2.06) -0.34 -1.44 
nHOLDE -0.418 (-0.740)' - -0.757 
nDEBTE 1.43 (2.56) 0.392 0,864 
nNFYE -0.551 (-0.987) -0.151 - 
nMECE 0.164 (0.294) - - 0.149 
1/. Figures in brackets are the probabilities for share-croppers in 
Khunda. 
P is-the probability that the average household in the three 
villages has a migrant member 
riTPRODE, r1HOLDE, r1DEBTE, nNFYE, and nMECE _ are elasticities of the probability of migration with respect to, respectively, ' total 
value of output per household earner, total acreage per earner, 
total debt owed per earner, total non-farm income per earners 
and total value of mechanical assets on the farm per earner. 
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The expression in brackets is derived from the assumption of normal 
distribution of the error term U-9 ßX. The whole expression indicates 
that there is a non-linear relationship between P, the probability of having 
a migrant and Z'the probit. This implies that the effect of a unit change 
in an explanatory variable depends not only on that variable but also on 
the other variables in the function. (Hay, 1974). 
An implication of the expression for 9P " for our villages is that. 
äx. 
J 
probabilities of migration can be evaluated for groups of individuals that 
have common characteristics: ` Different regimes may be constructed within 
each village on the basis of the significant variables reported in Tables 7.7 to 
7.9. 'Probabilities of migration may then be evaluated for the representative 
households within each regime. 
The expression for 8P may be used also for determining elasticity 
äx. 
of the probability to migrate with respect to a variable X Elasticity may 
be defined as: 
'8P 
x 
8X. P 
J 
For our villages we can-evaluate 
äX, 
and P from Tables 7.7 to 7.9 
and from standard probit-probability tables given in Finney (1971). X. 
may be obtained from table 7.6 given in Section 7.2. Clearly, elasticities 
are evaluated for the 'representative' households in each village. Elasticities 
at the disaggregated level of specific groups within a village (groups being 
defined by different regimes as indicated above) may be obtained by 
estimating the migration function for each group. 
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In Table 7.10 we have reported the elasticities of the 
probability of migrates of the 'representative' household with respect 
to the statistically significant variables in each village. The first 
row in the table gives the proportion of migrants in each village, 
the second row gives the probability of migration for the 'representative' 
households in each village. The subsequent rows give elasticities of the' 
probability of the 'representative' household's migration with respect to, 
respectively, TPRODE, HOLDE, DEBTE, NFYE and HECE. We noted in Table 7.7 
that the dummy for sharecropping tenancy inKhunda is significant. In 
Khunda, therefore, we have also reported the elasticities when the 
'representative' household is a share-cropping tenant. 
Table 7.10 indicates that the probability of migration is highest in 
Jatli followed by Khunda and Chak. This confirms the general impressions 
formed by informal discussions in the villages (and mentioned in our 
descriptions Of the villages in Chapter 1). Both Khunda and Jatli have a 
long tradition of households having members with employment in the military 
and police service. In addition, Jatli has very good access to the'national 
highway and public transport which gives the village an advantage in 
migration. 
Taking elasticities with respect to the significant variables in each 
village, we can see that a 10 percent change in TPRODE changes the probability 
of migration by about 12 percent in Khunda, 3 percent in Jatli and 14 percent 
in Chak. Further, in Khunda-, if the representative household is a sharecropping 
tenant, probability of migration is changed-by 21 percent. An alternative 
way of interpreting elasticities is to evaluate the value by which the 
proportion of migrants in a village is likely to change. For example, in 
Jatli7107 increase in TPRODE is likely to lower the proportion of migrants 
from 0.441 to 0.428. Thus the elasticity of the probability of migration 
with respect to TPRODE is most sensitive in Chak, comparatively less 
sensitive in Khunda and least sensitive in Jatli. 
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The pattern of the sensitivity of migration with respect to DEBTE 
across the three villages is similar to that of TPRODE. As we argued in 
our hypotheses, this-may be interpreted as indicative of the working of rural 
credit markets. In all three villages, lenders may consider potential 
remittances from migrant members of a household as a safe collateral 
while making decisions about extending credit. The elasticity values may 
indicate the relative importance of this factor in credit markets in the 
three villages. 
In terms of our hypothesis that establishes the relationship between 
the decision to migrate and acreage per earner of the household, the 
greater sensitivity of the probability elasticities with respect to HOLDE 
in Chak compared to Khundaamay be interpreted as indicative of the importance, 
in migration, of the probability of finding urban jobs in keeping with the village 
status. (It is reasonable to argue that the perceived status in the village 
and the size of holding of a household are likely to be strongly correlated). 
In Khunda both large and small cultivators have well-established family 
patterns of migration. Scions of the large farmers enter the higher 
echelons of government service such as the officer corps in the civil 
service, the army and the police, while the small farmers encourage their 
offsprings to join the ranks (we noted in Chapter 1 that migration has 
been an important feature in Khunda for a long time). These patterns 
facilitate the migration of successive generations to seek employment in 
keeping with their village status (Haufbauer, 1973, has also argued that the 
hereditary factor is important in determining employment in Pakistan). Chak, 
however, is a more recently settled canal colony village. ' Migrants from this 
village usually'seek jobs in large cities such as Lyallpur and Lahore 
where the probability of finding low wage jobs requiring few skills may be 
greater than for well paid skilled jobs. If we argue'that households 
encourage members to take up jobs in keeping with their village status, it 
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follows that those who'cultivate large holdings are likely to have a 
lower probability of finding urban jobs compared to those who cultivate 
small holdings. As indicated by the sign of the'elasticity coefficient, 
this is true in Khunda as well. However, our argument suggests that, the 
difference in the absolute value of the elasticity coefficients-may be 
explained by the difference in the pattern of migration in the two villages. 
Thus,. it may be easier for large farmers in Khunda to find employment outside 
the village in keeping with their status compared to the-large farmers in Chak. 
NFYE is significant in Khunda and Jatli and has the predicted sign 
(Tables 7.7 and 7.8). The greater sensitivity of NFYE in Khunda may be,,, 
accounted for by the importance of commuting in determining non-farm income. 
In Jatli road connections already exist and are used by commuters regularly. 
In Khunda commuting is rare and as a special facility, is available 
only to a few households. A small improvement in access to public 
transport is likely to increase non-farm incomes'through commuting and 
discourage migration in Khunda by a greater proportion compared to Jatli. 
It may be seen from Tables 7.7 and 7.9 that MECE is significant 
only in Khunda and Chak. From Table'7.10 it can be seen that the value 
of the elasticity of the probability of migration is lower in Chak compared 
to Khunda. This is an interesting result and merits some discussion. 
Binswanger (1977) has argued that an attraction of farm mechanization 
in South Asia is that the labour time and effort required in preparing 
land for cultivation is reduced. This contributes in raising the cropping 
intensity of mechanized farms. Higher cropping intensity may lead to 
greater employment opportunities. Therefore, rural unemployment caused 
by mechanization may not be so'severe. However, to achieve greater 
cropping intensity irrigation may be essential. Thus in Chak (a canal 
irrigated village) it is more likely-than in Khunda (a'barani' village) 
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that mechanization improves cropping intensity. Due to the compensating 
effect pointed out by Binswanger, mechanization may lower employment 
opportunities to a lesser extent in Chak compared to Khunda. Hence the 
elasticity of the probability of migration with respect to mechanization 
may be lower in Chak as-compared to Khunda. This is confirmed by our 
estimates of'the elasticities in the two villages. 
The dummy for sharecropping tenancy in Khunda is significant and has 
a negative sign. (Table 7.7). Figures in brackets in Table 7.10 indicate 
that in Khunda, the probability of migration is lower and its elasticity with 
respect, to the significant explanatory variables greater amongst sharecroppers 
as compared to the other households. An important reason for the lower 
incidence of migration amongst the sharecropping tenants may be seen 
in'the discussion on sharecropping contracts presented in Section 3.2. of 
Chapter 3. We argued that sharecropping tenants have specialized skills of 
husbandry and cultivation that distinguish them from landless 
labourers. '(Also see Bell and Zusman, 1976, on this argument). Having, ' 
acquired these skills sharecropping tenants may prefer to look for jobs' 
in rural areas that use their skills before entering the urban job markets, 
For example, it has been argued that land reform legislation (Herring, 1979) 
and farm mechanization (Alavi, 1971) may result in sharecropping tenants 
taking up employment as permanent labourers on the farms they previously, 
sharecropped. Landlords may prefer to hire the services of ex-sharecroppers 
both because of their special skills as cultivators, as well as their, 
knowledge of the land. These factors may explain the lower probability, 
of migration among sharecropping households. Another important explanation 
may be the tenant's poor access to credit for financing migration. We 
argued in, Chapters. 3 and 5 that landowners may facilitate tenant's access 
to credit for purchasing farm inputs. However, landowners may be unwilling 
to facilitate borrowing to finance migration. 
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7.4. Summary and Conclusions 
Our main objective in this'Chapter was to explain migration decisions 
in Khunda, Jatli and Chak. Migrants in our villages come from cultivating 
households, are young males and regularly send back remittances. On 
the basis of this evidence we made a case for analysing migration decisions in 
terms of joint household's attempt to maximize its welfare. Thus the unit 
of observation in"our migration function is the household rather than the 
individual migrant. 
We argued that village-end variables are quite important in 
influencing the decision to migrate. This is particularly true in the 
course-of technological change since the demand for rural credit increases 
and remittances from migrant members may be important as collateral in the 
rural credit markets. ' Also, farm mechanization may result in a surplus 
of household labour which may be encouraged to seek employment in the urban 
labour markets. In the empirical migration function-that we have estimated1 
we have included variables that capture the ability to borrow in the rural 
-credit market and expenditure on farm mechanization along with the more 
'traditional' variables such as the value of output per capita on the farm, 
farm acreage per household member, education, non-farm income and tenurial 
status. 
The dependent variable in our migration function is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 when households report migrant members and 0 otherwise. 
This implies a threshold model of migration. We argued that the ordinary 
least squares method is inappropriate for estimating such models. We have 
used probit analysisj involving the maximum likelihood method for estimating 
probits which yield probabilities of households having migrant members. Using 
this procedure we examined our hypotheses regarding the important variables 
included in the migration function. We find that output per capita, farm 
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acreage and non-farm income are negatively correlated with the 
; decision to migrate while education and 
farm mechanization are positively 
correlated. Our results also indicate that the ability to borrow in the 
rural credit market is positively correlated with migration. Further, 
we find that. sharecropping-tenant households have a lower incidence of rural- 
urban migration compared. to, other cultivators. . 
Using the estimates of the coefficients on explanatory variables in 
our migration function, we evaluated elasticities of the probability of 
migration. We discussed the results in terms of inter-village comparisons. 
This enabled us to comment on some village differences in explaining 
. 
migration and to indicate the relative merits of public policies that 
aim to influence the flow of rural-urban migration. 
The important. conclusions that emerge from our discussion are as 
follows: The nature of operations in the rural credit market is important 
in influencing migration. Remittances from migrant members enhance the 
ability to borrow because lenders may accept remittances as a safe 
collateral. An 
implication of this result is that migration may encourage 
the use of modern inputs on the farm (as argued in Chapter 6). Further, ---°"-- 
rural-urban migration is likely to be encouraged by farm machanization to 
-a greater extent 
in areas where there is a limited scope for increasing 
cropping intensity, compared to areas where cropping intensity can be 
increased thus creating demand for agricultural labour. Migration is likely 
to be influenced by the village status of households. 
, 
However, the 
, 
important of-status depends on the pattern of migration in different villages. 
Commuting may be important in determining non-farm income which, -in turn, - 
influences migration. An increase in commuting facilities is likely to 
lower migration to a greater extent in villages where households do not 
commute compared to the villages where commuting patterns are well established. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 7 
. Table 7. lla 
Distribution of the annual remittances per household earner in Khunda. Jatli 
and Chak by the size of holding 
(Rupees) 
.. u 
Size category (1) Small Medium Large All households 
Village 
Khunda 562.50 507.50 298.786 1093.58 
Jatli 1525.53 
, 
1380.24 1000.12 1394.93 
Chak 1481.48 979.16 1342.71 1244.49 
Table 7. llb 
Distribution of the annual remittances per mi¬ 
Chak by the size of holding 
t in Khunda, Jatli and 
(Rupees) 
Size category Small Medium Large All households 
Village 
Khunda 825.00 826.05 6271.42 2096.50 
Jatli 2375.87 2605.08 2292.46 2431.78 
Chak 3008.33 2474.00 3162.50 2842.46. 
Table 7. llc 
Distribution of the annual remittances as a 
of output on the farm in Khunda, Jatli and 
ion of the total value 
the size of holding 
ize category Small Medium Large All households 
Village 
Khunda 1.06 1.22 5.99 2.31 
Jatli 4.59 2.25 0.80 3.25 
Chak 2.53 0.77 0.55 1.28 
(1) For definition of size categories of farms see p in the main text. 
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Table 7.12 
Estimated values of the coefficients of variables explaining migration 
decisions in Khunda, Jatli and Chak using ordinary least squaresmethod. 
Dependent variable 
(1) 
=M-1 if'household has a migrant member 
0 otherwise. 
(Linear form) 
Villages 
Explanatory variables 
Khunda 
(2) 
Jatli Chak 
TPRODE -0.0001 0.00011 -0.00003 
( 2.72)*(2) (1.71)* (1.3)** 
HOLDE -0.13 0.0027 -0.02. 
( 1.03) (0.17) (1.14) 
STUDE -0.02 -0.06 0.004 
( 0.36) (1.34)** (0.67) 
DEBTE 0.0003 -0.000015 0.000001 
(2.10)* (0.93) (0.03) 
NFYE -0.000085 -0.000096 -0.00001 
(1.59)** (2.31)* (0.20) 
MECE 0.000015 0.0000085 0.00001 
(3.02)* (0.73) (0.62) 
DTEN1 -0.12 -0.06 0.09 
(l. 95)* (0.2) (0.24) 
CONSTANT 0.38 0.52 0.30 
2 
R 0.23 0.12` 0.14 
F 2.85* 2.76* 1.73 
. S. E. 
0.31 0.48 0.42 
N 194 179 110 
1. The regression equation is: 
M. s constant + ß1TPRODEi + $2IIOLDEi + 3STUAEi + 4TtECEi + 
ß5DEBTEi + ß6NFYEi + ß7 DTEN1 + ß8DTEN2 +v 
2. For definition of variables see pp. 3o6,307 in the main text. 
3. Figures in brackets are t- values. 
*-. indicates significance at 5% level while ** indicates significance at 
10% level. 
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CHAPTER 8-I 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
§8.1 Conclusions 
§8.2 Implications for policy 
§8.3 Suggestions for further research 
Section 8.1 Conclusions 
We have analysed important issues such as the relationship between 
size of farm and productivity (Chapter 4), tenancy (Chapter 5) techno- 
logical innovation (Chapter 6) and rural-urban migration (Chapter 7) 
separately. The main conclusions of our analyses were presented at the 
end of each chapter. Our discussions suggest that rural factor markets 
in our villages are far from perfect. For some factors, -markets are 
segmented and allocative decisions vary across cultivators distinguished 
on the basis of size and tenancy. There are other factors for which markets 
do not exist at all. We also came across examples of factor markets where 
quantity rather than price adjustments are made to clear markets. We shall 
bring together examples of such market imperfections discussed in the, 
previous-chapters and then comment on some inter-linkages. We shall'also 
present a brief discussion of the importance of factor market linkages in 
agricultural production. 
In Chapter 4, we argued that an important explanation for the inverse 
relationship between the size of farm and yield per acre in our villages 
may be that small farms are usually family farms that use inputs such as 
labour, more intensively compared to large farms. This may be explained in 
terms of the differences in the opportunity cost of family-and hired labour. 
We argued that lower disutility may be attached to working on the family 
farm compared to working for someone else, so that cultivators are prepared 
to work harder-and longer on family farms. This is one example of a 
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segmented labour market, `Another example may be found by bringing 
together our discussions-on tenancy (Chapter 5) and rural-urban migration 
(Chapter 7). In Chapter 5 we'"presented evidence indicating that yields 
on'share-cropped lands are often greater than yields on similar'land 
cultivated by owner-cultivators. We offered several explanations for 
this result. One-of the' explanations was presented in terms of the 
working'of rural labour`markets. We argued that share-croppers have- 
special-"skills of'husbandry that result in increasing their prospects of 
getting employment in agricultural activities. Thus the opportunity cost 
of labour on the share-cropped farm may be the expected rural wage., The 
pattern of rural-urban migration indicates that owner-cultivators migrate 
frequently to, the urban areas so that they may consider the comparatively 
higher expected urban wage as the opportunity cost, for their. labour on the 
farm. Thus landowners may succeed in stipulating greater intensity of 
labour use on, share-cropped land as compared to the owner-cultivated land. 
This discussion indicates that rural, labour markets may be segmented on 
the basis of differences in the migration patterns and tenurial contracts. 
Another example of imperfect factor markets in our villages is the 
market for managerial skills. In Chapters 4 and 5 we'argued that small 
family farmers and share-croppers have high yields because, they have 
special skills which cannot be marketed easily. We argued that if large 
landowners could purchase such skills easily, and constant returns, to scale 
operate, they would be as productive as small farmers and there may not be 
any need for tenancies. 
Throughout our discussion we have emphasised the special features of 
the market for land in our villages. In Chapter 4, we argued that a. _. 
favourable distribution of. the quality of land, measured in terms of soil 
fertility, may be important in explaining higher yields on the small farms 
compared to the large farms. In Chapter 2 we commented on some theoretical 
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models that explain-the importance'of the'size of holding in determining 
cultivators'' attitude towards risk` while-allocating resources on the farm. 
Evidence'on"input use `in the villages and in Khanewal was analysed in 
Chapter 6 in'the'light of these arguments. We concluded that, in` general, 
the size of holding is not proportionately related to the intensity of 
input use. Our discussion of the market for tenancies presented in' 
Chapters 3 and 5)indicates the special role of the land market in adjusting 
resource endowments when factor markets function imperfectly. We shall 
comment on this feature of the land market (a feature that also indicates 
the nature of factor market linkages), after briefly mentioning two other 
markets that we have analysed in this study. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we have commented in detail on the absence of 
markets for bullock services in our villages. We suggested that there 
may be sociological explanations for this. An important consequence, 
however, is the existence of tenancies since, in the short run, cultivators 
adjust excess bullock services by renting in land. We argued that the 
development of markets for tractor services may remove the constraints 
imposed by the non-existence of markets for bullock services on the ability 
of landowners to cultivate their land. 
Finally, imperfections in the rural credit markets were discussed 
in Chapter 3,6 and 8. We indicated small farmers' difficulties of access 
to the sources of institutional credit. We argued that attempts to overcome 
these difficulties also contribute in developing factor market linkages. 
There are two examples of factor market linkages that we have 
discussed in considerable detail in the study. These are, tthe linkages 
that explain the incidence of tenancy (Chapter 5) and rural-urban migration 
Chapter 7). We have stressed their importance in influencing resource 
allocation and productivity in agriculture. 
In Chapter 5, we argued that operations in the land market result in 
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tenancies and are related to the imperfections in. the markets for family 
labour and bullock services. We tested a short run model of, tenancy in 
which agents owning excess land (relative to their endowments of, family 
and bullock labour). rent out land, to agents whose endowments of family 
and bullock labour are in, excess relative to the land that they , own.. - 
The 
underlying assumptions of the model are based on. the observations made 
earlier, regarding imperfections in they bullock and family labour markets, 
which result in adjustments being made in the tenancy, rather than bullock 
and . labour, markets. Our model performs quite well 
in. villages where 
factor market imperfections prevail and performs poorly in Jatli where 
the incidence of. tractor use and rural-urban migration is high. Operations 
in the tenancy market are also indicative of linkages between the rural 
credit and land markets. , 
We argued that share-cropping tenants are as 
productive as fixed-rent tenants because landowners encourage. the use of 
the'new inputs by providing credit to their share-cropping tenants, 
In Chapter 7we examined the factors that influence cultivating 
households' decision to encourage household members to migrate from 
rural to urban areas., The nature of operations in the rural credit-- 
markets are important in our migration function. We argued that cultivating 
households' demand for credit to purchase inputs increases during the 
process of technolgical change. If small farmers have poor access to. 
rural credit, they are likely to encourage members to migrate to urban 
areas and use the remittances to purchase the new inputs. We also argued, 
that migration may be positively correlated with the availability of 
credit if lenders in the village consider remittances from migrants a 
safe collateral. This discussion is indicative of linkages between 
rural credit and urban labour markets. We-argued that such linkages may be 
important in determining productivity on the farm. 
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To see the importance of factor market linkages in influencing 
resource allocation and productivity on the farm let us reconsider the 
main conclusions of Chapters 4 and 5. These indicate that the existing 
structure of land tenure (with respect to size and tenancy) is such that 
small farmers are relatively more productive compared to, large farmers, 
while share-cropping tenants are at least as efficient as other categories 
of cultivators. These conclusions acquire particular significance if we 
see them in the context of the debate on 'green revolution' technology. 
An important argument'in the debate is that the tenurial structure of' 
agricultural economies in developing countries may change because small 
farmers and tenants have poor access to new inputs such as high yield- 
variety seeds, chemical fertilizers and tube-well irrigation. These - 
inputs require cash outlays that are denied to these' cultivators due to... 
the poor functioning of rural credit markets. The inverse relationship 
between farm size and productivity may change because the matrix of 
inputs is now different, so that small farmers no longer have the traditional 
comparative advantage over large farmers. It has been argued further-that 
the eviction of tenants is also likely to increase since the landowners 
may prefer to cultivate land themselves both because they wish to use the 
new inputs intensively and because of the availability of tractors. 
Clearly, there is aneed to reconcile our conclusions with these 
arguments. We may argue that our villages are at an early stage of 
technological innovation so that the relationship between size of farm and 
productivity , which is changing over time, may become proportional after the 
effects of 'green revolution' technology have worked themselves out. Our 
inter-village comparisons support this argument. Evidence suggests that 
in the 'barani' villages, where the use of the new inputs is restricted, 
the inverse relationship. is stronger than in the irrigated villages. Thus 
in the long run, with increased use of new inputs that require greater 
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cash'outlays, small farms may indeed be rendered less productive compared 
to large farms (but see the discussion below). The arguments regarding 
changes in tenancy are less clear and need to be examined separately. 
A more interesting interpretation of our conclusions in the context 
of the 'green revolution' debate is the following. We examined the 
evidence on input use on the farm in Chapter 6 and concluded that, in 
general, there is no significant difference between small and large farmers 
on the one hand, and different forms of tenurial contracts on the other, 
regarding the use of biological inputs such as fertilizers and irrigation 
water. However, large farmers appear to use tractors more intensively 
compared to other'categories of farmers. This evidence casts some doubt 
on the argument that small owner-cultivators and tenants have a comparative 
disadvantage regarding the use of new 'green revolution! ' inputs (tractors 
may be argued to be a consequence of 'green revolution' technology rather 
than as an integral part of it).. We offered an explanation for these 
results in terms of the nature of adjustments, that are taking place in the rural 
factor markets to accommodate technological innovation. We presented 
evidence to suggest that markets for the services of new inputs have 
developed along with novel distribution mechanisms to facilitate their 
use by small farmers. Consequently, the inverse relationship may be 
reasserted in time even with the new technology. 
1ý 
1/. This argument may be seen in terms of shifts and movements along T the production function. Consider a production function 
F (t, H, x (H) ) where t is technology, H is land and x is 
the vector of co-operating inputs which are a function of the size 
of holding (see Chapter 4). The production functions for old and 
new technology are given in Figure 8.1 below. (We hold t and 
x (H) constant for each production function. ) 
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1/. (continued) 
-' Figure 8.1 
output 
de 
c. /b 
Cld technoloý' 
small large acres 
Given the old technology small and large farms lie at points a 
and b on the production function. As the rays from the origin 
indicate, output per acre is greater on the small farms compared 
to the large farms. With the introduction of new technology in 
the short run only large farms may shift to the higher production 
function, say to a point such as d. Now a and d lie on the 
same ray ro that output per acre appears to be proportional with 
size. However, over a longer period of time, with the development 
of new markets and sources of inputs (as argued in Chapter 6) small 
farmers also shift to the new production function - in the figure 
this may be seen in terms of a movement from a to c- and the 
inverse relationship is re-asserted. _ 
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Share-cropping tenants'°access to the new inputs'is determined by 
the'attitude of landowners towards the new technology. If landowners 
wish to encourage innovation, they can make adjustments in the tenurial 
contracts to accommodate technological change. Their activities, in rural 
factor markets other than, land (landowners participate in the credit, 
market, see Chapters, 3 and 5) are likely, to contribute in facilitating 
tenants' access to, the new, inputs. The important question is whether 
landowners would continue to rent out land on share-cropping tenancy 
given that tractors are available. We may answer this question in the 
affirmative if we argue that tenants have special husbandry skills, other 
than owning bullocks for ploughing land, that make them attractive to 
landowners. Tractors may displace unskilled labour but they are a poor 
substitute for the skills of tenants. It is likely, therefore, that with 
appropriate adjustments in contracts, given the nature of production 
functions and rural wages, landowners may continue to rent out land 
(they may start renting out tractors) to skilled share-croppers. 
Our, discuion, aimed at integrating the analysis of the four issues, 
indicates that two particular categories of factor market linkages may 
be important in explaining the slow change in_the tenurial structure of 
Pakistani agriculture.. The prevalence of the inverse, size-productivity 
relationship may be explained by the inter-action between urban labour,., 
and rural credit markets. Further, the continued high incidence of share- 
cropping tenancy may be, explained in terms of the interaction between 
land, labour and credit markets brought about by the. landowners' activities 
in these markets. This enables the adoption of modern technology using 
share-croppers'-skills Also, the risk-spreading advantages of sharecropping 
are retained. 
-., - . 
Seen in this light, inter-village differences in the relationship 
between farm-size and productivitylon the one hand, and tenancy-and-efficiency 
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on-the other1may be'interpreted as'consequences of village differences 
in'the workings of the rural factor markets. 
Section 8.2 Implications for policy.,., 
Our discussions-of the four issues,, analysed in this study enable 
us to commentýon a number of policies initiated-in the agricultural 
sector. In-this Section we shall briefly discuss some of these policies:. 
Land reform policy is much discussed'in the literature. The two 
main objectives of land reforms are to redistribute land to reduce 
inequalities in land ownership as well as to increase agricultural 
production and employment. Underlying the second objective of this policy 
is the belief that small farms use labour more intensively and have higher 
yields compared to large farms. The evidence from our four ecologically 
distinct villages supports this belief. However, our analysis suggests that 
a number of issues need careful examination when implementing land 
reforms. First, there may be problems'in defining land ceilings in accept- 
able units of measure. We have seen that due to differences in soil 
fertility acreage on its own is not a reliable measure. A better measure 
liesin the concept of produce index units. However, considerable 
administrative. costs may have to be incurred to measure produce index 
units in different agricultural regions. A related, problem refers to, the 
quality, of soil surrendered by landowners who own land above the prescribed 
ceiling. If only land with poor soil fertility is surrendered, the increase 
in output through land redistribution may be quite small. Another feature 
that needs to be considered carefully1before estimating the expected 
increment in agricultural output as a result of land redistribution, is that 
part of the explanation for higher yields on small farms is that they 
use mainly family labour that has a lower opportunity cost compared to 
hired labour. Thus, unless we assume the existence of underemployment on 
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small family farmslland redistribution may result in increased hiring of 
labour (unless land is given to the landless). This may imply lower 
intensities of cultivation and lower yields than those anticipated. 
It may be argued that land reforms improve small farmers' access to 
inputs by removing the large farmers who, through their political contacts 
and influence, corner the markets for new inputs and rural credit. This 
argument holds if it can be'"shown that large farmers use inputs wastefully, 
i. e. they 'use 'excessive' doses of fertilizer, seed and' irrigation. 
Evidence from our villages does not support this. However, large farmers' 
easy access to credit may lead to an unsatisfactory allocation of capital 
if they use credit to purchase tractors instead of the biological inputs, 
thus lowering the potential for creating employment-'in the agricultural 
sector. In this sense, land reforms, by facilitating small farmers' access 
to credit, may result-in greater employment in the agricultural sector. 
Finally, land reforms may discourage rural-urban migration through 
i: 1creasing the available food per capita in agriculture and also by creating 
rural job' opportunities for potential migrants. 
An important objective of tenancy reform in Pakistan is to increase 
the share--proportion in output and to lower the share in costs for share- 
cropping tenants. Another objective is to make it difficult for landowners 
to evict their tenants. It is well-known that, in practice, tenancy reforms 
fall far short of their stated objectives. Legislations regarding shares 
are ignored and evictions are widespread (Herring (1979)). Our analysis 
of tenancy offers some explanations for this. 
The official policy emphasises the populist aspects of tenancy 
reforms, aimed at redistribution of output rather than efficiency in resource 
allocation. Landowners, on the other hand, are more likely to be 
concerned with the latter aspect which determines their own income. Our 
analysis suggests that when output share is in the same proportion as the 
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share in-costs there is likely to be efficiency in resource allocation. 
Evidence from our villages suggests that many landowners share outputs 
and costs in this manner. They also supervise plots closely to enforce 
contracts. On the other hand, there are many landowners who do not 
supervise land properly, do not pay their share of costs and rely mainly 
on the threat of eviction to enforce, contracts. Here there may be room 
for increasing yields through policies that increase the incentives for, 
closer supervision and contracting proportional shares in output and costs.. 
But such landowners are likely to be a small proportion of the total 
number of landowners. We have also seen that efficiency is not an 
important issue as far as fixed-rent tenancies are concerned. 
Regarding the objective of redistribution through tenancy reform our 
analysis suggests that given corruptions in the administration, policies 
aimed at. improving wages of share-croppers in alternative employment are 
likely to be more effective at increasing their shares in agricultural 
produce rather than official fiat. This implies that policies should aim 
to increase employment opportunities for the landless in rural areas 
by encouraging labour intensive technologies that increase cropping 
intensities, thus raising the expected wages in alternative rural employment. 
Improvements in share--croppers' access to rural credit will also help to 
strengthen their bargaining power. 
It is often argued (see, for example, Bhaduri (1973)), that tenancy 
discourages the switch to new, more productive technologies, and therefore 
is an undesirbale institution. We have seen that there is, little evidence 
in our villages to support this. view. As far as share-cropping tenancies 
are concerned, legislation that lays down terms of contracts too rigidly 
and is slow to respond to changes in technology, is likely to discourage 
the use of new inputs. We have seen that landowners who supervise land 
closely are likely to have a good knowledge of new opportunities and will 
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adjust contracts to accommodate them (by contracting new cost-sharing 
arrangements, for example). This also applies to land-improving, 
technology, such as the installation of ý tube-wells for, irrigation. 
There is one aspect of tenurial'reform-that we have not discussed. 
This is the distributional impact of making tenants owners of the land 
they cultivate. Clearly, if resources are allocated efficiently on share- 
cropped farms this is not likely to improve total agricultural'output. 
However, the increment in the tenants' share in the output may be-desirable-" 
in itself. 
In summary, contractual adjustments that take into account the issues 
of efficiency and adoption of modern technology are best left to the 
contracting parties. The legislative process is likely to respond more 
slowly to the new opportunities than the agents involved. Redistribution 
of output in favour of tenants, however, may be achieved directly by. 
making tenants owners of the plots they cultivate and indirectly by 
improving the bargaining position of tenants through policies that 
increase the expected wages in alternative employment. 
Our discussion of rural-urban migration suggests that policies that 
aim to reduce the flow of migrants, because'of the associated problems of 
urban unemployment, are based on a partial analysis of the phenomenon. 
A more comprehensive approach ought to take into account the welfare 
implications of remittances sent by migrants to their rural households, 
thus raising consumption per capita in the household. We have argued. 
that remittances are important in facilitating the switch to new technology 
by small cultivators both by providing a surplus for investment as well 
as by lowering risk through diversification of income streams. ' Thus the 
policy should take into account these benefits while estimating the net 
social cost of rural-urban migration. It is more desirable to reduce the 
flow of migrants to urban areas by policies that tackle the root cause of 
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the'problem. ' Our results indicate that the creation of non-farm employment 
opportunities and redistribution of land in favour of small farmers is 
'likely to'discourage migration. We have also seen that improvements in 
the operation of rural credit markets that make it easier for the small 
cultivator to borrow, are likely to lower migration. 
Our results indicate that mechanisation encourages migration while 
share-cropping tenancy discourages it. To the extent that mechanisation 
may displace tenants, rural-urban migration is likely to increase even further. 
This-suggests the need to revise policies that subsidise the purchase of 
farm machinery. We have argued that an important net benefit of migration 
may be the increase in the cropping intensity through the use of new inputs. 
However, there are alternative ways. of increasing cropping intensity. Some 
of these involve the provision of incentives to use tube-wells for extending 
irrigation and research in new strains of crops that require a shorter 
maturing period. These are labour intensive strategies that are likely 
to increase employment opportunities on owner-cultivator farms and also 
to discourage the eviction of tenants, with a consequent: reduction in, 
rural-urban migration., 
In many discussions of agriculture in developing economies, land 
reforms are considered to be particularly important in improving resource 
allocation and productivity (see Bhaduri (1973), Griffin (1974), Myrdal 
(1968). Our discussion in this section indicates that often land reforms 
are expected to do more than what is realistically possible. ' One 
explanation for this is that land reforms use country-wide criteria while 
determining legislations on land ceilings and terms of tenancy contracts. 
Our analysis indicates that given the nature of agricultural activities, 
variations-in market imperfections and market linkages, these criteria 
may be inoperable in practice. For example', we have argued that-landowners 
provide land as well as credit to share-croppers because rural credit 
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markets are imperfect. Tenancy reforms,. that give ownership rights to 
tenants without at the same time improving their access to the credit 
market may not achieve the objective_of 
increasing agricultural productivity. 
A related, difficulty with land reforms arises on account of the 
lack of political will to implement them. In Pakistan there exists 
an, elaborate bureaucratic structure that could be used to interpret the 
broad criteria of land reforms in the context of specific regional 
environment. However, in the absence of -penalities, there is little 
incentive to attempt serious implementation. An interesting discussion 
of the issues involved here may be seen in Myrdal (1968) where it is 
argued that there is a gap between political rhetoric and effective 
action in the 'soft' state structure of developing countries. 
Section 8.3 Some suggestions for further research 
Our villages provide case studies illustrating the importance of 
the four issues(and their inter-linkages)that have been the focus of our 
discussion. For policy purposes, however, it is important to examine, at 
the country-wide level, the results that we have suggested. This requires 
a more comprehensive data base than the one we have analysed. There is 
a need, therefore, to initiate village studies where the sanpleof villages 
is chosen to represent the farming households in each major ecological 
zone in the country. It is important to identify such zones carefully 
since decisions regarding resource allocation on the farm are influenced 
by the cropping pattern which, in turn, is determined by climatic conditions, 
soil fertility and the availability of irrigation. 
The process of data collection itself,: is vital in determining 
the quality of, evidence that is needed. The questionnaire method is, 
useful. only if the information. it provides is. a close approximation to 
reality. It is important, therefore, for, the interviewer to establish 
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a rapport with'the farmers. ' This takes time. Thus, the'quality of the 
evidence'is determined to an important extent by the length of time 
spent by the interviewer in each village. To'avoid biases-due to the 
initial 'teething troubles' and climactic variations, it is desirable 
to interview'each household in the sample over at least two annual 
cropping seasons. 
In our discussion of the size-productivity relationship we offered 
a number of explanations for our results. - These were based on our 
discussions of the influence of the quality of soil, access to, irrigation, 
the proportion of'family to hired labour etc. in determining the relation- 
ship. ""The evidence that we provided in these discussions was indirect. 
We referred to the broad impressions formed by the research team 
during visits to the villages (and to sources other than our village studies). 
A better approach is to collect 'direct evidence at the household. level 
in each village. A comprehensive study of villages of, the type discussed 
above would pay particular attention to this aspect. 
Our discussion of tenancy suggested several important areas where 
empirical and theoretical research may be extended. In our discussion, 
we'took the rental share to be fixed at half of the farm produce. This, 
by and large, -is supported by the evidence collected in ourinterviews 
with the tenants. However, throughout our discussion we referred to 
instances where changes are taking place in the rental share as a result 
of mechanisation. In Khanewal we were told, in informal discussions, that 
a growing trend in the area was that landowners rent out both tractors, 
as well as land to potential tenants and at the same time lower tenants' 
share in the produce. Also, the tenant is not required to provide bullock 
services on the farm. The discussion of this adjustment in the tenancy.,: 
contract requires careful examination of the evidence. It'would be - 
interesting, for example, to estimate the value of the share and compare., 
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it with the wages of the permanently hired labourers. The difference, 
if it exists, may respresent the implicit price of the husbandry skills 
of the tenants. It is important also to determine how widespread is 
the incidence of such contractual adjustments and whether it is limited 
to regions with a specific cropping pattern. 
The extent and the nature of changes taking place in-the share- 
proportion may indicate the need to extend the theoretical models that 
explain the determination of the rental share. ' Two well-known theoretical 
models are; the competitive model of Bardhan and'Srinivasan (1971)"and 
the game theoretic model of Bell and Zusman (1976). These models may 
be extended to determine the impact of bullock-displacing technological" 
innovation. ' In the latter model it would be particularly interesting 
to discuss the impact of this on the relative bargaining power of tenants 
and landowners, and hence on the equilibrium rental share. 
While conducting our field survey in Khanewal we noted a form of 
rental contract that has received little attention in theoretical 
discussionson tLnancy. We observed that a plot of land was rented on 
different contracts concurrently. Under this arrangement, the landowner 
rents out land to a fixed-rent tenant who, in turn, rents it out to a 
share-cropper. This appears to be an example of special services being 
provided by a middleman - in this case a fixed- rent tenant - to bring 
together the landowner and the cultivator. One possible approach in 
discussing sub-leasing contracts may be to analyse the relative levels 
of risk aversion of the three agents involved. This requires a careful 
description of the agents to identify the ownership pattern of assets that 
may influence risk aversion. Casual observation in Khanewal suggests' 
that landowners involved in sub-leasing contracts are usually medium sized 
owning up to 50 acres and, typically, are absentee `landowners., Fixed-' 
rent tenants are usually middlemen with strong connections in rural-credit 
and grain markets. Finally, share-croppers involved in this contract are 
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often landless cultivators. However, more reliable and carefully 
collected data is needed before the three agents can be thus classified 
and theoretical extensions attempted. 
Our discussion of technology in this study has been restricted to 
certain aspects that are of direct relevance to the broad arguments that 
inter-link our analyses and were presented in Section 8.1. Data collected 
in Khanewal allow us to go considerably further than this discussion. 
In our interviews we asked detailed questions about varieties of seeds 
and fertilizers used on the farm. We also collected data on the number 
of years that each variety of seed and fertilizer , tractor and tube-well 
had been in use for each farmer in the sample. This allows us to examine 
an aspect of 'green revolution' technology that has received little 
attention so far. This concerns the impact of learning-on productivity. 
Thus we may test hypotheses that postulate a"relationship between learning 
63 doing (Arrow (1962) and may-suggest explanations for the recent 
evidence indicating a decline in the use of 'green revolution' technology 
inputs. Detailed data are also available on mandays of employment of 
family and hired labour on the farm for each major crop. This will enable 
us to test hypotheses regarding imperfections in the labour markets in 
the framework of . well-specified production functions. We propose to 
use the data from Khanewal in carrying out research along these lines 
at a later stage. 
In the study of migration in our three villages we emphasised the 
importance of rural-end variables in influencing rural-urban migration 
by cultivating households. We then proceeded to estimate a migration 
model containing such variables. It is quite likely that our migration 
functions are misspecified because information on important urban-end 
variables, such as the urban wage rate, urban contracts and distances to 
urban labour markets, are missing in the set of data collected by the 
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research team in Islamabad. In the ideal survey that. we described 
earlier, information concerning urban-end variables could easily be 
collected. Direct evidence could also be obtained on the operations in 
the rural credit'market to determine whether remittances, area desirable 
collateral for the creditors. The ideal survey may be designed to test 
comprehensively. Stark's arguments regarding the relationship between 
-technological change and migration. We argued earlier that data should 
be collected for two crop years. This will allow us to identify the 
households which start receiving remittances after some time has elapsed 
(for job search, etc., ) since making the decision to encourage household 
members to migrate. This valuable information will give a better idea 
of the success rate of finding urban jobs and the saving pattern of the 
successful job hunters. Data may also be collected to enable an analysis 
of the allocation of remittances by the households at the village end. 
This will allow a detailed examination of Stark's model and our arguments 
concerning operations in'the rural credit markets. Evidence is"also' 
needed to examine the pattern of migration of all the village households 
to analyse changes in the tenurial structure-of rural Pakistan. 
The analysis of the issues presented in this study have helped us 
to understand some important aspects of agricultural production in Pakistan. 
We hope to extend our research along the lines described in this, Section, 
in order to understand these issues better and examine them at the 
country-wide level. 
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